Subject: OIF Observations from an Inf Bn Cdr in Iraq
UNCLASSIFIED

Some more AARs/TTPs from Iraq.
Attached are OIF observations.

1. Weapons and Munitions Availability - The amount of weapons and
ammunition readily available is astounding. Every house, every single one
of them, had multiple automatic weapons when we arrived. Arms dealers were
everywhere; dealing military weapons is easy and very profitable. There
were complete mortars of varying sizes for sale on the main road in Ba'Qubah
when we first entered the city. Raiding a weapons bazaar was, in fact, our
first mission in the city and we seized over 20 mortars at a roadside stand
on the city's main street.

Iraqi Nationals have looted weapons and munitions from the many
military installations throughout our area of operations, which in turn
provide a ready market for the arms dealers mentioned above. Weapons are
hidden everywhere, Date Palm orchards, irrigation canals, even in graveyards
(which would create quite a stink if Americans began searching in the graves
for weapons caches, as I am sure you can imagine). We have found women
hiding weapons underneath their black gowns, which may not seem like such a
good idea until you consider that only female soldiers can search IZ
females. This presents a challenge at remote sites and checkpoints. While
we have not found WMD, we have come across lots of chemical defensive
equipment, to include nerve agent antidote, MOPP suits, and masks.

2. Economy/Standard of Living - The economy/standard of living is
very depressed, while unemployment is sky high. We have killed/captured
many Iraqis we believe where paid to shoot at us in order to make a little
money. The consequence is that these folks usually don't aim very well and
shoot wildly erratic, but sometimes they get lucky. Many of these men are
reported to be drunk or under the influence of drugs during the commission
of their activities (according to HUMINT sources), however, none of the
detainees we have processed appear to be under the influence of anything
except bad judgment. A little money goes a long way here and we have been
pumping so much money into the infrastructure it is crazy. Regardless of
the money pumped into the local economy it has not yet turned the tide.
This area has suffered from 35 years of neglect, 12 years of UN sanctions,
and the results of a dictatorial leadership; you would not believe how bad
everything is.

It appears that corruption is commonplace, lots of black market
activities and political graft/bribery. We have made a concerted effort to
spend our Commander's Emergency Relief Program (CERP) and our Field Ordering
Officer (FOO) monies in our zone of operation. The local purchasing of
goods and services are necessary to fill gaps in the military logistical
system, which had a significant early impact on the local economy. Our
introduction of U.S. dollars into the marketplace without a formal
established conversion rate led to uncontrollable inflation and black
marketing.

3. Infrastructure - The water system is particularly bad and has
been for many years. The water does not meet U.S. standards for potability.
Most of the water treatment plants are not functioning because of damage,
neglect, or looting of machinery. The electrical grid is overloaded and
most rural areas only get electricity for a few hours each day. There has
been a huge problem with IZ nationals stealing power cables and bootlegging
electrical power. The loss of these power cables makes delivery of
electricity to towns even more difficult as only rudimentary rerouting is
possible on the electrical grid. Our ability to establish basic services
will go a long ways towards stabilizing the country. Electricity has become
a key component to coalition strategy, our ability to provide electricity
will demonstrate that things are getting better for the Iraqi people.

It is very important to understand previous standards of living in
the local environment in order to establish realistic and attainable
measures of success when planning and executing infrastructure improvement
projects. Though a western-level of infrastructure may be the expectation,
it may be an unachievable goal. We measure our progress in local
areas without understanding what the standard really is. For example, a
well or filter that produces potable drinking water would provide a service
never before seen in most of the areas in our zone of operation. To expect
water piped into every home is unrealistic for many years to come.

4. Local Populace Attitude - Most of the people are glad Saddam is
gone but that is about all they have in common. Political parties are
sprouting up but they really do not have set political agendas or platforms.
The Kurds are the best when it comes to political organization and this has
helped them when we form local governments. The Arabs for the most part do
not trust political parties (Ba'ath Party influence, I think) but some have
started to form there own parties; primarily as a way to get their foot in
the door concerning local politics. Most Iraqi's also feel that the
Coalition is a necessary evil to prevent a civil war, but a good portion of
these folks would rather we not be here. There are small groups adamantly
opposed to our presence but most people take a "wait and see" approach to
life. They are reluctant to help because they are afraid of the future,
which I think they realize will not include U.S./Coalition Forces. Many do
not want to be known as "traitors" for helping the Americans.

