User Panel
User Panel
User Panel
WA, USA
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Posted: 6/9/2013 6:59:13 PM EDT
[Last Edit: BGENE]
I assume on a composite fill TL rated safe that the composite fill cures similar to concrete and achieves a certain strength after X number of days.
I have seen the old U.L. TL-30 test video were the U.L. guys zip the outer shell off the safe in a matter of maybe 30 seconds, they then proceed to beat on the safe with sledge hammers/picks/chisels repeatedly with no luck. I recognize we are talking serious PSI fill, is it just simple physics, the sledge blows can't generate enough force against the high PSI? I further assume there is all kinds of secret fill like aluminum fibers or whatever holding the fill together behind the scenes. On the X6 safes that have alloy plates in the side, I assume they are fixed during the pour process similar to using rebar with ties during a concrete pour. The term interlocking is tossed around, I assume this is so it is difficult to peel the plates from the composite? I assume the alloy selected is some form of a compromise based on anticipated type of attack, costs, torch vs. drill. I.E., Manganese is superior for this but not that, etc, etc based upon alloy. Any comments would be greatly appreciated. ETA APRIL 2016 - Before this thread became the standard Amsec thread, there were several active threads and I have dug through the archives to add them to this thread. Yet Another AMSEC Safeguy Question AMSEC Question AMSEC Amvault burned in fire AMSEC Questions for Thesafeguy 06-05-13 AMSEC (and new UL) Can the AMSEC ESL10 lock be muted Early thread discussing various AMSEC TL's 2014 thread on S&G Locks added 12/29/19 As requested fire testing added to OP.  Attached File |
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USA
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Posted: 9/20/2014 10:14:14 AM EDT
[#1]
There is no way that the FBI implants RFID in their employees for security at their headquarters. I mean maybe I can believe it was done once for some perceived kidnap threat, but not just for opening doors around the office.
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USA
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Posted: 9/21/2014 6:47:06 PM EDT
[Last Edit: clifton]
[#2]
TSG,
I know you are an electronic lock guy, but what do you think of the X-09 lock vs the S&G Group 1 locks like the 8500 or 2937 series? Thank you. 
Govt even puts those locks on filing cabinets. I guess when you have free tax money, you might as well. |
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Posted: 9/21/2014 11:28:00 PM EDT
[#3]
Technically, that is an electronic lock, isn't it?
Posted Via AR15.Com Mobile |
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Posted: 9/21/2014 11:43:10 PM EDT
[#4]
Technically, that is an electronic lock, isn't it Electromechanical. |
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USA
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Posted: 9/21/2014 11:49:55 PM EDT
[#5]
An 8550 is looking pretty good right now. Govt price is $148. Wish I could get it for that.
What is the deal with the arrow knob on the 8400 series? Is that obsolete? |
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USA
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Posted: 9/21/2014 11:59:39 PM EDT
[#6]
The advantage of the electromechanical dial is that you can have the benefits of an electronic, such as audit capability, two-user-code modes, lockout for too many failed attempts, and easy to change codes - without the downside of electronic. I see the main downside being that you can take a UV marker and ink the buttons and then come back the next day with a UV led and see what buttons have the ink rubbed off of them, making it easy to see which 4 keys are used. Then it is just a matter of trying 24 codes to get in.
The S&G 2740 seems to be way-nice. It has a lithium CR123 battery and a backup battery. The main battery lasts for something like 24,000 entries. It then warns you on the final 100 entries to change it. If you fail to change it with 100 warnings, it switches to the backup battery and keeps on working. The MAS locks have a somewhat annoying power generator so that they do not need a battery. I think that is an outdated concept and very much like Trijicon holding on to avoiding batteries rather than just using them well like AIMPOINT. I have a MAS Hamilton 100 on one of my gun safes, so I know all about the power generator. It is a good wrist exercise. |
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Posted: 9/22/2014 7:54:06 PM EDT
[#7]
I have been wanting to weigh in on this conversation, but I'm in China this week and this website is blocked. For some reason, I clicked on a link and it opened, but I don't have any time to offer my thoughts on the MH X07/X08/X09 locks. If I have another break in the filtering, I'll answer some of these questions.
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Posted: 9/23/2014 9:51:44 PM EDT
[#8]
What upgrades are able to be added to the BF series (other than paint and lock)? I have seen online where you can get "4 gauge liner" as an upgrade. Is this just an interior lining, and what does that upgrade do? More fire protection (probably not), or more drilling protection? Sorry for my ignorance...
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CA, USA
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Posted: 9/24/2014 1:53:44 PM EDT
[#9]
The standard BF configuration uses external steel and a 16g inner liner to form the shell which contains the poured fill.
