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Posted: 4/19/2014 3:38:55 PM EDT
[#1]
Quote HistoryQuoted: one of the stupidest missions ever conducted. To quote the movie Patton, "A waste of fine infantry" Churchill loved his stupid diversions. |
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Posted: 4/19/2014 4:15:08 PM EDT
[#2]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
they completed their mission :shrugs: and it did keep the big ships away for the war.. doesnt seem that stupid.. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
one of the stupidest missions ever conducted. To quote the movie Patton, "A waste of fine infantry" Churchill loved his stupid diversions. So let me get this straight. The british need to destroy the place where they could repair the turpitz if it gets damaged, but not sunk. Well, why not do the stupid suicide mission after turpitz is in there if you need to? What was the mission? Keep turpitz out of the Atlantic? Didn't need to do that raid to accomplish that. The submarine pens were a more valuable objective. Germany's surface navy wasn't doing dick and everyone knew it. Churchill wanted offensive action. (See also: Dieppe). Maybe politically it was needed. Militarily it was as stupid waste. Acknowledging it as such does nothing to diminish the men who did the mission. I don't think less of my time in Afghanistan fully knowing what a colossal waste of men and money the mission will end up being. |
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Posted: 4/19/2014 9:30:29 PM EDT
[#3]
Thanks. Great video.
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Posted: 4/19/2014 9:46:44 PM EDT
[#4]
Quote HistoryQuoted: More from Clarkson. Very good documentaries  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tpg6h16k8eUVictoria cross...... I cried like a little gurl...... Quote HistoryQuoted: More from Clarkson. Very good documentaries http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tpg6h16k8eUVictoria cross...... I cried like a little gurl...... |
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Posted: 4/19/2014 9:59:36 PM EDT
[#5]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
So let me get this straight. The british need to destroy the place where they could repair the turpitz if it gets damaged, but not sunk. Well, why not do the stupid suicide mission after turpitz is in there if you need to? What was the mission? Keep turpitz out of the Atlantic? Didn't need to do that raid to accomplish that. The submarine pens were a more valuable objective. Germany's surface navy wasn't doing dick and everyone knew it. Churchill wanted offensive action. (See also: Dieppe). Maybe politically it was needed. Militarily it was as stupid waste. Acknowledging it as such does nothing to diminish the men who did the mission. I don't think less of my time in Afghanistan fully knowing what a colossal waste of men and money the mission will end up being. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
one of the stupidest missions ever conducted. To quote the movie Patton, "A waste of fine infantry" Churchill loved his stupid diversions. So let me get this straight. The british need to destroy the place where they could repair the turpitz if it gets damaged, but not sunk. Well, why not do the stupid suicide mission after turpitz is in there if you need to? What was the mission? Keep turpitz out of the Atlantic? Didn't need to do that raid to accomplish that. The submarine pens were a more valuable objective. Germany's surface navy wasn't doing dick and everyone knew it. Churchill wanted offensive action. (See also: Dieppe). Maybe politically it was needed. Militarily it was as stupid waste. Acknowledging it as such does nothing to diminish the men who did the mission. I don't think less of my time in Afghanistan fully knowing what a colossal waste of men and money the mission will end up being. Because at the time the British had no way to possibly damage the Tirpitz. The German's did not know the extent that the RAF and RN had been relegated to ineffectiveness. The goal was to deny the German's the repair facility to prevent the German's from using the Tirpitz aggressively in the Atlantic, for fear it would be damaged and unable to be repaired. Waiting for it to be damaged (which most likely would not have happened, Brits knew this, German's weren't sure) would have opened up more and more convoy's to Tirpitz attacks. This raid prevented this and once the Brits had the firepower to take down the battleship, they did, later in the war obviously. You are right Churchill wanted an attack and a victory. But it did serve a larger scale strategic objective. Which one weighed more in Churchill's mind is anyone's guess. |
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Posted: 4/19/2014 10:03:40 PM EDT
[#6]
Quote HistoryQuoted: KMS Tirpitz was sunk by Tallboy bombs. |
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Posted: 4/19/2014 10:39:31 PM EDT
[#7]
Great show. Thanks for posting .
