First off, tremendous props to LoBrau, who saw Ukraine coming well in advance and started a record setting thread. May that record stand forever, because nothing would please us more than for there to no longer be anything to talk about.

What has become evident since February of 2022 is that there is a global reshuffling taking place, with three primary players behind most of the conflict in the world today. Discussion of current geopolitics cannot be constrained to one country or conflict.

What this thread is:
News and discussion related to political / military actions by Russia / Iran / China and their proxies, chief among those, North Korea.
News and discussion of the relationships between Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
News and discussion of responses to Russia / Iran / China and their proxies.
Related Grey Zone / hybrid warfare / “competition short of war.”
Relevant or interesting technical discussion.
Relevant economic / social / historical discussion.
Reliable reporting from Russian / Iranian / Chinese sources.
Russian / Iranian / Chinese perspectives and factual evaluation thereof.
Political topics in the US and / or elsewhere which bear directly on these issues, including the politics of foreign aid.
Current focus is on the Russian war against and in Ukraine, however this could change if the Ukraine war cooled off and Taiwan heated up.  Related topics are always allowed.
Secondary but related topics like Wagner in Africa, uprising in Georgia, or a Third Chechen War.
Reasonable tangents.

What this thread is not:
US and / or foreign political issues which do not directly bear on these topics, including campaigning / advocating for one party or candidate.

General rules:
Discussion is expected to be conducted in good faith and assertions of fact should be substantiated.
In case of a question on whether a subtopic or line of discussion is relevant to this thread, the following members should be considered co-owners with decision making authority- AlmightyTallest, Capta, and SaltwaterHillbilly.

The Axis of Upheaval
How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order
By Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine
May/June 2024
Published on April 23, 2024

In the early morning of January 2, Russian forces launched a massive missile attack on the Ukrainian cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv that killed at least five civilians, injured more than 100, and damaged infrastructure. The incident was notable not just for the harm it caused but also because it showed that Russia was not alone in its fight. The Russian attack that day was carried out with weapons fitted with technology from China, missiles from North Korea, and drones from Iran. Over the past two years, all three countries have become critical enablers of Moscow’s war machine in Ukraine.

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Moscow has deployed more than 3,700 Iranian-designed drones. Russia now produces at least 330 on its own each month and is collaborating with Iran on plans to build a new drone factory inside Russia that will boost these numbers. North Korea has sent Russia ballistic missiles and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, just as Ukrainian stockpiles have dwindled. China, for its part, has become Russia’s most important lifeline. Beijing has ramped up its purchase of Russian oil and gas, putting billions of dollars into Moscow’s coffers. Just as significantly, China provides vast amounts of warfighting technology, from semiconductors and electronic devices to radar- and communications-jamming equipment and jet-fighter parts. Customs records show that despite Western trade sanctions, Russia’s imports of computer chips and chip components have been steadily rising toward prewar levels. More than half of these goods come from China.

The support from China, Iran, and North Korea has strengthened Russia’s position on the battlefield, undermined Western attempts to isolate Moscow, and harmed Ukraine. This collaboration, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Cooperation among the four countries was expanding before 2022, but the war has accelerated their deepening economic, military, political, and technological ties. The four powers increasingly identify common interests, match up their rhetoric, and coordinate their military and diplomatic activities. Their convergence is creating a new axis of upheaval—a development that is fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape.

The group is not an exclusive bloc and certainly not an alliance. It is, instead, a collection of dissatisfied states converging on a shared purpose of overturning the principles, rules, and institutions that underlie the prevailing international system. When these four countries cooperate, their actions have far greater effect than the sum of their individual efforts. Working together, they enhance one another’s military capabilities; dilute the efficacy of U.S. foreign policy tools, including sanctions; and hinder the ability of Washington and its partners to enforce global rules. Their collective aim is to create an alternative to the current order, which they consider to be dominated by the United States.

Too many Western observers have been quick to dismiss the implications of coordination among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The four countries have their differences, to be sure, and a history of distrust and contemporary fissures may limit how close their relationships will grow. Yet their shared aim of weakening the United States and its leadership role provides a strong adhesive. In places across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, the ambitions of axis members have already proved to be destabilizing. Managing the disruptive effects of their further coordination and preventing the axis from upsetting the global system must now be central objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

THE ANTI-WESTERN CLUB

Collaboration among axis members is not new. China and Russia have been strengthening their partnership since the end of the Cold War—a trend that accelerated rapidly after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. China’s share of Russian external trade doubled from ten to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021, and between 2018 and 2022 Russia supplied a combined total of 83 percent of China’s arms imports. Russian technology has helped the Chinese military enhance its air defense, antiship, and submarine capabilities, making China a more formidable force in a potential naval conflict. Beijing and Moscow have also expressed a shared vision. In early 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a joint manifesto pledging a “no limits” partnership between their two countries and calling for “international relations of a new type”—in other words, a multipolar system that is no longer dominated by the United States.

Iran has strengthened its ties with other axis members as well. Iran and Russia worked together to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power after the onset of civil war in 2011. Joining Russia’s efforts, which include major energy agreements with Iran to shield Tehran from the effects of U.S. sanctions, China has purchased large quantities of Iranian oil since 2020. North Korea, for its part, has counted China as its primary ally and trade partner for decades, and North Korea and Russia have maintained warm, if not particularly substantive, ties. Iran has purchased North Korean missiles since the 1980s, and more recently, North Korea is thought to have supplied weapons to Iranian proxy groups, including Hezbollah and possibly Hamas. Pyongyang and Tehran have also bonded over a shared aversion to Washington: as a senior North Korean official, Kim Yong Nam, declared during a ten-day trip to Iran in 2017, the two countries “have a common enemy.”

