Being a military history buff, as well as a veteran who served in several Light Infantry and Airborne Units, dealing with "the pigs" on a daily basis, I find this subject doesn't come up enough, although it recently has on the IAR discussion.

What I would like to do is get the ball rolling on an area that I see neglected for the most part because there is so much focus on individual service rifles & carbines, when they aren't really the most casualty-producing weapons that dismounted Infantry units have in their inventories.  What this subject is on is the Art of Machinegunnery, as the Germans referred to and practiced.

German Gun Team with MG42, Tripod, Zeiss Periscope, Flex Mount, and Auto-Traverse & Elevate mechanism


I think it would be appropriate to start off with the history of the machinegun, how it totally changed warfare, how it matured into a standard infantry crew-served weapon in the Great War of 1914-1918, how it branched into several different types of weapons for totally different applications by WWII, how those designs were used in the following wars leading up to French & US involvement in Indochina, the changes that took place in the 1970's, 1980's, 1990's, and the current period from 2001-present.

The main focus will be on Medium or General-Purpose Machineguns (GPMG's), as well as Light Machineguns (LMG's), and how their employment has evolved, driving design and performance requirements into what we're seeing now with the Mk48, Hk121, & NEGEV.

For those that don't know, in the US system, we treat GPMG's as a crew-served weapon, as the Germans and other European Armies did since the Great World War (WWI).  They are normally in-support of the Infantry Platoon by book, but often tasked to Infantry Squads as attached gun teams.  The current GPMG in US Service is the M240, which is basically an FN MAG 58, an older design than the M60 that it replaced.  Up until the 1990's, the US Army used the M60, while the USMC used the M60E3.  Both suffered from significant reliability issues, and are literal descendants of the German MG34, MG42, and FG42 Paratroop rifle.  The common design approach to all of these weapons was a "half bullpup" layout, where the butt was directly attached to the end of the receiver, negating the use of a traditional rifle-type stock.  This provided a very compact package for the M60 gunner, especially the M60E3.

German Gun Team with the MG34


These German advents of the 1930's and 1940's introduced the General-Purpose Machinegun to the battlefield for the first time.  They were fundamental improvements over the old Maxim and Browning style machineguns that weighed too much for dismounted infantry to effectively maneuver with, after lessons learned from the Great War and the "new" German Blitzkrieg Combined Arms fighting doctrine of lightning fast shock attacks, by-passing of enemy strongholds, quick envelopments, and targeting of logistics and infrastructure.  The MG34 and MG42 allowed gun teams to move into position much more quickly, emplace the gun, and provide an insane level of effective fire on enemy troops, light-skinned vehicles, and bunker complexes.  No other army had such weapons, and after the war, several nations began research, development, testing, & evaluation of their own GPMG's.

The main GPMG designs that evolved from that era were:

MG3 (7.62 NATO MG42)
The FN MAG58
The US M60
The Russian PK

The peripheral GPMG chamberings that are more like LMG's are:

PKM & Variants
HK21
South African SS77
Israeli NEGEV
Mk 48
HK 121

Intended Use and Real World Employment
Interestingly enough, the Central European steppe, with its millions of hectares of farmland, hedgerows, and historic cities & villages, would not see overt conflict post-1945, where enfilade positions for GPMG's could interlock and decimate troops like fodder.  Instead, these new GPMGs would first see service in a totally different terrain in limited war conflicts around the globe, starting in Malaysia, then Indochina, Africa, the Middle East, Central America, and South America.  Ultimately, they would end up in the Middle East and Central Asia, post September 2001.  

The bipod is the main support that the GPMG rests upon when a gunner gets into the prone position, and has been for decades.  The pace at which modern dismounted operations develops is such that a tripod is a hindrance to maneuverability, with very few opportunities to be employed by the gun team, who carries the additional burden of soft and hard armor systems that combine to add spine-crushing excess to the existing pack mule burdens a gun team must carry.

However, a well-disciplined unit can use their gun teams as overwatch in support of the rifle squads as they maneuver through an area, and emplacement of the gun on the tripod is a much more effective way of getting rounds on target.

