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Posted: 9/7/2010 4:28:37 PM EDT
This was posted in GD by another member of arfcom and I got the link from him. I know its long, but its worth it original article Some press accounts have placed blame for M4 carbine malfunctions at the Battle of Wanat, Afghanistan, squarely on the weapon's manufacturer. In fact, other factors could have led to the disaster there. On the morning of 13 July 2008, 49 Americans, including 40 paratroopers from Captain Matthew Myer's Chosen Few Company of the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Airborne Infantry, six combat engineers, and three Marine embedded tactical trainers were defending Combat Outpost (COP) Kahler near Wanat in Nuristan Province. Also involved were 24 Afghan National Army soldiers from the 3rd Kandak [Battalion], 2nd Brigade, 201st Corps. Suddenly, a deadly wave of intense small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades struck the small and exposed operating base.1 As many as 200 insurgents—core Afghan-centric and foreign takfiri fighters supported by numerous local combatants—crept, many barefoot, to within meters of the American positions. The insurgents quickly debilitated the unit's heavy weapons, then, in a coordinated effort, suppressed Kahler and simultaneously moved to isolate the defenders of Observation Post (OP) Topside, three fighting positions that had been situated on a prominent knoll east of COP Kahler proper. Only the timely arrival of support—including American AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and field artillery—prevented the complete destruction of COP Kahler.2 Yet the outcome was tragic enough: nine U.S. Soldiers died, and a further 27 were wounded, making that day one of the bloodiest of the war and prompting The New York Times to describe the four-hour Battle of Wanat as "the 'Black Hawk Down' of Afghanistan."3 More than a year after the battle, historian Douglas R. Cubbison of the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute released a 248-page draft Occasional Paper in an attempt to sort out what went wrong. The American and Afghan troops outnumbered there two years ago were plagued by numerous weapon stoppages. Beyond all the clamor, just how reliable is the M4? Press Perceptions Immediately after the release of the Army's Occasional Paper, press reports seized on Soldiers' accounts of weapon stoppages detailed in it. The Times reported that "Soldiers who survived the battle described how their automatic weapons turned white hot and jammed from nonstop firing."4 A November 2009 Defense News story also cited reports of weapon stoppages, but went further, attempting to connect the deaths of Soldiers in the battle to the enduring debate over the reliability and lethality of the military's primary infantry weapon, the M4 carbine. Since its introduction with U.S. forces during the Vietnam War, the M16 rifle and its offspring, including the M4, have been the subject of some controversy, especially related to reports of the weapons' reliability in combat. Initial reports from Vietnam indicated a high incidence of stoppages. These were in fact directly related to the Army's initial decision to alter the ammunition's propellant from military specifications (mil-specs) and to dispense with chrome plating the M16's chamber—an improvement that had become a standard feature of all U.S. military small arms since World War II. Both decisions led to premature corrosion of the chamber and ultimately to stoppages. Upgrades, including those that improved the manufacturing process and design of the weapon's buffer, bolt, trigger components, and chamber, which would receive a chrome lining, resulted in a much superior M16A1. Troops issued the M16A1 in 1969 and later rarely complained about their weapons. One Marine rifleman did complain in a 1967 letter to his family following the battle for Hills 881 and 861 above Khe Sanh: "We left with 72 men in our platoon and came back with 19. Believe it or not, you know what killed most of us? Our own rifles. Practically every one of our dead was found with his [M16] torn down next to him where he had been trying to fix it."5 Design Enhancements Not mentioned in the letter was the fact that many of the Marines who fought at Khe Sanh had been issued their M16s only days before the action and probably were unfamiliar with them. Also worth mentioning is the fact that the M16 of four decades ago is not the same weapon as the M4 in service in Iraq and Afghanistan today. Enhancements made to the original design have substantially improved the weapon's reliability, so much so that commanders often praise the M4. At the 2006 Infantry War Fighting Conference, Major General Walter Wojdakowski, commanding general, U.S. Army Infantry Center & School, called the M4 "one of many success stories in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan."6 Yet troops outnumbered at Wanat, like those described in the Khe Sanh account 41 years before, were still plagued by numerous weapon stoppages. Studies conducted by the Army, by independent research institutions, and by Colt itself offer some indication of the cause. In particular, they provide some possible explanations for the numerous stoppages suffered by Wanat's defenders. The Army's draft Occasional Paper states that to maintain fire parity with their attackers, the Chosen Few Company soldiers "were firing their weapons 'cyclic,' on full automatic at the highest possible rates of fire."7 For this reason, the paper concludes, some Soldiers experienced stoppages. Staff Sergeant Erich Phillips, manning the 120-mm mortar, recalled that during the engagement his "M4 quit firing and would no longer charge when [he] tried to correct the malfunction." An engineer specialist who loaded for Phillips recalled that, "Staff Sergeant Phillips poured out fire," going "through three rifles using them until they jammed."8 Specialist Chris McKaig, defending OP Topside, also experienced problems with his M4. "My weapon was overheating," he recalled. "I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn't charge my weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and threw my weapon down."9 The CNA Study The subject of weapon stoppages during engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan figured prominently in a 2006 formal independent study conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) at the behest of the U.S. Army's Project Manager, Soldier Weapons (PMSW), located at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. The study, Soldier Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, is based on a survey of 2,607 Soldiers, a sampling of active-duty Army and Army Reserve personnel (70 percent), and National Guard personnel (30 percent), who had returned from Iraq or Afghanistan within the 12 months prior to the study and had engaged in at least one firefight using an M9, M4, M16 (A2 or A4), or an M249 during their last deployment.10 No special operations or Marine Corps personnel participated in the study. Its findings suggest weapon stoppages are not uncommon during combat in both theaters. Respondents were chosen to parallel as closely as possible the actual demographics of Soldiers in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Overwhelmingly, 95 percent of respondents had just returned from deployments in Iraq. Most (80 percent) were E-4s, E-5s, or E-6s; most (61 percent) had served for one to five years; most (77 percent) had qualified as sharpshooter or expert; and most (84 percent) had participated in one to five engagements during their deployments, though 15 percent had fought in more, and 27 respondents each indicated they had survived more than 50 engagements. If one attempted to describe the average respondent to the CNA survey, one might say he was a Soldier in the Regular Army, an E-5 with a little over six years in service and a recent tour in Iraq during which he fought in five engagements. Armed with an M4, he is a sharpshooter.11 The study did not capture specific information regarding the numbers of engagements each respondent had participated