But the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 hastened the convergence among these four countries in ways that transcend their historical ties. Moscow has been among Tehran’s top suppliers of weapons over the past two decades and is now its largest source of foreign investment; Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent in the first ten months of 2022. Over the past two years, according to the White House, Russia has been sharing more intelligence with and providing more weapons to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies, and Moscow has defended those proxies in debates at the UN Security Council. Last year, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China’s largest source of crude oil and trade between the two countries topped $240 billion, a record high. Moscow has also released millions of dollars in North Korean assets that previously sat frozen in Russian banks in compliance with Security Council sanctions. China, Iran, and Russia have held joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman three years in a row, most recently in March 2024. Russia has also proposed trilateral naval drills with China and North Korea.

The growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia is fueled by their shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, an antagonism rooted in their belief that that system does not accord them the status or freedom of action they deserve. Each country claims a sphere of influence: China’s “core interests,” which extend to Taiwan and the South China Sea; Iran’s “axis of resistance,” the set of proxy groups that give Tehran leverage in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; North Korea’s claim to the entire Korean Peninsula; and Russia’s “near abroad,” which for the Kremlin includes, at a minimum, the countries that composed its historic empire. All four countries see the United States as the primary obstacle to establishing these spheres of influence, and they want Washington’s presence in their respective regions reduced.

All reject the principle of universal values and interpret the West’s championing of its brand of democracy as an attempt to undermine their legitimacy and foment domestic instability. They insist that individual states have the right to define democracy for themselves. In the end, although they may make temporary accommodations with the United States, they do not believe that the West will accept their rise (or return) to power on the world stage. They oppose external meddling in their internal affairs, the expansion of U.S. alliances, the stationing of American nuclear weapons abroad, and the use of coercive sanctions.

Any positive vision for the future, however, is more elusive. Yet history shows that a positive agenda may not be necessary for a group of discontented powers to cause disruption. The 1940 Tripartite Pact uniting Germany, Italy, and Japan—the original “Axis”—pledged to “establish and maintain a new order of things” in which each country would claim “its own proper place.” They did not succeed, but World War II certainly brought global upheaval. The axis of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia does not need a coherent plan for an alternative international order to upset the existing system. The countries’ shared opposition to the present order’s core tenets and their determination to bring about change form a powerful basis for collaborative action.

Fissures do exist among members of the axis. China and Russia vie for influence in Central Asia, for instance, while Iran and Russia compete for oil markets in China, India, and elsewhere in Asia. The four countries have complicated histories with each other, too. The Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941; Russia and China settled their long-standing border dispute only in 2004 and had both previously supported efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear programs and to isolate North Korea. Today, China may look askance at North Korea’s deepening relationship with Russia, worrying that an emboldened Kim Jong Un will aggravate tensions in Northeast Asia and draw in a larger U.S. military presence, which China does not want. Yet their differences are insufficient to dissolve the bonds forged by their common resistance to a Western-dominated world.

CATALYST IN THE KREMLIN

Moscow has been the main instigator of this axis. The invasion of Ukraine marked a point of no return in Putin’s long-standing crusade against the West. Putin has grown more committed to destroying not only Ukraine but also the global order. And he has doubled down on relationships with like-minded countries to accomplish his aims. Cut off from Western trade, investment, and technology since the start of the war, Moscow has had little choice but to rely on its partners to sustain its hostilities. The ammunition, drones, microchips, and other forms of aid that axis members have sent have been of great help to Russia. But the more the Kremlin relies on these countries, the more it must give away in return. Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran are taking advantage of their leverage over Moscow to expand their military capabilities and economic options.

Even before the Russian invasion, Moscow’s military assistance to Beijing was eroding the United States’ military advantage over China. Russia has provided ever more sophisticated weapons to China, and the two countries’ joint military exercises have grown in scope and frequency. Russian officers who have fought in Syria and in Ukraine’s Donbas region have shared valuable lessons with Chinese personnel, helping the People’s Liberation Army make up for its lack of operational experience—a notable weakness relative to more seasoned U.S. forces. China’s military modernization has reduced the urgency of deepening defense cooperation with Russia, but the two countries are likely to proceed with technology transfers and joint weapons development and production. In February, for instance, Russian officials confirmed that they were working with Chinese counterparts on military applications of artificial intelligence. Moscow retains an edge over Beijing in other key areas, including submarine technology, remote sensing satellites, and aircraft engines. If China can pressure a more dependent Russia to provide additional advanced technologies, the transfer could further undermine the United States’ advantages.

A similar dynamic is playing out in Russia’s relations with Iran and North Korea. Moscow and Tehran have forged what the Biden administration has called an “unprecedented defense partnership” that upgrades Iranian military capabilities. Russia has provided Iran with advanced aircraft, air defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cyber-capabilities that would help Tehran resist a potential U.S. or Israeli military operation. And in return for North Korea’s ammunition and other military support to Russia, Pyongyang is reportedly seeking advanced space, missile, and submarine technology from Moscow. If Russia were to comply with those requests, North Korea would be able to improve the accuracy and survivability of its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles and use Russian nuclear propulsion technology to expand the range and capability of its submarines. Already, Russia’s testing of North Korean weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine has supplied Pyongyang with information it can use to refine its missile program, and Russian assistance may have helped North Korea launch a military spy satellite in November after two previous failures last year.

Strong relations among the four axis countries have emboldened leaders in Pyongyang and Tehran. Kim, who now enjoys strong backing from both China and Russia, abandoned North Korea’s decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and stepped up its threats against Seoul, indulged in nuclear blackmail and missile tests, and expressed a lack of any interest in talks with the United States. And although there does not appear to be a direct connection between their deepening partnership and Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, growing support from Russia likely made Iran more willing to activate its regional proxies in the aftermath. The coordinated diplomacy and pressure from Russia and the West that brought Iran into the 2015 nuclear deal are now a distant memory. Today, Moscow and Beijing are helping Tehran resist Western coercion, making it easier for Iran to enrich uranium and reject Washington’s efforts to negotiate a new nuclear agreement.

