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Posted: 8/24/2016 9:16:10 PM EDT
[#1]
We can still be friends. CAS is always dicey. Since it by nature has no script. And ROE aside, the amount of training dedicated to CAS for most airframes is criminal.
But such is the way of things. |
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Posted: 8/24/2016 9:18:30 PM EDT
[#2]
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Which is what I said I think on page 2. It is interesting to note that the AF's premier Air to Ground training exercises are conducted where there are no army units. Quote HistoryQuoted:
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This unit isn't intended to deploy down range, it's to provided dedicated aircraft for the JTAC weapons school at Nellis. The Air Force intends for the 57th OG to include the CAS-dedicated organization with a tactical air support squadron, which would provide dedicated air support to the Joint Terminal Attack Controller Qualification Course, USAF Weapons School, and Green Flag and Red Flag exercises capitalizing on the existing CAS expertise and schoolhouses currently at Nellis AFB Upon reaching full operational capability, the 57th Wing at Nellis AFB will conduct all graduate-level CAS training as well as operational training for the forward air control mission. The wing currently conducts the JTAC weapon’s instructor course, the air liaison officer qualifying course, and Green Flag, the Air Force’s series of premier air-to-ground training exercises. http://www.nellis.af.mil/News/tabid/6431/Article/916393/af-to-grow-enhance-nellis-group-with-close-air-support-focus.aspx Which is what I said I think on page 2. It is interesting to note that the AF's premier Air to Ground training exercises are conducted where there are no army units.  Must have missed that.
Training involving the Army, mainly Green Flag, is done in conjunction with Fort Irwin. |
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Posted: 8/24/2016 9:25:56 PM EDT
[#3]
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Or close down both, give nukes to the AF and just make the marine corps 1 million people. Quote HistoryQuoted:
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I don't think it helps the issue to focus on inter-service rivalry. In fact, I would change our whole organizational culture to integrate as expeditionary task forces without parent service loyalties getting in the way. Maybe the Army and USAF need to remove their service name tapes, and simply use: TF SLAYER Do it before deployment while training up, on deployment, and have some type of memorabilia to designate the Task Force they can identify with, rather than their parent organization for that deployment experience. Or close down both, give nukes to the AF and just make the marine corps 1 million people. Brilliant! |
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Posted: 8/24/2016 9:27:31 PM EDT
[#4]
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Unbelievable. Sounds like a bunch of staff weenie BS so I dont doubt it. The truth is though, we flew anywhere from a minimum of 4 hours to as much as 12 hour missions, and given that taskings changed and the tanker plan often flexed for various reasons the truth is we were often all over the country...at any altitude we wanted from surface to the stratosphere so if the CAOC thought we were on some route that is laughable. They know better. Nobody, including us, knew where we were going to be in five minutes much less five hours. There was no coordinating anything, Ive dodged everything from transports to drones to helicopters. We just went where we were asked to go, at whatever altitude we needed to see what we needed to see. Ive been everywhere from Basra to Syria to north of Mosul and back on one flight. Everyone else is doing the same thing, so it is literally impossible to deconflict everything for even one aircraft much less hundreds. We have and air to air radar that allows us to see airborne conflicts and for artillery, well the big sky theory was in full force. Once we had a huge, and I mean huge explosion go off near us West of Baghdad in 2004...Im talking thousand foot diameter fireball, created a mushroom cloud over a mile high like a tactical nuke. We were running a show of force ( dont get me started) down a MSR just to the South of it, and thank God we weren't directly over top of it as it was throwing chunks of stuff through the air over a mile all directions, we were about 1000 agl and offset by chance just enough. Made our two thousand pounders look like a grenade. Apparently it was some kind of giant stockpile of scud warheads, mines, etc. Another time I was asked to find a mobile motar team at a location that they were actively raining 155s on. We were even talking on the radio and It still happened, I guess I failed to mention Id be flying over it at a couple hundred feet and they failed to mention they were already shelling it. Fog of war and all that. Im not complaining, what Im saying is that if they are denying strikes for airspace that is silly because we were everywhere at any given moment. I never worried about that kind of stuff. Unintentionally intercepting a friendly artillery round = not your day, war is dangerous. What is unacceptable though, and should never happen, is intentional targeting of friendlies...either by a pilot screwing up the CAS talk on and not positively IDing a target, or by ground forces shooting patriots at our own aircraft. Both have occurred at one time or another. Its a gut check to hit the pickle button and send a weapon hurtling down in proximity to friendlies, as it should be. Running everything through a central clearinghouse called the CAOC is part of the problem. All the jags looking over the shoulder off anyone O-6 or higher isnt helping either. Quote HistoryQuoted:
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You were never asked to get out of the way of an artillery fire mission because the JFACC and his staff either deny airspace requests outright or slow roll them long enough for the targets to disappear. The reason for denials is often aircrew safety. I posted this in another thread but I have been specifically denied airspace to shoot GMLRS because the missile flight path came within 50km of a published route. The AF has too much control of airspace and it cripples our artillery. It shouldn't come as a shock to you that there are blue suiters who have the authority to say no to anything above the CA. Those guys say no without ever bothering the pilots like you. Alternatively, they spend so long mulling it over that a Kiowa or ground QRF beats them to the punch. I know that ROE affects a lot of what we can do and that the Army bears much of the responsibility for that. The AF, however, constrict our use of airspace beyond any rational reason . The ATO cycle also hampers effective use of what little CAS is generally available. I am sure it is frustrating to RTB with bombs on the rack. It is equally frustrating to lay a gun or launcher on target with the ability to end a fight almost instantly and be put in check fire due to aircraft two counties away from the flight path of the round.   