As an AG, Gunner, and Weapon's Squad Leader, we were usually separated from line Squads and told to go do "Weapon's Squad Stuff", which usually consisted of WWI & WWII era gun team drills, where the AB and AG would move up into a position dictated by the Gunner, Weapon's Squad Leader, Platoon Leader, or Platoon Sergeant, emplace the tripod while the AB pulled security, right before the Gunner would set the gun into the tripod.  

During Platoon, Company, and even Battalion-sized Deliberate Attacks, we would execute this same drill, only covertly.  In the formal patrolling courses in the US Army, namely Ranger School and the SF Qualification Course, you can count on emplacing the gun team covertly on every Raid, Ambush, and Deliberate Attack you will do, unless a hasty emplacement is necessary due to Murphy showing up.



As a Weapon's Squad leader, what I would do with my gun teams in an urban environment would be to have the AB's, AG's, Javelin Gunner, and myself clear a building with the gun teams in trail, then occupy the 2nd floor or roof and establish quick fields of fire for the gun teams.  We would use furniture from the residences to set-up gun tables, and have the gun teams in different rooms.  We would practice this drill as quickly as possible so that we could be in-position for the line squads to advance across a courtyard or other danger area to take the next building.  I could talk my guns back and forth when needed, then egress the building tactically once the line squads had established dominance on the buildings or field of fire to our front.  We would beat feet out of that building, bound to the next ones, and repeat.

This is a more appropriate drill for urban warfare, obviously, but has little value in the mountains of Afghanistan, unless you're using built-up huts as support by fire positions.  I'm interested to hear from those of you who have deployed to that AOR and what techniques made more sense for you.  This applies to dismounted Infantry Units in that type of terrain.  The biggest constraints I experienced with both the M60 and M240B is weight, which is driven by the ammunition, namely the 7.62 NATO, which basically duplicates the rough performance of the WWI-era .30 Caliber 7.62x63 (.30-06) in a 51mm case.  From the piles of linked 7.62 I have seen dumped in the field by many a Joe, the 7.62 NATO is clearly a painful round to carry in bulk.  When I was an AG, and we didn't have enough guys for 3-man gun teams, I carried a 120lb rucksack with 800rds of 7.62 NATO, the tripod, T&E, spare barrel, and binos, in addition to my individual weapon, LBV with mags, water, & NOD's.



Light Machine Guns are an individual weapon, used at the Squad Level to provide suppressive firepower as the Riflemen fix and destroy the enemy with maneuver and well-aimed fire.  The main LMG in US service has been the FN Minimi or M249, in various forms.  I have carried and used it in several different parts of the world, and feel it is entirely too heavy for what it does.  One of the main weapons that needs upgrade or replacing is the SAW.  The SOCOM Mk.46 is about the best you will get from the SAW, but I think something better is on the horizon.  Either way, an LMG needs to be Lightweight so that the LMG gunner in the line squad is as maneuverable as the Riflemen with M4's, or as close to that as possible.  The LMG also needs to do things that M4's don't, namely penetrate the hell out of buildings, light-skinned vehicles, and sail downrange with more retained energy than 5.56 NATO will ever allow.

As we are talking about the Art of Machinegunnery, you see that we've come to the modern era with the dilemma faced with these two designs from yesteryear:  The GPMG, and LMG, as new systems pack GPMG chambering into more LMG weapon profiles.  What we seem to be headed towards is a new type of assault LMG, that will still be capable of what GPMG's are.  These lighter weapons will be a welcome tool for the modern soldier engaged in dismounted warfare, but how do we address the WWI & WWII era gun team drills that revolve around the tripod, T&E, etc.?

How do we keep the pig fed, if its diet is hearty, and stay maneuverable?

What should the bread & butter gunner drills consist of?  

Is there any practicality to the tripod anymore?

How do we get out of the isolated individual or crew-served weapons mindset, and integrate with soldiers carrying grenade launchers, DMR's, rockets, and small mortars?