in; instead, it asked respondents to indicate the number of engagements in which they fought within a range of choices: 1-5, 6-15, 16-30, 31-50, or More than 50. When interpreting information regarding the frequency of weapon stoppages, this becomes important. Reflective of the 25 percent of Soldiers who were issued the M4 in the actual population at the time of the study, 917 respondents to the survey—roughly 35 percent—carried the M4 carbine on their last deployment.12 Of these respondents, 173, some 19 percent, reported they had experienced a weapon stoppage during an engagement. And of that number, 31 reported experiencing a large-impact stoppage, meaning that he "was unable to engage the target with that weapon during a significant portion of or the entire firefight after performing immediate or remedial action to clear the stoppage."13 Given the fact that the study contains no specific data regarding the numbers of engagements fought, incidences of M4 stoppages must be depicted as occurring at a frequency within the low-high range of engagements reported: 2,562 to 7,281 or more. Thus, the CNA study suggests that M4 weapon stoppages occurred during engagements 6.75 to 2.37 percent (or less) of the time, and that large-impact stoppages occurred 1.21 to 0.42 percent (or less) of the time. While no specific information is available describing the exact cause of each stoppage reported, in general terms, the study indicates that frequency of stoppages is impacted by full-automatic fire and several other factors. Full-Automatic Fire and Weapon Stoppages At Wanat, the weapons were pushed to their limits and beyond. In the Combat Studies Institute's paper, historian Cubbison attributed the weapon stoppages experienced by Wanat's defenders to their necessity to fire their M4 carbines at sustained high cyclic rates. This conclusion is supported by the CNA study, which revealed that Soldiers firing weapons on full-automatic doubled their probability of experiencing a stoppage.14 In a 21 October 2009 letter from Colt Defense LLC's executive vice president, retired Marine Major General James R. Battaglini, to Army Colonel Douglas Tamilio, project manager, Soldier Weapons, General Battaglini concludes that, finding themselves "under attack by a numerically superior Anti Coalition Militia (ACM) force conducting well planned attacks with overwhelming firepower," Soldiers at Wanat used their weapons "in excess of their cyclic rates of fire." The M4 carbine was born of the 1965-vintage Colt CAR-15 and XM177/XM177E2 carbines and the U.S. government's interest in procuring "a redesigned and upgraded variation of the M16A2 weapon system," which could fire the new M855 5.56x45-mm NATO cartridge.15 After several meetings with government officials beginning in September 1984, Colt received a procurement contract on 12 June 1985 to provide 40 XM4 carbines for testing and evaluation. The weapons that resulted from this program, those that through development would become known as the M4 and M4A1 carbines, were initially intended to be used by rear-echelon Soldiers and others who required only more firepower than an ordinary sidearm. However, "by the time the M4 and M4A1 carbines went into production a decade later in 1994, the end users had become frontline fighting units such as the SEALs, Special Forces, and Airborne Divisions."16 The original emphasis the government had placed on parts commonality between the new carbine and the M16A2 rifle had shifted to performance. Since that time, numerous and substantial improvements have been made to the M4 and M4A1, including strengthening the bolt, extractor, and extractor spring, resurfacing the chamber, and, in 2000, the introduction by Colt of the R0921HB, a heavy-profile barrel M4A1.17 Rounds per Minute According to U.S. Special Operations Command's SOPMOD (special operations peculiar modification) program office, "The current sustained rate of fire for the M4A1 Carbine is 15 rounds per minute and a maximum rate of 90 [rounds] per minute for short periods in an emergency."18 Firing the M4 carbine at cyclic rates of fire of 90 to 150 rounds per minute, "which is the rate of suppressive fire associated with machine guns" for prolonged periods leads to rapid heating of the barrel and possible failure.19 Tests conducted by both the Army and by Colt indicate that "exceeding the sustained rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute will result in the weapon 'cooking off' rounds after approximately 170 rounds have been fired." If the maximum rate of fire of 90 rounds per minute "is maintained for about 540 rounds, the barrel softens and gas starts to blow by the bullet, changing the sound and size of the muzzle blast." If the operator continues to fire the weapon, the barrel will begin to droop, and finally, at about 596 rounds, the barrel will burst. While the current M4 configuration exceeds the Army's requirements for general issue, early in the M4 program, the Special Operations Command requested a heavier barrel profile to accommodate the rapid heating that accompanies special operations forces' (SOF) high firing schedules. The Army denied this request, however, because a heavy barrel would be incompatible with M203 installation and because it did not want to add a SOF-unique repair part to its inventory.20 In Fiscal Year 2001, Rock Island Arsenal (RIA) "responded to the distinct needs of SOF with the RIA heavy barrel." The new heavy-profile barrel still allowed for the installation of the M203, but increased the rounds to cook off to 205 rounds, and the round count to barrel burst to 930. While the new heavy profile did not increase the service life of the barrel, it did provide SOF with, per its requirement document, an M4A1 having a limited light machine-gun capability, of a sort, as it requested.21 It should be noted that the requirement document did not define what this capability meant in the way of sustained fire (in numbers). In any case, the rationale for such a capability is based on special operations forces' need to break contact with large enemy formations. The method SOFs employ to break contact in such engagements is to lay down an overwhelming burst of fire intended to suppress the enemy long enough for SOFs to slip away. It is for this reason these forces are working to develop a carbine capable of firing two 30-round bursts followed by at least 45 and up to 75 rounds per minute for 440 rounds without damaging the weapon. Misconceptions Yet the M16/M4 was never designed to have this capability. In a 1967 TIME magazine article discussing the M16, the author marvels over "the M-16's maximum sustained rate of fire (up to 200 rounds a minute)." The quote provides some insight into the historical misconceptions about what the M16/M4 is, and what it isn't, and why many observers are disappointed in the 6-pound M4 when it fails to perform like a belt-fed light machine gun. While suggesting that Soldiers maintain fire discipline as a means of preventing their weapons from overheating is a simple solution, when Soldiers are fighting for their lives under conditions extreme even for the battlefield-such as those that presented themselves to Wanat's defenders—such arguments lose their veracity. According to officials at Colt, soon after the release of the Cubbison draft study, the Army contacted Colt, asking the company to "recommend any immediate options for the M4 carbine" that would increase its performance characteristics. Colt responded, recommending that the current Army contract requirement be modified by replacing the 3-round burst M4 with the fully automatic R0921HB/M4A1 and with the RIA heavy barrel, which would provide 1.7 times the sustained rate of fire as the M4.22 At Wanat, where firsthand accounts suggest that many defenders were firing their weapons at extremely high cyclic rates simply to prevent themselves from being overrun, it is possible that if they had been firing M4s with the RIA heavy-profile barrels instead of standard-issue weapons, they would have suffered fewer weapon stoppages. And yet some accounts, such as that of Specialist McKaig, who reported that his M4 