I was there from esrly in until middle 04, and again in 05 and 06, and as late as that there were no such thing as published routes... There were no routes and no airspace control for military aircraft besides numbered kill boxes that you get assigned. When they started letting civilian flights into BIAP etc then a rudimentary air traffic control was set up for the airliners/ civilian cargo aircraft. Perhaps this is what you are referring to. Maybe when that started they put our transports, c-17s/c-130s and the like on those. Before anyone gets defensive, dont think for a second Im arguing our generals were any more risk tolerant than yours...they were not, as evidenced by your airspace denial. Its sick, and like I was saying about ROE, borderline criminal. This is the stuff that has far more impact on our ability to win wars than weapons programs, sensors, and organizational structures, and its not even close. Ill say it again, Id be happy to split off the space stuff and the ICBMs calll that the Strategic Forces or something, and roll all the fighters bombers and transport aircraft into the army where they began. It would probably help, but its not going to solve the problem of generals who dont really want to kill, and civilian leadership in DC that doesnt want them to either. Oh, but go win anyway. You would think we would have learned our lesson on that kind "plan" in Vietnam, instead we doubled down and made it worse. Route = Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ) or similar. They were either published in the ATO or stood up by the AF as needed without regard to airspace usage by anyone else. The go from the ATO to TAIS and AFATDS. Any time a fire mission breaks an airspace control measure (ACM) it requires AF clearance to fire. Almost all fire missions cross at least one ACM, usually the coordinating altitude. TAIS is supposed to allow us to share artillery flight path info with the Joint Force. We can provide the exact flight path of any round we shoot. Unfortunately, the AF would not use TAIS so they operated everything manually attempting to clear airspace from the gun to the target all the way up to the max ord for the entire distance. That's a lot of airspace when you shoot a rocket 70km. The AF settled on clearing Keypads, which were huge chunks of airspace, all the way to max ord. That may be what you understand as killboxes in this context. It kind of surprises me that the pilots never see any of this. Every ATO mission you fly has at minimum a ROZ published. Your mere presence in the air shuts off all manner of options for the guy on the ground. Bad decisions are made by brass on both sides of the issue and I appreciate your candor. Unbelievable. Sounds like a bunch of staff weenie BS so I dont doubt it. The truth is though, we flew anywhere from a minimum of 4 hours to as much as 12 hour missions, and given that taskings changed and the tanker plan often flexed for various reasons the truth is we were often all over the country...at any altitude we wanted from surface to the stratosphere so if the CAOC thought we were on some route that is laughable. They know better. Nobody, including us, knew where we were going to be in five minutes much less five hours. There was no coordinating anything, Ive dodged everything from transports to drones to helicopters. We just went where we were asked to go, at whatever altitude we needed to see what we needed to see. Ive been everywhere from Basra to Syria to north of Mosul and back on one flight. Everyone else is doing the same thing, so it is literally impossible to deconflict everything for even one aircraft much less hundreds. We have and air to air radar that allows us to see airborne conflicts and for artillery, well the big sky theory was in full force. Once we had a huge, and I mean huge explosion go off near us West of Baghdad in 2004...Im talking thousand foot diameter fireball, created a mushroom cloud over a mile high like a tactical nuke. We were running a show of force ( dont get me started) down a MSR just to the South of it, and thank God we weren't directly over top of it as it was throwing chunks of stuff through the air over a mile all directions, we were about 1000 agl and offset by chance just enough. Made our two thousand pounders look like a grenade. Apparently it was some kind of giant stockpile of scud warheads, mines, etc. Another time I was asked to find a mobile motar team at a location that they were actively raining 155s on. We were even talking on the radio and It still happened, I guess I failed to mention Id be flying over it at a couple hundred feet and they failed to mention they were already shelling it. Fog of war and all that. Im not complaining, what Im saying is that if they are denying strikes for airspace that is silly because we were everywhere at any given moment. I never worried about that kind of stuff. Unintentionally intercepting a friendly artillery round = not your day, war is dangerous. What is unacceptable though, and should never happen, is intentional targeting of friendlies...either by a pilot screwing up the CAS talk on and not positively IDing a target, or by ground forces shooting patriots at our own aircraft. Both have occurred at one time or another. Its a gut check to hit