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Posted: 4/19/2014 10:40:33 PM EDT
[#8]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Because at the time the British had no way to possibly damage the Tirpitz. The German's did not know the extent that the RAF and RN had been relegated to ineffectiveness. The goal was to deny the German's the repair facility to prevent the German's from using the Tirpitz aggressively in the Atlantic, for fear it would be damaged and unable to be repaired. Waiting for it to be damaged (which most likely would not have happened, Brits knew this, German's weren't sure) would have opened up more and more convoy's to Tirpitz attacks. This raid prevented this and once the Brits had the firepower to take down the battleship, they did, later in the war obviously. You are right Churchill wanted an attack and a victory. But it did serve a larger scale strategic objective. Which one weighed more in Churchill's mind is anyone's guess. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
one of the stupidest missions ever conducted. To quote the movie Patton, "A waste of fine infantry" Churchill loved his stupid diversions. So let me get this straight. The british need to destroy the place where they could repair the turpitz if it gets damaged, but not sunk. Well, why not do the stupid suicide mission after turpitz is in there if you need to? What was the mission? Keep turpitz out of the Atlantic? Didn't need to do that raid to accomplish that. The submarine pens were a more valuable objective. Germany's surface navy wasn't doing dick and everyone knew it. Churchill wanted offensive action. (See also: Dieppe). Maybe politically it was needed. Militarily it was as stupid waste. Acknowledging it as such does nothing to diminish the men who did the mission. I don't think less of my time in Afghanistan fully knowing what a colossal waste of men and money the mission will end up being. Because at the time the British had no way to possibly damage the Tirpitz. The German's did not know the extent that the RAF and RN had been relegated to ineffectiveness. The goal was to deny the German's the repair facility to prevent the German's from using the Tirpitz aggressively in the Atlantic, for fear it would be damaged and unable to be repaired. Waiting for it to be damaged (which most likely would not have happened, Brits knew this, German's weren't sure) would have opened up more and more convoy's to Tirpitz attacks. This raid prevented this and once the Brits had the firepower to take down the battleship, they did, later in the war obviously. You are right Churchill wanted an attack and a victory. But it did serve a larger scale strategic objective. Which one weighed more in Churchill's mind is anyone's guess. Protecting the convoys was the key and keeping the Tirpitz out of the fight did that. Clearly the objective was proven effective by the fact that Tirpitz effectively sat the war out until it was sunk, the threat of damage being too great to allow it to be used. Thus the beast was denied to the Germans for the cost of the few hundred commando's and the clapped out destroyer the used - which may seem like a high price, but compared to the ships, men, and mostly material that would have been lost in the Atlantic if Tirpitz was put to use, it was a bargain. The morale boost from simply making such a bolt hit to the Germans was simply a bonus. |
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Posted: 4/19/2014 11:37:19 PM EDT
[#9]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Because at the time the British had no way to possibly damage the Tirpitz. The German's did not know the extent that the RAF and RN had been relegated to ineffectiveness. The goal was to deny the German's the repair facility to prevent the German's from using the Tirpitz aggressively in the Atlantic, for fear it would be damaged and unable to be repaired. Waiting for it to be damaged (which most likely would not have happened, Brits knew this, German's weren't sure) would have opened up more and more convoy's to Tirpitz attacks. This raid prevented this and once the Brits had the firepower to take down the battleship, they did, later in the war obviously. You are right Churchill wanted an attack and a victory. But it did serve a larger scale strategic objective. Which one weighed more in Churchill's mind is anyone's guess. Quote HistoryQuoted: Waiting for it to be damaged (which most likely would not have happened, Brits knew this, German's weren't sure) would have opened up more and more convoy's to Tirpitz attacks. This raid prevented this and once the Brits had the firepower to take down the battleship, they did, later in the war obviously. You are right Churchill wanted an attack and a victory. But it did serve a larger scale strategic objective. Which one weighed more in Churchill's mind is anyone's guess. Tirpitz didnt leave Germany/Norway because she lost her repair facilities, she hid because she would have been dead on her first mission.
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Posted: 4/19/2014 11:38:19 PM EDT
[#10]
This is why I thank Gd we fight with them. Tough motherfuckers the Brits.