The 4g inner liner is an optional upgrade which replaces the stock standard 16g inner liner. The additional steel in the shell does enhance brute force attack resistance, but please remember that this is still RSC level protection. AMSEC does make multiple true TL rated products for those who desire that level of protection. |
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Posted: 9/24/2014 6:59:43 PM EDT
[Last Edit: TheSafeGuy]
[#10]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By clifton:
The advantage of the electromechanical dial is that you can have the benefits of an electronic, such as audit capability, two-user-code modes, lockout for too many failed attempts, and easy to change codes - without the downside of electronic. I see the main downside being that you can take a UV marker and ink the buttons and then come back the next day with a UV led and see what buttons have the ink rubbed off of them, making it easy to see which 4 keys are used. Then it is just a matter of trying 24 codes to get in. The S&G 2740 seems to be way-nice. It has a lithium CR123 battery and a backup battery. The main battery lasts for something like 24,000 entries. It then warns you on the final 100 entries to change it. If you fail to change it with 100 warnings, it switches to the backup battery and keeps on working. The MAS locks have a somewhat annoying power generator so that they do not need a battery. I think that is an outdated concept and very much like Trijicon holding on to avoiding batteries rather than just using them well like AIMPOINT. I have a MAS Hamilton 100 on one of my gun safes, so I know all about the power generator. It is a good wrist exercise. Looks like I have a break in the Chinese internet blocking... We always joke that you have to have foreplay with the Mas Hamilton (Kaba-Mas) wind-up locks before they will open up... The spook ideas to defeat locks has always been a concern. I was concerned with this back int the 90's and I designed a feature to address this concern. On all generations of ESL locks, there is a spook-cracker feature in the code entry logic. The feature is explained in the Operating Instructions, but nobody ever reads instructions. On ESL Locks, you can enter the first 5 digits of your code correctly, then press as many numeric buttons as you like in any random pattern and then finish with the correct 6th digit before pressing the # key. The lock will open normally. Essentially, the last keystroke is replaced with every new entry, and the entry is not completed until you press the # key to complete the entry. This works in two ways to prevent spook issues. One is as you said, if you push all the buttons, there is no advantage to someone checking which keys had been pressed. It also boggles someone looking over your shoulder while you are dialing your code. Try it. I love to blow people's minds when I enter a 30-digit code to open a safe at trade shows. They always ask how I remember such a long combination, HaHa... |
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Posted: 9/26/2014 4:50:19 AM EDT
[#11]
Now that's awesome. I don't care if it's necessary or not.
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Posted: 9/26/2014 5:22:36 AM EDT
[#12]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy: Looks like I have a break in the Chinese internet blocking... We always joke that you have to have foreplay with the Mas Hamilton (Kaba-Mas) wind-up locks before they will open up... The spook ideas to defeat locks has always been a concern. I was concerned with this back int the 90's and I designed a feature to address this concern. On all generations of ESL locks, there is a spook-cracker feature in the code entry logic. The feature is explained in the Operating Instructions, but nobody ever reads instructions. On ESL Locks, you can enter the first 5 digits of your code correctly, then press as many numeric buttons as you like in any random pattern and then finish with the correct 6th digit before pressing the # key. The lock will open normally. Essentially, the last keystroke is replaced with every new entry, and the entry is not completed until you press the # key to complete the entry. This works in two ways to prevent spook issues. One is as you said, if you push all the buttons, there is no advantage to someone checking which keys had been pressed. It also boggles someone looking over your shoulder while you are dialing your code. Try it. I love to blow people's minds when I enter a 30-digit code to open a safe at trade shows. They always ask how I remember such a long combination, HaHa... Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy: Originally Posted By clifton: The advantage of the electromechanical dial is that you can have the benefits of an electronic, such as audit capability, two-user-code modes, lockout for too many failed attempts, and easy to change codes - without the downside of electronic. I see the main downside being that you can take a UV marker and ink the buttons and then come back the next day with a UV led and see what buttons have the ink rubbed off of them, making it easy to see which 4 keys are used. Then it is just a matter of trying 24 codes to get in. The S&G 2740 seems to be way-nice. It has a lithium CR123 battery and a backup battery. The main battery lasts for something like 24,000 entries. It then warns you on the final 100 entries to change it. If you fail to change it with 100 warnings, it switches to the backup battery and keeps on working. The MAS locks have a somewhat annoying power generator so that they do not need a battery. I think that is an outdated concept and very much like Trijicon holding on to avoiding batteries rather than just using them well like AIMPOINT. I have a MAS Hamilton 100 on one of my gun safes, so I know all about the power generator. It is a good wrist exercise. Looks like I have a break in the Chinese internet blocking... We always joke that you have to have foreplay with the Mas Hamilton (Kaba-Mas) wind-up locks before they will open up... The spook ideas to defeat locks has always been a concern. I was concerned with this back int the 90's and I designed a feature to address this concern. On all generations of ESL locks, there is a spook-cracker feature in the code entry logic. The feature is explained in the Operating Instructions, but nobody ever reads instructions. On ESL Locks, you can enter the first 5 digits of your code correctly, then press as many numeric buttons as you like in any random pattern and then finish with the correct 6th digit before pressing the # key. The lock will open normally. Essentially, the last keystroke is replaced with every new entry, and the entry is not completed until you press the # key to complete the entry. This works in two ways to prevent spook issues. One is as you said, if you push all the buttons, there is no advantage to someone checking which keys had been pressed. It also boggles someone looking over your shoulder while you are dialing your code. Try it. I love to blow people's minds when I enter a 30-digit code to open a safe at trade shows. They always ask how I remember such a long combination, HaHa... |