the pickle button and send a weapon hurtling down in proximity to friendlies, as it should be. Running everything through a central clearinghouse called the CAOC is part of the problem. All the jags looking over the shoulder off anyone O-6 or higher isnt helping either. Interesting. We could have run real-time clearance from the TAIS. We had all of the radar feeds, but we were never given the chance. The AF guys got really nervous when we shot GMLRS. I guess it comes down to your point on the number of people who can say no. I really wish we could coordinate well enough to move the coordinating altitude based on ground commander priorities. For example, if there is no CAS available in a certain BCT sector the coordinating altitude moves above the highest MAX ORD of the artillery systems available. Just spit-balling. We can work airspace in sims because we have a defined battle space and it is easy to determine handoff lines for separating artillery and AI missions. None of this is easy, but it doesn't have to be as hard as the current inter-service relationship makes it. I think we probably agree on a lot more than we disagree. |
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Posted: 8/24/2016 9:33:50 PM EDT
[#5]
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lol If they retooled and built a new Skyraider flown by Army WO's, I could just see you grinning ear to ear off into empty space for hours. |
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Posted: 8/24/2016 9:42:35 PM EDT
[#6]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Which is what I said I think on page 2. It is interesting to note that the AF's premier Air to Ground training exercises are conducted where there are no army units. Quote HistoryQuoted: Quoted: This unit isn't intended to deploy down range, it's to provided dedicated aircraft for the JTAC weapons school at Nellis. The Air Force intends for the 57th OG to include the CAS-dedicated organization with a tactical air support squadron, which would provide dedicated air support to the Joint Terminal Attack Controller Qualification Course, USAF Weapons School, and Green Flag and Red Flag exercises capitalizing on the existing CAS expertise and schoolhouses currently at Nellis AFB Upon reaching full operational capability, the 57th Wing at Nellis AFB will conduct all graduate-level CAS training as well as operational training for the forward air control mission. The wing currently conducts the JTAC weapon’s instructor course, the air liaison officer qualifying course, and Green Flag, the Air Force’s series of premier air-to-ground training exercises. http://www.nellis.af.mil/News/tabid/6431/Article/916393/af-to-grow-enhance-nellis-group-with-close-air-support-focus.aspx Which is what I said I think on page 2. It is interesting to note that the AF's premier Air to Ground training exercises are conducted where there are no army units. |
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Posted: 8/24/2016 9:42:36 PM EDT
[#7]
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We can still be friends. CAS is always dicey. Since it by nature has no script. And ROE aside, the amount of training dedicated to CAS for most airframes is criminal. But such is the way of things. Lol, glad to hear it. You make a good point that hasnt really been made...the REAL value of the A10 community has nothing to do with the airframe and everythng to do with corporate knowledge undiluted by five other mssions types you are also supposed to be proficient in. That is what I would worry about losing instead of the airframe if/when it goes away. Jdam is a drive by, but finding the target through a talk on, targeting movers, considerations for when its really close, etc there is alot that can go wrong. we have geen doing at lot of CAS for many years now, but if there is ever a pause in ops tempo you know how quickly things turnover, and knowledge/experience is being lost all the time as newbies come in. And yes, I do want to shoot the gun. |
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Posted: 8/24/2016 9:57:59 PM EDT
[#8]
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Well, if I wanted to destroy T62s in Czechoslovakia in 1973, I would want a lot of A-10s. alas.... Quote HistoryQuoted:
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tide is changing, perhaps. active duty 64 pilot fast tracking just wrote an article saying we should buy LAARs for the Army. and army published it. LAAR perhaps. I was referring to the A-10 specifically with the statement. Well, if I wanted to destroy T62s in Czechoslovakia in 1973, I would want a lot of A-10s. alas.... How bout some Aermacchi M-346 action? 
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Posted: 8/25/2016 7:23:58 AM EDT
[#9]
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How bout some Aermacchi M-346 action?
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tide is changing, perhaps. active duty 64 pilot fast tracking just wrote an article saying we should buy LAARs for the Army. and army published it. LAAR perhaps. I was referring to the A-10 specifically with the statement. Well, if I wanted to destroy T62s in Czechoslovakia in 1973, I would want a lot of A-10s. alas.... How bout some Aermacchi M-346 action?