overheated after firing 12 magazines—approximately 360 rounds—in a half hour's time (an overall rate of fire of only 12 rounds per minute; well within design specifications for the weapon) suggest either that Soldier's recollections are not accurate or that other factors may have led to weapon stoppages. Other Possible Causes The CNA study indicates that several other important factors contribute to an increased probability of experiencing a weapon stoppage, including cleaning and lubrication procedures (CLP), the attachment of weapon accessories, the weapons' magazines, and the possible use of rebuilt weapons. And these factors, in addition to sustained high cyclic rates of fire, may also have contributed as underlying causes of the weapon stoppages at Wanat. "Maintenance regimens, including weapon cleaning and lubrication, have very little or no impact on . . . weapon stoppages" the report said. However, Soldiers who used dry lubricants in the maintenance of their M4s, rather than CLP, "decreased the probability of experiencing a stoppage by half."23 Soldiers reporting a high frequency of lubricant application (one or more times per day), particularly M16 users, were more likely to experience stoppages.24 Increased frequency in quick-wipedown weapon cleaning also increased the odds of experiencing a stoppage. This somewhat counterintuitive finding is most likely a result of Soldiers replacing fully disassembled cleanings with quicker and less effective methods. "9 to 10 percent of M4 and M16 users called for improvements in magazine quality. Soldiers stated that the [standard 30-round aluminum] magazines [issued] are easily dented during the course of normal use and carrying in theater, causing problems in ammunition feed from the magazine."25 Some combat veterans have said it's also critical to keep the magazines clean as well. The CNA report says, "Soldiers issued a cleaning kit with their weapons were one-third less likely to experience a stoppage than those not issued a cleaning kit."26 Surprisingly, more than one-third of all respondents to the CNA study indicated that they had not been issued cleaning kits with their weapons. The study indicates also that attaching accessories to the M4 significantly had an impact on stoppages, "regardless of how the accessories were attached." Soldiers who duct-taped and zip-corded accessories to their M4s "were two and three times [respectively] more likely to experience a stoppage."27 Finally, the report indicates, Soldiers issued rebuilt M4s are "3.5 times more likely to experience a stoppage."28 Dust Test 3 Beyond these potential causes are environmental factors. In a 10 December 2009 letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, co-signed by Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO) and Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Readiness Representative Solomon Ortiz (D-TX), the congressmen raised the issue of the M4, citing their concerns that although the M4 "routinely rank[s] lower than other military weapons in testing, they are still being issued as the Army's weapon of choice." What the congressmen seem to be referring to are the results of the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Center's (ATEC) September-November 2007 Extreme Dust Test 3, which press reports leapt on as an indication of the M4's purported shortcomings. In the test, where ten sample M4s drawn from Army inventory competed against ten samples each of Heckler & Koch's HK416 and XM8 and Fabrique National's Mk16 SCAR, the weapons, with an initial coating of heavy lubrication applied, were placed in a dust chamber for 30 minutes and then fired to 120 rounds before being returned to the dust chamber for another half hour. This process was repeated to 600 rounds, at which point the weapons were wiped down and another coat of heavy lubrication was applied.29 Firing continued in this way to 6,000 rounds per weapon. Raw test data made available to the press indicated that, collectively, M4s experienced 863 low-impact and 19 high-impact stoppages over a firing schedule of 60,000 rounds—the other weapons experienced significantly fewer stoppages—but ATEC's final report, which appeared in February 2008, noted that "M4 performance . . . was significantly different than in the previous extreme dust test in which it participated," and that a separate effort was under way to investigate the reasons. According to officials at Colt, those reasons included the fact that six of the ten M4s drawn for the test did not meet the minimum rate of fire of 700 rounds-per-minute mandated under Mil-Spec IAW Mil-C-70599A(AR), which requires a cyclic rate of fire of 700 to 970 rounds-per-minute. The M4s used in Dust Test 3, delivered to the Army in June 2007, met mil-specs when delivered; however, together the ten drawn for the test from the U.S. Army inventory averaged only 694 rounds-per-minute.30 While performing comparably with the HK416, XM8, and Mk16 in all other respects, the M4 carbines used in the test experienced a large number of failure-to-feed and failure-to-extract stoppages.31 Colt says this is because of the sub-mil-spec rate-of-fire of the test weapons. Colt also states that ATEC's testers were unfamiliar with the M4s' 3-round burst configuration which, depending on the position of the cam, will sometimes fire 1 round or a 2-round burst before firing a 3-round burst. This unfamiliarity, said Colt, led to single rounds and 2-round bursts being counted as stoppages. With the exception of the M4s, all other weapons tested were fully automatic with no 3-round burst provision. Further, Colt points out that the test itself did not meet Mil-Spec 810F and "was not repeatable." In response to what Colt described as "the premature media reporting" of the raw test data, Program Executive Office Soldier suggested that Colt conduct its own extreme dust test. So Colt contracted a DOD-certified testing agency, Stork East-West Technology Corporation in Jupiter, Florida, to conduct its own dust test according to mil-spec guidelines. In this test of ten M4 carbines, which was conducted under a protocol identical to that used in Extreme Dust Test 3, only 111 stoppages were reported. Where Are the M4s from Wanat? Though possibly the result of numerous factors, the exact causes of the weapon stoppages suffered by Wanat's defenders are still unreported and perhaps unknown. According to General Battaglini, Colt requested that the U.S. Army provide the weapons recovered from Wanat so the manufacturer could test them to determine the precise causes of reported stoppages. So far, the Army has not obliged. When asked if the weapons from Wanat were recovered and tested, no officials at Project Manager, Soldier Weapons, the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Center, U.S. Army Forces Command, or Central Command could or would respond. If the weapons have not yet been tested, nearly two years after the battle, the precise causes of stoppages may never be known. Numerous media outlets have blamed the M4 for the death of Soldiers at Wanat, or continue to deride the weapon in favor of the commercial off-the-shelf products of Colt competitors-part of what Colt alleges to be a "concerted media campaign" led by writers at Army Times, Military.com, and others to promote the products of German firearms manufacturer Heckler & Koch. For now, however, the M4 carbine continues to be the U.S. Army's battlefield weapon of choice. Questions asked about replacing the M4, which has a direct gas impingement operating system, with another carbine having a gas-piston system, have been repeatedly dismissed by the Army as offering no efficiency over the current system. In the late 1960s, in response to an official request, Colt provided the Army with its own gas-piston carbine, the model 703, which was tested and turned down as it offered no increase in reliability over the direct gas impingement operating system. Since then, other comparative evaluations and assessments have been completed supporting the Army's initial choice. A December 2005 study conducted by the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), for