AMERICA UNDERMINED

Collaboration among the axis members also reduces the potency of tools that Washington and its partners often use to confront them. In the most glaring example, since the start of the war in Ukraine, China has supplied Russia with semiconductors and other essential technologies that Russia previously imported from the West, undercutting the efficacy of Western export controls. All four countries are also working to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar. The share of Russia’s imports invoiced in Chinese renminbi jumped from three percent in 2021 to 20 percent in 2022. And in December 2023, Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct bilateral trade in their local currencies. By moving their economic transactions out of reach of U.S. enforcement measures, axis members undermine the efficacy of Western sanctions, as well as anticorruption and anti-money-laundering efforts.

Taking advantage of their shared borders and littoral zones, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia can build trade and transportation networks safe from U.S. interdiction. Iran, for example, ships drones and other weapons to Russia across the Caspian Sea, where the United States has little power to stop transfers. If the United States were engaged in conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing could seek support from Moscow. Russia might increase its overland exports of oil and gas to its southern neighbor, reducing China’s dependence on maritime energy imports that U.S. forces could block during a conflict. Russia’s defense industrial base, now in overdrive to supply weapons for Russian troops in Ukraine, could later pivot to sustain a Chinese war effort. Such cooperation would increase the odds of China’s prevailing over the American military and help advance Russia’s goal of diminishing the United States’ geopolitical influence.

The axis is also hindering Washington’s ability to rally international coalitions that can stand against its members’ destabilizing actions. China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, made it far easier for countries across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to do the same. And Beijing and Moscow have impeded Western efforts to isolate Iran. Last year, they elevated Iran from observer to member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a predominantly Asian regional body, and then orchestrated an invitation for Iran to join the BRICS—a group that China and Russia view as a counterweight to the West. Iran’s regional meddling and nuclear pursuits have made other countries wary of dealing with its government, but its participation in international forums enhances the regime’s legitimacy and presents it with opportunities to expand trade with fellow member states.

Parallel efforts by axis members in the information domain further weaken international support for U.S. positions. China, Iran, and North Korea either defended or avoided explicitly condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and they all parroted the Kremlin in accusing NATO of inciting the war. Their response to Hamas’s attacks on Israel last October followed a similar pattern. Iran used the state media and social media accounts to express support for Hamas, vilify Israel, and denounce the United States for enabling Israel’s military response, while the Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese media sharply criticized the United States’ enduring support for Israel. They used the war in Gaza to portray Washington as a destabilizing, domineering force in the world—a narrative that is particularly resonant in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Even if axis members do not overtly coordinate their messages, they push the same themes, and the repetition makes them appear more credible and persuasive.

AN ALTERNATIVE ORDER?

Global orders magnify the strength of the powerful states that lead them. The United States, for instance, has invested in the liberal international order it helped create because this order reflects American preferences and extends U.S. influence. As long as an order remains sufficiently beneficial to most members, a core group of states will defend it. Dissenting countries, meanwhile, are bound by a collective action problem. If they were to defect en masse, they could succeed in creating an alternative order more to their liking. But without a core cluster of powerful states around which they can coalesce, the advantage remains with the existing order.

For decades, threats to the U.S.-led order were limited to a handful of rogue states with little power to upend it. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the restructuring of interstate relations it prompted have lifted the constraint on collective action. The axis of upheaval represents a new center of gravity, a group that other countries dissatisfied with the existing order can turn to. The axis is ushering in an international system characterized by two orders that are becoming increasingly organized and competitive.

Historically, competing orders have invited conflict, especially at the geographical seams between them. Wars arise from specific conditions, such as a territorial dispute, the need to protect national interests or the interests of an ally, or a threat to the survival of a regime. But the likelihood that any of those conditions will lead to war increases in the presence of dueling orders. Some political science researchers have found that periods in which a single order prevailed—the balance-of-power system maintained by the Concert of Europe for much of the nineteenth century, for example, or the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War era—were less prone to conflicts than those characterized by more than one order, such as the multipolar period between the two world wars and the bipolar system of the Cold War.

The world has gotten a preview of the instability this new era of competing orders will bring, with potential aggressors empowered by the axis’s normalization of alternative rules and less afraid of being isolated if they act out. Already, Hamas’s attack on Israel threatens to engulf the wider Middle East in war. Last October, Azerbaijan forcibly took control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region inhabited by ethnic Armenians. Tensions flared between Serbia and Kosovo in 2023, too, and Venezuela threatened to seize territory in neighboring Guyana in December. Although internal conditions precipitated the coups in Myanmar and across Africa’s Sahel region since 2020, the rising incidence of such revolts is connected to the new international arrangement. For many years, it seemed that coups were becoming less common, in large part because plotters faced significant costs for violating norms. Now, however, the calculations have changed. Overthrowing a government may still shatter relations with the West, but the new regimes can find support in Beijing and Moscow.

Further development of the axis would bring even greater tumult. So far, most collaboration among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia has been bilateral. Trilateral and quadrilateral action could expand their capacity for disruption. Countries such as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—all of which chafe against the U.S.-led, Western-dominated system—could also begin working more closely with the axis. If the group grows in size and tightens its coordination, the United States and its allies will have a more difficult time defending the recognized order.

TAKING ON THE REVISIONISTS

For now, U.S. national security strategy ranks China as a higher priority than Iran, North Korea, or even Russia. That assessment is strategically sound when considering the threat that individual countries pose to the United States, but it does not fully account for the cooperation among them. U.S. policy will need to address the destabilizing effects of revisionist countries’ acting in concert, and it should try to disrupt their coordinated efforts to subvert important international rules and institutions. Washington, furthermore, should undercut the axis’s appeal by sharpening the attractions of the existing order.

If the United States is to counter an increasingly coordinated axis, it cannot treat each threat as an isolated phenomenon. Washington should not ignore Russian aggression in Europe, for example, in order to focus on rising Chinese power in Asia. It is already clear that Russia’s success in Ukraine benefits a revisionist China by showing that it is possible, if costly, to thwart a united Western effort. Even as Washington rightly sees China as its top priority, addressing the challenge from Beijing will require competing with other members of the axis in other parts of the world. To be effective, the United States will need to devote additional resources to national security, engage in more vigorous diplomacy, develop new and stronger partnerships, and take a more activist role in the world than it has of late.

