First off, tremendous props to LoBrau, who saw Ukraine coming well in advance and started a record setting thread. May that record stand forever, because nothing would please us more than for there to no longer be anything to talk about.

What has become evident since February of 2022 is that there is a global reshuffling taking place, with three primary players behind most of the conflict in the world today. Discussion of current geopolitics cannot be constrained to one country or conflict.

What this thread is:
News and discussion related to political / military actions by Russia / Iran / China and their proxies, chief among those, North Korea.
News and discussion of the relationships between Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
News and discussion of responses to Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
Related Grey Zone / hybrid warfare / “competition short of war.”
Relevant or interesting technical discussion.
Relevant economic / social / historical discussion.
Reliable reporting from Russian / Iranian / Chinese sources.
Russian / Iranian / Chinese perspectives and factual evaluation thereof.
Political topics in the US and / or elsewhere which bear directly on these issues, including the politics of foreign aid.
Current focus is on the Russian war against and in Ukraine, however this could change if the Ukraine war cooled off and Taiwan heated up.  Related topics are always allowed.
Secondary but related topics like Wagner in Africa, uprising in Georgia, or a Third Chechen War.
Reasonable tangents.

What this thread is not:
US and / or foreign political issues which do not directly bear on these topics, including campaigning / advocating for one party or candidate.

General rules:
Discussion is expected to be conducted in good faith and assertions of fact should be substantiated.
In case of a question on whether a subtopic or line of discussion is relevant to this thread, the following members should be considered co-owners with decision making authority- AlmightyTallest, Capta, and SaltwaterHillbilly.

The Axis of Upheaval
How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order
By Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine
May/June 2024
Published on April 23, 2024

In the early morning of January 2, Russian forces launched a massive missile attack on the Ukrainian cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv that killed at least five civilians, injured more than 100, and damaged infrastructure. The incident was notable not just for the harm it caused but also because it showed that Russia was not alone in its fight. The Russian attack that day was carried out with weapons fitted with technology from China, missiles from North Korea, and drones from Iran. Over the past two years, all three countries have become critical enablers of Moscow’s war machine in Ukraine.

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Moscow has deployed more than 3,700 Iranian-designed drones. Russia now produces at least 330 on its own each month and is collaborating with Iran on plans to build a new drone factory inside Russia that will boost these numbers. North Korea has sent Russia ballistic missiles and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, just as Ukrainian stockpiles have dwindled. China, for its part, has become Russia’s most important lifeline. Beijing has ramped up its purchase of Russian oil and gas, putting billions of dollars into Moscow’s coffers. Just as significantly, China provides vast amounts of warfighting technology, from semiconductors and electronic devices to radar- and communications-jamming equipment and jet-fighter parts. Customs records show that despite Western trade sanctions, Russia’s imports of computer chips and chip components have been steadily rising toward prewar levels. More than half of these goods come from China.

The support from China, Iran, and North Korea has strengthened Russia’s position on the battlefield, undermined Western attempts to isolate Moscow, and harmed Ukraine. This collaboration, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Cooperation among the four countries was expanding before 2022, but the war has accelerated their deepening economic, military, political, and technological ties. The four powers increasingly identify common interests, match up their rhetoric, and coordinate their military and diplomatic activities. Their convergence is creating a new axis of upheaval—a development that is fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape.

The group is not an exclusive bloc and certainly not an alliance. It is, instead, a collection of dissatisfied states converging on a shared purpose of overturning the principles, rules, and institutions that underlie the prevailing international system. When these four countries cooperate, their actions have far greater effect than the sum of their individual efforts. Working together, they enhance one another’s military capabilities; dilute the efficacy of U.S. foreign policy tools, including sanctions; and hinder the ability of Washington and its partners to enforce global rules. Their collective aim is to create an alternative to the current order, which they consider to be dominated by the United States.

Too many Western observers have been quick to dismiss the implications of coordination among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The four countries have their differences, to be sure, and a history of distrust and contemporary fissures may limit how close their relationships will grow. Yet their shared aim of weakening the United States and its leadership role provides a strong adhesive. In places across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, the ambitions of axis members have already proved to be destabilizing. Managing the disruptive effects of their further coordination and preventing the axis from upsetting the global system must now be central objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

THE ANTI-WESTERN CLUB

Collaboration among axis members is not new. China and Russia have been strengthening their partnership since the end of the Cold War—a trend that accelerated rapidly after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. China’s share of Russian external trade doubled from ten to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021, and between 2018 and 2022 Russia supplied a combined total of 83 percent of China’s arms imports. Russian technology has helped the Chinese military enhance its air defense, antiship, and submarine capabilities, making China a more formidable force in a potential naval conflict. Beijing and Moscow have also expressed a shared vision. In early 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a joint manifesto pledging a “no limits” partnership between their two countries and calling for “international relations of a new type”—in other words, a multipolar system that is no longer dominated by the United States.

Iran has strengthened its ties with other axis members as well. Iran and Russia worked together to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power after the onset of civil war in 2011. Joining Russia’s efforts, which include major energy agreements with Iran to shield Tehran from the effects of U.S. sanctions, China has purchased large quantities of Iranian oil since 2020. North Korea, for its part, has counted China as its primary ally and trade partner for decades, and North Korea and Russia have maintained warm, if not particularly substantive, ties. Iran has purchased North Korean missiles since the 1980s, and more recently, North Korea is thought to have supplied weapons to Iranian proxy groups, including Hezbollah and possibly Hamas. Pyongyang and Tehran have also bonded over a shared aversion to Washington: as a senior North Korean official, Kim Yong Nam, declared during a ten-day trip to Iran in 2017, the two countries “have a common enemy.”

But the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 hastened the convergence among these four countries in ways that transcend their historical ties. Moscow has been among Tehran’s top suppliers of weapons over the past two decades and is now its largest source of foreign investment; Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent in the first ten months of 2022. Over the past two years, according to the White House, Russia has been sharing more intelligence with and providing more weapons to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies, and Moscow has defended those proxies in debates at the UN Security Council. Last year, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s largest source of crude oil and trade between the two countries topped $240 billion, a record high. Moscow has also released millions of dollars in North Korean assets that previously sat frozen in Russian banks in compliance with Security Council sanctions. China, Iran, and Russia have held joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman three years in a row, most recently in March 2024. Russia has also proposed trilateral naval drills with China and North Korea.

The growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia is fueled by their shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, an antagonism rooted in their belief that that system does not accord them the status or freedom of action they deserve. Each country claims a sphere of influence: China’s “core interests,” which extend to Taiwan and the South China Sea; Iran’s “axis of resistance,” the set of proxy groups that give Tehran leverage in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; North Korea’s claim to the entire Korean Peninsula; and Russia’s “near abroad,” which for the Kremlin includes, at a minimum, the countries that composed its historic empire. All four countries see the United States as the primary obstacle to establishing these spheres of influence, and they want Washington’s presence in their respective regions reduced.

All reject the principle of universal values and interpret the West’s championing of its brand of democracy as an attempt to undermine their legitimacy and foment domestic instability. They insist that individual states have the right to define democracy for themselves. In the end, although they may make temporary accommodations with the United States, they do not believe that the West will accept their rise (or return) to power on the world stage. They oppose external meddling in their internal affairs, the expansion of U.S. alliances, the stationing of American nuclear weapons abroad, and the use of coercive sanctions.

Any positive vision for the future, however, is more elusive. Yet history shows that a positive agenda may not be necessary for a group of discontented powers to cause disruption. The 1940 Tripartite Pact uniting Germany, Italy, and Japan—the original “Axis”—pledged to “establish and maintain a new order of things” in which each country would claim “its own proper place.” They did not succeed, but World War II certainly brought global upheaval. The axis of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia does not need a coherent plan for an alternative international order to upset the existing system. The countries’ shared opposition to the present order’s core tenets and their determination to bring about change form a powerful basis for collaborative action.

Fissures do exist among members of the axis. China and Russia vie for influence in Central Asia, for instance, while Iran and Russia compete for oil markets in China, India, and elsewhere in Asia. The four countries have complicated histories with each other, too. The Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941; Russia and China settled their long-standing border dispute only in 2004 and had both previously supported efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear programs and to isolate North Korea. Today, China may look askance at North Korea’s deepening relationship with Russia, worrying that an emboldened Kim Jong Un will aggravate tensions in Northeast Asia and draw in a larger U.S. military presence, which China does not want. Yet their differences are insufficient to dissolve the bonds forged by their common resistance to a Western-dominated world.

CATALYST IN THE KREMLIN

Moscow has been the main instigator of this axis. The invasion of Ukraine marked a point of no return in Putin’s long-standing crusade against the West. Putin has grown more committed to destroying not only Ukraine but also the global order. And he has doubled down on relationships with like-minded countries to accomplish his aims. Cut off from Western trade, investment, and technology since the start of the war, Moscow has had little choice but to rely on its partners to sustain its hostilities. The ammunition, drones, microchips, and other forms of aid that axis members have sent have been of great help to Russia. But the more the Kremlin relies on these countries, the more it must give away in return. Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran are taking advantage of their leverage over Moscow to expand their military capabilities and economic options.

Even before the Russian invasion, Moscow’s military assistance to Beijing was eroding the United States’ military advantage over China. Russia has provided ever more sophisticated weapons to China, and the two countries’ joint military exercises have grown in scope and frequency. Russian officers who have fought in Syria and in Ukraine’s Donbas region have shared valuable lessons with Chinese personnel, helping the People’s Liberation Army make up for its lack of operational experience—a notable weakness relative to more seasoned U.S. forces. China’s military modernization has reduced the urgency of deepening defense cooperation with Russia, but the two countries are likely to proceed with technology transfers and joint weapons development and production. In February, for instance, Russian officials confirmed that they were working with Chinese counterparts on military applications of artificial intelligence. Moscow retains an edge over Beijing in other key areas, including submarine technology, remote sensing satellites, and aircraft engines. If China can pressure a more dependent Russia to provide additional advanced technologies, the transfer could further undermine the United States’ advantages.

A similar dynamic is playing out in Russia’s relations with Iran and North Korea. Moscow and Tehran have forged what the Biden administration has called an “unprecedented defense partnership” that upgrades Iranian military capabilities. Russia has provided Iran with advanced aircraft, air defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cyber-capabilities that would help Tehran resist a potential U.S. or Israeli military operation. And in return for North Korea’s ammunition and other military support to Russia, Pyongyang is reportedly seeking advanced space, missile, and submarine technology from Moscow. If Russia were to comply with those requests, North Korea would be able to improve the accuracy and survivability of its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles and use Russian nuclear propulsion technology to expand the range and capability of its submarines. Already, Russia’s testing of North Korean weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine has supplied Pyongyang with information it can use to refine its missile program, and Russian assistance may have helped North Korea launch a military spy satellite in November after two previous failures last year.

Strong relations among the four axis countries have emboldened leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran. Kim, who now enjoys strong backing from both China and Russia, abandoned North Korea’s decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and stepped up its threats against Seoul, indulged in nuclear blackmail and missile tests, and expressed a lack of any interest in talks with the United States. And although there does not appear to be a direct connection between their deepening partnership and Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, growing support from Russia likely made Iran more willing to activate its regional proxies in the aftermath. The coordinated diplomacy and pressure from Russia and the West that brought Iran into the 2015 nuclear deal are now a distant memory. Today, Moscow and Beijing are helping Tehran resist Western coercion, making it easier for Iran to enrich uranium and reject Washington’s efforts to negotiate a new nuclear agreement.

AMERICA UNDERMINED

Collaboration among the axis members also reduces the potency of tools that Washington and its partners often use to confront them. In the most glaring example, since the start of the war in Ukraine, China has supplied Russia with semiconductors and other essential technologies that Russia previously imported from the West, undercutting the efficacy of Western export controls. All four countries are also working to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar. The share of Russia’s imports invoiced in Chinese renminbi jumped from three percent in 2021 to 20 percent in 2022. And in December 2023, Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct bilateral trade in their local currencies. By moving their economic transactions out of reach of U.S. enforcement measures, axis members undermine the efficacy of Western sanctions, as well as anticorruption and anti-money-laundering efforts.

Taking advantage of their shared borders and littoral zones, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia can build trade and transportation networks safe from U.S. interdiction. Iran, for example, ships drones and other weapons to Russia across the Caspian Sea, where the United States has little power to stop transfers. If the United States were engaged in conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing could seek support from Moscow. Russia might increase its overland exports of oil and gas to its southern neighbor, reducing China’s dependence on maritime energy imports that U.S. forces could block during a conflict. Russia’s defense industrial base, now in overdrive to supply weapons for Russian troops in Ukraine, could later pivot to sustain a Chinese war effort. Such cooperation would increase the odds of China’s prevailing over the American military and help advance Russia’s goal of diminishing the United States’ geopolitical influence.