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OK, USA
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Posted: 9/26/2014 8:34:38 AM EDT
[#13]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By teeli:
Even on the amsec 20's ? That's awesome. absolutely fascinating. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By teeli:
Originally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
Originally Posted By clifton:
The advantage of the electromechanical dial is that you can have the benefits of an electronic, such as audit capability, two-user-code modes, lockout for too many failed attempts, and easy to change codes - without the downside of electronic. I see the main downside being that you can take a UV marker and ink the buttons and then come back the next day with a UV led and see what buttons have the ink rubbed off of them, making it easy to see which 4 keys are used. Then it is just a matter of trying 24 codes to get in. The S&G 2740 seems to be way-nice. It has a lithium CR123 battery and a backup battery. The main battery lasts for something like 24,000 entries. It then warns you on the final 100 entries to change it. If you fail to change it with 100 warnings, it switches to the backup battery and keeps on working. The MAS locks have a somewhat annoying power generator so that they do not need a battery. I think that is an outdated concept and very much like Trijicon holding on to avoiding batteries rather than just using them well like AIMPOINT. I have a MAS Hamilton 100 on one of my gun safes, so I know all about the power generator. It is a good wrist exercise. Looks like I have a break in the Chinese internet blocking... We always joke that you have to have foreplay with the Mas Hamilton (Kaba-Mas) wind-up locks before they will open up... The spook ideas to defeat locks has always been a concern. I was concerned with this back int the 90's and I designed a feature to address this concern. On all generations of ESL locks, there is a spook-cracker feature in the code entry logic. The feature is explained in the Operating Instructions, but nobody ever reads instructions. On ESL Locks, you can enter the first 5 digits of your code correctly, then press as many numeric buttons as you like in any random pattern and then finish with the correct 6th digit before pressing the # key. The lock will open normally. Essentially, the last keystroke is replaced with every new entry, and the entry is not completed until you press the # key to complete the entry. This works in two ways to prevent spook issues. One is as you said, if you push all the buttons, there is no advantage to someone checking which keys had been pressed. It also boggles someone looking over your shoulder while you are dialing your code. Try it. I love to blow people's minds when I enter a 30-digit code to open a safe at trade shows. They always ask how I remember such a long combination, HaHa... Works on my XL 20 |
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Posted: 9/26/2014 9:18:19 AM EDT
[#14]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
The spook ideas to defeat locks has always been a concern. I was concerned with this back int the 90's and I designed a feature to address this concern. On all generations of ESL locks, there is a spook-cracker feature in the code entry logic. The feature is explained in the Operating Instructions, but nobody ever reads instructions. I read them, and I love that feature. I've used it many times. 
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USA
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Posted: 9/26/2014 11:02:20 AM EDT
[#15]
One way to code a lock is as a state machine where only the last X digits count. You can still have the # key required, and then you can still log failed attempts.
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Posted: 9/30/2014 6:58:59 PM EDT
[#16]
Hey guys posted this in GD but I figured in here wouldn't hurt either:
My wife has one of those cheap (well not really) sentry fireproof safes that she stores her important paper work in. She recently lost/forgot the combo and sentry makes you jump though all sorts of hoops and pay for your combination! Is there any way I can figure out the combo or unlock it without ruining the safe? Its a dial combo |
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NH, USA
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Posted: 9/30/2014 7:44:08 PM EDT
[#17]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
Looks like I have a break in the Chinese internet blocking... We always joke that you have to have foreplay with the Mas Hamilton (Kaba-Mas) wind-up locks before they will open up... The spook ideas to defeat locks has always been a concern. I was concerned with this back int the 90's and I designed a feature to address this concern. On all generations of ESL locks, there is a spook-cracker feature in the code entry logic. The feature is explained in the Operating Instructions, but nobody ever reads instructions. On ESL Locks, you can enter the first 5 digits of your code correctly, then press as many numeric buttons as you like in any random pattern and then finish with the correct 6th digit before pressing the # key. The lock will open normally. Essentially, the last keystroke is replaced with every new entry, and the entry is not completed until you press the # key to complete the entry. This works in two ways to prevent spook issues. One is as you said, if you push all the buttons, there is no advantage to someone checking which keys had been pressed. It also boggles someone looking over your shoulder while you are dialing your code. Try it. I love to blow people's minds when I enter a 30-digit code to open a safe at trade shows. They always ask how I remember such a long combination, HaHa... Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
