(…continued)
Pay or be punished
Fehr and his colleague Simon Gachter, of the University of St Gallen, devised an economic game where four anonymous participants had to decide how much to invest in a common pot. Returns were balanced so that the 'rational' strategy was to invest nothing and reap the benefits of other's contributions. But by investing a lot, the whole group could gain.
Egalitarianism seems to be a basic part of human behaviour
Herbert Gintis,
University of Massachusetts
The amount invested by the players was revealed after each round. In some games, players could then fine each other, but they had to pay a small sum for this. The make-up of the group changed with each round, preventing players from learning whether they could trust one another.
When penalties were allowed, the common good prevailed, and the investment by each group member climbed.1 "But if there's no opportunity for punishment, cooperation unravels," says Fehr, with investment declining rapidly.
Union power
Cohesion-through-punishment is an influential force in contemporary western society. In industrial disputes, for example, the hatred heaped on strike-breakers cements solidarity, says Fehr.
If there's no opportunity for punishment, cooperation unravels
Ernst Fehr,
University of Zurich
Conversely, the waning of support for state welfare programmes among the US middle class over the past few decades was caused by a perception that too many freeloaders were exploiting the system without fear of detection or punishment, says Gintis.
Gintis acknowledges the potential pitfalls of using local action to stamp out social scrounging: it might fragment communities into opposing factions, or breed resentment of nonconformists.
There are also problems if fear of punishment cultivates antisocial aims, Fehr points out. "You see it in the Mafia," he says, where the threat of reprisal maintains a code of silence.
References
Fehr, E & Gachter, S. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137 - 140, (2002).
[URL]http://www.nature.com/nsu/020107/020107-6.html[/URL]