example, which evaluated the HK416 and Colt's Close Quarters Battle-Receiver (CQB-R), concluded that CQB-R "out performed the HK416 in mechanical reliability."32 Other reports have rendered similar conclusions about other possible M4 replacements, including the XM8. The Army's own April 2008 Small Arms Capabilities-Based Assessment, carried out to support "a small arms acquisition strategy through 2015," did not fault the M4 carbine, but instead called for improvements in ammunition, sights, and optics.33 In January 2010, Project Manager, Soldier Weapons released a market survey outlining the Army's dual approach to both improvements of the M4 and moves being made toward a future carbine competition once the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approves the new requirement.34 In the meantime, the Army says, "We have what we need."35 A Leadership Failure Though weapon stoppages certainly played some role in the outcome of the engagement, no disaster such as the one that occurred at Wanat is the result of a single failure, a single mistake. Rather, the Battle of Wanat was the result of a chain of tactical mistakes, lapses in judgment, failures to hold the human terrain, and failures of leadership. The Army acknowledged this, in part, in a CBS News report on 11 March 2010. Captain Matthew Myer, the Chosen Few company commander who was the senior American officer on the ground at Wanat and who was awarded a Silver Star for his heroism during the battle, along with Lieutenant Colonel William Ostlund, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Airborne Infantry, and Colonel Charles Preysler, commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, neither of whom were actually at the battle, received "career ending reprimands for failing to prepare adequate defenses [at Wanat] in the days leading up to the attack."36 To prevent future Wanats, military planners should make every effort to ensure American forces continue to receive the best and most appropriate weapons and equipment possible. More important perhaps, they also should make every effort to understand not only how the events immediately prior to the battle influenced its outcome, but how the many events that, together, comprised the much broader history of the American relationship with the people of Nuristan Province, those that lie at the heart of America's population-centered counterinsurgency strategy in the region, converged to form an outcome so tragic as the attack at Wanat. 1. Douglas R. Cubbison, , Occasional Paper: The Battle of Wanat-First Draft, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Research and Publication Team, U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 2009), pp. 70, 73. 2. Ibid., p. 84. 3. Tom Shanker, "Report Cites Firefight as Lesson on Afghan War," The New York Times, 2 October 2009. 4. Ibid. 5. "Defense: Under Fire," TIME, 9 June 1967. 6. MGEN James R. Battaglini, USMC (Ret.), Letter to the Editor, Army Times, in response to Matthew Cox's article, "Better than M4, but you can't have one," Army Times, 1 March 2007. Remarks attributed to MGEN Walter Wojdakowski, Commander of the Infantry Center. 7. Cubbison, Occasional Paper, p. 115. 8. Ibid., p. 110. 9. Ibid., p. 125. 10. Sara M. Russell, Soldier Perspectives on Small Arms (CRM D0015259.A2 / Final) Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses (CNA): December 2006, p. 1. 11. Ibid., p. 11. 12. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 13. Ibid., pp. 17-1). 14. Cubbison, Occasional Paper, p. 115; and Russell, Soldier Perspectives, p. 23. 15. Christopher R. Bartocci, Black Rifle II: The M16 into the 21st Century (Cobourg, Ontario: Collector Grade Publications Inc., 2004), p. 67. 16. Ibid., p. 68. 17. Colt Defense, LLC. (2007). M4 Changes 1994-2007. 18. USSOCOM SOPMOD Program Office (USPO), (23 February 2001). M4A1 5.56mm Carbine and Related Systems Deficiencies and Solutions: Operational and Technical Study with Analysis of Alternatives (Draft, Version 6), (Crane, Indiana: Naval Surface Warfare Center USPO, 2001), p. 16. 19. Ibid., p. 15. 20. Ibid., p. 16. 21. Ibid., p. 14. 22. MGEN James R. Battaglini, USMC (Ret.). (21 October 2009). Letter to COL Douglas Tamilio, Project Manager, Soldier Weapons regarding "Battle of Wanat Historical Analysis," General Battaglini is the Executive Vice President of Colt Defense, LLC.Battaglini, 2009, p. 3. 23. Russell, Soldier Perspectives, p. 23. 24. Ibid., p. 22. 25. Ibid., p. 23. 26. Ibid., p. 22. 27. Ibid., p. 23. 28. Ibid. 29. Matthew Cox, "Changes to the M4?" Marine Corps Times, 14 January 2008, p. 12. 30. Colt Defense, LLC. (February 2008). Colt Data and Analysis of M4 Carbine Cyclic Rates of Fire for Colt Weapons Used in Dust Test #2 and #3: Competition and Test Control, p. 25. 31. U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Center (ATEC). System Assessment Reliability Performance of Select 5.56-mm. Excerpts provided by Colt Defense LLC, 2008, p. 2-2. 32. MSGT Kevin M. O'Connor, USA, AAR HK 416 Operations Testing and Assessment (Memorandum for Record), Department of the Army, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Carson, CO, p. 4. 33. Andrew Feickert, (2009, August 3). The Army's M-4 Carbine: Background ad Issues for Congress (RS22888). Congressional Research Service, 3 August 2009, p. 6. 34. Scott Gourley, "Army Shifts Modernization Focus to M4 Carbine Improvements," The Year in Defense, 8 April 2008. 35. Matthew Cox, "Army Acquires Rights to M4," Army Times, 6 July 2009. 36. David Martin, "Exclusive: Hero's Acts Faulted," CBS News, 11 March 2010. |
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Thanks for posting the article, Shawn.
When I took the Colt M-16/M4/AR-15/SMG Armorers school in 2007, taught by Ken Elmore of S. A. W., he spoke of M4 failures in military combat related to exceeding the rate of fire. In his Advanced Armorer's school, which I'm attending in December, he sometimes demonstrates this by putting some mags through an M4 on full auto (exceeding the rate of fire) then leaving a live round chambered to cook off. Ken said if the gun is hot enough to cook off rounds, it is getting close to failing. The article made a point that some of the M4 failures at Wanat could have been attributed to the M4's being fired at LMG rates of fire. Related to rates of fire, over the years I've taken one Operator level and one Instructor level course from Paul Howe, owner of CSAT and a retired Army Delta Operator. He said in his 10 years of special ops, he mainly used semi-auto in combat, never getting close to exceeding the rate of fire of the M4. Howe said he got more hits in semi that full. I'm not necessarily comparing Howe's combat with what happened at Wanat just using it as an example. I've also shot the full-auto SCAR 16 and HK416, about 150 rounds each. I actually like the SCAR more than I want to, but it is not worth the price and does not really do anything better than the M4. As for the 416, I don't see it as an improvement over the M4 and have first hand knowledge of some issues a LE Agency has been having with them. Of 25 416's purchased, 5 have charging handle latch retaining pin problems (they work loose and begin gouging the receiver). Unacceptable in a $2000 gun! |
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I read somewhere (can't remember where) that once the false failures (1 and 2 round burst instead of 3 round burst and similar things) were discarded, the M4's total number of failures in Dust Test 3 dropped to somewhere around 280.
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Which is what many of us have said for years...
If you use the M4 as a rifle/carbine it works well... If you try to use it as a machine gun, it does not. And if you're a platoon(+) element, trying to hold out against a half a battalion of enemy, you're probably going to break some guns in the process of staying alive... Regardless of which gun it is... |
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Why are people so emotionally invested in defending the Colt M-4? It is like the waterboy in the M-14 section that constantly claims the M-14 is the end all be all rifle...