Driving wedges between members of the axis, on the other hand, will not work. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some strategists suggested that the United States align itself with Russia to balance China. After the war began, a few held out hope that the United States could join China in an anti-Russian coalition. But unlike President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in the 1970s, which took advantage of a Sino-Soviet split to draw Beijing further away from Moscow, there is no equivalent ideological or geopolitical rivalry for Washington to exploit today. The price of trying would likely involve U.S. recognition of a Russian or Chinese sphere of influence in Europe and Asia—regions central to U.S. interests and ones that Washington should not allow a hostile foreign power to dominate. Breaking Iran or North Korea off from the rest of the axis would be even more difficult, given their governments’ revisionist, even revolutionary aims. Ultimately, the axis is a problem the United States must manage, not one it can solve with grand strategic gestures.

Neither the West nor the axis will become wholly distinct political, military, and economic blocs. Each coalition will compete for influence all over the world, trying to draw vital countries closer to its side. Six “global swing states” will be particularly important: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey are all middle powers with enough collective geopolitical weight for their policy preferences to sway the future direction of the international order. These six countries—and others, too—can be expected to pursue economic, diplomatic, military, and technological ties with members of both orders. U.S. policymakers should make it a priority to deny advantages to the axis in these countries, encouraging their governments to choose policies that favor the prevailing order. In practice, that means using trade incentives, military engagement, foreign aid, and diplomacy to prevent swing states from hosting axis members’ military bases, giving axis members access to their technology infrastructure or military equipment, or helping them circumvent Western sanctions.

Although competition with the axis may be inevitable, the United States must try to avoid direct conflict with any of its members. To that end, Washington should reaffirm its security commitments to bolster deterrence in the western Pacific, in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, and on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States and its allies should also prepare for opportunistic aggression. If a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prompts U.S. military intervention, for instance, Russia may be tempted to move against another European country, and Iran or North Korea could escalate threats in their regions. Even if the axis members do not coordinate their aggression directly, concurrent conflicts could overwhelm the West. Washington will therefore need to press allies to invest in capabilities that the United States could not provide if it were already engaged in another military theater.

Confronting the axis will be expensive. A new strategy will require the United States to bolster its spending on defense, foreign aid, diplomacy, and strategic communications. Washington must direct aid to the frontlines of conflict between the axis and the West—including assistance to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine, all of which face encroachment by axis members. Revisionists are emboldened by the sense that political divisions at home or exhaustion with international engagement will keep the United States on the sidelines of this competition; a comprehensive, well-resourced U.S. strategy with bipartisan support would help counter that impression. The alternative—a reduction in the U.S. global presence—would leave the fate of crucial regions in the hands not of friendly local powers but of axis members seeking to impose their revisionist and illiberal preferences.

THE FOUR-POWER THREAT

There is a tendency to downplay the significance of growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. By turning to Beijing, this argument goes, Moscow merely signals its acceptance of the role of junior partner. Obtaining drones from Iran and munitions from North Korea demonstrates the desperation of a Russian war machine that incorrectly assumed that conquering Ukraine would be easy. China’s embrace of Russia shows only that Beijing could not achieve the positive relationship it originally sought with Europe and other Western powers. North Korea remains the world’s most isolated country, and Iran’s disruptive activities have backfired, strengthening regional cooperation among Israel, the United States, and Gulf countries.

Such analysis ignores the severity of the threat. Four powers, growing in strength and coordination, are united in their opposition to the prevailing world order and its U.S. leadership. Their combined economic and military capacity, together with their determination to change the way the world has worked since the end of the Cold War, make for a dangerous mix. This is a group bent on upheaval, and the United States and its partners must treat the axis as the generational challenge it is. They must reinforce the foundations of the international order and push back against those who act most vigorously to undermine it. It is likely impossible to arrest the emergence of this new axis, but keeping it from upending the current system is an achievable goal.

The West has everything it needs to triumph in this contest. Its combined economy is far larger, its militaries are significantly more powerful, its geography is more advantageous, its values are more attractive, and its democratic system is more stable. The United States and its partners should be confident in their own strengths, even as they appreciate the scale of effort necessary to compete with this budding anti-Western coalition. The new axis has already changed the picture of geopolitics—but Washington and its partners can still prevent the world of upheaval the axis hopes to usher in.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine

@cpermd
Link  

UKRAINIAN TANK KILLS RUSSIAN TANK AT CLOSE RANGE

There is now a song about UAZs!

Ukrainian girl and her grandma killed in Russian shelling

Germany contracts for several radars for Ukraine

Russian T90 hit with a barrage of kamikazes

CANDYGRAM FOR MONGO

Variety of kamikaze and dropper hits o Russian troops and knocked-out vehicles.  Some repeats, but some good new stuff.  NSFW

Series of drone drops.  Notable for two cases of drone close air support for Ukrainians in direct close-range contact.  Good videos.

Drone work against a Russian night infantry assault.  Their APC runs over a mine and the infantry cleaned up one by one.

TB-2 compilation from early war.  Some I remember, some I don’t.

Reported as a series of airstrikes on Russian-held buildings.

EXTREEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEMELY NSFW.  Drone drop direct hits Russian in the hip.  One you may not want to see.  What a fucking waste.

People spontaneously headed to the GD headquarters. (Same in Kutaisi). Yeah… I don’t think the GD’s strategy of extending public holidays in hopes of people leaving Tbilisi will work in their favor. It’s Good Friday and you see the picture. #GeorgiaProtests #NoToRussianLaw pic.twitter.com/iQSV65uhJs

— Marika Mikiashvili \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA (@Mikiashvili_M) May 3, 2024

Crowds march by Georgian Dream’s party office, blocking embarkment, one of Tbilisi’s main arteries pic.twitter.com/RXsMrF9jdM

— Formula NEWS | English (@FormulaGe) May 3, 2024

#Tbilisi unique tactics: "violent" Georgian protesters strike back against riot police water cannons with water guns. \uD83D\uDCA6\uD83D\uDD2B pic.twitter.com/NriZhDYGwo

— Girchi•More Freedom (@GIRCHIMF) May 3, 2024

Today we paralyzed Tbilisi from 18:00 till 04:00.