How do we prepare the leadership of the future to embrace combined arms fighting with belt-fed machineguns in a more effective way, leaving WWI style crew drills for the history books, or do we?

Good post.  I learned a good bit but have nothing to offer so here's a bump

Excellent post

Great post, thanks OP

Tag

Grazing fire and plunging fire have been replaced with the modern TTP of "lead it onto the target".
Longstanding frustration of mine.

Having been a machine gunner in my military years, I can relate to this article. I carried the old Pig during ym first years in the USAR as an MP; then they took away my lovely Pig and gave me the SAW, which i complained that it was (to me at least), nothing more than a glorified M16. Then theymake the Mk48 and I am out of the military, so i don;t get to play with it. The Mk48 SHOULD HAVE BEEN the proper replacement for the M60.



Many good memories with this heavy hunk of steel.



THis should;ve been it's proper replacement...

Great post. My contribution:

The Germans, based on their experiences in WWI, thought machine guns were the source of firepower, and therefore combat power, ability to suppress, and gain mobility.  They had an undemocratic attitude toward where firepower came from. They resourced accordingly.  A German rifle company had 14 MG34s or MG42s. A US Army rifle company had two tripod mounted  M1919 .30 cals.  The German put their best guy, schutze #1, on the gun.  Many landser had bolt action kar98ks, and their mission in life was to help carry ammo for the machine gun, which did the heavy work.
The US Army put a BAR (20 round, box fed, closed bolt, no spare barrel) in each squad, and based firepower around the individual riflemen and the M1 garand rifle.  The British Army did likewise, with the Bren. Generally considered –the Bren was better then the BAR but not as good as an MG42-it had a 30 round magazine and a spare barrel.

Most historians have said the German system worked better. It generated more firepower.  Of note, the ‘gun group’ in the German rifle squads did not necessarily have the tripod.  The art of machinegunnery was an LMG to support squad maneuver, and only two of the 14 guns in a rifle company in the Wehrmacht routinely used the tripod. They would rather carry the ammo.  This is the German Army. Some units, such as German airborne (fallschirmjager) would have two LMGs per squad.   Ferocious firepower. Of course, they were on the defense.  So basing tactics around MGs may have made more sense.  

After the war, after fits and starts, the British and US Armies copied the German system for a while.  In Vietnam M60s were usually with rifle squads. The British Army went with the MAG 58, basically the same as  the M240 per squad; later on, both armies decided a fire team concept with a belt fed SAW or mag fed LSW in each team offered more flexibility  than a ‘rifle group’-‘gun group’ doctrine.     Either fireteam could take over the other’s tasks.  The 7.62s tend to have migrated upward to weapons squads, or platoons.

I am not so certain, in Western Europe at least, that tripods were that big a piece of German doctrine.  The philosophy that you man the MG with your best pax, and task soldiers to support the gun, were cornerstones. Tell me how you man what weapons and I know how you think about it.

Today there is a bit of a “best of times-worst of times” attitude. A mounted patrol that leaves the wire in OIF/OEF would put its best people on the machine guns on the vehicle, and use those as the primary weapon especially in OEF where mounted fighting was common.  But now that soldiers load has gone up due to widespread body armor, and carrying more water to hydrate the guy in the body armor, people wish to fall back on their old ways.  Using DMs, optics, increased marksmanship standards, creates a point of view that you can increase the firepower without the weight of a dedicated M240 crew or SAW gunner slowing you down.  Theoretically, I have seen, the idea that a rifleman with a scope can get hits just as well as a machine gunner, means you can travel lighter. Given that we have been fighting people who travel very lightly, hit and run, and are poor marksmen, usually, this may be a workable philosophy for the current fight.  On the other hand, I never saw a designated marksman with a rifle in the hatch of a humvee. Go figure.

The answer IMHO is you take weapons as you will deploy them to the range, see who can hit what with what, and reinforce the main effort.  Forcing a rifleman to carry seven magazines but leaving the tripod and binoculars behind prior to engaging Taliban at 700-800 meters is not organized thinking.  But if modern technology can provide hits on target without weight, then we go back to what is in US communities, at least, is the historical comfort zone, which is a rifleman based approach.    