It will be hilarious if the 'Raytheon T-100' win T-X, because then we can say we have a Yakovlev in our inventory. Israel likes 'em, so who knows... |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 7:31:54 AM EDT
[#10]
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We can still be friends. CAS is always dicey. Since it by nature has no script. And ROE aside, the amount of training dedicated to CAS for most airframes is criminal. But such is the way of things. but the entire doctrine is written around it being highly scripted. Which is the primary, but not only, failure point. Its a doctrinal failure. Everything else goes from that. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 7:39:45 AM EDT
[#11]
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How large is the National Training Center compared to the NTTR? Quote HistoryQuoted:
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This unit isn't intended to deploy down range, it's to provided dedicated aircraft for the JTAC weapons school at Nellis. The Air Force intends for the 57th OG to include the CAS-dedicated organization with a tactical air support squadron, which would provide dedicated air support to the Joint Terminal Attack Controller Qualification Course, USAF Weapons School, and Green Flag and Red Flag exercises capitalizing on the existing CAS expertise and schoolhouses currently at Nellis AFB Upon reaching full operational capability, the 57th Wing at Nellis AFB will conduct all graduate-level CAS training as well as operational training for the forward air control mission. The wing currently conducts the JTAC weapon’s instructor course, the air liaison officer qualifying course, and Green Flag, the Air Force’s series of premier air-to-ground training exercises. http://www.nellis.af.mil/News/tabid/6431/Article/916393/af-to-grow-enhance-nellis-group-with-close-air-support-focus.aspx Which is what I said I think on page 2. It is interesting to note that the AF's premier Air to Ground training exercises are conducted where there are no army units. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 10:02:06 AM EDT
[#12]
F-16 is augmenting the A-10 because the AF has 4+ squadrons of them right now...sitting, that we don't have the manpower to fly or maintain.
They will probably go civilian contract and dedicated F-16 CAS squadrons will start up. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 10:20:50 AM EDT
[#13]
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Well, if I wanted to destroy T62s in Czechoslovakia in 1973, I would want a lot of A-10s. alas.... Quote HistoryQuoted:
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tide is changing, perhaps. active duty 64 pilot fast tracking just wrote an article saying we should buy LAARs for the Army. and army published it. LAAR perhaps. I was referring to the A-10 specifically with the statement. Well, if I wanted to destroy T62s in Czechoslovakia in 1973, I would want a lot of A-10s. alas.... I would have actually wanted to kill bridging assets and fuelers, but same-same. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 10:26:28 AM EDT
[#14]
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RQ-9s and their progeny are the future of CAS. Long endurance and a deep magazine of Hellfire's and other PGMs is what's needed, that is neither a Super Tucano, Scorpion, or A-10 follow on. Reforming CAS tasking is the other side of the problem that also needs to be addressed. Ah, yes, because putting a turboprop that is crewed from 16000 NM away, but still requires in theater ground support, but nomnoming low density high demand interdictable network assets is far more efficient than putting a turboprop crewed by people integrating with the actual battlespace owner. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 10:31:34 AM EDT
[#15]
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Running everything through a central clearinghouse called the CAOC is part of the problem. All the jags looking over the shoulder off anyone O-6 or higher isnt helping either. We are getting to the meat of the argument. Do you think the CAOC exists as benefit to the ground commander, or coordination element for the effective/efficient use of aircraft? |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 10:32:30 AM EDT
[#16]
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Ah, yes, because putting a turboprop that is crewed from 16000 NM away, but still requires in theater ground support, but low density high demand interdictable network assets is far more efficient than putting a turboprop crewed by people integrating with the actual battlespace owner. Quote HistoryQuoted:
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RQ-9s and their progeny are the future of CAS. Long endurance and a deep magazine of Hellfire's and other PGMs is what's needed, that is neither a Super Tucano, Scorpion, or A-10 follow on. Reforming CAS tasking is the other side of the problem that also needs to be addressed. Ah, yes, because putting a turboprop that is crewed from 16000 NM away, but still requires in theater ground support, but low density high demand interdictable network assets is far more efficient than putting a turboprop crewed by people integrating with the actual battlespace owner. LAAR could do other things as well: I think it would be a dandy escort for V-22 (better than a dinky little rocket pod hobbled onto the Osprey itself). You could load it up with AIM-9X and kill the shit out of helicopters... |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 10:54:08 AM EDT
[#17]
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LAAR could do other things as well: I think it would be a dandy escort for V-22 (better than a dinky little rocket pod hobbled onto the Osprey itself). You could load it up with AIM-9X and kill the shit out of helicopters... Quote HistoryQuoted:
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RQ-9s and their progeny are the future of CAS. Long endurance and a deep magazine of Hellfire's and other PGMs is what's needed, that is neither a Super Tucano, Scorpion, or A-10 follow on. Reforming CAS tasking is the other side of the problem that also needs to be addressed. Ah, yes, because putting a turboprop that is crewed from 16000 NM away, but still requires in theater ground support, but low density high demand interdictable network assets is far more efficient than putting a turboprop crewed by people integrating with the actual battlespace owner. LAAR could do other things as well: I think it would be a dandy escort for V-22 (better than a dinky little rocket pod hobbled onto the Osprey itself). You could load it up with AIM-9X and kill the shit out of helicopters... counter UAV, Route Security, Border enforcement. Cheap manned aircraft have a lot of useful abilities if we cared about fighting wars and not spending money. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 12:52:58 PM EDT
[#18]
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LAAR could do other things as well: I think it would be a dandy escort for V-22 (better than a dinky little rocket pod hobbled onto the Osprey itself). You could load it up with AIM-9X and kill the shit out of helicopters... Quote HistoryQuoted:
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RQ-9s and their progeny are the future of CAS. Long endurance and a deep magazine of Hellfire's and other PGMs is what's needed, that is neither a Super Tucano, Scorpion, or A-10 follow on. Reforming CAS tasking is the other side of the problem that also needs to be addressed. Ah, yes, because putting a turboprop that is crewed from 16000 NM away, but still requires in theater ground support, but low density high demand interdictable network assets is far more efficient than putting a turboprop crewed by people integrating with the actual battlespace owner. LAAR could do other things as well: I think it would be a dandy escort for V-22 (better than a dinky little rocket pod hobbled onto the Osprey itself). You could load it up with AIM-9X and kill the shit out of helicopters... Because we fight so many helicopters. But we totally need to prep for that with LAAR. Lol |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 1:00:22 PM EDT
[#19]
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Because we fight so many helicopters. But we totally need to prep for that with LAAR. Lol How many fourth generation fighters have we fought? |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 1:04:15 PM EDT
[#20]
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How many fourth generation fighters have we fought? Quote HistoryQuoted:
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Because we fight so many helicopters. But we totally need to prep for that with LAAR. Lol How many fourth generation fighters have we fought? How important is air superiority? Can fourth and fifth gen deal with RW? |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 1:06:00 PM EDT
[#21]
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With all due respect, and I really mean that, I dont think it is. Put eight lgbs and a jdam on your jet Ill be surprised if you can stick around as long in tha cas wheel. But the main point I was trying to make( especially since we usually have tanker support so loiter is less relevant) is that none of this makes a difference when you land with your bombs anyway. And youre right its a shit show i had no idea but now I do. You are wise to avoid, I will be more so in the future. Quote HistoryQuoted:
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F-15E pilot. Enlighten me about the weapons and the A10. Always open to learning something Like I said just curious. Don't care about the brass and big AF stuff. And I'm not going to get into the arfcom shit show that is CAS discussions. But, you're assertions that th mud hen has more loiter and such than the Hog is simply exaggerated. As a former Hog driver I was intrigued. That's it. With all due respect, and I really mean that, I dont think it is. Put eight lgbs and a jdam on your jet Ill be surprised if you can stick around as long in tha cas wheel. But the main point I was trying to make( especially since we usually have tanker support so loiter is less relevant) is that none of this makes a difference when you land with your bombs anyway. And youre right its a shit show i had no idea but now I do. You are wise to avoid, I will be more so in the future. Thanks for your service, both of you. I appreciate that you answered the call, and were away form your fiends and family for so long. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 1:10:49 PM EDT
[#22]
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How important is air superiority? Can fourth and fifth gen deal with RW? Quote HistoryQuoted:
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Because we fight so many helicopters. But we totally need to prep for that with LAAR. Lol How many fourth generation fighters have we fought? How important is air superiority? Can fourth and fifth gen deal with RW? Not if they aren't THERE. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 1:18:39 PM EDT
[#23]
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Not if they aren't THERE. Quote HistoryQuoted:
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Because we fight so many helicopters. But we totally need to prep for that with LAAR. Lol How many fourth generation fighters have we fought? How important is air superiority? Can fourth and fifth gen deal with RW? Not if they aren't THERE. Yeah, I admit 4th and 5th gen AC can't deal with helicopters that aren't there.