Originally Posted By clifton:
The advantage of the electromechanical dial is that you can have the benefits of an electronic, such as audit capability, two-user-code modes, lockout for too many failed attempts, and easy to change codes - without the downside of electronic. I see the main downside being that you can take a UV marker and ink the buttons and then come back the next day with a UV led and see what buttons have the ink rubbed off of them, making it easy to see which 4 keys are used. Then it is just a matter of trying 24 codes to get in. The S&G 2740 seems to be way-nice. It has a lithium CR123 battery and a backup battery. The main battery lasts for something like 24,000 entries. It then warns you on the final 100 entries to change it. If you fail to change it with 100 warnings, it switches to the backup battery and keeps on working. The MAS locks have a somewhat annoying power generator so that they do not need a battery. I think that is an outdated concept and very much like Trijicon holding on to avoiding batteries rather than just using them well like AIMPOINT. I have a MAS Hamilton 100 on one of my gun safes, so I know all about the power generator. It is a good wrist exercise. Looks like I have a break in the Chinese internet blocking... We always joke that you have to have foreplay with the Mas Hamilton (Kaba-Mas) wind-up locks before they will open up... The spook ideas to defeat locks has always been a concern. I was concerned with this back int the 90's and I designed a feature to address this concern. On all generations of ESL locks, there is a spook-cracker feature in the code entry logic. The feature is explained in the Operating Instructions, but nobody ever reads instructions. On ESL Locks, you can enter the first 5 digits of your code correctly, then press as many numeric buttons as you like in any random pattern and then finish with the correct 6th digit before pressing the # key. The lock will open normally. Essentially, the last keystroke is replaced with every new entry, and the entry is not completed until you press the # key to complete the entry. This works in two ways to prevent spook issues. One is as you said, if you push all the buttons, there is no advantage to someone checking which keys had been pressed. It also boggles someone looking over your shoulder while you are dialing your code. Try it. I love to blow people's minds when I enter a 30-digit code to open a safe at trade shows. They always ask how I remember such a long combination, HaHa... I showed this to everyone at work, and we show it to every customer that comes in looking for safes. |
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USA
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Posted: 9/30/2014 11:05:04 PM EDT
[#18]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By Tbr1806:
Hey guys posted this in GD but I figured in here wouldn't hurt either: My wife has one of those cheap (well not really) sentry fireproof safes that she stores her important paper work in. She recently lost/forgot the combo and sentry makes you jump though all sorts of hoops and pay for your combination! Is there any way I can figure out the combo or unlock it without ruining the safe? Its a dial combo They only charge $20. You should pay the fee and get the combination. |
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Posted: 10/1/2014 4:36:23 AM EDT
[#19]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By GraniteStateMike:
I showed this to everyone at work, and we show it to every customer that comes in looking for safes. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By GraniteStateMike:
The spook ideas to defeat locks has always been a concern. I was concerned with this back int the 90's and I designed a feature to address this concern. On all generations of ESL locks, there is a spook-cracker feature in the code entry logic. The feature is explained in the Operating Instructions, but nobody ever reads instructions.
On ESL Locks, you can enter the first 5 digits of your code correctly, then press as many numeric buttons as you like in any random pattern and then finish with the correct 6th digit before pressing the # key. The lock will open normally. Essentially, the last keystroke is replaced with every new entry, and the entry is not completed until you press the # key to complete the entry. This works in two ways to prevent spook issues. One is as you said, if you push all the buttons, there is no advantage to someone checking which keys had been pressed. It also boggles someone looking over your shoulder while you are dialing your code. Try it. I love to blow people's minds when I enter a 30-digit code to open a safe at trade shows. They always ask how I remember such a long combination, HaHa.. I showed this to everyone at work, and we show it to every customer that comes in looking for safes. It's a simple feature that really expands the safety associated to numeric code entry. Sounds like you're having fun with it. Just one more way that we add value in our products. |
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Posted: 10/1/2014 11:33:56 AM EDT
[#20]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
It's a simple feature that really expands the safety associated to numeric code entry. Sounds like you're having fun with it. Just one more way that we add value in our products. Interesting feature - I can see how it might add some security vs look-over-shoulder attacks. But it does reduce the combination complexity by a factor of 10, so the 6-digit combo is effectively only 5. |
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Posted: 10/1/2014 12:36:37 PM EDT
[#21]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
It's a simple feature that really expands the safety associated to numeric code entry. Sounds like you're having fun with it. Just one more way that we add value in our products. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
Originally Posted By GraniteStateMike:
The spook ideas to defeat locks has always been a concern. I was concerned with this back int the 90's and I designed a feature to address this concern. On all generations of ESL locks, there is a spook-cracker feature in the code entry logic. The feature is explained in the Operating Instructions, but nobody ever reads instructions.