The dilemma/debate continuously revolves around a weight/firepower tradeoff.  An MG34/MG42/M60/PK/M240/SAW like weapon vs the BAR/Bren/IAR/LSW like weapon.  Part of the art of the machine gun is a strict attention to detail on soldiers load, and cross loading, and leaving unnecessary crap behind.  Ideally if you have the appropriate command influence you get your most physically fit, best soldiers, and that helps immensely.   The tripod is advantageous in a long range fight, but to carry that requires a larger gun team, or a willingness to leave other things behind.   Mounted on a bipod, a crew working together, spotting rounds, using binoculars, firing short bursts, is more effective then two personnel working separately.  That is an enduring crew drill.  
Back in the 1980s there were thoughts that the M249 SAW could replace the M60 and a 5.56mm weapon would suffice.   I am not certain we are there yet.  May well be.  

Shot, over.

MK48s belong in a garbage can.

Why?  I have no experience with them but they seem like an upgrade over a 249.

ETA: Is it not designed well enough to handle the increased recoil of 7.62x51 vs. 5.56 or is it just a hold over from the 249 being so bad/worn-out?

Huge amounts of recoil. No thought went into the design, they just made a gigantic saw. Headspacing problems. Super heavy for claiming to be light.  Dont come with a quick change barrel handle. (You can set it up with one though). Bipod is retarded. Unergonomic. Jam alot. Barrels get shot out super fast. Smells. Is ugly.



























 

We need a Magpul Art of Machinegunnery DVD.

That would complete their DVD instructional series.

The weapon porn could be epic!

I think we are headed in the right direction with the new  automatic infantry rifles like the marines asked for.  I would have like the  open bolt function in full auto mode, however.

The USMC has not lost this. As long as they keep making 0331s, the art will progress and continue.

Please share why you think replacing a belt-fed weapon with a mag-fed weapon when the stated use is for base-of-fire and suppression is "the right direction."

You're the first person I've seen say that outside of HK and the Marines higher echelons.

Nice post OP!!

I carried the 240B when I was an 11M in the infantry. It was heavy and a bitch to carry at times, but was all worth it when I got to lay down and really get on it.

We did most of our shooting off of the bi-pod, but we did use the tri-pod at the range and in training. As much of a burden the tri-pod was for my AG, I loved shooting off of it. The 240B, IMO, is a very accurate gun and it really grew on me the more time I spent with it.

The germans still had the best concept when it came to GPMGs.  

I still think the MG-42/MG-3 is the best GPMG ever.  


The problem with the modern US army in one area is the requirement that soldiers wear the heavy body armor all the time when on a mission.  This is more
a mindset of keeping casualties down than what is really best for the mission.  The local commander should have more say so on what type of armor is to be carried depending on mission.  

As one poster explained above many weapons and tactics are being designed around the soldier carrying the heavy body armor.  In other words the body armor is dictating mission requirements many times which is not the best way to conduct operations.

Interesting, I woke this morning to think to myself how moot the IAR is. 30 round magazine fed weapon meant to suppress the enemy? Give me a break, someone in the USMC got major kick backs from Hk on that one. Sadly to say, I think the Soviets nailed it with the PKM.

Tag

Great discussion. For now I will just provide a soundtrack.

My dad taught me a few things from his machine gunning experiences during World War II.  The most important was not to piss away ammunition by firing long bursts.
 

You do realize the Soviets did the same thing the Marines did with their RPD, SAW like weapon and replaced it with the IAR like RPK?

What is the thought process that justifies the loss of sustained (seemingly) firepower?

that thing looks badass

PKM FTW!

I have no practical experience with machine guns in a real fight but based on what I've seen, the pkm is the machine gun  I would use if I had the choice.  I've shot one and it was easily controllable.  The new m16v2.0 hk crapgun is a joke and I can't believe they switched to that

As a SAW, the logistics and maneuvering burden of the M249 are far too much.