There is no perfect system. Everything is a tradeoff. The M-4 isn't bad...I carried one on both of my Iraq tours and an old M-16A2E in Astan back in 04. They all worked. Having said that, they worked because I was well dialed in on parts replacement schedules and detailed inspection that went far beyond what a regular soldier would be able/allowed to do. The M-16 FOW has some issues...mostly that it requires a high level of armorer attention and regular parts replacement if you want to keep it duty grade reliable. Sadly, DOD does not do this. They shoot them until they break and their armorers are largely there to count guns and make soldiers scrub the finish off of them. One of two things needs to happen: 1. Start treating duty weapons like aircraft and replacing parts prior to failure by keeping accurate round counts and replacing early and often. This is a nightmare of logistics and records keeping...not likely to happen. 2. Procure a system that requires less maintenance, parts replacement, and is more tollerant of adverse operations. In a perfect world...#1 would work. In reality, #2 is the best option and will actually work in the .gov world. |
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Quoted:
I read somewhere (can't remember where) that once the false failures (1 and 2 round burst instead of 3 round burst and similar things) were discarded, the M4's total number of failures in Dust Test 3 dropped to somewhere around 280. Has this ever been proven to be true? I never saw where this was true...only that Colt put it out. Also, if the Colt M-4s were not meeting Mil-Spec...they why did Colt sell them to the Army as part of a Military weapons order |
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Quoted: Why are people so emotionally invested in defending the Colt M-4? It is like the waterboy in the M-14 section that constantly claims the M-14 is the end all be all rifle... There is no perfect system. Everything is a tradeoff. The M-4 isn't bad...I carried one on both of my Iraq tours and an old M-16A2E in Astan back in 04. They all worked. Having said that, they worked because I was well dialed in on parts replacement schedules and detailed inspection that went far beyond what a regular soldier would be able/allowed to do. The M-16 FOW has some issues...mostly that it requires a high level of armorer attention and regular parts replacement if you want to keep it duty grade reliable. Sadly, DOD does not do this. They shoot them until they break and their armorers are largely there to count guns and make soldiers scrub the finish off of them. One of two things needs to happen: 1. Start treating duty weapons like aircraft and replacing parts prior to failure by keeping accurate round counts and replacing early and often. This is a nightmare of logistics and records keeping...not likely to happen. 2. Procure a system that requires less maintenance, parts replacement, and is more tollerant of adverse operations. In a perfect world...#1 would work. In reality, #2 is the best option and will actually work in the .gov world. As I understand it, an internal "round counter" is a high priority for any future military firearms acquisitions. And anyway (if we're talking about piston AR-15s), I'm not buying that they live up to #2, for example, how does the addition of a gas piston prevent the action spring from wearing out as fast as on a "regular" M4? How will transferring some heat from the bolt carrier to the gas block and barrel allow the barrel to live longer? Any extended barrel life with said systems is most likely the result of alternate manufacturing processes and finish methods instead of the addition of an op rod. Quoted: Quoted: I read somewhere (can't remember where) that once the false failures (1 and 2 round burst instead of 3 round burst and similar things) were discarded, the M4's total number of failures in Dust Test 3 dropped to somewhere around 280. Has this ever been proven to be true? I never saw where this was true...only that Colt put it out. Also, if the Colt M-4s were not meeting Mil-Spec...they why did Colt sell them to the Army as part of a Military weapons order It wasn't from Colt, I remember that much. |
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I read somewhere (can't remember where) that once the false failures (1 and 2 round burst instead of 3 round burst and similar things) were discarded, the M4's total number of failures in Dust Test 3 dropped to somewhere around 280. Has this ever been proven to be true? I never saw where this was true...only that Colt put it out. Also, if the Colt M-4s were not meeting Mil-Spec...they why did Colt sell them to the Army as part of a Military weapons order they said they met spec when they shipped them out the idea being from some armorer fuckin with them or some such and old worn parts made the guns not operate to spec colt had a third party re do the test, and from what I have researched, they are serious about having nutral parties test out their weapons and try to duplicate any flaws no one defends the M4 cause they think its the end all be all. people just point out its a great gun but cant be used past it purpose. its purpose was never to even be a general issue rifle when colt came up with it. people keep comparing it to some kinda LMG or something meant to fill the role of a do everything gun. what I dont get is why people cant look at its original intent and judge it by how well it does its original purpose. not what its been forced into doing |
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.......It is like the waterboy in the M-14 section that constantly claims the M-14 is the end all be all rifle....... Those M-14 waterboys are much much worse than us. Much much worse. Not as bad as the Mini-14 fanboys, but almost as bad. I have nothing useful to contribute, but I'm bored: insomnia attack.......sorry. |
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LOL! Funny! I actually do - I have two of them right now and am planning to get the new 7.62 X 39 "Tactical" version. I was talking about a group of people at....ahem.....I don't think I should mention the board, but I am sure you know which one I've been tempted to call out their BS many times, but I don't want to burn bridges, just incase I had questions I need to ask them about the Mini.
Sorry that I was hijacking your thread - I couldn't go to sleep and bored as hell - I am such a low life back stabber, I know |
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I read somewhere (can't remember where) that once the false failures (1 and 2 round burst instead of 3 round burst and similar things) were discarded, the M4's total number of failures in Dust Test 3 dropped to somewhere around 280. Has this ever been proven to be true? I never saw where this was true...only that Colt put it out. Also, if the Colt M-4s were not meeting Mil-Spec...they why did Colt sell them to the Army as part of a Military weapons order If you are referring to the M4's in question being out of spec because they were giving 1 and 2 shots in burst mode on the first trigger pull, you are wrong. The 3 round burst that Colt designed at the request of the USMC and US Army is different from the burst mechanism that is on H&K weapons. The 2 and 3 round burst on H&K's will always give you the 2 or 3 rounds. The Colt burst system is less complex, but is constantly "counting" rounds, whether being fired in semi or burst. So, depending on where the "counter" (a ratchet type device) is on the first shot of a mag, when in burst, you may get 1, 2 or 3 rounds. Subsequent bursts will give 3 shots. The Navy and Air Force were smart in not adopting burst. |
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....snip....how does the addition of a gas piston prevent the action spring from wearing out as fast as on a "regular" M4? How will transferring some heat from the bolt carrier to the gas block and barrel allow the barrel to live longer? Any extended barrel life with said systems is most likely the result of alternate manufacturing processes and finish methods instead of the addition of an op rod. .....snip... This is just a WAG. Maybe it's because the piston would either add mass to the whole system (if it was attached to the BCG), slowing it down, or if employed as a separate unit, the piston would absorb some of the energy being delivered by the gas, hence decreasing the impulse of the whole system. But the second WAG doesn't make sense, because the force created by the gas act on the system only for a very brief moment, hence the impulse that the system is subjected upon should be very low. I completely agree with you about not seeing how transferring some of the theat to the gas block / piston will increase barrel life. I can see how it will increase the life of the bolt, because hot gas will not be directly blown into the receiver and the BCG. If they really want something that will decrease barrel temperature, didn't LaRue and their OBR (whatever that thing is called) already accomplished that? Maybe .gov should look into that (upgrade the M4 with that system), instead of replacing the M4 with a piston weapon. |