On ESL Locks, you can enter the first 5 digits of your code correctly, then press as many numeric buttons as you like in any random pattern and then finish with the correct 6th digit before pressing the # key. The lock will open normally. Essentially, the last keystroke is replaced with every new entry, and the entry is not completed until you press the # key to complete the entry. This works in two ways to prevent spook issues. One is as you said, if you push all the buttons, there is no advantage to someone checking which keys had been pressed. It also boggles someone looking over your shoulder while you are dialing your code. Try it. I love to blow people's minds when I enter a 30-digit code to open a safe at trade shows. They always ask how I remember such a long combination, HaHa.. I showed this to everyone at work, and we show it to every customer that comes in looking for safes. It's a simple feature that really expands the safety associated to numeric code entry. Sounds like you're having fun with it. Just one more way that we add value in our products. I showed that to my wife in the form of a 'new' combination the other day. Her words: "If you think I am going to remember that, then you are clearly sniffing glue" 
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Posted: 10/1/2014 2:17:33 PM EDT
[#22]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By gasdoc09:
But it does reduce the combination complexity by a factor of 10, so the 6-digit combo is effectively only 5. No, the last keystroke must be the correct number. It still takes all six digits to authenticate the entry. |
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USA
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Posted: 10/1/2014 6:06:06 PM EDT
[Last Edit: turnip75]
[#23]
Originally Posted By clifton:
you can take a UV marker and ink the buttons and then come back the next day with a UV led and see what buttons have the ink rubbed off of them, making it easy to see which 4 keys are used. Then it is just a matter of trying 24 codes to get in. That is a movie thing which is pretty much useless because there are a lot more than 24 possible combinations to try on a electronic safe lock. And I say "pretty much" because people can pick some really stupid and easy to guess combinations. So even if you know which numbers were used in the combo, you will still have hundreds to try: 3 unique numbers used in 6-digit combination = 90 possible combinations 4 numbers = 1080 5 numbers = 1800 6 numbers = 720 You also have to contend with the 5-10 minute penalty timeout after 3-5 incorrect combinations. After the initial timeout, most locks will only need 2 incorrect entries before going back into the timeout period. |
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Posted: 10/1/2014 8:05:57 PM EDT
[Last Edit: TheSafeGuy]
[#24]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By turnip75:
That is a movie thing which is pretty much useless because there are a lot more than 24 possible combinations to try on a electronic safe lock. And I say "pretty much" because people can pick some really stupid and easy to guess combinations. So even if you know which numbers were used in the combo, you will still have hundreds to try: 3 unique numbers used in 6-digit combination = 90 possible combinations 4 numbers = 1080 5 numbers = 1800 6 numbers = 720 You also have to contend with the 5-10 minute penalty timeout after 3-5 incorrect combinations. After the initial timeout, most locks will only need 2 incorrect entries before going back into the timeout period. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By turnip75:
Originally Posted By clifton:
you can take a UV marker and ink the buttons and then come back the next day with a UV led and see what buttons have the ink rubbed off of them, making it easy to see which 4 keys are used. Then it is just a matter of trying 24 codes to get in. That is a movie thing which is pretty much useless because there are a lot more than 24 possible combinations to try on a electronic safe lock. And I say "pretty much" because people can pick some really stupid and easy to guess combinations. So even if you know which numbers were used in the combo, you will still have hundreds to try: 3 unique numbers used in 6-digit combination = 90 possible combinations 4 numbers = 1080 5 numbers = 1800 6 numbers = 720 You also have to contend with the 5-10 minute penalty timeout after 3-5 incorrect combinations. After the initial timeout, most locks will only need 2 incorrect entries before going back into the timeout period. That's not correct. This is a permutation, not a combination. By definition, the order of the numbers matters, so it is a permutation calculation. The formula is for this problem is n^r (n to the r power), where r is always 6 and n is the number of keys used. 3 numbers = 729 4 numbers = 4,096 5 numbers = 15,625 6 numbers = 46,656 The Penalty Lockout on all ESL Locks is 15 minutes, and repeats after every forth bad entry. So, even with a 3-key pin code, you could could potentially need to run 729 codes and use 2,719 minutes (45 hours) to guess the right code. |
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USA
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Posted: 10/1/2014 8:27:05 PM EDT
[Last Edit: turnip75]
[#25]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
That's not correct. This is a permutation, not a combination. By definition, the order of the numbers matters, so it is a permutation calculation. The formula is for this problem is n^r (n to the r power), where r is always 6 and n is the number of keys used. 3 numbers = 729 4 numbers = 4,096 5 numbers = 15,625 6 numbers = 46,656 The Penalty Lockout on all ESL Locks is 15 minutes, and repeats after every forth bad entry. So, even with a 3-key pin code, you could could potentially need to run 729 codes and use 2,719 minutes (45 hours) to guess the right code. That's exactly what I did but I eliminated numbers that didn't include at least one example of each number. Let's say for 6, the dye shows buttons 1 through 6 have been pressed. Only combinations that include those numbers would be tried and there can be no duplicate numbers because the combination is only 6 digits. That's how I got to 720 six-digit numbers that all include 1-6. The rest of them leave out some necessary numbers: 111111, 111112, 111113 etc Or 5 numbers, your number of 15,625 doesn't exclude ineligible numbers that don't include all 5: (suppose we're using numbers 1-5) "List has 15625 entries. {1,1,1,1,1,1} {1,1,1,1,1,2} {1,1,1,1,1,3} {1,1,1,1,1,4} {1,1,1,1,1,5} {1,1,1,1,2,1} {1,1,1,1,2,2} {1,1,1,1,2,3} {1,1,1,1,2,4} {1,1,1,1,2,5} {1,1,1,1,3,1} {1,1,1,1,3,2} {1,1,1,1,3,3} {1,1,1,1,3,4} {1,1,1,1,3,5} {1,1,1,1,4,1} {1,1,1,1,4,2} {1,1,1,1,4,3}" That being said, I need to rerun 3-5 with the exclusions and I'm pretty sure a few of my totals might be too low. |
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USA
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Posted: 10/1/2014 10:44:14 PM EDT
[#26]
Ok good - even if you know what keys are used, it will take a lot of time to get in.
