Quoted:
So doing some family history on my wife's side, I came across her grandfather's Silver Star citation:
http://projects.militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=36740
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Private First Class Raymond W. Haynes (MCSN: 506165), United States Marine Corps Reserve, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving with an Assault Demolition Team attached to the First Battalion, Eighteenth Marines (Engineer) in action against enemy Japanese forces during the invasion of Tarawa, Gilbert Islands; as a member of a Navy Underwater Demolition Team, during the Marshall Islands Operation and as a Member of an Underwater Demolition Team attached to the First Battalion, Eighteenth Marines (Engineer), SECOND Marine Division during the invasion of Saipan and Tinian, Marianas Islands. Frequently under intense hostile fire, preceding the vital assaults on these enemy held Islands, Private First Class Haynes carried out the hazardous duties of an underwater demolition man, assisting in clearing the invasion lanes of explosive and anti-landing boat obstacles. By his skill and courageous devotion to duty, Private First Class Haynes upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
General Orders: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific: Serial 8631
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So now I'm on a mission to find out what UDT he belonged to. However, it seems that historical accounts online never seem to mention any specifics on non-Navy personnel in WWII UDTs, beyond a couple passing mentions of Marine and Army personnel being involved. No rosters, no other history.
Can anyone more intelligent on this subject give any insight?
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Cetainly not an expert here, but some research brings up some things for you to research further and mentions what units took part:
From USMC Historical Monograph,
Saipan: the Beginning of the End, by Major Carl W. Hoffman, pp. 41-42, as posted on
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-Saipan/USMC-M-Saipan-1.html
"Operating under cover of naval gunfire three underwater demolition teams (UDT's)(135) moved close inshore during daylight of 14 June to perform their hazardous tasks. There, with eyes anxiously searching for signs of enemy activity, skilled hands prodded the reef floor for obstacles, mines, and the like. Once found, such obstacles had to be removed or destroyed. Teams were assigned as follows: Beaches Red Two and Three and Green One and Two--UDT #5; reef at the north side of Tanapag Harbor, leading to Beaches Scarlet One and Two (alternate plan beaches)--UDT #6; Beaches Blue One and Two and Yellow One and Two--UDT #7.
UDT #5 (covered by California and Birmingham,) and UDT #6 (covered by Maryland, Colorado and Louisville) proceeded according to plan, neither team suffering casualties. For the men of UDT #7, however, it was a different story; heavy fire from Beaches Blue and Yellow greatly complicated their tasks. To assist them, Tennessee and Indianapolis laid down an intense 5-inch and 40mm barrage along the beaches but were unable to neutralize enemy positions sufficiently for UDT #7, to conduct a complete reconnaissance. Hostile fire notwithstanding, UDT #7 executed its reconnaisance to the following distances from beaches: Blue One--Waterline; Blue Two--75 yards; Yellow One--Reconnaissance impossible except lip of reef; Yellow Two--100 yards.
At 0956, Commander UDT #7 requested smoke to screen rescue of survivors--including seven wounded. For this screen, the destroyer Wadleigh fired 87 rounds of 5-inch 38 white phosphorous. The battleship Tennessee also fired several white phosphorous rounds along the beach to assist in the evacuation. This constituted the Navy's only use at Saipan of screening smoke for other than screening transport areas and anchorages.(136)
No one was disappointed to find that preassault demolitions would be unnecessary at Saipan. But, despite the lack of obstacles, the UDT's were able to provide some valuable information to the landing force, information concerning reef conditions, depths of water, channels, surf, tide, current, and defenses on the beach.(137) "
135. Each team consisted of approximately 16 officers and 80 men, all Navy except for one Army and one Marine liaison officer per team.
136. A detailed smoke plan had been prepared which included the screening of the front and flanks of boat waves; except as stated, however, the plan was not used. Adm Harry W. Hill, Commander Western Landing Group, stated that smoke was not used in the ship-to-shore movement because it was unnecessary. "Smoke is a double-edge weapon. Though it screens the enemy's observation, it also greatly complicates control and coordination. We felt that more was to be lost than gained by the use of smoke in the ship-to-shore movement at Saipan." Interview with Adm Hill on 20Sep49. To this, Adm Turner adds: "Actually, at Saipan we had too much smoke during the landing. The ship bombardment set up a heavy wall of smoke, due to the light off-shore breeze, that did not dissipate until after about the second wave had landed. Turner.
137. Details of UDT operations at Saipan are a synthesis of the following sources: COMINCH P-007, 4-1 and 8-1; Task Force 52 Attack Order A11-44, Annex G, 1-2; Task Unit 52.17.1 Report, 5-6.
And from the USMC Historical Monograph,
The Seizure of Tinian, by Major Carl W.Hoffman, pp 21-23, from
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-Tinian/USMC-M-Tinian-1.html
"The flood of intelligence information pouring into U. S. hands appeared to confirm the practicality of the original landing force concept for the attack on Tinian. Every indication supported the belief that Colonel Ogata was less prepared to counter a landing on the northwestern beaches than any other. But these beach areas, designated WHITE 1 and 2, were extremely poor, being very narrow(53) and having three- to ten-foot cliffs on their flanks. Never had such a large force attempted a landing over such narrow and restricted beaches. Could it be done? In addition, could amphibian tractors (LVT's) negotiate the hemmed in beach terrain and get far enough inland to unload, turn around and return to sea? Disturbing questions--that had to be answered before Jig-Day.