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Posted: 4/20/2014 12:09:41 AM EDT
[#11]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
I have mixed feelings about the St. Nazaire raid. If a German capitol ship used that drydock, she'd be a sitting duck for the RAF. Isn't that a good thing? For failed raids, goggle Task Force Baum. It was a raid on a PoW camp to free Patton's son-in-law. It Baumed-Out. The rescue of Mussolini was spectacular, but credit went to Skorzeny instead of the Luftwaffe that planned and carried it out. The U-boat pens were there too. Fucking flak city. I'll pass. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 12:23:56 AM EDT
[#12]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
KMS Tirpitz was sunk by Tallboy bombs. After it had been heavily damaged in a midget submarine raid. http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Source There were a shitload of RAF and Fleet Air Arm raids against her that were failures. Only had handful resulted in hits. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 12:33:11 AM EDT
[#13]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
There were efforts at improving bombing accuracy on both sides. US WWII smart bomb, the AZON Nazi WWII smart bombs Quote HistoryQuoted:
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Yeah. The Norden wasn't all it was cracked up to be. it was MUCH better than the previous "Guess and Press" method, but yeah, it wasnt what could be considered "Precision" by modern standards... "Precision" was keeping the bomb strings in one county, and hoping 5-10% of the ordnance managed to actually hit the intended target There were efforts at improving bombing accuracy on both sides. US WWII smart bomb, the AZON Nazi WWII smart bombs We had TV guided bombs too back then |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 12:35:30 AM EDT
[#14]
Thanks for the link, OP. Incredible story.
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Posted: 4/20/2014 12:37:44 AM EDT
[#15]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
They had already sank her sister the Bismarck...And the Ranger was in the Atlantic by 1942. Tirpitz didnt leave Germany/Norway because she lost her repair facilities, she hid because she would have been dead on her first mission. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Waiting for it to be damaged (which most likely would not have happened, Brits knew this, German's weren't sure) would have opened up more and more convoy's to Tirpitz attacks. This raid prevented this and once the Brits had the firepower to take down the battleship, they did, later in the war obviously. You are right Churchill wanted an attack and a victory. But it did serve a larger scale strategic objective. Which one weighed more in Churchill's mind is anyone's guess. Tirpitz didnt leave Germany/Norway because she lost her repair facilities, she hid because she would have been dead on her first mission. They had to throw the entire Royal Navy at the Bismarck to sink her. Put the Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, and Gnisenhau together and you're going to lose capital ships trying to stop them. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 12:43:48 AM EDT
[#16]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
They had already sank her sister the Bismarck...And the Ranger was in the Atlantic by 1942. Tirpitz didnt leave Germany/Norway because she lost her repair facilities, she hid because she would have been dead on her first mission. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Waiting for it to be damaged (which most likely would not have happened, Brits knew this, German's weren't sure) would have opened up more and more convoy's to Tirpitz attacks. This raid prevented this and once the Brits had the firepower to take down the battleship, they did, later in the war obviously. You are right Churchill wanted an attack and a victory. But it did serve a larger scale strategic objective. Which one weighed more in Churchill's mind is anyone's guess. Tirpitz didnt leave Germany/Norway because she lost her repair facilities, she hid because she would have been dead on her first mission. Bismark was attempting to get into the Atlantic to conduct an extensive campaign against the Atlantic convoys. Because the German codes had been broken, the British were able to push for a battle and sink her. But after this battle the Hood and Prince of Wales, one sunk and the other severely damaged, the future battle with the Tirpitz was not going to be as easy. Especially if the Tirpitz escaped battle and got into the Atlantic. The battle of the Denmark Strait and the St Nazaire Raid had the same strategic objective. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 12:52:37 AM EDT
[#17]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
one of the stupidest missions ever conducted. To quote the movie Patton, "A waste of fine infantry" Churchill loved his stupid diversions. When the Kriegsmarine sends two battleship through the English Channel in broad daylight, defeating the RN and RAF you need a flashy diversion. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 3:34:22 AM EDT
[#18]
Any one know where Bismarck was headed after she sustained damage in her battle with Prince of Wales and Hood?
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Posted: 4/20/2014 3:57:53 AM EDT
[#19]
Really Gigglesmith? You don't read much naval history, do you? The Prince of Wales and Repulse doesn't count? They were sunk by aircraft and unlike being stationary in a dry dock, they were moving.