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Quoted: Quoted: ....snip....how does the addition of a gas piston prevent the action spring from wearing out as fast as on a "regular" M4? How will transferring some heat from the bolt carrier to the gas block and barrel allow the barrel to live longer? Any extended barrel life with said systems is most likely the result of alternate manufacturing processes and finish methods instead of the addition of an op rod. .....snip... This is just a WAG. Maybe it's because the piston would either add mass to the whole system (if it was attached to the BCG), slowing it down, or if employed as a separate unit, the piston would absorb some of the energy being delivered by the gas, hence decreasing the impulse of the whole system. But the second WAG doesn't make sense, because the force created by the gas act on the system only for a very brief moment, hence the impulse that the system is subjected upon should be very low. I completely agree with you about not seeing how transferring some of the theat to the gas block / piston will increase barrel life. I can see how it will increase the life of the bolt, because hot gas will not be directly blown into the receiver and the BCG. If they really want something that will decrease barrel temperature, didn't LaRue and their OBR (whatever that thing is called) already accomplished that? Maybe .gov should look into that (upgrade the M4 with that system), instead of replacing the M4 with a piston weapon. POF loaned me two uppers: one was a standard piston/op-rod upper, and the other had a gas tube. Other than that it was identical to the piston upper - same big handguard for airflow, heat sink barrel nut, fluted barrel, etc. The "DI" rifle's bolt was marginally warmer (8-9 degrees, IIRC) than the piston/op-rod one, but the barrel was over 100 degrees cooler. Piston "conversions" that use otherwise standard components are not likely to exhibit the cooling abilities of the POF system (either one) and in fact the barrel, gas block, and handguards will be significantly hotter. |
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Quoted: Why are people so emotionally invested in defending the Colt M-4? It is like the waterboy in the M-14 section that constantly claims the M-14 is the end all be all rifle... Because it's a perfectly adequate rifle, and there are hundreds of equipment issues that need to be fixed (but are ignored) while we keep (DoD) keep obsessing over what might be the 'perfect' infantry rifle. |
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Why are people so emotionally invested in defending the Colt M-4? It is like the waterboy in the M-14 section that constantly claims the M-14 is the end all be all rifle... Because it's a perfectly adequate rifle, and there are hundreds of equipment issues that need to be fixed (but are ignored) while we keep (DoD) keep obsessing over what might be the 'perfect' infantry rifle. It may be adequate for you as a tanker because it isn't even a secondary weapon but for those of us who rely on it as a primary, it has some serious issues...primarily service life issues that come from the design flaws created by using M-16 parts at M-4 pressures and velocities. There is a good reason you rarely see broken bolt lugs on full sized M-16 and yet, see them regularly on M-4s. Gas port erosion is another issue that plagues the M-4 and contributes to those bolt lug breakages. It doesn't help that the gun has to be run pretty wet to keep it running in sandy places. There are good COTS solutions out there and I hope that DOD moves quickly on this. We are functionally still using 1960s tech that needs to be updated. The AR is a great system and IMO, something along the lines of the SR15 with a few mods would be ideal. |
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Why are people so emotionally invested in defending the Colt M-4? It is like the waterboy in the M-14 section that constantly claims the M-14 is the end all be all rifle... Because it's a perfectly adequate rifle, and there are hundreds of equipment issues that need to be fixed (but are ignored) while we keep (DoD) keep obsessing over what might be the 'perfect' infantry rifle. It may be adequate for you as a tanker because it isn't even a secondary weapon but for those of us who rely on it as a primary, it has some serious issues...primarily service life issues that come from the design flaws created by using M-16 parts at M-4 pressures and velocities. There is a good reason you rarely see broken bolt lugs on full sized M-16 and yet, see them regularly on M-4s. Gas port erosion is another issue that plagues the M-4 and contributes to those bolt lug breakages. It doesn't help that the gun has to be run pretty wet to keep it running in sandy places. There are good COTS solutions out there and I hope that DOD moves quickly on this. We are functionally still using 1960s tech that needs to be updated. The AR is a great system and IMO, something along the lines of the SR15 with a few mods would be ideal. Sounds like your primary problem with the M4 is the carbine gas system and standard AR15 bolt design. While the KAC E3 bolt design and mid-length gas system are "also nice", you need to keep in mind that Colt builds guns based on what DOD wants and if the DOD wanted a more reliable/durable bolt design, Colt would do it. If DOD wanted a mid-length gas system, Colt would do it. The fact of the matter is that right now, those requirements do not exist, therefore Colt is not making them. Also I should point out that the KAC SR-16 (I'm assuming you meant that instead of the SR-15 seeing as DOD requires select fire), is also built/based off of 1960's technology. Making slight modifications to the bolt does not all of a sudden make it a high tech 2010 gun... You mentioned mods with the SR15 as well. I am curious what mods you think need to be made? |
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DOD is fully aware of the problems with the M-4. They have spent tens of millions on replacement rifles that failed to make it through the obtuse development process that has failed for decades. Dr Roberts did a good presentation on failures in small arms procurement that is enlightening...I will see if I can locate it. In the meantime, here is a recent article from Army Times about some of the issues with the M-4.
Army wants soldiers to have improved carbine By Lance M. Bacon - Staff writer Posted : Monday Aug 30, 2010 5:23:04 EDT Soldiers, get ready for a better carbine. The Army has launched a dual strategy designed to give you a more accurate, durable and lethal weapon that will be the mainstay for the next 40 years. The first part of that strategy is to radically overhaul the M4 starting now and give grunts an improved version of the special operations M4A1. Simultaneously, the second part challenges industry to come up with a new carbine that can outperform the M4. The competition opened in early August. “This is an historic event. We have not done a carbine competition in our lifetimes,” Col. Douglas Tamilio, project manager for soldier weapons, told Army Times. His office is spearheading the M4 Carbine Improvement Program. “We don’t switch rifles and carbines too quickly, and it is not an easy thing.” The M4 has faced some criticism from soldiers and others who have cited problems with its lethality and reliability, including a 2007 “dust” test in which the M4 performed the worst among four weapons tested, with the greatest number of stoppages. Tamilio, a career infantry officer, said the weapon has “served the Army extremely well” and touted the 62 improvements made to the M4 in the past 19 years. But, he said, “We can’t sit on our laurels and say M4 is good enough.” Deadlier weapon The improvements have begun on thousands of M4s being built now, and thousands more will get conversion kits. The upgrades will be done in phases. The improvement plan’s first phase essentially distributes an improved M4A1, which is notable for its heavier barrel and automatic fire. The heavier barrel reduces warping and erosion, resulting in better performance and longer life. It also allows for a higher sustained rate of fire. The Army also is adding ambidextrous controls. The Army has 12,000 M4s on the production line, and has told manufacturer Colt to turn them into A1s, said Brig. Gen. Peter Fuller, Program Executive Office Soldier. In addition, 25,000 M4A1s would be purchased beyond existing contracts, as well as roughly 65,000 conversion kits, Tamilio said. “The Army would like to convert about 150,000 in the near term for infantry brigade combat teams,” he said. The optimal plan would be to convert all the M4s, he added, but funding will be a large factor in that decision. More changes external to the weapon are also improving its reliability and lethality, Fuller said. Soldiers will experience fewer jams, thanks to a new magazine that doesn’t allow rounds to move, he said. And the new M855 A1 ammo provides more stopping power at shorter distances. The older round had to get into a yaw dependency for maximum effect. If it hit the enemy straight, it would punch right through them. The new ammo is not yaw dependent. If it hits the enemy, he is going down. Many combat vets surveyed in 2006 described how enemy soldiers were shot multiple times but were still able to continue fighting. The survey included 2,600 soldiers who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. One in five U.S. soldiers polled recommended a more lethal round. The new round is designed to address that. “It’s not enhanced performance, it’s consistent performance,” Fuller said. “It really performs the way you want a round to perform, and it’s optimized to the M4.” Better accuracy The second phase of the M4 improvement program begins this fall and will focus on increasing the M4’s effectiveness and accuracy, with emphasis on the