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Posted: 8/25/2016 1:22:37 PM EDT
[#24]
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How important is air superiority? Can fourth and fifth gen deal with RW? Well, our fourth gen aircraft have successfully engaged our current helos, so I guess they can. The reality is air superiority appears to be a nice to have, considering we've had it for decades and seem to be unable to translate it into battlefield success. Could we live with parity? Local air superiority? Air denial? I don't know, but I suspect we could. Could LM shareholders and the Texas Congressional District or Air Power Doctrinares at Maxwell? I'm pretty sure "no" is the answer. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 1:42:13 PM EDT
[#25]
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Think about it. The number of drops and weapons employed was closely tracked and was briefed at every level up the chain...why do you think that is? Because every bomb we dropped, every effective sortie, is ammo for the brass to fight the only war the DOD really cares about, the funding wars. You are crazy if you think they will turn down an actual CAS mission, in combat. Its a win win situation for the AF...if we drop we justify our existence and our funding, makes for awesome press conference video, etc etc.. If we follow the Army's ROE for CAS, and we do, if too much collateral damage happens it makes for some bad press but who is it really on, as far as the top brass is concerned? Who called in the strike? Under whose terms? Who was giving the orders, who cleared us hot, who gave us the target? Ground commanders, all. Think about it...politically, who gains from CAS engagements? The Air Force. Who risks most from CAS engagements? The Army and its ground commanders. Yes thats right, the very thing that helps the grunt in the heat of the fight is huge political risk to the ground commander, and worse, a feather in the cap of the Air Force and their money grubbing generals. For the army brass, credit for victory has to be shared, while very little of the political risk is shared with the Air Force as long as they follow the rules they gave them. Is it any surprise that the Army brass hates asking for CAS support, and much of the time just wont do it? Even when there is an assigned asset, overhead, ready to act, which I was many times...WE STILL COULDNT GET CLEARANCE. ... If you were there, think about all the times the senior brass tied your hands, think about the denied artillery,even though the footprint is an order of magnitude smaller than an airstrike. You are being played, and I dont like it any more than you do. Team Green doesn't want to admit this, but the above is spot-on. How hard would it be for the Army to have their own UAV CAS? Oh, wait a second, the Grey Eagle is an Army system at the division level. Yes, the Army has it's own fixed wing, Hellfire-launching, GBU44-dropping CAS. Operated by the Army, for the Army. Why aren't they all the rage? Same reason you couldn't get 155 whenever you wanted it, even though PGM for our own tubes is available. The dude on the ground just might call in the wrong coordinates and drop it on the school three blocks down, or his own unit, or one of dozen other "oh-shit" scenarios. It's easier, politically and emotionally, to suck up a couple of casualties versus a catastrophic CAS failure. When you're doing ground combat operations, you're going to take casualties over the long term anyways. Easier all around just to point the finger at the AF. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 1:44:45 PM EDT
[#26]
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Team Green doesn't want to admit this, but the above is spot-on. How hard would it be for the Army to have their own UAV CAS? Oh, wait a second, the Grey Eagle is an Army system at the division level. Yes, the Army has it's own fixed wing, Hellfire-launching, GBU44-dropping CAS. Operated by the Army, for the Army. Why aren't they all the rage? Same reason you couldn't get 155 whenever you wanted it, even though PGM for our own tubes is available. The dude on the ground just might call in the wrong coordinates and drop it on the school three blocks down, or his own unit, or one of dozen other "oh-shit" scenarios. It's easier, politically and emotionally, to suck up a couple of casualties versus a catastrophic CAS failure. When you're doing ground combat operations, you're going to take casualties over the long term anyways. Easier all around just to point the finger at the AF. Quote HistoryQuoted:
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Think about it. The number of drops and weapons employed was closely tracked and was briefed at every level up the chain...why do you think that is? Because every bomb we dropped, every effective sortie, is ammo for the brass to fight the only war the DOD really cares about, the funding wars. You are crazy if you think they will turn down an actual CAS mission, in combat. Its a win win situation for the AF...if we drop we justify our existence and our funding, makes for awesome press conference video, etc etc.. If we follow the Army's ROE for CAS, and we do, if too much collateral damage happens it makes for some bad press but who is it really on, as far as the top brass is concerned? Who called in the strike? Under whose terms? Who was giving the orders, who cleared us hot, who gave us the target? Ground commanders, all. Think about it...politically, who gains from CAS engagements? The Air Force. Who risks most from CAS engagements? The Army and its ground commanders. Yes thats right, the very thing that helps the grunt in the heat of the fight is huge political risk to the ground commander, and worse, a feather in the cap of the Air Force and their money grubbing generals. For the army brass, credit for victory has to be shared, while very little of the political risk is shared with the Air Force as long as they follow the rules they gave them. Is it any surprise that the Army brass hates asking for CAS support, and much of the time just wont do it? Even when there is an assigned asset, overhead, ready to act, which I was many times...WE STILL COULDNT GET CLEARANCE. ... If you were there, think about all the times the senior brass tied your hands, think about the denied artillery,even though the footprint is an order of magnitude smaller than an airstrike. You are being played, and I dont like it any more than you do. Team Green doesn't want to admit this, but the above is spot-on. How hard would it be for the Army to have their own UAV CAS? Oh, wait a second, the Grey Eagle is an Army system at the division level. Yes, the Army has it's own fixed wing, Hellfire-launching, GBU44-dropping CAS. Operated by the Army, for the Army. Why aren't they all the rage? Same reason you couldn't get 155 whenever you wanted it, even though PGM for our own tubes is available. The dude on the ground just might call in the wrong coordinates and drop it on the school three blocks down, or his own unit, or one of dozen other "oh-shit" scenarios. It's easier, politically and emotionally, to suck up a couple of casualties versus a catastrophic CAS failure. When you're doing ground combat operations, you're going to take casualties over the long term anyways. Easier all around just to point the finger at the AF. psychiatrists have defined his post as "projection" |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 1:49:34 PM EDT