The USS Arizona was sunk by armor piercing bombs dropped from 3,000 meters. Remember that the RAF bombing raids worried the Germans enough to make the Channel Dash. Later the RAF did hit the Gneisenau while she was in drydock. She required extensive repairs and never returned to service. The Armored Ship (pocket-battleship) Lutzow was hit by RAF dropped Tallboy and thereafter never sailed again (she became a floating battery). Her sister, Admiral Scheer, was also hit and capsized after beings bombed by the RAF. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 4:06:56 AM EDT
[#20]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Really Gigglesmith? You don't read much naval history, do you? The Prince of Wales and Repulse doesn't count? They were sunk by aircraft and unlike being stationary in a dry dock, they were moving. The USS Arizona was sunk by armor piercing bombs dropped from 3,000 meters. Remember that the RAF bombing raids worried the Germans enough to make the Channel Dash. Later the RAF did hit the Gneisenau while she was in drydock. She required extensive repairs and never returned to service. The Armored Ship (pocket-battleship) Lutzow was hit by RAF dropped Tallboy and thereafter never sailed again (she became a floating battery). Her sister, Admiral Scheer, was also hit and capsized after beings bombed by the RAF. What was the RAF's dive bomber? That is important since the examples you cite were dive bombed. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 4:11:49 AM EDT
[#21]
Gigglesmith raised the issue of accuracy. Yeah, it was the sh*tz, but planes could bomb ships and sink them. That's my point. Billy Mitchell argued that point and proved it against a stationary German dreadnought (no AA defense and no damage control crew).
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Posted: 4/20/2014 4:26:04 AM EDT
[#22]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Gigglesmith raised the issue of accuracy. Yeah, it was the sh*tz, but planes could bomb ships and sink them. That's my point. Billy Mitchell argued that point and proved it against a stationary German dreadnought (no AA defense and no damage control crew). The type of bomber mattered. Early in the was only dive bombers had the accuracy. I'm not familiar with the RAF having dive bombers at that point in the war. Neither did they have tall boys or specialized bombers. Couple that with the increased level of difficulty of the target. It wouldn't be enough to hit the dry dock, the lock had to be hit, a much smaller target. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 4:44:40 AM EDT
[#23]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
The type of bomber mattered. Early in the was only dive bombers had the accuracy. I'm not familiar with the RAF having dive bombers at that point in the war. Neither did they have tall boys or specialized bombers. Couple that with the increased level of difficulty of the target. It wouldn't be enough to hit the dry dock, the lock had to be hit, a much smaller target. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Gigglesmith raised the issue of accuracy. Yeah, it was the sh*tz, but planes could bomb ships and sink them. That's my point. Billy Mitchell argued that point and proved it against a stationary German dreadnought (no AA defense and no damage control crew). The type of bomber mattered. Early in the was only dive bombers had the accuracy. I'm not familiar with the RAF having dive bombers at that point in the war. Neither did they have tall boys or specialized bombers. Couple that with the increased level of difficulty of the target. It wouldn't be enough to hit the dry dock, the lock had to be hit, a much smaller target. While the Brits had the Skua which was expected to dive bomb, you miss the point. The Germans didn't care whether the RAF had a dive bomber or not. They cared about their ships being vulnerable to aerial attack and that was enough to inspire the Channel Dash. ETA: The Arizona was destroyed by bombs dropped by level flying torpedo bombers. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 5:54:56 AM EDT
[#24]
Wow. Good stuff. Thanks OP
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Posted: 4/20/2014 6:03:27 AM EDT
[#25]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