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Posted: 10/2/2014 9:24:52 PM EDT
[#27]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
No, the last keystroke must be the correct number. It still takes all six digits to authenticate the entry. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
Originally Posted By gasdoc09:
But it does reduce the combination complexity by a factor of 10, so the 6-digit combo is effectively only 5. No, the last keystroke must be the correct number. It still takes all six digits to authenticate the entry. But you get unlimited tries to enter the last number. The brute-force complexity is reduced by a factor of 10. If the combo is 1 2 3 4 5 6 then testing [...] 1 2 3 4 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 (open) Would require only 10^5 attempts, instead of 10^6. Not that it matters for manual attempts, but an automated cracker would be 10x faster. |
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Posted: 10/2/2014 9:39:14 PM EDT
[#28]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By gasdoc09: But you get unlimited tries to enter the last number. The brute-force complexity is reduced by a factor of 10. If the combo is 1 2 3 4 5 6 then testing [...] 1 2 3 4 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 (open) Would require only 10^5 attempts, instead of 10^6. Not that it matters for manual attempts, but an automated cracker would be 10x faster. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By gasdoc09: Originally Posted By TheSafeGuy: Originally Posted By gasdoc09: But it does reduce the combination complexity by a factor of 10, so the 6-digit combo is effectively only 5. No, the last keystroke must be the correct number. It still takes all six digits to authenticate the entry. But you get unlimited tries to enter the last number. The brute-force complexity is reduced by a factor of 10. If the combo is 1 2 3 4 5 6 then testing [...] 1 2 3 4 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 (open) Would require only 10^5 attempts, instead of 10^6. Not that it matters for manual attempts, but an automated cracker would be 10x faster. wow, good point. It actually makes the combo less effective.. |
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Posted: 10/2/2014 9:59:45 PM EDT
[#29]
wow, good point. It actually makes the combo less effective.. Only if hitting the last number was what opened the lock. But it's not. You still have to hit the pound key which ends the entry. |
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OK, USA
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Posted: 10/2/2014 10:40:54 PM EDT
[Last Edit: tyromeo55]
[#30]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By gasdoc09:
But you get unlimited tries to enter the last number. The brute-force complexity is reduced by a factor of 10. If the combo is 1 2 3 4 5 6 then testing [...] 1 2 3 4 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 (open) Would require only 10^5 attempts, instead of 10^6. Not that it matters for manual attempts, but an automated cracker would be 10x faster. Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By gasdoc09:
Originally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
Originally Posted By gasdoc09:
But it does reduce the combination complexity by a factor of 10, so the 6-digit combo is effectively only 5. No, the last keystroke must be the correct number. It still takes all six digits to authenticate the entry. But you get unlimited tries to enter the last number. The brute-force complexity is reduced by a factor of 10. If the combo is 1 2 3 4 5 6 then testing [...] 1 2 3 4 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 (open) Would require only 10^5 attempts, instead of 10^6. Not that it matters for manual attempts, but an automated cracker would be 10x faster. TSG Correct me if im out of line but to answer the above quote... The effectiveness is not compromised at all You are still required to choose what the last digit is because you have to enter # after you cave completed your sequence. If you are wrong then you got to start all over just like any other attempt ETA: crap, Looks like I totally missed a1abdj's reply that cleared it up |
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Posted: 10/3/2014 12:21:49 AM EDT
[Last Edit: TheSafeGuy]
[#31]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By gasdoc09:
But you get unlimited tries to enter the last number. The brute-force complexity is reduced by a factor of 10. If the combo is 1 2 3 4 5 6 then testing [...] 1 2 3 4 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 (open) Would require only 10^5 attempts, instead of 10^6. Not that it matters for manual attempts, but an automated cracker would be 10x faster. The code is not tested for correctness until you press the # key. That entry is wrong, count it as bad, start over. four times, you wait 15 minutes before another try. Believe me, we went thru all of these mathematical gymnastics long ago. These permutations are already embedded in the UL 2058 Standards. There are no oversights in this computation or process |
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Posted: 10/3/2014 5:55:46 AM EDT
[#32]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By TheSafeGuy:
The code is not tested for correctness until you press the # key. Ah, that makes all the difference in the world. Thanks for the explanation. 
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CA, USA
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Posted: 10/4/2014 8:34:20 PM EDT
[#33]
Question Are there any tricks or anything special I need to know about removing the door from an AMSEC BF-3416?