[#27]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
I don't think it helps the issue to focus on inter-service rivalry. In fact, I would change our whole organizational culture to integrate as expeditionary task forces without parent service loyalties getting in the way. Maybe the Army and USAF need to remove their service name tapes, and simply use: TF SLAYER Do it before deployment while training up, on deployment, and have some type of memorabilia to designate the Task Force they can identify with, rather than their parent organization for that deployment experience. Since the solution seems to be to have the two branches working more closely, why not just make them a single branch? This way you permanently resolve all these internal conflicts of interest, reduce overhead from redundant bases and head count, and increase overall efficiency. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 1:59:00 PM EDT
[#28]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Since the solution seems to be to have the two branches working more closely, why not just make them a single branch? This way you permanently resolve all these internal conflicts of interest, reduce overhead from redundant bases and head count, and increase overall efficiency. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
I don't think it helps the issue to focus on inter-service rivalry. In fact, I would change our whole organizational culture to integrate as expeditionary task forces without parent service loyalties getting in the way. Maybe the Army and USAF need to remove their service name tapes, and simply use: TF SLAYER Do it before deployment while training up, on deployment, and have some type of memorabilia to designate the Task Force they can identify with, rather than their parent organization for that deployment experience. Since the solution seems to be to have the two branches working more closely, why not just make them a single branch? This way you permanently resolve all these internal conflicts of interest, reduce overhead from redundant bases and head count, and increase overall efficiency. the AF was created to wield INDEPENDENT strategic airpower. They were institutionally developed to NOT work with other branches, as they were irrelevant to nuclear deterrence. The problem with the AF is they take an institutional culture designed to wield nuclear weapons and apply it to COIN. |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 5:15:20 PM EDT
[#29]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Yeah, I admit 4th and 5th gen AC can't deal with helicopters that aren't there. Quote HistoryQuoted:
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Because we fight so many helicopters. But we totally need to prep for that with LAAR. Lol How many fourth generation fighters have we fought? How important is air superiority? Can fourth and fifth gen deal with RW? Not if they aren't THERE. Yeah, I admit 4th and 5th gen AC can't deal with helicopters that aren't there. Except maybe Blackhawks - they are pretty good at downing those - right? |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 5:38:24 PM EDT
[#30]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
I would have actually wanted to kill bridging assets and fuelers, but same-same. Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
tide is changing, perhaps. active duty 64 pilot fast tracking just wrote an article saying we should buy LAARs for the Army. and army published it. LAAR perhaps. I was referring to the A-10 specifically with the statement. Well, if I wanted to destroy T62s in Czechoslovakia in 1973, I would want a lot of A-10s. alas.... I would have actually wanted to kill bridging assets and fuelers, but same-same. This was a great article: http://www.airspacemag.com/ist/?next=/history-of-flight/above-amp-beyond-the-bridge-that-did-not-fall-45819375/ |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 6:35:07 PM EDT
[#31]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
psychiatrists have defined his post as "projection" Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
Think about it. The number of drops and weapons employed was closely tracked and was briefed at every level up the chain...why do you think that is? Because every bomb we dropped, every effective sortie, is ammo for the brass to fight the only war the DOD really cares about, the funding wars. You are crazy if you think they will turn down an actual CAS mission, in combat. Its a win win situation for the AF...if we drop we justify our existence and our funding, makes for awesome press conference video, etc etc.. If we follow the Army's ROE for CAS, and we do, if too much collateral damage happens it makes for some bad press but who is it really on, as far as the top brass is concerned? Who called in the strike? Under whose terms? Who was giving the orders, who cleared us hot, who gave us the target? Ground commanders, all. Think about it...politically, who gains from CAS engagements? The Air Force. Who risks most from CAS engagements? The Army and its ground commanders. Yes thats right, the very thing that helps the grunt in the heat of the fight is huge political risk to the ground commander, and worse, a feather in the cap of the Air Force and their money grubbing generals. For the army brass, credit for victory has to be shared, while very little of the political risk is shared with the Air Force as long as they follow the rules they gave them. Is it any surprise that the Army brass hates asking for CAS support, and much of the time just wont do it? Even when there is an assigned asset, overhead, ready to act, which I was many times...WE STILL COULDNT GET CLEARANCE. ... If you were there, think about all the times the senior brass tied your hands, think about the denied artillery,even though the footprint is an order of magnitude smaller than an airstrike. You are being