The axis is also hindering Washington’s ability to rally international coalitions that can stand against its members’ destabilizing actions. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, made it far easier for countries across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to do the same. And Beijing and Moscow have impeded Western efforts to isolate Iran. Last year, they elevated Iran from observer to member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a predominantly Asian regional body, and then orchestrated an invitation for Iran to join the BRICS—a group that China and Russia view as a counterweight to the West. Iran’s regional meddling and nuclear pursuits have made other countries wary of dealing with its government, but its participation in international forums enhances the regime’s legitimacy and presents it with opportunities to expand trade with fellow member states.

Parallel efforts by axis members in the information domain further weaken international support for U.S. positions. China, Iran, and North Korea either defended or avoided explicitly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and they all parroted the Kremlin in accusing NATO of inciting the war. Their response to Hamas’s attacks on Israel last October followed a similar pattern. Iran used the state media and social media accounts to express support for Hamas, vilify Israel, and denounce the United States for enabling Israel’s military response, while the Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese media sharply criticized the United States’ enduring support for Israel. They used the war in Gaza to portray Washington as a destabilizing, domineering force in the world—a narrative that is particularly resonant in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Even if axis members do not overtly coordinate their messages, they push the same themes, and the repetition makes them appear more credible and persuasive.

AN ALTERNATIVE ORDER?

Global orders magnify the strength of the powerful states that lead them. The United States, for instance, has invested in the liberal international order it helped create because this order reflects American preferences and extends U.S. influence. As long as an order remains sufficiently beneficial to most members, a core group of states will defend it. Dissenting countries, meanwhile, are bound by a collective action problem. If they were to defect en masse, they could succeed in creating an alternative order more to their liking. But without a core cluster of powerful states around which they can coalesce, the advantage remains with the existing order.

For decades, threats to the U.S.-led order were limited to a handful of rogue states with little power to upend it. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the restructuring of interstate relations it prompted have lifted the constraint on collective action. The axis of upheaval represents a new center of gravity, a group that other countries dissatisfied with the existing order can turn to. The axis is ushering in an international system characterized by two orders that are becoming increasingly organized and competitive.

Historically, competing orders have invited conflict, especially at the geographical seams between them. Wars arise from specific conditions, such as a territorial dispute, the need to protect national interests or the interests of an ally, or a threat to the survival of a regime. But the likelihood that any of those conditions will lead to war increases in the presence of dueling orders. Some political science researchers have found that periods in which a single order prevailed—the balance-of-power system maintained by the Concert of Europe for much of the nineteenth century, for example, or the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War era—were less prone to conflicts than those characterized by more than one order, such as the multipolar period between the two world wars and the bipolar system of the Cold War.

The world has gotten a preview of the instability this new era of competing orders will bring, with potential aggressors empowered by the axis’s normalization of alternative rules and less afraid of being isolated if they act out. Already, Hamas’s attack on Israel threatens to engulf the wider Middle East in war. Last October, Azerbaijan forcibly took control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region inhabited by ethnic Armenians. Tensions flared between Serbia and Kosovo in 2023, too, and Venezuela threatened to seize territory in neighboring Guyana in December. Although internal conditions precipitated the coups in Myanmar and across Africa’s Sahel region since 2020, the rising incidence of such revolts is connected to the new international arrangement. For many years, it seemed that coups were becoming less common, in large part because plotters faced significant costs for violating norms. Now, however, the calculations have changed. Overthrowing a government may still shatter relations with the West, but the new regimes can find support in Beijing and Moscow.

Further development of the axis would bring even greater tumult. So far, most collaboration among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia has been bilateral. Trilateral and quadrilateral action could expand their capacity for disruption. Countries such as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—all of which chafe against the U.S.-led, Western-dominated system—could also begin working more closely with the axis. If the group grows in size and tightens its coordination, the United States and its allies will have a more difficult time defending the recognized order.

TAKING ON THE REVISIONISTS

For now, U.S. national security strategy ranks China as a higher priority than Iran, North Korea, or even Russia. That assessment is strategically sound when considering the threat that individual countries pose to the United States, but it does not fully account for the cooperation among them. U.S. policy will need to address the destabilizing effects of revisionist countries’ acting in concert, and it should try to disrupt their coordinated efforts to subvert important international rules and institutions. Washington, furthermore, should undercut the axis’s appeal by sharpening the attractions of the existing order.

If the United States is to counter an increasingly coordinated axis, it cannot treat each threat as an isolated phenomenon. Washington should not ignore Russian aggression in Europe, for example, in order to focus on rising Chinese power in Asia. It is already clear that Russia’s success in Ukraine benefits a revisionist China by showing that it is possible, if costly, to thwart a united Western effort. Even as Washington rightly sees China as its top priority, addressing the challenge from Beijing will require competing with other members of the axis in other parts of the world. To be effective, the United States will need to devote additional resources to national security, engage in more vigorous diplomacy, develop new and stronger partnerships, and take a more activist role in the world than it has of late.

Driving wedges between members of the axis, on the other hand, will not work. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some strategists suggested that the United States align itself with Russia to balance China. After the war began, a few held out hope that the United States could join China in an anti-Russian coalition. But unlike President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in the 1970s, which took advantage of a Sino-Soviet split to draw Beijing further away from Moscow, there is no equivalent ideological or geopolitical rivalry for Washington to exploit today. The price of trying would likely involve U.S. recognition of a Russian or Chinese sphere of influence in Europe and Asia—regions central to U.S. interests and ones that Washington should not allow a hostile foreign power to dominate. Breaking Iran or North Korea off from the rest of the axis would be even more difficult, given their governments’ revisionist, even revolutionary aims. Ultimately, the axis is a problem the United States must manage, not one it can solve with grand strategic gestures.

Neither the West nor the axis will become wholly distinct political, military, and economic blocs. Each coalition will compete for influence all over the world, trying to draw vital countries closer to its side. Six “global swing states” will be particularly important: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey are all middle powers with enough collective geopolitical weight for their policy preferences to sway the future direction of the international order. These six countries—and others, too—can be expected to pursue economic, diplomatic, military, and technological ties with members of both orders. U.S. policymakers should make it a priority to deny advantages to the axis in these countries, encouraging their governments to choose policies that favor the prevailing order. In practice, that means using trade incentives, military engagement, foreign aid, and diplomacy to prevent swing states from hosting axis members’ military bases, giving axis members access to their technology infrastructure or military equipment, or helping them circumvent Western sanctions.

Although competition with the axis may be inevitable, the United States must try to avoid direct conflict with any of its members. To that end, Washington should reaffirm its security commitments to bolster deterrence in the western Pacific, in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, and on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States and its allies should also prepare for opportunistic aggression. If a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prompts U.S. military intervention, for instance, Russia may be tempted to move against another European country, and Iran or North Korea could escalate threats in their regions. Even if the axis members do not coordinate their aggression directly, concurrent conflicts could overwhelm the West. Washington will therefore need to press allies to invest in capabilities that the United States could not provide if it were already engaged in another military theater.