bolt, bolt carrier assembly and the forward rail assembly. Over time, reliability will degrade with the bolt, as that component provides the weapon’s action. Officials will host an open competition for a new bolt assembly to determine whether different materials and coatings can enhance the bolt. The Army also is interested in “unique design changes” that have arisen within the industry, Tamilio said. The service also looks to strengthen the forward rail assembly on top of the receiver. This lends stability to the weapon and serves as the mount for weapon attachments, but restricts the barrel movement that is required for accuracy when re-engaging the target. The Army wants to determine whether a free-floating rail is the answer. Officials also will look to provide a more consistent trigger pull for better control, according to a June Congressional Research Service report. New operating system The third phase, focusing on the operating system, will begin in about 18 months, Tamilio said. The goal is to improve the gas system by allowing less gas and dirt in, or replacing it with a conversion kit similar to the HNK16 that would put a piston in the M4. Both have their benefits and detractors, the colonel said. The piston reduces the number of moving parts and provides better stability, but there is “a little more metal on metal,” which can diminish durability and accelerate fatigue. A gas-impingement system is far smoother in operation, and supporters say its reduced heat and carbon deposits will decrease malfunctions. But the gas system requires a lot more elbow grease to get it clean. The 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, or “Delta Force,” replaced its M4s with the HK416 in 2004, according to the congressional report. That weapon combines the operating characteristics of the M4 with the piston system. “There’s a lot of dynamics involved,” Fuller said. “When you go to a piston charger, you’re actually driving that bolt down at an angle versus back, so you have to make sure you understand it might not be the same weapon.” The next carbine The competition for the Army’s next-generation carbine opened in early August, and the service is looking for the “future Army weapon for any environment,” Fuller said. The Army’s open, industrywide Individual Carbine Competition was approved Aug. 4 by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. No caliber restriction has been placed on a new design. The requirements, instead, are for the most reliable, accurate, durable, easy-to-use and easy-to-maintain weapon out there, Tamilio said. It will be at least a 500-meter weapon and have a higher incapacitation percentage, meaning if a shot doesn’t kill the enemy, it will put a serious dent in his medical record. This weapon will be modular and able to carry all the existing attachments soldiers use. It can have a gas or piston system. Interchangeable barrel sizes, such as those seen in the SCAR, are not a “must have,” but “certainly won’t be a negative thing,” Tamilio said. But above all, Fuller wants a weapon that has the soldiers’ approval. “We really need to figure out lethality from a ‘soldier in the loop’ perspective,” he said. “If you can’t shoot the weapon accurately, it doesn’t matter how lethal it is.” To meet that goal, Tamilio will release a draft request for proposal late this year. It is a warning order of sorts that will give industry a preliminary idea of what is expected. An industry day will follow in which officials will answer questions and provide clarity. The official RfP will go out early next year, in the second quarter of fiscal 2011, which begins in January. Manufacturers will have a set time, typically a few months, to respond with their proposed weapons. Next comes the “extreme, extensive testing” and selection of the weapons, Tamilio said. During testing, hundreds of thousand of rounds will be fired over 12 to 18 months as weapons are tested to their destruction point. The primary goal is to determine if they meet Army specifications. But evaluators also will know whether a weapon can live up to its manufacturer’s claims. “If they say it has a barrel life up to 20,000 rounds, we’ll test to that,” Tamilio said. Weapons will also be tested to see if they maintain accuracy throughout their life cycle — something the military has not tested before, Tamilio said. A weapon typically loses accuracy as it ages. “This is a huge importance for us,” he said. Soldiers will be involved in virtually all aspects of this testing, Tamilio said. From the individual to unit, he said the tests will focus on what soldiers really care about: “When he pulls the trigger, it fires in a reliable fashion, and what he aims at, he hits.” Mixed reviews Investing in an improved M4 has met some opposition. Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., in April 2007 asked Army leadership why the service planned to spend $375 million on the carbine through fiscal 2009 “without considering newer and possibly better weapons available on the commercial market.” The senator’s letter questioned the M4’s reliability and lethality and called for a “free and open competition” to evaluate alternatives. Nevertheless, improvements have been recommended from within the service. The Army Infantry Center in a Small Arms Capabilities-Based Assessment in 2008 identified 42 separate ideas for material solutions to address capability gaps. Thirteen solutions called for new or improved munitions, and 10 involved aiming devices, optics or laser designators. Only seven suggested modifying or developing new small arms. After-action reports from soldiers both praise and criticize the M4’s reliability and lethality. The mixed reviews are reflected in the congressional report: • A February 2001 U.S. Special Operations Command study said the M4A1 was “fundamentally flawed” and suffered “alarming failures … in operations under the harsh conditions and heavy firing schedules common in [special operations forces] training and operations.” • An Army report from July 2003 on small arms performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom found the M4 was “by far the preferred individual weapon across the theater of operations.” • A December 2006 survey requested by Army’s Project Manager for Soldier Weapons and conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses polled 2,600 soldiers who had engaged in combat action in Iraq or Afghanistan. More than half said they never experienced a stoppage in the M4 or M16. The study found that the frequency of disassembled cleaning did not affect the number of stoppages. The type and amount of lubrication used had little effect on stoppages, though dry lubricant decreased reports for M4 stoppages. Nearly nine in 10 soldiers said they were satisfied with the M4. • A December 2007 test — resulting from Coburn’s letter — evaluated the M4 against the HK416, the HK XM8 and the FNH SCAR. Each system had 10 weapons on the line, and each fired 6,000 rounds under sandstorm conditions. The XM8 had 127 stoppages, the SCAR had 226 stoppages, the HK416 had 233 stoppages and the M4 had 882 stoppages. The Army later modified that number to 296 stoppages, attributing the difference to discrepancies in the test and scoring. When you’ll get it A new weapon could be selected by the end of 2011. How long it would take to field a new weapon would depend on funding. Fielding could start fairly quickly, but will take up to 10 years, Tamilio said. No cost estimate of producing a new weapon is available from the Army, as the dozens of potential manufacturers have yet to receive specifications and generate the subsequent design. By Aug. 19, the Army had 41 respondents to its market survey, Tamilio said. “Industry is waiting for this,” he said. “They are excited about this … and that’s exactly what we want.” How the dual-path strategy unfolds remains to be seen, but it means every soldier should be getting a better carbine. That’s because there are 1.1 million soldiers, but only 500,000 M4s in the system. If the Army selects a new carbine, it may purchase 1.1 million. But a more likely scenario would see 500,000 purchased for infantry brigade combat teams, and the existing and improved M4s given to support troops to replace their M16s. If the M4 turns out to be the weapon of choice, then the ICBTs will likely be fitted with the improved M4s, and the existing M4s would again be given to support troops to replace their M16s. For soldiers “consistently using that M4 and satisfied with that M4, to know the Army is going out there to get you something better … that’s pretty damn exciting,” Tamilio said. “And that’s only going to make you more effective on the battlefield.” |
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Which is what many of us have said for years... If you use the M4 as a rifle/carbine it works well... If you try to use it as a machine gun, it does not. And if you're a platoon(+) element, trying to hold out against a half a battalion of enemy, you're probably going to break some guns in the process of staying alive... Regardless of which gun it is... And this means its a damn fine weapon for LE and civilian use, even w/o a piston. Thanks. |
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I think this was posted before, but some good video of test firing the M4 amd M4A1 until they fail.
http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/m4-and-m4a1-guns/?hp |
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What is this M855 A1 round with a "guaranteed" incapacitation?
