Being the studious criminal justice college senior that i am, i hit the books with this issue to see what i could drum up in case law. The following is abridged from Lexis-Nexis, the elipses represent portions of the case that are irrelevant. I bolded the important parts for clarity:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. JAMIE L. PHILLIPS
2005-034
COUNTY COURT OF NEW YORK, ST. LAWRENCE COUNTY
2005 NY Slip Op 50438U; 7 Misc. 3d 1004A; 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 611
[I will just include the relevant case law]
Defendant is charged with one count of third degree criminal possession of a weapon [Penal Law § 265.02(1)] and Unlawful Possession of Marijuana [Penal Law § 221.05].
In asking the court to review the grand jury minutes, defense counsel asserts (1) that there was insufficient proof of defendant's identity as the person previously convicted of another crime in Virginia; (2) that the device seized from defendant's car at the US border crossing [***2] was not a prohibited billy club; (3) that the legal instruction on the standard of proof was insufficient; and (4) that there was insufficient proof that the substance found on a seized 'grinder' in the trunk of the car was in fact marijuana.
...
Count one of the indictment charges defendant under Penal Law § 265.02(1) with possession of a billy club. This crime is identical to possession of a "billy" as proscribed in Penal Law § 265.01(1), with the additional element of a previous criminal conviction. The term 'billy' is [*2] not defined in the Penal Law. Although it is also possible to charge a person, under Penal Law § 265.01(2) with possession of "any deadly instrument or weapon with intent to use the same unlawfully against another," that crime, distinct from strict liability for mere possession of a billy, is not charged here.
The US Customs Officer who first noted the device in defendant's car, and who testified in the grand jury proceeding, described the device as a collapsible baton. He said that it had a cylindrical handle with foam covering, and had two internal collapsible sections, each about 6 to 8 inches long, made of steel tubing which could be extended and locked into place with the flick of a wrist. He described it as a striking weapon, which he had seen demonstrated [***4] in his training as a federal law enforcement agent. Some such batons are issued to immigration officers as secondary weapons, Hyde testified. He also said that it is a non-lethal weapon intended to disable someone rather than to inflict injury, though it is capable of misuse in such a way as to be lethal in a blow to the head or neck. Collapsible batons are not included in the list of weapons whose mere possession is prohibited in Penal Law § 265.01(1).
...
In People v. Talbert, 107 A.D.2d 842, 484 N.Y.S.2d 680 (3 Dept 1985) the court examined the question of what qualifies as a billy club. In that case the court was considering a wooden stick or club observed on the floor of a car with four occupants. The car was stopped for speeding. The court found that the wooden stick was neither a billy, since it was not in the list of inherently [***5] dangerous items, not a dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon, since there was no allegation that defendant intended to use it against anyone else. The court further stated, "In our view, based on the manner in which the statute is set forth, the term 'billy' must be strictly interpreted to mean a heavy wooden stick with a handle grip which, from its appearance, is designed to be used to strike an individual and not for other lawful purposes. An object which can be used as a billy but which does not fit the strict definition may still be a prohibited weapon under subdivision (2) of section 265.01 of the Penal Law if there exists the requisite intent to use the object unlawfully against another." 107 A.D.2d 842, 844, 484 N.Y.S.2d 680.
...
In People v. Mercer, 42 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles County 1995), the [***7] court held that a collapsible baton, under the circumstances in which police found defendant holding it, was a 'billy' within the meaning of a statute prohibiting possession of a billy. The court noted that the baton was not, as such, mentioned in the list of prohibited weapons. The California statute, unlike New York's, also prohibits possession of an instrument of a kind commonly known as a billy. This language allowed the court to give an inclusive reading to the California statute, unavailable in New York under the Talbert decision.
In giving legal instruction to the grand jury, the prosecutor gave a dictionary definition of a 'billy club' as 'a short stick or club, especially a police officer's club.' This was unintentionally misleading in two respects. First, there was no testimony to show that a collapsible baton was equivalent to a police officer's club. Second, in light of the appellate decision in Talbert, it was inappropriate to give an instruction which allowed consideration of any sort of device defined differently from the language used by the Talbert court.
This court finds that the collapsible baton seized from defendant does not fall within the [***8] Talbert definition of a billy. From a policy standpoint it might make sense for there to be a prohibition against possession of such a device, though the California court in Mercer heard testimony that the device is also used by practitioners of martial arts. Any such declaration must come either from the state legislature, or from an appellate court by way of judicial interpretation of the statute. This court is bound by the appellate holding in Talbert. Since the device was not a billy, its possession was not unlawful, and the first count must be dismissed.
So according the that, the court upheld that a collapsible baton is not by strict definition of a billy or bludgeon. Other case law holds that a collapsible baton is not in and of itself a dangerous instrument unless carried with the intent of assault or malice. Anyone else care to draw conclusions?
[Edited for clarity]