Confronting the axis will be expensive. A new strategy will require the United States to bolster its spending on defense, foreign aid, diplomacy, and strategic communications. Washington must direct aid to the frontlines of conflict between the axis and the West—including assistance to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine, all of which face encroachment by axis members. Revisionists are emboldened by the sense that political divisions at home or exhaustion with international engagement will keep the United States on the sidelines of this competition; a comprehensive, well-resourced U.S. strategy with bipartisan support would help counter that impression. The alternative—a reduction in the U.S. global presence—would leave the fate of crucial regions in the hands not of friendly local powers but of axis members seeking to impose their revisionist and illiberal preferences.

THE FOUR-POWER THREAT

There is a tendency to downplay the significance of growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. By turning to Beijing, this argument goes, Moscow merely signals its acceptance of the role of junior partner. Obtaining drones from Iran and munitions from North Korea demonstrates the desperation of a Russian war machine that incorrectly assumed that conquering Ukraine would be easy. China’s embrace of Russia shows only that Beijing could not achieve the positive relationship it originally sought with Europe and other Western powers. North Korea remains the world’s most isolated country, and Iran’s disruptive activities have backfired, strengthening regional cooperation among Israel, the United States, and Gulf countries.

Such analysis ignores the severity of the threat. Four powers, growing in strength and coordination, are united in their opposition to the prevailing world order and its U.S. leadership. Their combined economic and military capacity, together with their determination to change the way the world has worked since the end of the Cold War, make for a dangerous mix. This is a group bent on upheaval, and the United States and its partners must treat the axis as the generational challenge it is. They must reinforce the foundations of the international order and push back against those who act most vigorously to undermine it. It is likely impossible to arrest the emergence of this new axis, but keeping it from upending the current system is an achievable goal.

The West has everything it needs to triumph in this contest. Its combined economy is far larger, its militaries are significantly more powerful, its geography is more advantageous, its values are more attractive, and its democratic system is more stable. The United States and its partners should be confident in their own strengths, even as they appreciate the scale of effort necessary to compete with this budding anti-Western coalition. The new axis has already changed the picture of geopolitics—but Washington and its partners can still prevent the world of upheaval the axis hopes to usher in.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine

Hitting a single spot in a refinery is more damaging than taking out a single well.
I keep hoping the "houthis" take care of russian shipping sooner or later.

I was thinking the distribution points rather than wells.

Anyway, the Houthi's are Iran's puppets, who are allies with Russia, so... mostly unlikely that they'll attack any Russian-flagged vessels. Not sure why Houthi's still have any launch sites/equipment left by now. They should all have been smoked by the USN. If we're not going to put them down, we should stay the heck away from them. Biden's entire team are morons. Very serious and dedicated people with very low intelligence and comprehension.

Houthis are semi-allies of Russia.

1A33 fire control system of the T-64

When I say "houthis" I don't really mean houthis.
You are correct as far as the dos. Inbred ivy league morons are watching their sweet gig fall apart at the same time the ivy league midwits in charge of the ponzi scheme are watching it crash at the same time. It took a little over 100 years, but the liberals finally have us augering in. It's a shame that the information age forgot to bring along logic and reason.

not for nothing, but some "Houthis" might end up with bad aim. *nudge* *nudge*

Hitting the refining capability reduces Russia's income without necessarily taking the oil off the market (they have to sell as crude).

Hitting the refineries deprives Russia of fuel, and may lead them to a situation where they have to choose to fuel the army or civilians.

Taking the crude offline deprives the Russian government of income, which hurts them even more. Yes, the rest of the world would have to pay more for oil. IMO, hurting Russia enough to stop the war is worth it. For the record, Russian oil is about 12% of the global market, and Russia is the #2 world exporter of oil (behind Saudi Arabia), and makes up about 10% of global oil exports. https://www.investopedia.com/articles/company-insights/082316/worlds-top-10-oil-exporters.asp

Their industry has been on life support ever since the collapse of the USSR. And they never had the petrodollars to try and reconstitute it, unlike Russia. Most younger engineers pivoted to coding for various software outsourcing companies or left the country for good. The rise of the Israeli tech sector had a lot to do with the mass emigration of the 1990ths. And they were a part of Soviet defense-industrial complex, so there are gaps in the parts they can make. The take that they were the sole maker of all the Soviet good stuff is overly optimistic. Whatever remained of the industry survived doing R&D work for foreign customers who wanted localized defense production with no strings attached, and some export contracts. They may have the capacity to build one-off prototypes and some low rate production but nowhere the high volume manufacturing. And that was before the war. The Russians knew very well where the big factories and design bureaus were and targeted them early on.

What a jip! That cannon looked like it was about to connect!

I'm assuming it got stuck in that ditch, couldnt traverse the cannon to fire so staying there and fighting till the end was impossible. Anyway, recovery seemed impossible so 100% of the crew was saved. I wish there was a big depot somewhere filled with replacement M1's but we sent 31 lol.

I still remember the arguments against the M1..."the maintenance and log train is beyond the UA"...as if the goal was to pass down the tanks 25 years from now like a heirloom or something. In this war tanks get consumed like boots and AK mags. The crews are most important. But instead the UA (and Russia) is doing trench assaults in boots. Fucking 31 tanks!!%$#@&?

I dont think Ukraine can long-range-bomb Russia into submission. Russia may actually nuke them if they could come close. They should be blowing up what they can but look at Germany, Japan, England in WWII...strategic bombing (like Russia will never see) only strengthened resolve. Maybe Russia is weaker internally but I dont think Russia will end up like Germany in WWI. They need to be stopped on the ground unless we are hoping some Gazprom exec takes out Putin.

It's possible Russia is as weak internally as they were in 1917.

I'm not worried about FME as much as handing Russia with more IO victories. Is what keeps the Russian people in this among other things.

I see what you mean now, yeah I agree.

@Easterner

Yippee I can participate again.

This morning.

\uD83D\uDCA5 Russian fascists just dropped a glide bomb on Belgorod (Russia). The bomb was intended to strike Kharkiv across the border in Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/eBTnsZSnhQ

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 4, 2024

UPDATE: Russian aviation dropped a glide bomb on Belgorod in Russia injuring 5 people, damaging 30 homes and 10 cars.
The fascist governor of the region reported the damage but remained silent on the cause. pic.twitter.com/lgc3SSJbJs

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 4, 2024

A Russian aerial bomb probably fell on a house in Belgorod.