While the Brits had the Skua which was expected to dive bomb, you miss the point. The Germans didn't care whether the RAF had a dive bomber or not. They cared about their ships being vulnerable to aerial attack and that was enough to inspire the Channel Dash. ETA: The Arizona was destroyed by bombs dropped by level flying torpedo bombers. Good catch on the level booming of Arizona. Thank you for the correction. I think we are both missing the point. The Raid on St. Nazaire was a preventative measure. It was to keep the Tirpitz from operating in the Atlantic as the Bismarck tried to do. The Bismarck, once damaged, tried to make her way back to St. Nazaire. The Raid on St. Nazaire was to prevent Tirpitz from doing the same. Without a repair facility, operating Tirpitz in the Atlantic would mean, if damaged, she would have to make her way back past the British Isles. The much safer proposition would be to return to the coast of France, get repaired, and move out again. Take out the possibility of the Tirpitz being repaired in France, and the ship is effectively bottled up in the North Sea, which is exactly what happened. As for the Channel dash, two points. -The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been on the coast of France for almost a year before they made the dash. The Prinz Eugen had been there about nine months. Despite repeated air attacks they made repairs and were refueled in France. The fact they were in good shape to make the dash in the first place is telling. -The professional naval officers in Germany viewed the dash a strategic defeat, because their surface ships no longer threatened the shipping lanes. A fleet in being doesn't really work if the fleet is bottled up. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 6:12:13 AM EDT
[#26]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
What was the mission? Keep turpitz out of the Atlantic? Didn't need to do that raid to accomplish that. Quote HistoryQuoted:
What was the mission? Keep turpitz out of the Atlantic? Didn't need to do that raid to accomplish that. Actually, they did. The removed the enabler for operations in the Atlantic, thereby removing the threat to the Atlantic. The submarine pens were a more valuable objective. Not really. Submarines were the essence of distributed firepower. You'd have to knock out a lot of pens and submarines to make the same impact compared to knocking out one dry dock lock. Germany's surface navy wasn't doing dick and everyone knew it. Not in early '42. Even the threat of Tirpitz in July of 1942 was enough to lead to the disaster that was PQ-17. The resources required to find, fix, track, target, and engage the Bismarck were substantial. Resources that would have to be kept near the British Isles if Tirpitz was allowed to break out. It pulled resources from the Med, the Indian Ocean. Remember that raid on St. Nazaire was 28 March 1942. The Japanese Raided Ceylon on 5 April 1942. British convoys in the Med led to the Siege of Malta in May 1942, which would require naval resources as well. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 6:14:22 AM EDT
[#27]
dport - you mentioned fleet in being. That's exactly what the Germans had. It could do raids which it did, but it could not successfully challenge the Royal Navy in an all out, toe to toe slugfest. Even the Kaiser's navy couldn't do that. The Royal Navy had the tonnage over the Germans in both wars. As Raeder sadly commented at the beginning of WW II, "All we can do gentlemen, is to show that we can bravely die."
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Posted: 4/20/2014 6:21:57 AM EDT
[#28]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
dport - you mentioned fleet in being. That's exactly what the Germans had. It could do raids which it did, but it could not successfully challenge the Royal Navy in an all out, toe to toe slugfest. Even the Kaiser's navy couldn't do that. The Royal Navy had the tonnage over the Germans in both wars. As Raeder sadly commented at the beginning of WW II, "All we can do gentlemen, is to show that we can bravely die." Except that to be a fleet in being, to be effective, you must pose a threat. They couldn't pose a threat being bottled up in the North Sea. A threat to convoys bound for Russia, sure, but those convoys weren't going to knock Britain out of the war, and we are talking about a British raid here. On the coast of France, they could threaten the very lifelines to Britain. On the coast of France they could reach the Atlantic without passing through a bottleneck patrolled by the British. On the coast of France they were a fleet in being. In the North Sea, hiding in the fjords of Norway, they weren't. The RN effectively contained the problem of German surface raiders to the North Sea, and what they didn't manage to do for themselves, the Germans did for them with the Channel Dash. That limited the area they had to patrol. That limited the number of convoys they had to send cruiser and above surface escorts with. That freed up assets for the Med, the Indian Ocean, and to support invasions in Africa later on that year. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 6:37:23 AM EDT
[#29]
Bloody fantastic.
Thank you for posting. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 6:46:10 AM EDT
[#30]
Fleet in being could also tie up resources which is what the Tirpitz did by just being afloat. A few battleships had to be around Scapa Flow ready to engage her in case she crept out from her fjord.