The Iraqi people have been submitted to a dictatorship that prevented them
from voicing their opinions without retribution. Unsure of the future, they
are tentative to assist either side for fear of such retribution. Rumors
spread like wild fire and are readily believed by the populace. Many are
unsure that Sadaam is gone for good. The people prefer to remain neutral,
often saying, "I saw nothing". There are still many that fear
repercussions from other tribes or families if they identify someone as a
regime loyalist. The concept of the "Blood Feud" is very much alive and
well here. The police do not have much legitimacy at this point so
paybacks often occur between families and tribes. Much of the cooperation
we get is, in many cases, people "fingering" someone to settle old scores
and get even with their adversaries.

Populations that have survived in a brutal regime over the past 35
years should not be expected to rush to the streets, offering unconditional
assistance. These people are survivors and very willing to play both sides
of the street as long as it is beneficial to do so. Trust must be earned
(usually in the form of financial investment and visible improvement
projects in the area) before they can be expected to provide assistance or
intelligence. Apathy on the part of the general population should not be
viewed as a threat to U.S. operations, rather as an untapped resource, yet
to be won over.

5. Crime/Organized Crime - Crime is rampant. Sadam released all
prisoners in Iraqi jails in what he called "the Forgiveness". This was
basically just another way he could de-stabilize the area and it also
provides Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) with a cadre of triggermen.
Organized crime families have been the target of at least one Brigade size
raid in our area of operations, which was successful in removing this
network. This particular crime family dabbled in various illegal activities
and was blatant about their activities. The reader should imagine a "Pancho
Villa" type organization as opposed to a traditional Mafia type
organization. There is no pretense of respectability and weapons (to
include machine guns and hand grenades) were openly carried as a very
visible reminder to the local population of the consequences of challenging
this criminal element. Reports that this family was engaged with direct
action operations against coalition forces were beginning to trickle in, but
the destabilizing effect that they had on the local community was sufficient
reason to remove them as a major player in this area.

It is important not to try and superimpose western thought, morals,
or codes of conduct over activities of local nationals. Virtually every
structure not guarded by privately sponsored security has been looted.
Entire buildings have virtually disappeared because the local population
will loot the very bricks used to build the structure, not to mention the
tiles, pipes, wires, windows, doors, etc. Vehicles abandoned on the side of
the road are stripped with-in minutes. The local population steals power
lines supporting the national electrical grid and then illegally taps into
the electrical system, receiving free power. This unaccounted for
requirement adds strain to an already stressed power grid and compounds the
problem of getting the grid operating at near capacity levels. Locals also
"steal" water for their fields. They dig unauthorized irrigation canals
that siphon water from the canals. This significantly reduces the amount of
water available at the intend locations, affecting crops further downstream,
local population water supplies, and creating artificial shortages. Farmers
found doing this believe they have a right to the water as well as anyone
else, even though they know digging illegal irrigation ditches is against
the law. With very few exceptions, there is no white or black; only shades
of gray. We are talking about poverty levels that are staggering and a
society of "haves" and "have-nots". One must remember at all times, that
almost every local national they come in contact with has a self-motivation.


6. Threat Tactics - Though not backed by a truly conventional
military force, his tactics can otherwise be accurately described as those
of a guerilla force. Small group tactics, improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), ambushes, and harassing attacks are his line of operations. His
intent is not to draw U.S. forces into a larger conflict (see #7), rather,
to instill fear and inflict casualties regularly. This may be my COE
training coming out but the Threat is clearly aware that military defeat of
Coalition forces is unattainable, strategic culmination is a more readily
attainable goal and the purpose, I believe, of his attacks.