Authorities did not issue a missile alert before the explosion, indicating it is unlikely the house was hit by a Ukrainian missile.

Judging by the photos from the explosion site, several houses received serious damage, which is not typical for a UAV explosion.

Right during the emergency, Russian aviation carried out several strikes with controlled aerial bombs on the Kharkov region. Perhaps one of the bombs fell on a private house.

This may also be indicated by the column of smoke and dust that rose after the explosion.

https://t.me/belpepel/5468



Belgorod Governor
An explosion occurred in the city of Belgorod. I went to the scene of the incident.
⠀
According to preliminary data, five people were injured. A woman with a closed craniocerebral injury and a shrapnel wound of the cheek, a woman with a bruised wound in the temporal region, a shrapnel wound of the shoulder and a closed craniocerebral injury, a man with multiple shrapnel wounds of the head and face, a closed craniocerebral injury, a man with a shrapnel wound to the hips wounded hand, woman with closed head injury. All victims were taken to city hospital No. 2, where they received all the necessary medical care. Thank God, no one is in danger of life.
⠀
At the moment, damage has been detected in 30 private residential households, and 10 cars have also been damaged. Fire crews are extinguishing two fires. I spoke with the owner of the house who suffered the most serious damage. Miraculously, everyone survived. On Monday we will start taking measurements and begin restoration.
⠀
Emergency services are working on the ground. The door-to-door tour continues.

https://t.me/vvgladkov/6625

"Today, the Ukrainian defense forces shot down a Russian Su-25 aircraft in the Donetsk region," President Zelenskyy announced in his evening address. \uD83D\uDE0E\uD83D\uDD25 pic.twitter.com/pWrK5fgPpL

Dr. Khaled Alfaiomi  (@Alfaiomi) May 4, 2024

Archival episodes of a small arms battle near the village of Krynky on the left bank of the Kherson region, through the eyes of our marines
https://twitter.com/small10space/status/1786736143544799715

A major fire is being extinguished in Crimea

In the village of Beloglinka, a one-story warehouse covering 1,000 square meters is on fire. In total, 60 Emergencies Ministry specialists and 14 pieces of equipment are working on site.

Source: tg channel truekpru // Photo: Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia

? ????? ????? ??????? ?????

? ???? ?????????? ????? ??????????? ????? ?? 1000 ?????????? ??????. ????? ?? ????? ???????? 60 ???????????? ??? ? 14 ?????? ???????.

????????: ??-????? truekpru // ????: ??? ??????#???? #?? #??????? pic.twitter.com/9Ic1Bw0TRo

— @kpru (@kpru) May 4, 2024

In Crimea, a fire was localized in a warehouse
The Ministry of Emergency Situations reported the localization of a fire in a warehouse in Crimea


MOSCOW, May 4 - RIA Novosti. A fire with an area of 1 thousand square meters in a one-story warehouse in the Crimea has been localized, the Russian Emergencies Ministry reports in Telegram channel.
Earlier it was reported that rescuers were extinguishing a large fire in Crimea, 60 specialists and 14 pieces of equipment worked on the spot.

"In Crimea, firefighters of the Russian Emergencies Ministry localized the fire on 1,000 square meters," the report says.

According to the Ministry of Emergency Situations, 72 specialists and 21 pieces of equipment are working on the spot.

https://ria.ru/20240504/pozhar-1943883789.html

F16?

What this Russian chemical feedstock for explosive production supply issue @Schizointel  tells us about in his post below...??

Russian Explosive Supply Chain\uD83E\uDDF5
1/ https://t.co/lyuaqtIQdo

Trent Telenko  (@TrentTelenko) May 4, 2024

...means that the Russian TogliattiAzot ammonia production facility just became a priority target for Ukraine's OWA-drone strategic bombing campaign.

The distance by car between Kharkiv, Ukraine and Tolyatti, Russia is 982 km.

2/https://t.co/r7cKlvzHvS pic.twitter.com/mYkV3w9f4H

Trent Telenko  (@TrentTelenko) May 4, 2024

TogliattiAzot is Russia's biggest producer of ammonia.

It's 2012 8-year modernization plan ran into the Western 2014 Crimean/Donbas sanctions.

Russian grain exports peaked in 2018, roughly  after those sanctions caught up.

So, fertilizer is implicated.https://t.co/ipL4ylrn0E

Trent Telenko  (@TrentTelenko) August 7, 2022

It's less by air for a Ukrainian OWA-drone.

And since it was made with Western loans, there is insurance data in the West detailing the lay out of the plant for precision OWA-Drone strikes.

That's an example of the weakness of Soviet Union/Russian "one big plant" industrial… pic.twitter.com/nodqKAVxor

Trent Telenko  (@TrentTelenko) May 4, 2024

That could be a really big boom with two more drones. Hit storage vessel cause large leak and hit again moments
later and hopefully the NH3/air ratio would be boomable.

Daily Ukraine map \uD83E\uDDF5thread for Saturday 4th May 2024

Highlights: Russian forces raise flags in Keramik and Arkhenhelske north of Avdiivka, showcasing their advances over the villages

Ukraine downgrades 1st Ivan Bohun Brigade to a TDF Brigade

Map: https://t.co/jNogrb24rK

1/10 pic.twitter.com/BzpInSwp8x

Ukraine Control Map  (@UAControlMap) May 5, 2024

Hello All, Just released my weekend update. It builds on what @MBielieskov and I talked about in the podcast. That the Russian army is not about to collapse the Ukrainian line, their advances are small and at great cost. Indeed, the update goes into what the most important… pic.twitter.com/SgYWuYbxuw

Phillips P. OBrien  (@PhillipsPOBrien) May 4, 2024

Russian forces occupied Kotlyarivka, most of Arkhanhelske, and the remainder of Ocheretyne. They also advanced in Krasnohorivka and elsewhere along the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk front.https://t.co/o7W7oFzWaehttps://t.co/uH6yK7SyW9 https://t.co/cJ11Djw9CN pic.twitter.com/v4FEKkphnR

Rob Lee  (@RALee85) May 5, 2024

Here are the losses I could identify today. Sorry about the prior post, I accidentally didn't export them all.https://t.co/6ZeZYh00Ln pic.twitter.com/Awe4rz8L4h

Andrew Perpetua  (@AndrewPerpetua) May 5, 2024

1/ It's time to show the rest of BMPs and BTRs left in Russian storage. Here's my final thread on AFV counts. pic.twitter.com/4B1kqhiYPT