They didn’t even try to use robocops this time. It was very rainy so they thought we would disperse. Well guess what? We didn’t.

Using robocops on hero square is futile. The terrain heavily favors us. ?\uD83C\uDFFB\uD83D\uDD25 pic.twitter.com/hIw1KxMaIQ

— General George Fella \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@jezko_fella) May 3, 2024

Adorbs.

Tbilisi  #NoToRussianLaw

Our little participant and police

\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83E\uDEF6\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83E\uDE77\uD83E\uDE77\uD83E\uDE77\uD83E\uDE77\uD83E\uDE77\uD83E\uDE77\uD83E\uDE77
We united love pic.twitter.com/IgORHgjAZ3

— Samira Bayramova \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA \uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8 (@SamBayramova) May 3, 2024

"Armenians and Azerbaijanis in solidarity with Georgians. This affects us all!"

Tbilisi Protesters #NoToRussianLaw

pic.twitter.com/bzZApAB9XM

GAMZIRI24  (@GAMZIRI24) May 3, 2024

Tbilisi Protesters #NoToRussianLaw
Follow @GAMZIRI24

\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA pic.twitter.com/sMfJMVrdE5

GAMZIRI24  (@GAMZIRI24) May 3, 2024

At the conclusion of today's rally, participants lit candles in front of Kashveti Church. #NoToRussianLaw #Tbilisi #Georgia #Easter pic.twitter.com/SX6w3ZaM8U

Netgazeti  (@netgazeti) May 3, 2024

Tbilisi last night: cheerful protesters walking in the pouring rain, singing "Zhuzhuna Tsvima," the popular Georgian rain song. #TbilisiProtests
\uD83D\uDCF9 Muro Takalandze pic.twitter.com/zA0EVQWPKM

Civil.ge  (@CivilGe) May 3, 2024

Mood in #Tbilisi at 3 am: people are protesting Russian law. We continue to block the main roads. When the gov is using water cannons every day against us, who is afraid of the rain? \uD83D\uDE00 We are fighting for our European future, and we will prevail! #NoToRussianLaw \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA #Georgia pic.twitter.com/5fLNrVS7ko

Nika Gurini  (@nikagurini) May 3, 2024

Warning: Georgian Dream is using illegal gangs to target the youth on the streets of Tbilisi, reminiscent of the tactics used by the Yanukovych regime. Just an hour ago, peaceful protesters were assaulted by around 20 individuals who physically attacked the youth, resulting in… pic.twitter.com/w4erqsHkxQ

Nodar Rukhadze  (@xonoda) May 2, 2024

Another video has surfaced showing a Georgian protester being attacked by a gang controlled by the government. It’s crucial for the world to witness the injustice we’re up against. pic.twitter.com/2nFIORSTiE

Nodar Rukhadze  (@xonoda) May 2, 2024

Georgian Riot "Police" speaking Russian#NoToRussianLaw #Tbilisi #Georgia pic.twitter.com/HRabEgURhG

— Lasha Tatulashvili / ???? ???????????\uD83D\uDC0A\uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83D\uDC68?\uD83D\uDCBB (@lashatatu) May 3, 2024

Need more

\uD83C\uDDE9\uD83C\uDDEA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 Germany to deliver 6x TRML-4D mobile radar stations to Ukraine this year. This is the newest variant that went into service in 2020.
The radar can track around 1,500 targets within a 250km radius, and has a critically wide altitude range - from ground level up to 40,000m. pic.twitter.com/P0qGBFN6B8

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 4, 2024

This is getting its own post.

Protestors in the US hijacked this image, it was posted to IG over two weeks ago.

https://www.instagram.com/ssagittarrius/p/C52x4jTg4vk/

The graphic designers at pro-Russia CODEPINK made a cartoon of the lip gloss protester without realizing she's an anti-Russia Georgian. Incredible. pic.twitter.com/kgW3CQ4tOV

— Kareem Rifai \uD83C\uDF10 (@KareemRifai) May 3, 2024

I am not willing to give them the benefit of the doubt. They stole knowingly. If that wasn't the case, they'd already delete their tweet and apologize several times over. The tweet is still up. CodePink are disgusting marauders.

Stardust Collector  (@ruinwanderer) May 3, 2024

I’d ask for her number!

⚡️ Russia has changed the tactics of using drones in the last 2-3 weeks - Yevlash

"We see that the tactics have changed somewhat. They have recently significantly reduced the number of Shahed attack drones, as they did until, for example, two or three weeks ago. Now the enemy has activated reconnaissance drones to adjust their missile strikes," he said.

Yevlash also added that during missile attacks, the Russian occupiers try to adjust the fire with the help of drones.

He added that the analysis of the situation is ongoing, the Ukrainian side is monitoring the use of reconnaissance UAVs, as they are smaller and more difficult to detect. However, as Yevlash noted, if possible, the Air Force also destroys them with air defense means

https://t.me/Tsaplienko/53077



In the Mariinsky direction, life has taught the Podars something - they no longer carry out assaults with the use of armor. Instead, in the last 3-4 days in the direction of Georgiivka, they conduct something like combat reconnaissance, advancing on golf carts, but they work well with FPV drones, then finish off with drops. Basically, all efforts are directed towards Pobeda.

https://t.me/officer_alex33/2726



It is noticeable how the podars are very afraid of our FPV drones, their tactics of combat are changing accordingly. Don't laugh at golfers and bikers, they use it much more often, because they are more maneuverable than any armor, more chances to escape from drones and it sometimes works, because they often use the suddenness factor - we sometimes don't have time to react.