Threat tactics have evolved to fit the intent of the responsible
group and spread to like groups throughout the country. When a TTP is
observed in a large population center it quickly becomes prevalent in
smaller towns. The ultimate goal the Former Regime Loyalists (FRL), Badr
Corps, and criminal groups is to remove Coalition forces from the country.
Each has its own reasons for doing so; however, the methods are the same.
As mentioned before, I believe they are trying to weaken resolve and attain
early withdrawal of Coalition Forces. Success at the tactical level, in my
estimation, occurs when the Threat conducts an attack and is not killed or
captured, regardless of whether or not this attack resulted in Coalition
casualties or damage to equipment. When these groups do inflict injuries on
US forces it will be reported in the international media and is seen as a
major victory. It also has the intended effect of inspiring other group
members to conduct attacks and is an effective recruiting tool. On the
other hand, when an attacker is wounded/killed, it deters attacks for a
period of time while the group regroups and recruits new members.

Initial attacks against Coalition Forces in our zone were direct fire small
arms and RPG ambushes. This led to heavy Threat losses with minimal
negative impact on our forces. The net effect was that the guerilla force
was entering into a war of attrition with Coalition Forces. This tactic
rapidly became unsupportable from a threat standpoint and attackers have
begun to use tactics that allow for more standoff distance. Small arms fire
accuracy is not the Threat's strong point. The threat uses AK-47s with no
butt stock and often fire from the hip. They are not very good
marksmanship. They need to be close to hit you. It is the same with RPGs.
They need to be close to hit, especially for moving targets.

The use of command detonated IEDs has become fashionable. Wire leading
several hundred meters to a concealed position is common. This has also
resulted in heavy Threat causalities when conducted against combat arms
units and the threat has further adapted his tactics to target specific
units and unit types. See Note No. 7 for more on this TTP. Threat IEDs are
very rudimentary, but innovative. Using "daisy-chained" mortar rounds and
Artillery rounds on the high end to a shampoo bottle full of C4 on the low
end; there is quite a variety. Animal carcasses, vegetable oil cans, fire
extinguishers and a bag of garbage have all been used as IEDs. The bottom
line is we drive around potholes and any debris on the roads or the sides of
roads. Most are not very effective and some do not even ignite. They
mostly use command detonation with electrical wire running 200 to 300 meters
from the IED location to increase stand off.

Mortar fire is another tactic that rarely results in Coalition
casualties but is very safe for the attackers. If you accept that success
is defined as the ability to engage and live to engage again another day;
mortars becomes the best way for the enemy to be successful. We believe the
Threat is setting up their mortars in the direct lay mode and firing within
in sight of the Forward Operating Base. They are not precise and the sheaf
is fairly dispersed, indicating that the Threat is just shooting in the
general direction of the FOB and then quickly evading. We have never had
more than one mortar engage at the same time, although I do not know if
other FOBs have been engaged by multiple mortars or not. It is very
difficult to counter mortar fire. The Threat normally fires three or fewer
rounds per engagement and they will engage each target only once per day,
very often skipping days between attacks. By the time the rounds begin
impacting, the attackers have begun their exfiltration. Acquisition of
firing points has been achieved with Q-36/Q-37 radar, although these radars
are not designed to acquire mortar trajectories and are normally not
reliable. Crater analysis allows us to conduct pattern analysis to
determine likely launch points. We can then conduct anti-mortar ambushes
with ground forces but there are more launch points than we can
realistically cover.

The bottom line, however, is that it is difficult to identify the
exact firing point quickly enough to action forces before the attacker
flees. It is necessary to work with local residents to identify the
perpetrators and the locals are more afraid of the Threat than they are
willing to help the Coalition. It all goes back to that "wait and see"
mentality. We have, in the Brigade zone, used indirect fires to counter the
mortar threat but units must understand the constraints facing them when
they conduct this type of response. Given the proximity of non-combatants
to threat targets, counter-battery is nearly non-existent because indirect
fires are nearly impossible to clear. Further compounding this dilemma is
the fact that disposition of U.S. forces in relationship to threat targets
often prevent adequate firing solutions above 120mm mortars, minimizing the
capability of the 155mm howitzers available for fire support.

7. Why attack the lion when you can attack the sheep? Most attacks
when we first arrived in zone were conducted against my infantry patrols.
This was a very bad choice of targets and the threat paid dearly for these
attacks. Threat planners and financiers have switched tactics to attack log
convoys or other soft targets. I believe the Threat has learned to
distinguish between units that will stop, establish a base of fire and then
maneuver to destroy them versus units that break contact. Our unit marking
systems aid this identification. My units are the former as the Threat has
discovered over time, and my units have repeatedly passed through areas
unscathed only to have another convoy (one that adheres to the "break
contact" TTP) trailing 15 minutes behind and get hit with IEDs, RPGs, and
small arms fire.