Jompy  (@Jonpy99) May 4, 2024

Your thread is gaining traction! #TopUnroll https://t.co/ZjiwW1YNHm \uD83D\uDE4F\uD83C\uDFFC@DwixJorn for \uD83E\uDD47unroll

Thread Reader App  (@threadreaderapp) May 4, 2024

Another good thread by @Jonpy99 summarising the situation in the Russian storage facility. Looking at this graph, I think since about December the supply of referred BMP-2s has slowed down noticeably. https://t.co/rHHkQhUh8r pic.twitter.com/7aJavs2jD8

Richard Vereker  (@verekerrichard1) May 4, 2024

57-year-old sergeant in a Russian artillery unit, Yuriy Galushko apparently killed 6 commanding officers of his division in occupied Donetsk and disappeared with his AK-12 machine gun. The Russians fear he will defect to Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/4ZgGWZNTgD

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 5, 2024

Don't bet on it. The overwhelming majority of the Russian people support the war and very few of the citizens in St. Petersburg or Moscow are suffering the consequences. What Siberia thinks or suffers is of no consequence.

Russian media has been laying the foundation for this fascist campaign for well over a decade. That's a long time for independent thinkers to resist.

I'm not betting on it, but in July 2018 the German Army looked very strong and in the summer of 1916 the Russian Army was winning battles.

Putin has learned a lot of lessons from history, 1917 and other revolutions/successions. He's managed to create a system that blocks both meaningful public dissent and rival political opponents within his own network. As a specimen of authoritarianism it's pretty impressive; he really is a modern Hitler or Stalin.

Also recall the 1420 videos from the six months leading up to Russia's elections. Support for Putin was consistently extremely high, both in urban and rural populations. Among the young, people who know they can never have political power just profess to be apolitical.

Maybe in late 2022 when the initial efforts were a disaster, Russia may have been more brittle. Since the war has solidified and Russia is grinding away, there is no practical reason why Putin or the war should face serious domestic opposition. The only thing that could change that would be serious economic disruption, like cutting off Russia's oil & gas income.

A good start!!

Protests against the foreign agents’ law continue in Tbilisi despite Easter celebrations. \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA

pic.twitter.com/h6ag8p5UJU

— Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) May 4, 2024

What a picture!

Tbilisi right now. Protesters are celebrating Easter in front of the Parliament and the Kashveti Church. The inscription made by candles reads: “Language, Homeland, Unity, Faith - \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA EU”

\uD83D\uDCF8Artem Monaghan pic.twitter.com/EZhbZXcoFq

Giorgi Revishvili  (@revishvilig) May 4, 2024

#Tbilisi: “Christ has risen." Today along with the protesting #RussianLaw, Christians, atheists, and Muslims are celebrating Easter together in the streets of the capital. They brought and swapped red eggs and Easter cakes to honour tradition. I call this unity in diversity. \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA pic.twitter.com/980pjE5Agg

— Little Soldier Fella \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA (@soldier_fella) May 5, 2024

Absolute goosebumps!

A protester performs Ave Maria in front of the Kashveti Church in Tbilisi as people celebrate Easter.

Georgia belongs in the European Union \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA

\uD83D\uDCF8Gvantsa Chkheidze pic.twitter.com/ufIN2qNiGQ

Giorgi Revishvili  (@revishvilig) May 4, 2024

Reminder of how Russians invaded #Georgia and installed puppet regime. You did not care then. You better care now #Tbilisi pic.twitter.com/vozCj89YDU

— AnnaOdesa, MD (@DrAnnaPirates) May 4, 2024

Last name is distinctly Ukrainian, although people moved around so much inside the Soviet Union that it doesn't mean much.

Nine minutes of Brad footage.

I made a compilation of Bradley footage from Ukraine.
Doin what it was built to do, ripping through Russian invaders and equipment \uD83E\uDD17
If you like it, throw a few bucks at a fundraiser helping Ukraine \uD83E\uDEE1
I would support @Y_Chornomorets and the Ukrainian snipers \uD83D\uDE0F#TeamYuri https://t.co/q2FfYPIGPk pic.twitter.com/jwRhqZgq7Z

— Kvist.P \uD83C\uDDE9\uD83C\uDDF0\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@kvistp) May 4, 2024

Donetsk Oblast, a Ukrainian drone drops a 40mm grenade on a pile of TM-62 antitank landmines, setting off a massive explosion. pic.twitter.com/mlKXlYalxv

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) May 4, 2024

Source- https://t.co/c9tAGkEKLc

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) May 4, 2024

I mean, I wouldn't think so, but...

Footage of F-16 fighter jets bearing the insignia of the Ukrainian Air Force were shown in a video greeting by Air Force Commander Mykola Oleshchuk on the 20th anniversary of the Kharkiv National University of the Air Force. pic.twitter.com/1SsO9SsJWU

— NOELREPORTS \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@NOELreports) May 4, 2024

It‘s a rendering. Not the real jets … yet.

Trontir  (@Trontir) May 4, 2024

Side story-
An AI-controlled fighter jet took the Air Force leader for a historic ride. What that means for war

By TARA COPP
ASSOCIATED PRESS • May 3, 2024


EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. — With the midday sun blazing, an experimental orange and white F-16 fighter jet launched with a familiar roar that is a hallmark of U.S. airpower. But the aerial combat that followed was unlike any other: This F-16 was controlled by artificial intelligence, not a human pilot. And riding in the front seat was Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall.

AI marks one of the biggest advances in military aviation since the introduction of stealth in the early 1990s, and the Air Force has aggressively leaned in. Even though the technology is not fully developed, the service is planning for an AI-enabled fleet of more than 1,000 unmanned warplanes, the first of them operating by 2028.

It was fitting that the dogfight took place at Edwards Air Force Base, a vast desert facility where Chuck Yeager broke the speed of sound and the military has incubated its most secret aerospace advances. Inside classified simulators and buildings with layers of shielding against surveillance, a new test-pilot generation is training AI agents to fly in war. Kendall traveled here to see AI fly in real time and make a public statement of confidence in its future role in air combat.

“It’s a security risk not to have it. At this point, we have to have it,” Kendall said in an interview with The Associated Press after he landed. The AP, along with NBC, was granted permission to witness the secret flight on the condition that it would not be reported until it was complete because of operational security concerns.

The AI-controlled F-16, called Vista, flew Kendall in lightning-fast maneuvers at more than 550 miles an hour that put pressure on his body at five times the force of gravity. It went nearly nose to nose with a second human-piloted F-16 as both aircraft raced within 1,000 feet of each other, twisting and looping to try force their opponent into vulnerable positions.