In some areas, tanks and BBMs should be withdrawn 10-15 km from the front line, the only exceptions are tanks with tsar-magnals, but there are not many of them, because 1-2 units are used for a breakthrough.

https://t.me/officer_alex33/2727

The storming of \uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFA Russian positions near the village of Terny from the first person of a \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 Ukrainian fighter ?? pic.twitter.com/4KrBnDQKkC

— Sharky \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDE7 \uD83E\uDD1D \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@Jamie04381095) May 3, 2024

🌐 Place: #Yampolivka
🗓 Date: ~23.04.2024
🇺🇦 Unit: 23 OSB
📌 Geolocation: 49.0527, 37.99239
📂 Description: Assault and capture of prisoners. East of the village of Yampolivka, Donetsk region.
❗️ Source

https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/14491

79th Brigade repelling Russian attacks on the Novomykhailivka front.
Previously undocumented Russian  losses: 2??-62?; 1xT-72B3; 1xT-90M; 2xBTR-80; 2xBMP-3; 1xBMP-2https://t.co/8MkgeP7qyohttps://t.co/d5cUK0uGv5https://t.co/cNCHYzPZq2 pic.twitter.com/buS37q3Wap

— Special Kherson Cat \uD83D\uDC08\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@bayraktar_1love) May 3, 2024

🌐 Place: #Novomykhailivka
🗓 Date: ~01.05.2024
🇺🇦 Unit: 79 ODSHBr
📌 Geolocation:
00:23 - 47.852527,37.452888
00:01, 00:16 - 47.851947,37.454395
00:33 - 47.847743,37.463826
📂 Description: Destruction of a Russian T-62M tank and two BTR-82A (?) and drops on Russian infantry. Southwest of the village of Novomykhailivka, Donetsk region.
❗️ Source

https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/14486

\uD83D\uDD25Flying Scull soldiers stopped the Russian T-90 and hit it a few more times.\uD83D\uDCA5#UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar #RussiaIsATerroristState #RussiaIsANaziState #RussianArmy #UkraineWarNews pic.twitter.com/XIZ87DeY8n

— ?? Hunter UA ? \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@UaCoins) May 3, 2024

🌐 Place: #Marinka
🗓 Date: ~10.03.2024
🇺🇦 Unit: "Flying Skull"
📌 Geolocation: 47.933533, 37.479502
📂 Description: Damage to the Russian tank T-90M with the help of FPV-kamikaze. South-west of the city of Maryinka, Donetsk region.
❗️ Source

Part 1. Part 2 Later, the t-90M will be destroyed by another unit using an FPV kamikaze - https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/12227

https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/14483

Rare footage of tank battle. A column of two Russian BMPs and one tank goes on the attack. The tank of the 58th brigade of Ukraine is there to meet them. A tank of the 58th brigade makes a shot and destroys a Russian tank that was at the head of the column, after which two… pic.twitter.com/5MfdMpPw5q

— Special Kherson Cat \uD83D\uDC08\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 (@bayraktar_1love) May 4, 2024

🌐 Place: #Urozhane
🗓 Date: ~02.05.2024
🇺🇦 Unit: 58 OMBr
📌 Geolocation: 47.739830,36.821998
📂 Description: The tank works on the advancing equipment of the enemy, with direct guidance. Harvest, Donetsk region.
❗️ Source

https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/14492

🇷🇺🇺🇦 Chronicle of a special military operation
for May 3, 2024

Russian forces continue to carry out targeted attacks on the production facilities and infrastructure of Ukrainian formations. Enemy facilities and deployment points were hit in several areas of the so-called. Ukraine.

The advance of the RF Armed Forces is recorded in the Kotlyarovka-Kislovka section, where in the latter the Russian forces managed to reach the outskirts, and the enemy, according to some sources, is withdrawing forces from the populated area.

In the Bakhmut direction there are battles in the vicinity of Chasov Yar. The Russian Armed Forces are tightening their flanks and expanding the control zone in the Stupki-Golubovskie-2 nature reserve.

To the north of Avdeevka, in the direction of the same name, the Russian Armed Forces were able to make significant progress in the area of ​​Novokalinovo and Ocheretino.

In the Ugledar direction, Russian forces, after consolidating in Novomikhailovka and the surrounding area, undertook reconnaissance in force in the direction of Paraskovievka.

https://t.me/rybar/59753





🇷🇺🇺🇦 Ugledar direction: battles west of Novomikhailovka
situation at 10:00 May 4, 2024

After the capture of Novomikhailovka and a short operational pause, the Russian Armed Forces resumed local offensive operations in the vicinity of the settlement.

▪️Frames appeared on the Internet showing several attacks by the Russian Armed Forces with small armored groups. To the west of the Mashinostroitel gardening partnership, an attempt to advance appears to have been unsuccessful. However, the very fact of a local attack confirms not only complete control over the gardening partnership, but also at least the absence of the enemy in the forest belt to the north.

▪️To the south, to the west of the Veliko-Tarama gully, Russian forces also attempted to storm Ukrainian positions in the forest belt. The enemy is partially knocked out.

▪️At the same time, strikes continue against various targets in Paraskovievka and rear settlements. The practice of using Lancets against relatively small targets (for example, individual mortars) has not stopped, which obviously affects the enemy’s defensive capabilities.

https://t.me/rybar/59763



❗️🇷🇺🇺🇦 Battle of Chasov Yar: flank attacks by the Russian Armed Forces and access to the canal
situation as of 11.00 May 4, 2024

In the vicinity of Chasov Yar, offensive actions by the Russian Armed Forces continue.

🔻On the northern flank, taking into account the enemy’s control over Grigorovka and Kalinovka, it is not yet possible to advance, including due to enemy counterattacks.

🔻In the central area, after reaching the eastern outskirts of the Kanal microdistrict, the Russian Armed Forces started fighting for the territory of school 77, but apparently they failed to break through into the development.

Based on the footage of objective control with strikes with 240-mm adjustable mines “Smelchak” on the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, one of the obstacles was a high-rise building on the corner of Zelenaya and Gorbatogo streets, which overlooks the field and the private sector on the outskirts of the village. The building is also notable for the fact that after the arrival of several FABs at UMPC, they remained not only suitable for defense, but also relatively intact, having lost only one of the entrances.