Ships are terribly expensive to build and to maintain. In short, they tie up a lot of resources that could be better put to use elsewhere. If Germany built the H-class battleships, that meant a lot fewer panzers, artillery, trucks and other equipment. Hitler ranted against the surface fleet and at one time wanted to scrap them all and make the Kreigsmarine all u-boats. The Germans u-boat menace certainly caused more damage than all the surface ships including the hilfskreuzer/auxiliary cruisers. I'm not saying either course are right or wrong. History is what it is. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 6:51:16 AM EDT
[#31]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
These two deserve honorable mention when talking of "great raids." Raid on Entebbe (rescue of Israeli hostages in Uganda in the 1970's) http://melgibstein.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/7700016_bb_raid-on-entebbe.jpg?w=640&h=269 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Entebbe 100% correct sir! Raid on Eben Emael (technically not a "raid" in the pure doctrinal sense of the word, but has repeatedly been referred to as one). Small contingent of German paratroopers take out the most formidable defensive fortress in Europe at the beginning of WWII. http://harveyblackauthor.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/bild-101i-569-1579-14a.jpg http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/fortebenemael.aspx |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 6:53:46 AM EDT
[#32]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Fleet in being could also tie up resources which is what the Tirpitz did by just being afloat. A few battleships had to be around Scapa Flow ready to engage her in case she crept out from her fjord. Ships are terribly expensive to build and to maintain. In short, they tie up a lot of resources that could be better put to use elsewhere. If Germany built the H-class battleships, that meant a lot fewer panzers, artillery, trucks and other equipment. Hitler ranted against the surface fleet and at one time wanted to scrap them all and make the Kreigsmarine all u-boats. The Germans u-boat menace certainly caused more damage than all the surface ships including the hilfskreuzer/auxiliary cruisers. I'm not saying either course are right or wrong. History is what it is. She tied up less resources being in the North Sea than she did on the coast of France. That's the point. That was the point of the raid to knock out the dry dock locks. That is my point. Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau all tied up fewer Royal Navy resources being in the North Sea, where they had to either transit the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap or the English Channel to slip out into the Atlantic where they could interdict or threaten to interdict convoys bound for the UK. On the coast of France, they could have been in the Atlantic very easily, not subject to monitoring from the RN. Once that happens, the RN would have had to tie up resources to provide cruiser or battleship escorts of convoys, committed aircraft carriers to find and engage Tirpitz. Not to mention surface action groups dedicated to filling in the gaps where the other groups weren't at/looking. Patrolling a choke point requires far fewer resources, greatly reducing the effectiveness of a fleet in being. That is what the British achieved. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 7:00:58 AM EDT
[#33]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
I have mixed feelings about the St. Nazaire raid. If a German capitol ship used that drydock, she'd be a sitting duck for the RAF. Isn't that a good thing? The problem was how much havoc that ship could level on shipping in the Atlantic if it ever made it out there before it went into dry dock to sit pretty for the RAF. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 7:09:01 AM EDT
[#34]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Actually, they did. The removed the enabler for operations in the Atlantic, thereby removing the threat to the Atlantic. Not really. Submarines were the essence of distributed firepower. You'd have to knock out a lot of pens and submarines to make the same impact compared to knocking out one dry dock lock. Not in early '42. Even the threat of Tirpitz in July of 1942 was enough to lead to the disaster that was PQ-17. The resources required to find, fix, track, target, and engage the Bismarck were substantial. Resources that would have to be kept near the British Isles if Tirpitz was allowed to break out. It pulled resources from the Med, the Indian Ocean. Remember that raid on St. Nazaire was 28 March 1942. The Japanese Raided Ceylon on 5 April 1942. British convoys in the Med led to the Siege of Malta in May 1942, which would require naval resources as well. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
What was the mission? Keep turpitz out of the Atlantic? Didn't need to do that raid to accomplish that. Actually, they did. The removed the enabler for operations in the Atlantic, thereby removing the threat to the Atlantic. The submarine pens were a more valuable objective. Not really. Submarines were the essence of distributed firepower. You'd have to knock out a lot of pens and submarines to make the same impact compared to knocking out one dry dock lock. Germany's surface navy wasn't doing dick and everyone knew it. Not in early '42. Even the threat of Tirpitz in July of 1942 was enough to lead to the disaster that was PQ-17. The resources required to find, fix, track, target, and engage the Bismarck were substantial. Resources that would have to be kept near the British Isles if Tirpitz was allowed to break out. It pulled resources from the Med, the Indian Ocean. Remember that raid on St. Nazaire was 28 March 1942. The Japanese Raided Ceylon on 5 April 1942. British convoys in the Med led to the Siege of Malta in May 1942, which would require naval resources as well. The dry dock was only of value if turpitz was damaged. The port facility still existed. A pretty small probability requirement. Damaged, not sunk, but not damaged enough that would make it a sitting target for every naval and air asset in britain and the US |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 7:14:18 AM EDT
[#35]
Thanks for posting, a great story
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Posted: 4/20/2014 7:19:21 AM EDT
[#36]
I'd never seen this before (and apparently like most didn't even know about this raid) and I really like Jeremy Clarkson and so I watched this last night. Wow....OP thank you!!