At the end of the hourlong flight, Kendall climbed out of the cockpit grinning. He said he’d seen enough during his flight that he’d trust this still-learning AI with the ability to decide whether or not to launch weapons in war.

There’s a lot of opposition to that idea. Arms control experts and humanitarian groups are deeply concerned that AI one day might be able to autonomously drop bombs that kill people without further human consultation, and they are seeking greater restrictions on its use.

“There are widespread and serious concerns about ceding life-and-death decisions to sensors and software,” the International Committee of the Red Cross has warned. Autonomous weapons “are an immediate cause of concern and demand an urgent, international political response.”

Kendall said there will always be human oversight in the system when weapons are used.

The military’s shift to AI-enabled planes is driven by security, cost and strategic capability. If the U.S. and China should end up in conflict, for example, today’s Air Force fleet of expensive, manned fighters will be vulnerable because of gains on both sides in electronic warfare, space and air defense systems. China’s air force is on pace to outnumber the U.S. and it is also amassing a fleet of flying unmanned weapons.

Future war scenarios envision swarms of American unmanned aircraft providing an advance attack on enemy defenses to give the U.S. the ability to penetrate an airspace without high risk to pilot lives. But the shift is also driven by money. The Air Force is still hampered by production delays and cost overruns in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which will cost an estimated of $1.7 trillion.

Smaller and cheaper AI-controlled unmanned jets are the way ahead, Kendall said.

Vista’s military operators say no other country in the world has an AI jet like it, where the software first learns on millions of data points in a simulator, then tests its conclusions during actual flights. That real-world performance data is then put back into the simulator where the AI then processes it to learn more.

China has AI, but there’s no indication it has found a way to run tests outside a simulator. And, like a junior officer first learning tactics, some lessons can only be learned in the air, Vista’s test pilots said.

Until you actually fly, “it’s all guesswork,” chief test pilot Bill Gray said. “And the longer it takes you to figure that out, the longer it takes before you have useful systems.”

Vista flew its first AI-controlled dogfight in September 2023, and there have only been about two dozen similar flights since. But the programs are learning so quickly from each engagement that some AI versions getting tested on Vista are already beating human pilots in air-to-air combat.

The pilots at this base are aware that in some respects, they may be training their replacements or shaping a future construct where fewer of them are needed.

But they also say they would not want to be up in the sky against an adversary that has AI-controlled aircraft if the U.S. does not also have its own fleet.

“We have to keep running. And we have to run fast,” Kendall said.

https://www.stripes.com/branches/air_force/2024-05-03/ai-controlled-fighter-jet-air-force-secretary-13742736.html

I call BS on that last post.

Georgia background info:
Mikhail Saakashvili was elected President in 2004 after breaking from the incumbent's party (Shevardnadze, whom you might recall from the Soviet era). Saakashvili set himself up as an opposition reform candidate and his party did very well. He was reelected for a second term that saw the invasion of South Ossetia & Abkhazia by Russia. (By the way, those provinces were never solidly Georgian. Ossetia was lumped into Georgia under the USSR, but South Ossetia first declared independence from Georgia SSR in 1990.) Saakashvili held his office after the Russian attack in 2008, serving until 2012. His leadership was irreparably damaged by some murders and beatings of opposition political people that he was credibly linked to. He fled Georgia on leaving office, and was appointed Governor of Odessa. Dual-citizenship laws saw him stripped of Georgian citizenship. He then left Ukraine as well, and had some time in the US and I think Belgium. He was tried in absentia and convicted, was captured on his return to Georgia & jailed.

So Russia never installed a "puppet government" after the invasion, Georgia has suffered its own internal political issues, as parties wax and wane. Certainly, Russia interferes, but I haven't seen anything to say that the current leaders are puppets the way Yanukovich was in Ukraine. It's actually an unfair accusation, since the Georgian government has provided some aid to Ukraine and hosted Ukrainian refugees. They haven't joined sanctions against Russia, but the Russian army is literally on their doorstep.

The Georgian Dream party was established literally to be opposition to Saakashvili, and has had its own leadership issues in the last few years. Some say the party has changed is positions on some issues, and several members have resigned, leaving them in a coalition government. Georgian Dream was the strong plurality vote winner in the most recent elections, and won 63 of 64 mayoral seats in addition to their bloc in Parliament.

As for the "Russian law," the proposal is to call any group receiving more than 20% of is funding from outside the country as a "foreign agent." That's not exactly as harsh as the Russian "foreign agent" designation, where anybody that makes public speeches against Putin can get the label. It is a bad sign for a country that is almost certainly a future target for Russian annexation. In that sense, the spirit of that tweet is on point, even if the facts are wrong.

Gee, it would have been great to have those in 2022.

In the name of Allah, the most gracious, the most merciful

The Yemeni Armed Forces observe the developments of the battle in the Gaza Strip, of the ongoing Israeli-American aggression and serious preparations to carry out an aggressive military operation against the Rafah area, as well as the deal presented to the resistance in which the enemy wants to extract the cabtives card without a permanent ceasefire.

Accordingly;
In implementation of the instructions of Commander Sayyed Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, may Allah protect him, and in triumphing for the oppression of the Palestinian people, and in response to the calls of the Palestinian people, and with the intransigence of the Israeli and American enemy, the Yemeni armed forces announce the beginning of the implementation of the fourth stage of escalation, as follows:

First, the targeting of all ships that violate the ban decision of Israeli navigation and that heading to the ports of occupied Palestine from the Mediterranean Sea in any reachable area within our ample zone.

Second, implementation of this comes into effect immediately and from the moment this statement is announced.

Third: If the Israeli enemy intends to launch an aggressive military operation against Rafah, the Yemeni Armed forces will impose comprehensive sanctions on all ships and companies that are related to supplying and entering the occupied Palestinian ports of any nationality and will prevent all ships of these companies from passing through the armed forces’ operation zone, regardless of their destination.

The Yemeni armed forces, based on the support of the beloved Yemeni people and all the free people of the nation, will not hesitate to prepare for broader and stronger stages of escalation until the aggression is stopped and the siege on the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip is lifted.

Sanaa,
Shawwal 24, 1445 AH
May 3, 2024 AD

Issued by the Yemeni Armed Forces

https://t.me/army21ye/1729






For once I hope this huckster is successful.

\uD83D\uDEA8\uD83C\uDDFE\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8 The HOUTHIS have invited EXPELLED AMERICAN STUDENTS who support Palestine to study in Yemen.

"The University of Sana'a is ready to receive activists." pic.twitter.com/S4KLztQkL1

— Jackson Hinkle \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8 (@jacksonhinklle) May 4, 2024

That's probably exactly right.