To supply answers, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (Captain James L. Jones), in conjunction with Underwater Demolition Teams 5 (Lieutenant Commander D. L. Kauffman) and 7 (Lieutenant Richard F. Burke), conducted physical reconnaissances of the WHITE Beaches and the YELLOW Beach on the east coast on the nights of 10-11 and 11-12 July.(54) These well-trained personnel debarked from the transport-destroyers (APD's) Gilmer and Stringham and quietly paddled rubber boats(55) to within 500 yards of the shore. There they slipped into the water and swam to the beach. While the Marines explored beach areas, the underwater demolition teams investigated shelving reefs in front of the beaches. Aside from the technical skill required, stout hearts were necessary equipment for men in these night reconnaissance undertakings.
Originally, reconnaissance of north-Tinian's beaches was scheduled for one night rather than two. Company A, Reconnaissance Battalion (Captain M. H. Silverthorn, Jr.), was to examine the YELLOW Beach and Company B (1st Lieutenant Leo B. Shinn) the WHITE Beaches. Company A's search proceeded without a hitch. The Marines reconnoitered YELLOW Beach and its flanks to the high water mark; then one officer, 2d Lieutenant Donald Neff, moved inland about 30 yards to locate beach exits for vehicles. Company A's explorations revealed several obstacles: floating mines in the approaches to the beach; a number of underwater boulders and pot-holes; almost insurmountable 20- to 25-foot cliffs on the beach flanks; double-apron barbed wire on the beach itself; and evidence of fortifications in the area behind the beach (". . . construction activity continued unabated during the time the patrols were ashore . . . ."). The YELLOW Beaches appeared a poor choice.(56)
Meanwhile, men of Company B experienced complications. Powerful ocean currents swept them and men of the naval underwater demolition team so far off course that those scheduled for the WHITE 2 reconnaissance landed instead on WHITE 1 and the group intended for WHITE 1 reached a point on the reef some 700 to 800 yards to the north. Only half the mission was completed on 10-11 July.
The task of investigating WHITE 2 the next night was assigned to Company A, the unit that had executed the YELLOW Beach mission. This time the current-drift problem was solved. The Stringham guided the detachment to WHITE 2 by noting on her radar the course of the rubber boats and sending course corrections over an SCR-300. So assisted, Company A executed its mission successfully. While the Marines checked the beach, underwater demolition personnel conducted a reconnaissance of the reef fronting the beach.
Regarding the missions executed on the nights of 10-11 and 11-12 July, Admiral Turner commented;
The first series of reconnaissances were made as secretly as possible; and, in order to avoid the disclosure of landing intention, positive orders were issued that any mines and obstacles found there were under no circumstances to be disturbed.(57)
Reports on the first night's WHITE 1 reconnaissance and the second night's WHITE 2 mission confirmed much that had been assumed and, in addition, revealed several new facts. Both beaches, flanked by rough, rocky cliffs, offered extremely restricted landing areas for vehicles. But on the brighter side, the reconnaissance indicated that LVT's and waterproofed tanks or wheeled vehicles could safely negotiate the reef and land, and that troops could clamber over the low cliffs that flanked the beaches. Further, Marines disembarking from boats at the reef could wade ashore without encountering dangerous depths. The reconnaissance located no mines or man-made obstacles. In short, the WHITE Beaches were neither better nor worse than planners had estimated.(58)
The report of Underwater Demolition Team 5 confirmed the Marines' findings and noted that:
No mines or man-made underwater obstructions were found. A sufficiently thorough search was made to insure that no lines of mines were present. Buried mines or an odd mine not in pattern would have been overlooked by this search. It is difficult to bury mines in coral but very possible in the gravel slopes at shore edge.(59)"
53. Intelligence sources reported that WHITE 1 had only about 60 yards usable for passage of amphibian vehicles and WHITE 2 about 160, of which only the 65-yard center section was free of coral boulders and ledges. 4th Mar Div Report, Sec III, 5-6.
54. This mission was rehearsed on the night of 9-10 July off beaches in Magicienne Bay, Saipan.
55. Another rubber boat landing on Tinian had been contemplated two years earlier. In mid-1942, while selection of a suitable objective for the 2d Raider Battalion was still under consideration, Admiral Nimitz had ordered Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson to investigate the possibilities of hit-and-run raids against Tinian, Wake, Hokkaido, Tulagi, and Attu. None of these plans were executed, however. In early July 1942, Makin, Gilbert Islands, was selected as the raid objective. Michael Blankfort, The Big Yankee (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947), 37-38.
56. AmphReconBn, VAC Report, Report of reconnaissance of YELLOW Beach #1 Tinian, 11Jul44. NTLF Opn Order 27-44.
57. Turner.
58. AmphReconBn, VAC Report, Report of reconnaissance of WHITE Beach #1, Tinian, and Report of reconnaissance of WHITE Beach #2, Tinian, both reports dated 12Jul44. NTLF Opn Order 27-44.
59. Ltr from CO, UDT 5 to CTG 52.2, Reconnaissance of approaches to Beaches WHITE 1 and 2, 13Jul44.