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Posted: 4/20/2014 7:24:08 AM EDT
[#37]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
The dry dock was only of value if turpitz was damaged. The port facility still existed. A pretty small probability requirement. Damaged, not sunk, but not damaged enough that would make it a sitting target for every naval and air asset in britain and the US What you're not getting is the mere existence of a the dry dock was of value. As for being a target, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been on the French cost for almost a year, subject to air attack. They still managed the Channel Dash. This whole episode shows the folly of the Germans building large surface combatants. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 7:30:37 AM EDT
[#38]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
What you're not getting is the mere existence of a the dry dock was of value. As for being a target, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been on the French cost for almost a year, subject to air attack. They still managed the Channel Dash. This whole episode shows the folly of the Germans building large surface combatants. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
The dry dock was only of value if turpitz was damaged. The port facility still existed. A pretty small probability requirement. Damaged, not sunk, but not damaged enough that would make it a sitting target for every naval and air asset in britain and the US What you're not getting is the mere existence of a the dry dock was of value. As for being a target, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been on the French cost for almost a year, subject to air attack. They still managed the Channel Dash. This whole episode shows the folly of the Germans building large surface combatants. the latter I agree with. The dry dock was of value. The level of value? If the germans wanted turpitz running rampant they could have done and acknowledged the risk. The port facilities along the coast were still there. Only if turpitz took severe below the waterline damage, but not enough to sink or disable enough to be tracked down, could the raid be decisive. You are going to have to explain this with a bit more detail to get me to see how this dry dock was so damned important. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 7:36:20 AM EDT
[#39]
Wow.
That is outstanding. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 7:45:09 AM EDT
[#40]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
The dry dock was of value. The level of value? If the germans wanted turpitz running rampant they could have done and acknowledged the risk. The port facilities along the coast were still there. Only if turpitz took severe below the waterline damage, but not enough to sink or disable enough to be tracked down, could the raid be decisive. You are going to have to explain this with a bit more detail to get me to see how this dry dock was so damned important. Because it is easier to mission kill a ship than to sink it. Without a dry dock mere damage below the waterline takes Tirpitz out of the entire war. The threat is over. The fleet is no longer in being. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 7:50:16 AM EDT
[#41]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
the latter I agree with. The dry dock was of value. The level of value? If the germans wanted turpitz running rampant they could have done and acknowledged the risk. The port facilities along the coast were still there. Only if turpitz took severe below the waterline damage, but not enough to sink or disable enough to be tracked down, could the raid be decisive. You are going to have to explain this with a bit more detail to get me to see how this dry dock was so damned important. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
The dry dock was only of value if turpitz was damaged. The port facility still existed. A pretty small probability requirement. Damaged, not sunk, but not damaged enough that would make it a sitting target for every naval and air asset in britain and the US What you're not getting is the mere existence of a the dry dock was of value. As for being a target, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been on the French cost for almost a year, subject to air attack. They still managed the Channel Dash. This whole episode shows the folly of the Germans building large surface combatants. the latter I agree with. The dry dock was of value. The level of value? If the germans wanted turpitz running rampant they could have done and acknowledged the risk. The port facilities along the coast were still there. Only if turpitz took severe below the waterline damage, but not enough to sink or disable enough to be tracked down, could the raid be decisive. You are going to have to explain this with a bit more detail to get me to see how this dry dock was so damned important. If the Tirpitz made it into the Atlantic the RN was going to go after her. It does them no good to wound it just to have it refit in safety just to turn around and head back out. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 7:51:36 AM EDT
[#42]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
If the Tirpitz made it into the Atlantic the RN was going to go after her. It does them no good to wound it just to have it refit in safety just to turn around and head back out. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