▪️However, storming the Channel head-on is obviously not the task of the Russian Armed Forces. In fact, after reconnaissance in force, Russian troops moved on to pulling up the flanks with the goal of taking the microdistrict into semi-environment.

🔻The situation is different further south in the Ivanovsky (Krasny) area.

▪️The Russian Armed Forces have advanced at least along the southern part of the Stupki-Golubovskie-2 reserve to the bed of the Seversky Donets - Donbass canal. According to some reports, the reserve came under the control of Russian forces almost completely, which is indirectly confirmed by movements in the lowlands (this would not be very convenient if the enemy was present in the higher northern part of the reserve).

▪️At the same time, the situation to the west of Ivanovsky is hidden by the “fog of war.” Previously, information appeared about the advance of Russian units in the Stupki tract to the canal, but no objective control footage appeared from this area for a relatively long time. The presence of one side or the other east of the canal in the plantings along the T-0504 (H-32) highway also remains controversial.

🔻To the southeast between Ivanovsky and Kleshcheevka, the advance of the Russian Armed Forces is recorded. Based on the footage published by the enemy, the forest belt on the western outskirts of the former Artemovsk airfield up to the forest north of Kleshcheevka came under the control of Russian troops.

At the same time, the Russian Armed Forces attempted to further advance, at a minimum knocking out the Ukrainian formations from the next landing.

https://t.me/rybar/59765

1/2 Guerre d'Ukraine | 03/05/24

Secteurs :
\uD83C\uDF10 Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar\uD83D\uDD39U240503-1010
\uD83C\uDF10 Avdiivka-Ocheretyne\uD83D\uDD39U240503-1018
\uD83C\uDF10 Pervomaiske\uD83D\uDD39U240503-1023
\uD83C\uDF10 Marinka\uD83D\uDD39U240503-1028#UkraineRussianWar #GuerreEnUkraine pic.twitter.com/W5Wi8Z5Xmi

Poulet volant  (@Pouletvolant3) May 4, 2024

More air to air combat. https://t.co/0CB4GmPBfs pic.twitter.com/Lyf1TbLmuq

Andrew Perpetua  (@AndrewPerpetua) May 4, 2024

\uD83D\uDD25 Massive fires in occupied Crimea. Might be Russian munitions stockpiles given the scale. Fires began 6 hours ago.
Russian MoD claims to have shot down 4 ATACMS missiles this night. Recently the US government stated that not a single ATACMS missile has been shot down by Russia. pic.twitter.com/Lg6esvqe2g

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 4, 2024

Coordinates:
45.44656 33.72162
Between the settlements of Rivne and Luhove in central Crimea. pic.twitter.com/HDisJeILuS

Igor Sushko  (@igorsushko) May 4, 2024

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported the destruction of four ATACMS missiles in the Crimea
They were shot down by air defense systems


MOSCOW, May 4. /TASS/ Russian air defense systems shot down four American ATACMS operational-tactical missiles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over Crimea.

This was reported by the Russian Defense Ministry.

"During the past night, an attempt by the Kiev regime to carry out a terrorist attack using American ATACMS operational-tactical missiles on targets on the territory of the Russian Federation was thwarted. Four operational-tactical missiles were destroyed over the territory of the Crimean peninsula by the air defense systems on duty," the ministry said.

https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/20710651

Back from a 14 hour industrial size smoking accident... any significant news?

Lots of choices. https://t.co/plTYRablRB pic.twitter.com/HB3KBppRSf

— AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@AirPowerNEW1) May 4, 2024

A MALD decoy that becomes a long range cruise missile that attacks GPS emitters.

The Russians brag about having their own “Baba Yaga” heavy hexacopters.
In doing so they give us a good look at their approach to shielding the GNSS antenna from EW jamming, inside a series of four concentric metal baffles.
Maybe shielding it mostly from their own big jammers? pic.twitter.com/R7wfynz9hs

— Roy\uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 (@GrandpaRoy2) May 4, 2024

Here are losses I could identify for yesterday. https://t.co/6ZeZYh00Ln pic.twitter.com/n4OrTBPA2G

Andrew Perpetua  (@AndrewPerpetua) May 4, 2024

Possible AFU ATACMS strike on Russian S-300/400 or Iskander missile complex in Crimea

Last night, the AFU conducted an ATACMS strike on an unidentified target in Crimea. NASA FIRMS data shows a new large fire in the area of the town of Novoselivske at approximately 45.444045,… pic.twitter.com/zmdrjUqalK

— OSINT (Uri) \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8 \uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDE6 \uD83C\uDDEC\uD83C\uDDE7 \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6 \uD83C\uDDEE\uD83C\uDDF1 (@UKikaski) May 4, 2024

Synthetic Aperature Radar image of site:

47 OMBr eliminates the enemy in its area of ??responsibility. pic.twitter.com/Re4MZ3Qrco

TOGA  (@TOGAjano21) May 4, 2024

Oshkosh Defense was awarded an additional delivery order for the procurement of Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires (ROGUE-Fires) to be used in the Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDF8\uD83D\uDE80
\uD83D\uDCF8 by @Aaron_MatthewIL https://t.co/PcMC0QFfA6

Naval News  (@navalnewscom) May 3, 2024

Just the Crimean smoking accident

Somebody must have schwacked another supply convoy. Seems like anything above 50 in the vehicles category is a good day.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/China-s-territorial-claims-illegal-deceptive-U.S.-Indo-Pacific-chief

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Seems like there is no other option than to move here.

Am I the only one whose links from you are all blurry?  Reddit seems to work fine if I just go there but your links are all blurred for some reason.  Any ideas?