played, and I dont like it any more than you do. Team Green doesn't want to admit this, but the above is spot-on. How hard would it be for the Army to have their own UAV CAS? Oh, wait a second, the Grey Eagle is an Army system at the division level. Yes, the Army has it's own fixed wing, Hellfire-launching, GBU44-dropping CAS. Operated by the Army, for the Army. Why aren't they all the rage? Same reason you couldn't get 155 whenever you wanted it, even though PGM for our own tubes is available. The dude on the ground just might call in the wrong coordinates and drop it on the school three blocks down, or his own unit, or one of dozen other "oh-shit" scenarios. It's easier, politically and emotionally, to suck up a couple of casualties versus a catastrophic CAS failure. When you're doing ground combat operations, you're going to take casualties over the long term anyways. Easier all around just to point the finger at the AF. psychiatrists have defined his post as "projection" Projection? Im not the guy who denied CAS to my own men because I hate the AF. Were you that Colonel who got brought up on charges by the IG for refusing all airstrike requests? |
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Posted: 8/25/2016 8:07:58 PM EDT
[#32]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
Projection? Im not the guy who denied CAS to my own men because I hate the AF. Were you that Colonel who got brought up on charges by the IG for refusing all airstrike requests? Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
Think about it. The number of drops and weapons employed was closely tracked and was briefed at every level up the chain...why do you think that is? Because every bomb we dropped, every effective sortie, is ammo for the brass to fight the only war the DOD really cares about, the funding wars. You are crazy if you think they will turn down an actual CAS mission, in combat. Its a win win situation for the AF...if we drop we justify our existence and our funding, makes for awesome press conference video, etc etc.. If we follow the Army's ROE for CAS, and we do, if too much collateral damage happens it makes for some bad press but who is it really on, as far as the top brass is concerned? Who called in the strike? Under whose terms? Who was giving the orders, who cleared us hot, who gave us the target? Ground commanders, all. Think about it...politically, who gains from CAS engagements? The Air Force. Who risks most from CAS engagements? The Army and its ground commanders. Yes thats right, the very thing that helps the grunt in the heat of the fight is huge political risk to the ground commander, and worse, a feather in the cap of the Air Force and their money grubbing generals. For the army brass, credit for victory has to be shared, while very little of the political risk is shared with the Air Force as long as they follow the rules they gave them. Is it any surprise that the Army brass hates asking for CAS support, and much of the time just wont do it? Even when there is an assigned asset, overhead, ready to act, which I was many times...WE STILL COULDNT GET CLEARANCE. ... If you were there, think about all the times the senior brass tied your hands, think about the denied artillery,even though the footprint is an order of magnitude smaller than an airstrike. You are being played, and I dont like it any more than you do. Team Green doesn't want to admit this, but the above is spot-on. How hard would it be for the Army to have their own UAV CAS? Oh, wait a second, the Grey Eagle is an Army system at the division level. Yes, the Army has it's own fixed wing, Hellfire-launching, GBU44-dropping CAS. Operated by the Army, for the Army. Why aren't they all the rage? Same reason you couldn't get 155 whenever you wanted it, even though PGM for our own tubes is available. The dude on the ground just might call in the wrong coordinates and drop it on the school three blocks down, or his own unit, or one of dozen other "oh-shit" scenarios. It's easier, politically and emotionally, to suck up a couple of casualties versus a catastrophic CAS failure. When you're doing ground combat operations, you're going to take casualties over the long term anyways. Easier all around just to point the finger at the AF. psychiatrists have defined his post as "projection" Projection? Im not the guy who denied CAS to my own men because I hate the AF. Were you that Colonel who got brought up on charges by the IG for refusing all airstrike requests? lol |
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Posted: 8/26/2016 11:39:47 AM EDT
[#33]
Quote HistoryQuoted:
This was a great article: http://www.airspacemag.com/ist/?next=/history-of-flight/above-amp-beyond-the-bridge-that-did-not-fall-45819375/ Quote HistoryQuoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
tide is changing, perhaps. active duty 64 pilot fast tracking just wrote an article saying we should buy LAARs for the Army. and army published it. LAAR perhaps. I was referring to the A-10 specifically with the statement. Well, if I wanted to destroy T62s in Czechoslovakia in 1973, I would want a lot of A-10s. alas.... I would have actually wanted to kill bridging assets and fuelers, but same-same. This was a great article: http://www.airspacemag.com/ist/?next=/history-of-flight/above-amp-beyond-the-bridge-that-did-not-fall-45819375/ Good article. I disagree with his assessment. That bridge would have been worth his life. Even three more like him. Because that's the way it is. |
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Posted: 8/26/2016 12:14:18 PM EDT
[#34]
Quote HistoryQuoted:Good article.
I disagree with his assessment. That bridge would have been worth his life. Even three more like him. Because that's the way it is. the fascination with bridges is a panacea to cover a larger problem. destroying a bridge is NOT the same effect as destroying a battalion or regiment. the creativity of a living enemy, temporarily delayed, undermines the effectiveness of the tactic. But a destroyed enemy remains just that. destroyed. but bridges can be recon'd. grids mensurated. BDA accurately measured. It fits very nicely with the scientific desire of the ATO to be perfect. The fact that you have destroyed nothing but a bridge waived away with a placid, "The effect is the same" No its not. That is a lie. But bombing bridges is infinitely safer and easier than bombing the enemy. So here we are. At Hurlburt, the AF fascination with bridge bombing was really hit home, especially after getting IED'd on a bypass of a bridge that we bombed in Afghanistan. because, the Taliban needs bridges in a way that we do not. |
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