I just purchased a used BF-3416 but would like to take the door off to facilitate moving it to my desired location. Taking 200lbs off of it really helps me out. Are there any bearings or other "Gotcha's" I need to look out for when attempting this. Thanks |
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OK, USA
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Posted: 10/4/2014 10:44:49 PM EDT
[#34]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By guggep:
Question Are there any tricks or anything special I need to know about removing the door from an AMSEC BF-3416? I just purchased a used BF-3416 but would like to take the door off to facilitate moving it to my desired location. Taking 200lbs off of it really helps me out. Are there any bearings or other "Gotcha's" I need to look out for when attempting this. Thanks Take my advice seriously. Leave the door on and hump the additional weight. Much less dangerous |
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IL, USA
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Posted: 10/5/2014 4:01:06 PM EDT
[#35]
Holy crap. Stumbled across this thread as I am looking into Safes and love to do my research. So glad I did not buy one without reading this. Thank you TSG and every other professional for educating us on what is a quality safe and what is not. I truly appreciate it as a buyer.
I do have a question for TSG regarding UL tests. You mentioned when this thread first started that one of the UL tests was almost laughable considering they used a giant bosch tool to destroy a safe. Has there been any UL test or proposed test that you just said "Oh cmon. That is just absurd!" because it was so out of the realm of realism that you knew the safe would not hold up at all? Anything remotely close to it? |
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USA
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Posted: 10/5/2014 4:24:20 PM EDT
[#36]
They are limited in what tools they can use. They know of very effective tools that they specifically don't use for the testing.
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Posted: 10/5/2014 4:39:53 PM EDT
[#37]
They are limited in what tools they can use. They know of very effective tools that they specifically don't use for the testing. Please enlighten us further.......... |
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USA
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Posted: 10/5/2014 4:41:04 PM EDT
[Last Edit: turnip75]
[#38]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By clifton:
They are limited in what tools they can use. They know of very effective tools that they specifically don't use for the testing. Dude... he/she asked TSG not you. Googling threads on the internet and downloading a pirated copy of Marc's book do not make you qualified to answer a question like that. P.S. Marc's book is very outdated and not really relevant or informational when it comes to high security safes and vaults. He's much better finding flaws in the Kwikset or Medeco door lock on grandmas house and things like that. There are many things out there in the real high security safe world that people like him have zero clue about. |
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USA
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Posted: 10/5/2014 4:42:21 PM EDT
[Last Edit: turnip75]
[#39]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By a1abdj:
Please enlighten us further.......... Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By a1abdj:
They are limited in what tools they can use. They know of very effective tools that they specifically don't use for the testing. Please enlighten us further.......... Exactly!! Love these internet experts who read a few threads and think they have some real experience when none of them have seen a real safe in person much less worked on one. Clifton, how many high security safes have you serviced or opened? How many safes have you tested or cut open? How many safe manufacturers and insurance underwriters have you worked with? How many banks, jewelers and government clients (real safe users) have you professionally advised? Oh.. it's zero? Your answer is none to all those questions? Well then maybe you should be quiet and let the people who can answer yes to those questions talk. |
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USA
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Posted: 10/5/2014 5:01:14 PM EDT
[#40]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By turnip75:Dude... he/she asked TSG not you. Googling threads on the internet and downloading a pirated copy of Marc's book do not make you qualified to answer a question like that. I made a factual statement that can add to the conversation. It is not close to an answer to his question, which I think is obvious. |
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USA
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Posted: 10/5/2014 5:04:27 PM EDT
[Last Edit: clifton]
[#41]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By turnip75:Well then maybe you should be quiet and let the people who can answer yes to those questions talk. I think the problem is that many guys purposely and admittedly withhold information, and so are a marginal source of information. Also, you are performing an ad hominem attack. Please limit your comments to criticizing information rather than people. |
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Posted: 10/5/2014 5:06:52 PM EDT
[Last Edit: a1abdj]
[#42]
Ah, I can remember the good old days.....perhaps a week or so ago.....when Clifton was asking what type of pry bar he needed to buy to install a vault door he had purchased online. And fast forward to today, when he is active in just about every safe thread, answering questions.
I think the problem is that many guys purposely and admittedly withhold information, and so are a marginal source of information. Of course we withhold information. We don't want the people who shouldn't have the information having it, and those types of people know how to use Google the same way you do. That aside, most of us that know what we're talking about get paid for knowing what we talk about. You think we should provide you that information at no charge? Just because you want to know? If you want all the useful information, get out your checkbook. Once I receive your retainer check, I'll answer all of the non security compromising questions you want. I'll even let you fly out here, and touch some real safes. We can even pose you with some of them and take your picture. That will go a long way in proving you're an expert to those who are in doubt. |
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USA
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Posted: 10/5/2014 5:07:24 PM EDT
[Last Edit: clifton]
[#43]
Again, ad hominem attack by trying to discredit someone personally rather than the information itself. It is a sign of last resort when you have no actual argument. I have been into this stuff since the early 1990s.