The dry dock was only of value if turpitz was damaged. The port facility still existed. A pretty small probability requirement. Damaged, not sunk, but not damaged enough that would make it a sitting target for every naval and air asset in britain and the US What you're not getting is the mere existence of a the dry dock was of value. As for being a target, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been on the French cost for almost a year, subject to air attack. They still managed the Channel Dash. This whole episode shows the folly of the Germans building large surface combatants. the latter I agree with. The dry dock was of value. The level of value? If the germans wanted turpitz running rampant they could have done and acknowledged the risk. The port facilities along the coast were still there. Only if turpitz took severe below the waterline damage, but not enough to sink or disable enough to be tracked down, could the raid be decisive. You are going to have to explain this with a bit more detail to get me to see how this dry dock was so damned important. If the Tirpitz made it into the Atlantic the RN was going to go after her. It does them no good to wound it just to have it refit in safety just to turn around and head back out. and in that case, that narrow case, dust off the plans and be stupid to your hearts content. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 7:54:27 AM EDT
[#43]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
and in that case, that narrow case, dust off the plans and be stupid to your hearts content. That case is not narrow. In fact, it's probably the more likely scenario. More ships were damaged in WWII than sunk. And taking out the dry dock ensured Tirpitz would never venture into the Atlantic in the first place. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 8:00:30 AM EDT
[#44]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
That case is not narrow. In fact, it's probably the more likely scenario. More ships were damaged in WWII than sunk. And taking out the dry dock ensured Tirpitz would never venture into the Atlantic in the first place. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
and in that case, that narrow case, dust off the plans and be stupid to your hearts content. That case is not narrow. In fact, it's probably the more likely scenario. More ships were damaged in WWII than sunk. And taking out the dry dock ensured Tirpitz would never venture into the Atlantic in the first place. non-concur. Tirpitz still could have gone out in the Atlantic. The germans were more afraid of losing it then using it. So, what happened to Bismark? |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 8:02:36 AM EDT
[#45]
I bet the Germans could have rebuilt the drydock if they had wanted to...after all they built sub pens all over the damn place.
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Posted: 4/20/2014 8:05:08 AM EDT
[#46]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
non-concur. Tirpitz still could have gone out in the Atlantic. The germans were more afraid of losing it then using it. So, what happened to Bismark? Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
and in that case, that narrow case, dust off the plans and be stupid to your hearts content. That case is not narrow. In fact, it's probably the more likely scenario. More ships were damaged in WWII than sunk. And taking out the dry dock ensured Tirpitz would never venture into the Atlantic in the first place. non-concur. Tirpitz still could have gone out in the Atlantic. The germans were more afraid of losing it then using it. So, what happened to Bismark? Exactly right they were more afraid of losing it. That's why they needed the dry dock. Without a dry dock losing it meant damage as well as sinking. The experience with the Bismarck drove the Brits to conduct the raid. They knew just how lucky they got with Bismarck and didn't want to push it a second time. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 8:14:12 AM EDT
[#47]
A wounded, flooded duck, which would be the circumstances requiring a dry dock, would probably end up the same.
In the grand scale of WW2, losing a couple hundred dudes isn't a big deal I guess. But conducting offensive raids just to stay in the game was a churchill hall mark. This raid, rather than military necessity, strikes me as that sort of mission. Certainly the RN showed its commitment to the concept. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 8:41:27 AM EDT
[#48]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
I have mixed feelings about the St. Nazaire raid. If a German capitol ship used that drydock, she'd be a sitting duck for the RAF. Isn't that a good thing? For failed raids, goggle Task Force Baum. It was a raid on a PoW camp to free Patton's son-in-law. It Baumed-Out. The rescue of Mussolini was spectacular, but credit went to Skorzeny instead of the Luftwaffe that planned and carried it out. Not with all that AAA laying around the port.... |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 9:10:36 AM EDT
[#49]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Jeremy Clarkson is a wonderful narrator, and this is a wonderful documentary. Thanks for posting this, DoubleARon. |
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Posted: 4/20/2014 9:24:04 AM EDT
[#50]
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