Read McBride's "Emma Gees" for a look at what is the real lost art of machinegunnery.

this

 

I have a bit of time behind a MG3...... dead sex right there

 

And neither the RPD nor the RPK have lived up to expectations.

Fun post and very informative




It all comes down to the correct balance (and tradeoff) between three elements:

This is very interesting to me.  Would your preferred fix for the M249 be to make it lighter and shoot the same or keep the weight the same and be more destructive?  On a related issue, how important do you think ammunition/magazine commonality and interchangeability is between a rifleman and the squad support weapon?  

It seems to me that we either need to 1) remove the requirement that everybody shoot the same cartridge  or 2) standardize on something other than 5.56Nato as an infantry issue round.  Is there a third option that isn't obvious?  What do the boots on the ground say?

A_Deuce

Great video on machine gunnery


There has been a general  degradation in machine gunnery skills since the beginning of the GWOT .   Mostly this has to deal with how they are employed and how they have been employed.    For most part they have been used as direct fire bullet hoses either firing from vehicles or from their bipods often fired by gunners with only rudimentary levels of skill.   The Marine Corps has been attempting to arrest this through continuing education for its gunners and courses to teach MMGs to non-gunners who are pressed into the mission to man theater provided guns.  

The compromise we currently push is that if you are by MOS machine gunner, the gun is employed as a team weapon with 2 sections of guns.   If you are an "other MOS machine gunner," (non 0331 03 and Marines doing provisional or in lieu of missions, 08s, 12s, 18s, 58s, etc ) they are employed as heavy SAWs and default to be used similar to the direct fire bullet hoses I mentioned earlier either form a vehicle or from the gun's bipod.  

we were given (05 time frame) a very good set of "this is how you machine gun" classes - I instantly forgot it all

 

+1

Much truth here and earlier posts.

The German system did function better, especially for the long fighting withdrawal they conducted in the East.  

The US Army phased out the intensive crew served training (Plunging fire, grazing fire,...) as mortars became more numerous and got pushed to lower echelons.  There was probably a point some time in the 80s when w had the best of both worlds.  Well trained MG crews and instantly available indirect fire down to the company level.  Now the tripod is rarely used.  There is a real lack of skill at conducting long range MG engagements.  And worst, the mortars have been taken out of the responsive and flexible category by ROE, airspace clearance, HQ nanny rules to avoid collateral damage or Frat risk....  So we are now in a situation where the GPMG needs to be the long distance puncher but we've lost the ability.  So we spend millions developing the Xm25 to give dismout squads in Afghanistan the capaility to engage tgts out to 800m instead of letting them tailor their combat load by dropping armor and bringing along a tripod.  The moutain to mountain firefights develop slowly, a well drilled crew can have a 240 on a tripod returning an accurate VOLUME of fire quick enough to win a lot of those fights but the will and skill are not there.  Hell, look at the whole COP Keating story.  Why was there so much focus on the M4 issues.  Where were the tripod mounted 240s for defending the COP?  They were on bipods and essentially being used as individual weapons.

The solution is to bring back the dedcated  GPMG training for long distance engagements or to free up mortars to be more responsive.

or get both.

The Germans were all about their MG crews, it played a large part in their tactics.

Posted Via AR15.Com Mobile

As many others have said on the discussion and I apologize for not citing them directing

1) Marine Corps did not want a LMG for its AR, however for ease of procurement in the late 80s it bought M249s and has been experimenting with heavy barrel rifles ever since because we don't have machine gunners in the fire teams we have automatic riflemen so why do have a machine gun in usage?

The general line put out by many of the IAR advocates was
-Accuracy will overcome concerns with volume of fire
--The IAR is 3 times more accurate than the M249, with 1/3 the ammo
--Hits suppress the enemy, not near misses, volume of fire or noise (sensory input overload)
-The IAR provides increased portability
-The IAR provides increased mobility
--The IAR is ~50% lighter than the M249
---Empty weight IAR 7.9 to 11.2 lbs vs. SAW 17 lbs
---Loaded weight IAR 12 lbs vs. SAW 22 lbs
-The IAR prevents disruption of the infantry fire team during the attack
--Returns another rifle into the fire team
--Enables two buddy teams to mutually support one another
--Enables commonality of training within the fire team
The IAR eases the logistics burden at the squad level

Using an entirely different combined arms doctrine.