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USA
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Posted: 10/5/2014 5:13:40 PM EDT
[Last Edit: turnip75]
[#44]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By a1abdj:
Ah, I can remember the good old days.....perhaps a week or so ago.....when Clifton was asking what type of pry bar he needed to buy to install a vault door he had purchased online. And fast forward to today, when he is active in just about every safe thread, answering questions. LOL!!! Thank you clifton! Thank you for your vast wisdom and knowledge that you have acquired in your storied one week internet-forum reading career! You are the hero that ARFCOM needs! We are unworthy of your great stature and expertise! |
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USA
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Posted: 10/5/2014 5:17:34 PM EDT
[#45]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By a1abdj:You think we should provide you that information at no charge? Just because you want to know? Pretty much, yes. If you are posting here. I think you should be more forthcoming with information *if* you want to participate in an internet forum. If you want to keep answers secret, why be here? Just to show people that you know a lot, but can't really answer anything? The guys that don't want to share information generally are not here telling people they can't share information. |
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USA
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Posted: 10/5/2014 5:19:51 PM EDT
[Last Edit: turnip75]
[#46]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By clifton:
I have been into this stuff since the early 1990s. Oh ok, my bad! I had no idea you "have been into this stuff since the early 1990s". My mistake, that clearly makes you a real qualified high security safe expert. We all know that being "into stuff" makes you an expert qualified to advise people in situations with real life consequences. Matter of fact, I've been "into a lot of stuff", I guess I will open a new business and start giving everyone my expertise on 20th century horticulture. |
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Posted: 10/5/2014 5:22:54 PM EDT
[#47]
Pretty much, yes. If you are posting here. I think you should be more forthcoming with information *if* you want to participate in an internet forum. If you want to keep answers secret, why be here? Just to show people that you know a lot, but can't really answer anything? The guys that don't want to share information generally are not here telling people they can't share information. Why should guys like us be more forthcoming when we have you around to explain everything? |
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Posted: 10/5/2014 9:51:31 PM EDT
[Last Edit: TheSafeGuy]
[#48]
Quote HistoryOriginally Posted By FallenHero32:I do have a question for TSG regarding UL tests. You mentioned when this thread first started that one of the UL tests was almost laughable considering they used a giant bosch tool to destroy a safe. Has there been any UL test or proposed test that you just said "Oh cmon. That is just absurd!" because it was so out of the realm of realism that you knew the safe would not hold up at all? Anything remotely close to it? Yea, there have been times when we had to step aside with the lead engineer or staff heavy to discuss the methods or tools. The testing at UL is completely subjective and unpredictable. The team is free to explore new ideas and methods of attack. Sometimes that uncovers a new technique that is a game-changer, and then it becomes a contested matter of equality and fairness if it's in the middle of a test season. The retest cycles take over a year to run all the manufacturers thru the paces. Early applicants have an edge, unless a discovery late in the last retest cycle is adopted. Then everyone gets blind-sided. We have all been surprised many times. Going in cocky with attitude is usually met with disappointment. The test team is always pacing themselves with a degree of control so they give everyone an even shot, but if you are an ass-hat, they can step up their game and you can really suffer. So, if something you don't like goes down, it's in your best interest to keep your cool and think about your approach. The Torch Test for the TRTL ratings is pretty unrealistic IMHO. We have seen the evidence of dozens of torch burglaries, and the tools and methods are pretty conventional. The torch that UL uses is big enough to cut the top off of an M1 Abrams tank. They drive that torch with a huge 500 lb acetylene tank and a bank of five large 300 cu. ft. Oxygen tanks on a manifold. The torch is so badass, the team wears full body fire suits to use it in a test. Practically speaking, if you can't carry it to a burglary site, it should not be allowed. That's how the European standards work, the tool complement is limited to a maximum portable payload. But, UL's thinking is that it is consistent and conservative. In this case, it's way past conservative. |
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Posted: 10/5/2014 10:09:40 PM EDT
[#49]
Okay guys, let's not get too heated here. I'm sure clifton was just trying to help. These topics self correct if someone spews false information. His comments were not blatantly inaccurate, he simply has not established a clear background for credibility. I am happy to see others attempting to answer questions posed to myself. I invite that exchange. Frank answers questions posed to me all the time, doesn't bother me in the least. He has established credibility and deserves to be respected as a professional in this industry. Everyone gets respect until they demonstrate they don't deserve it...
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CA, USA
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Posted: 10/5/2014 10:25:08 PM EDT
[#50]
Hi TSG - I have a question about the used BF3416 I recently purchased.
The safe currently has a high security key lock installed instead of a dial or ESL lock. The owner represented that it was factory installed that way. I desire to replace the Key with an ESL10 to maintain the RSC rating and meet CDOJ requirements. I would purchase the lock new from a reputable AMSEC AD (Dean or West Coast) Are there any issues I should be aware of when attempting a DIY lock replacement Key -> ESL10 Thanks |
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