Attacks on convoys in our AO have been deterred by several TTPs.
Initially, our BFVs, scouts and other combat patrols were ambushed with
direct fire and RPGs. Despite their efforts, the threat rarely escaped
without suffering casualties. We found that if we maintain contact and
immediately attack their positions, the threat will immediately try to break
contact and runaway. He knows he cannot win toe to toe with US forces.
Unaware of our night fighting capability, they would often mistake distance
with safety, thinking we cannot see them. Many would be attackers walked
into direct fire engagements initiated by our forces as a result.
Occasionally the Threat was successful in initiating ambushes or attacks but
very rarely did these cause damage to US forces personnel or equipment.
They usually did result in Threat casualties and/or detention. If a convoy
is attacked, the element must return fire, maintain contact and attack
through the enemy. If not, the threat will escape and fight another day.
The threat uses hit and run tactics, but if you do not engage him he will
stay and continue to try inflict damage. If a convoy breaks contact, the
enemy will escape before a QRF can get out there.


The threat soon stopped ambushing/attacking us with small arms and
RPGs and resorted to the use of IEDs. This increased their stand off and
increased their chances of escape. Despite this, we still were able to
engage them and cause enemy casualties. They have since stopped attacking
any of our convoys, resorting instead to attacking vehicle convoys that are
not from our task force. We believe that if units look prepared (i.e.,
gunners up and scanning, crew served weapons manned and scanning, personnel
in vehicles facing out and vigilant) then they most likely they will not be
attacked.

The threat picks his targets wisely, and given the macho influence
of this region, normally attempts to avoid direct contact with prepared and
capable forces. The best deterrence to threat contact is to appear prepared
and willing to return fire and destroy the threat.

8. Strange bedfellows (opposition groups teaming up)- The adage
that my enemy's enemy is my ally is very much alive in this AO. Groups
(both political and religious) that previously opposed each other, quickly
find common ground when they share a common enemy (e.g. U.S. forces). At
the same time, one cannot assume that these types of alliances are automatic
given a common foe, as the sides can/do play each side against each other,
in an attempt to eliminate both threats simultaneously.

9. Sheiks - A balance between Sheiks (family heads),
professionals (educated citizens), religious leaders (Imams), and political
party leaders is essential in establishing a functional and legitimate
government. Appointed/selected positions and social perception are
essential to the preservation of the Sheiks status within this society. In
addition, it is imperative to ascertain the difference between a legacy
Sheik (one who inherited the position/title through legitimate family
ascension) and "90s" Sheiks, appointed by the former regime based upon
loyalty or wealth.

To combat local populace apathy and vendettas, we must hold the local sheiks
and people accountable for actions that occur in their towns/villages. They
would much rather have us work with the Sheiks then clear every house in
their village. The local villages and towns are fairly closed and are very
aware of outsiders when they come in to their town. After a relationship is
established with a sheik, he will often identify troublemakers and outsiders
that don't belong in the area. We try to make them understand that the
more peaceful the town, the more NGO's come in, the more money, the more
improvement.

10. Government/limited CA - The traditional BN/TF is ill-equipped
(and manned) to conduct "nation-building" without significant augmentation
and training (e.g. establishment of government, police, judicial, and
financial activities). Personal talents may mitigate this shortfall, but it
does not correct the systemic shortage of trained resources.

Tactical Human Intelligence Teams, Tactical Psyops Teams, Civil
Affairs, and translators all contribute significantly to successful
interaction between the local populace and Coalition Forces. These assets,
as critical as they are, do not prepare the commander for his role in
assisting in the formation of local governments, entering into negotiations,
and dealing with Sheiks and other community leaders.

Translators MUST be provided early on in theater in order to facilitate
day-to-day operations. Units cannot plan-on or rely-on English-speaking
local nationals for this duty, as many locals will remain apart from U.S.
forces until the situation stabilizes.

One final thought; the biggest combat multiplier is money. Population
approval and acceptance is the decisive point and while combat operations
against non-compliant forces are necessary, they should not be viewed as the
task Forces Main Effort.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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