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Why are people so emotionally invested in defending the Colt M-4? It is like the waterboy in the M-14 section that constantly claims the M-14 is the end all be all rifle... Because it's a perfectly adequate rifle, and there are hundreds of equipment issues that need to be fixed (but are ignored) while we keep (DoD) keep obsessing over what might be the 'perfect' infantry rifle. It may be adequate for you as a tanker because it isn't even a secondary weapon but for those of us who rely on it as a primary, it has some serious issues...primarily service life issues that come from the design flaws created by using M-16 parts at M-4 pressures and velocities. There is a good reason you rarely see broken bolt lugs on full sized M-16 and yet, see them regularly on M-4s. Gas port erosion is another issue that plagues the M-4 and contributes to those bolt lug breakages. It doesn't help that the gun has to be run pretty wet to keep it running in sandy places. There are good COTS solutions out there and I hope that DOD moves quickly on this. We are functionally still using 1960s tech that needs to be updated. The AR is a great system and IMO, something along the lines of the SR15 with a few mods would be ideal. Blue section is what I recall being key to M16 maintenance in Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. I don’t recall even hearing of a failure or a stoppage of an M16 being run wet. Yes, we had to ensure the barrel was free of dust/sand, but that was understood as being part of the deal to running the gun wet. Wet guns will attract more crud in a sandy/dusty and windy environment. I did see four catastrophic…failures is really the only word that fits…of M16’s that actually cracked during firing from the rear of the ejection port up through to the top of the upper receiver under the carrying handle. Later investigation revealed the barrels & chambers on all of those guns had small amounts of sand inside. The armorers determined this was the cause of the cracks. I don’t know how they determined this as I was not present during their investigation. I merely heard the report afterwards. I have never carried an M4 in combat so I cannot honestly reply to that. The CNA study indicates that several other important factors contribute to an increased probability of experiencing a weapon stoppage, including cleaning and lubrication procedures (CLP), the attachment of weapon accessories, the weapons' magazines, and the possible use of rebuilt weapons. And these factors, in addition to sustained high cyclic rates of fire, may also have contributed as underlying causes of the weapon stoppages at Wanat. "Maintenance regimens, including weapon cleaning and lubrication, have very little or no impact on . . . weapon stoppages" the report said. However, Soldiers who used dry lubricants in the maintenance of their M4s, rather than CLP, "decreased the probability of experiencing a stoppage by half."23 Soldiers reporting a high frequency of lubricant application (one or more times per day), particularly M16 users, were more likely to experience stoppages.24 Increased frequency in quick-wipedown weapon cleaning also increased the odds of experiencing a stoppage. This somewhat counterintuitive finding is most likely a result of Soldiers replacing fully disassembled cleanings with quicker and less effective methods. "9 to 10 percent of M4 and M16 users called for improvements in magazine quality. Soldiers stated that the [standard 30-round aluminum] magazines [issued] are easily dented during the course of normal use and carrying in theater, causing problems in ammunition feed from the magazine."25 Some combat veterans have said it's also critical to keep the magazines clean as well. The CNA report says, "Soldiers issued a cleaning kit with their weapons were one-third less likely to experience a stoppage than those not issued a cleaning kit."26 This quote doesn’t reflect my experiences in the field and in combat with the M16. However, I need reiterate that I never carried an M4. Nick |
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Probably because action springs, extractor springs, etc were completely worn out.
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Probably because action springs, extractor springs, etc were completely worn out. I have no doubt that they were...but that is part of what I am getting at. The USG has serious difficulties maintaining things. As a giant bureaucracy, it is tough to get down in the weeds on a system and inspect/replace parts. It requires a dialed in user that actually knows what to look for and take it to an armorer...then an armorer that actually knows what he is doing and gives a shit...and then available parts to do the fix. In some cases, the TM may not allow the armorer to fix something before it actually fails...IE the rifle still passes gauging but has serious gas port erosion causing overcycling and isn't reliable. He likely can't replace that barrel because it isn't worn out according to the gage. There are many examples like that....springs that are too weak but don't get replaced. Bolts that are pitted and show firing pin hole erosion from pierced primers, ect. At the end of the day and with the realities of USG procurement, the only solution is to buy a new system. Trying to fix part by part will fail...it is just the reality of the system... |
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So your solution is to acquire another system that will also wear out in a certain number of years? Just throw money at it?
Your argument sounds just like the M9 pistol acquisition program. Rather than replace worn/broken parts, they bought a whole new system. This new system also requires parts to be replaced and has gained (unfairly, IMHO) a poor reputation for that and other reasons. But if you look at the original claims of the program, some completely ridiculous claims were made as to why a new pistol was needed. |
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Probably because action springs, extractor springs, etc were completely worn out. I have no doubt that they were...but that is part of what I am getting at. The USG has serious difficulties maintaining things. As a giant bureaucracy, it is tough to get down in the weeds on a system and inspect/replace parts. It requires a dialed in user that actually knows what to look for and take it to an armorer...then an armorer that actually knows what he is doing and gives a shit...and then available parts to do the fix. In some cases, the TM may not allow the armorer to fix something before it actually fails...IE the rifle still passes gauging but has serious gas port erosion causing overcycling and isn't reliable. He likely can't replace that barrel because it isn't worn out according to the gage. There are many examples like that....springs that are too weak but don't get replaced. Bolts that are pitted and show firing pin hole erosion from pierced primers, ect. At the end of the day and with the realities of USG procurement, the only solution is to buy a new system. Trying to fix part by part will fail...it is just the reality of the system... Our armorers were on top of things. They knew that they were coming out with us to the field and in combat if need be so theykept up on weapons maintenace and service. The TM may not allow a part to be replaced in the non combat theaters, but in combat, a good armorer will fix it anyway. Are there bureaucrats in the military, who will only follow the manual despite the consequences...yes. But thankfully, they are not as common as hollywood makes them out to be. Nick |
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Anyone have a link to the original dust study?
Is there a link to colts criticism. And the independent study results? |
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Probably because action springs, extractor springs, etc were completely worn out. I have no doubt that they were...but that is part of what I am getting at. The USG has serious difficulties maintaining things. As a giant bureaucracy, it is tough to get down in the weeds on a system and inspect/replace parts. It requires a dialed in user that actually knows what to look for and take it to an armorer...then an armorer that actually knows what he is doing and gives a shit...and then available parts to do the fix. In some cases, the TM may not allow the armorer to fix something before it actually fails...IE the rifle still passes gauging but has serious gas port erosion causing overcycling and isn't reliable. He likely can't replace that barrel because it isn't worn out according to the gage. There are many examples like that....springs that are too weak but don't get replaced. Bolts that are pitted and show firing pin hole erosion from pierced primers, ect. At the end of the day and with the realities of USG procurement, the only solution is to buy a new system. Trying to fix part by part will fail...it is just the reality of the system... updating an old system has worked pretty well with the B-52 nothing has yet to be be shown that is so much better it justifies the money in buying a new gun every machine needs lube and parts that are worn replaced, anyone that says different is trying to sell you something or get a plant built in their state. the M16 series is the most efficient, accurate and versatile weapon system ever used. I tihnk effort would be better spent on coming up with better ammo then m855 and supporting old worn guns with newer parts at a better schedule |
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What is this M855 A1 round with a "guaranteed" incapacitation? its the green ammo. apparently its nothing special |
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So your solution is to acquire another system that will also wear out in a certain number of years? Just throw money at it? Your argument sounds just like the M9 pistol acquisition program. Rather than replace worn/broken parts, they bought a whole new system. This new system also requires parts to be replaced and has gained (unfairly, IMHO) a poor reputation for that and other reasons. But if you look at the original claims of the program, some completely ridiculous claims were made as to why a new pistol was needed. I am sure people won't track on this...but yes, in the .gov world is it generally easier to buy a whole new system than to try and repair an older one. It is often cheaper as well. To repair/upgrade takes years and you have to have multiple phases, a tracking matrix of repairs, Alpha and Beta testers, reports that must go back and be analyzed after all those tests...and you have to send guns two ways...from the field to the armory and then back to the field. That is a nightmare. That is why it is often easier to just buy new...no phased approaches, no trackiing of what got done and what didn't, no testing of the upgrades...ect. It sounds nuts but that is how it works in my experience. |
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