That image is frequently posted to represent the Russian invasion, and I want to show where I get things from, but sometimes the accompanying post is...a bit off.

Sparta IV,  a nominally civilian, sanctioned cargo ship left Kaliningrad Apr 15.

She has arrived in the naval base of Tartus, Syria with what looks like artillery and vechicles. https://t.co/faMDGjiW6L

Markus Jonsson  (@auonsson) May 5, 2024

\uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFAMED SEA FLOTILLA\uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFA
0.5M\uD83D\uDCF7(4 May 2024). About as full as I've seen it.

Sparta IV has arrived & lives up to her name as a 'weapons runner'

I see what is likely 2x towed artillery & 13x vehicles on the pier with another 8x vehicles & 1x artillery waiting to be unloaded pic.twitter.com/r7REg2wdoi

— MT Anderson (@MT_Anderson) May 5, 2024

Everyone in port except Varyag, Shaposhnikov & Merkury@KaptainLOMA @Dmojavensis @auonsson @FouthTimeLucky @intercityfc @SMACT72 @tillykium @Saturnax1 @TiaFarris10 @WarshipCam @ItaMilRadar @CovertShores @vcdgf555 @charly0153 @brit_bearded55 @HamWa07 @Schizointel @TheIntelFrog

— MT Anderson (@MT_Anderson) May 5, 2024

Swedish Archer kills Russian Msta-S 152mm.  Confirmed destroyed by spotter.

Long-format video, Russian infantry squad assault on Ukrainian trench repelled by mortars and small-arms.  Firefight at 20 yards, one Russian probably hit.  Good video!

Ukrainian reporters trapped in a cellar with a Ukrainian unit when their small village is overrun by a Russian mechanized attack.  Finally all of them get out with coordination from nearby artillery, drone, and infantry units.  Hairy stuff.

If this doesn’t convince you to want to die in terror and horrible agony in Ukraine, I don’t know what will!

Feature on drones, UGVs, jamming, EW, and related topics.

Reported as a firefight with UA marines on the east bank of Kherson

UA source - Russian domestic gas shortages as a result of refinery bombings

Chinese company to build a higher-end military drone factory in Russia

Another UA source on reportedly decreased Russian oil exports.

Ukrainian MI-24 direct attacks on Hostomel at the start of the war.

RUAF drops a glide bomb on Belgorod, damaging a considerable number of houses.

Russian soldier’s appeal.  Says his commanders want to “null“ (execute) him and another soldier.  Says right now that four soldiers at his own position have been executed and that it’s common in his unit, they just bury the bodies in a marsh and call them missing in action.

Russian sheltering by knocked-out tank takes a direct drone drop.

Russian BMP-1 burning, probably due to a mine.

9-minute TERRA drone drop/kamikaze ops.  First video is yet another example of a Russian committing suicide after being wounded by drone.

Ukrainian night live fire training exercise

One-off MRAP prototype purchased by donors in the US to send to Ukraine

BBC article on the NK supply of missiles to Russia

Odesa citizens thanking soldiers on Orthodox Easter

Star Wars Day!

Russian Msta-S destroyed by kamikaze, spotter confirmed.  Title says they’d been hunting for it for a week.

Kamikaze hits BTR with infantry on top

Thermal kamikaze hits and burns out Russian BTR

Thermal drone direct-hits two Russians with two accurate munitions drops.  Both likely killed.

Series of kamikaze hits on Russian troops and vehicles.  A few repeats.  All HARD hits.

Series of drone drops on Russian troops.  Some brutal.  NSFW.

Double drop direct hits a Russian playing dead.  NSFW.

Two kamikazes hit a Russian in the Krynky area.  Might be old.

Drone drops flush out and likely kill a Russian hiding next to destroyed armor.

Series of kamikaze strikes and drops on Russian vehicles and positions.

Russian manages to hit a kamikaze with his backpack, results unknown.

Kamikaze kills a Russian on a quadrunner

Series of NV kamikaze attacks on Russian transport.  Based on the reactions of some vehicles, it seems that they may be using at least Gen 1 NV goggles or COTS IR cameras which might be able to see active IR from the drones.

Drone drop wounds a Russian waiting beside another wounded Russian

Kamikaze seriously wounds a lone Russian

Series of accurate grenade drops on Russians in trench.  Possibly Kremmina.

How US sanctions are strangling Putin’s ambitions to grow LNG exports
\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8 \uD83E\uDD4A\uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFA

Arctic LNG 2 has been ready to start exports for months

And yet it sits virtually idle, the first piece of Russia’s energy complex to be halted by US restrictions

A thread \uD83E\uDDF5https://t.co/ehXYUPycw3

Stephen Stapczynski  (@SStapczynski) May 5, 2024

Good stuff.



Also-

I guess forcibly annexing people who don’t want to be apart of your empire is not going so well. Not everyone is as down with it

Is this like a Ukraine vs Russia thread 2.0? Sure looks like it.

Watch an AC-130J Ghostrider gunship aircraft of the #USAF's 27th SOW hunting boats during exercise #Balikatan2024 of the Philippines Armed Forces. Soon or late, these AC-130Js can hunt Chinese Coast Guard vessels during any possible maritime conflict with #China. pic.twitter.com/yYZiTZ1v4B

Babak Taghvaee - The Crisis Watch  (@BabakTaghvaee1) May 2, 2024

\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8–\uD83C\uDDF5\uD83C\uDDED@PhilAirForce positions surface-to-air defense systems alongside @USARPAC defense systems during #Balikatan24, strengthening interoperability and combined capabilities supporting mutual defense priorities in the #FreeAndOpenIndoPacific.

\uD83D\uDCCD #Philippines

\uD83D\uDCF8 Maj Trevor Wild pic.twitter.com/eExZl2It8t

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command  (@INDOPACOM) May 4, 2024

Departing #USINDOPACOM Commander Adm. John C. Aquilino retired today after serving over 40 years in the @USNavy.

\uD83D\uDCCD #Hawaii

\uD83D\uDCF8 MC1 John Bellino pic.twitter.com/m3suajFW7O

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command  (@INDOPACOM) May 4, 2024

Great video thank you

#India unique country with a very open society: FM Jaishankar rejects Biden's 'xenophobic' remarks

External affairs minister S Jaishankar pushed back against recent assertions made by US President Joe Biden characterizing India as "xenophobic," highlighting India's history of… pic.twitter.com/68UmoMlC9M

— Indo-Pacific News - Geo-Politics & Defense (@IndoPac_Info) May 5, 2024

Click To View Spoiler