The Soviet Motorized Rifle elements provide close-in infantry suppression for the Tank elements, both in the defense and offense - and their doctrine is offensively oriented.



Motor Rifle troops in the offense stayed mounted and fire on the move from the infantry carrier (BTR-60) or the infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant) which has a belt-fed machine gun on it (14.5mm KVPT and 7.62x54R PKT on he BTR-60 series / 73mm smooth-bore and PKT on the BMP-1; then 30mm automatic cannon and PKT on the BMP-2).



They stay mounted unless enemy defenses hold up the assault and enemy infantry AT weapons / tank hunter-killer teams threaten the Tank units' advance. Then they dismount and attack using automatic fire in 'assault marching fire' (fire from the hip, when the right foot hits the ground sort of thing).



The carrier supports with it's heavy machine gun. The sharpshooter (most usually employed in the defense, but he has a role in the attack) takes out enemy leaders (including tank commanders if they are up), AT weapon gunners and radiomen.



The RPK is merely a sustained fire "AK" used for close in suppressive fire - the carrier's heavy weapons are the real "punch" while the Motor Rifle troops keep enemy infantry out of light anti-tank weapon range (LAW / RPG / recoilless rifle / Gustav / Panzerfaust).



US Marines don't fight that way. USMC AAV's carry Marines from ship to shore.



The USMC IAR is a step back to the BAR (WWII USMC doctrine centered around the BAR - by 1945 they had gone from 513 BARs in a MARDIV to 867 and had a 14-man squad with three 4-man fire-teams, each with a BAR; the riflemen protected the BAR gunner).



The problem is that the M1918A2 was obsolete by 1942 and the IAR is a return to a dead-end. 30-round magazines, no ability to limit heat (open bolt and barrel changing) - it doesn't do anything that an M16A3 doesn't do (just like an RPK does nothing that an AK can't do).



The BAR took 20-round magazines while the semiautomatic M1 had an 8-round clip so it at least could keep up the fire while Willie and Joe reloaded their M1s (just as the Bren had a 30-round magazine while Tommy had 10 in his bolt action No. 4 SMLE or the DP-28 had 47 rounds in the pan while Ivan had 55 in his bolt action M91/30).



Today, every Marine has 30-round magazines, just like the IAR... shooting the same round... at the same rate of fire...



The Army used to call one guy in the fire team the "automatic rifleman" and gave him a clothespin bipod for his M16. The USMC gives a guy with an IAR a gripod. It's still a rifle, not a f machine gun.



The IAR is a non-answer to the need to have a LMG at squad level.

So what you are really saying is that the IAR is not an "automatic rifle" as much as it is a squad designated marksman rifle that as automatic fire capability?



And that everyone that's ever been suppressed by machine gun fire but wasn't hit wasn't suppressed?



It seems that the USMC would have been better served by loosing the 'automatic rifle / rifleman rhetoric and calling it the SDMR.

I will give you the 240; that MG is perfect for vehicle/fixed positions; however, the PKM? Not so much; I would use the PKP Pecheneg instead.

Thanks for the interesting topic of the day, OP.

Actually, the last time we used Marines in a conventional war they operated EXACTLY like motorized Infantry. 2003, battle for An Nasiriyah. They used the AAVs as APCs with mounted 7.62 and M2 .50cal MGs and were supported by M1 Abrams tanks. They fough almost exactly like the soviet doctrine you are describing. Their Infantry did not dismount until they started taking a lot of RPG fire.

Ammo Bearer and Assistant Gunner, respectively.

AB carries extra stuff, and the AG guides the gunner in his job. The AG will give the gunner adjustments, help with reloading and emplacing, help with barrel changes, etc.

Pure awesomeness

Ive never used a PKP, I have extensively used PKMs.

Ah, that makes sense.  Thank you.

 

ost.