Edit..  I figured it out.  I got logged out of Redit and thus the paged got blurred.  Just in case someone else is a dummy.

https://www.newsweek.com/us-doesnt-support-ukraine-using-american-weapons-russia-ambassador-1897256

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They better hope that they have enough satellites in view within that cone of LOS. Otherwise, their position fix will be crap. Also, as the vehicle maneuvers, the numbers of satellites in view will change and some that may have been contributing to a good fix will drop off the list. Right idea, poor implementation.

Actually, Russia is advancing. Slowly, gradually, at significant cost. But advancing. See the Economist interview with the GUR's deputy: Ukraine is losing. The only question is how much they lose and how much it costs Russia.

And if the US is weak and cannot provide power to support free societies in WestPac, that makes places like Korea more inclined to seek accommodation with their 900 pound gorilla neighbor.

China’s pitch to Taiwanese and East Asians generally is “USA gonna cut and run like Afghanistan but China will be here forever”

Ukrainian OTR-21 Tochka-U belonging to the 19th Missile Brigade "Saint Barbara" carrying out a launch against a Russian target. (Sometime in 2022)

Why won't dumb Ucrainians follow the western doctrine their being taught and told to follow? Idiots!

Because they're not given western equipment and conditions, idiots!

True.
China can also legitimately say "all we have to do is wait for a favorable POTUS/Adim. (that we have bought and put in power by our covid) and then we can do what we want. By the time the stupid Americans come to their senses, it's way too late"....

Or they can say "we bought the Americans and we can buy your gov't also so why fight"...

I have a question. Ukraine has enough industry, engineering, and production capability to build things like Neptune & Hrim (haven't heard much of that lately). Why do they not produce ballistic missiles domestically? Sending a medium-long range ballistic missile to hit Russian oil/gas field facilities would send a marker of far more serious disruptions than small refinery strikes.

Okay, I have another question. Why does Ukraine not send teams to launch missiles at Russian LNG shipping facilities? They sent teams to hit Wagner in Sudan, which was purely a vanity project for appearance and accomplished absolutely nothing in the big picture. Why do they not send teams to hit strategic Russian targets, like the oil & gas export system? Why not hit Russia's oil tanker "ghost fleet," load the oil onto other tankers and sell it at cut rates in ports of convenience?

I think it is a priority for Ukraine to manufacture ballistic missiles and cruise missiles but I don't know if they are using them sparingly and building up these stockpiles for later and more numerous attacks combined with the Western aid that is arriving.  It would certainly make sense, but these missile systems would be more complicated to make and more time consuming.

For the second question It may be escalation fears and a lack of such capabilities on the Ukrainian side.

While Russia remains a serious battlefield threat, their ability to replace lost armored vehicles is limited. A vivid example is the motorcycle abandoned during the assault in the Bilohorivka area, where a pallet was used as a sidecar to transport assault infantry pic.twitter.com/bFmj6JY9cR

— Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA) May 4, 2024

The entire crew of this abrams exited the vehicle. https://t.co/AKTXKaS9ia pic.twitter.com/fxARKGgm0d

— 2S7 pion (trost) (@Trotes936897) May 4, 2024

I still recommend Arat on turret top and rear with drone netting and spaced armor over engine compartment.

Exactly. If our allies think we won't stand up for them. They're probably gonna do what they can to not be on unfriendly terms with China and Russia. Eventually we'll be the isolated country and they'll have the big alliances.

https://www.rferl.org/amp/iran-military-irgc-ship/32933233.html

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C-17ish size payload from California to Okinawa in 30 minutes.

I will add that it may not change the immediate situation on the front. Unless they are making dozens of Neptunes per month and wrecking critical infrastructure like rail, bridges, ports, that keep the RU supplies getting to the front. I'm glad they are working on them but they need to prioritize arty rounds, drones, and maybe CAS with the F16 that may show up just after the peace deal.

Either they cant (they just cant get a team w/drones inside and within range). OR, they dont want to (US ROE would cause them more harm with future aid packages than they could inflict on Russia).

Ukraine is not going to beat Russia in tactical combat operations. That should be an established fact. The west is not going to provide sufficient weapons, and Russia is now throwing more men in than Ukraine can kill. Russian collapse - sadly, Ukraine's only path to victory - cannot happen without hitting strategic targets and causing domestic disruption in Russia. Blowing up Russia's LNG exports, savaging the ghost fleet, hitting Russian oil & gas production facilities (on the extraction end, not just refineries), etc.

??\uD83D\uDD25 "Soldiers of the 110th OMB today shot down a Russian Su-25 in Donetsk region", — Zelensky pic.twitter.com/1ydGFHYHuq

— MAKS 23 \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83D\uDC40 (@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) May 4, 2024

Cleaning bugs from the front of a Ukrainian Army Aviation Mi-8 after a low level mission, Donetsk Oblast. pic.twitter.com/ffz1VshQrT

OSINTtechnical  (@Osinttechnical) May 4, 2024

\uD83D\uDE15 The occupiers destroyed the bridge over the "Siverskyi Donets-Donbas" canal on the outskirts of Chasiv Yar. pic.twitter.com/jbb2fEQxXP

— MAKS 23 \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6\uD83D\uDC40 (@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) May 4, 2024

As the world looks on, the horrors inflicted on Ukrainians by the advancing Russians only get worse.

Starting May 6th, hospitals in Russian occupied Luhansk will take newborn babies from parents unless proven that at least one parent is Russian.

Link below pic.twitter.com/WKJV7gBM0t

Jay in Kyiv  (@JayinKyiv) May 4, 2024

Even though armor losses are to be expected.. still hurts to see our equipment being used in a non doctrinal manner with usual results. Are we not supplying thermite grenades with these things?

These are the old m1a1s with downgraded armor packages. If Russia can't make an equivalent of those by now they never will.

Guess who's the fastest between a 76mm shell and an Aster interceptor...?

\uD83C\uDDEB\uD83C\uDDF7 warship engaging a Houthi drone with its cannon and missiles while escorting 3 commercial ships in Bab El Mandeb straight.

(First noticed by @Ancrepoudre well done) https://t.co/s7vzUdtnLQ

— M51.4ever (@M51_4ever) May 4, 2024