Quoted: Quoted: The author fingers General Patton as one of the main reasons for failure to get the T-26 into full production; I knew General McNair was mostly responsible for the failed "tank destroyer" doctrine, but Patton's involvement in supressing the T-26 came as a suprise.    How/why did they do that ? Patton was a sticler for following doctrine, and Armored Forces Doctrine stated that the main Tank units did not fight other tanks- their purpose was to rapidly exploit break-throughs, and shoot up the enemy's rear area units; therefore, tanks did not need heavy armor or anti-armor main gun. Destroying enemy tanks was the responsibility of Tank Destroyer Command.

This was German doctrine, too.  However, since German tanks could (and were) transoprted by rail instead of by ship, and did not have to be lifted by port cranes,  weight and size were not a critical issue for the Germans, allowing them the luxury of up-armoring and up gunning almost at will.

Before the Normandy invasion, the T-26 was only availale in small numbers; films demonstraing it were shown to the invasion commanders in England, but Patton (who was in charge of Armored Forces) rejected it, saying it used too much gas, and did not fit into Armored Forces doctrine anyway. He could have had it placed into volume production, but preferred large numbers of M-4 Shermans instead.

Patton was never "in charge of Armored Forces" in Europe or anywhere alse.  Therefore, his input, if any,  to the M-4/M-26 decision was as one General officer among many.
Patton did command the Armored Training Center at Indio, CA early in the War, but that was long before and not at all the same thing as commanding all Armored Forces, as alleged.

The author points out that the most lowly US Army armor lieutenant could see that Germans would not fight according to our doctrine; OF COURSE our tanks would have to fight theirs.

As noted, armored doctrine was very similar between the Germans and Allies.  There were differences in construction and design in AFV and TD arty, almost always favoring the Germans, but few real differences in doctrine itself, except those which reflected abilities and constraints imposed by the equipment.  The reader will recall the constant and recurring use of the 8.8cm gun as the German version of TD arty.  The even more knowledgeable reader will recall the increasing use of dedicated, turretless anti-tank AFV by the Germans as the war ground on.  

He also points out that Patton went ape shit when he found out that US tank crews were addiing field-expedient armor to their Shermans...that caused them to burn more gas, and wear out quicker. Get the picture? Patton did not give a damn about the men's lives...in that he was clearly an Army officer cast in the old frontal-assault mold...Men did not matter, Victory did.

Patton realized that the chief asset available to Allied armored troops was their mobility, speed, and the reliability of their vehicles, all of which were compromised by adding on unplanned-for weight to existing AFV.  There were Ordnance-approved programs to add applique armor to various portions of the M-4, ant this was supported by Patton and others, as it made the best use of scarce armor plate and manpower to install it in truly critical areas.   The unrestrained attachment of anything from bogie wheels to sandbags was completely out of control, hindered more than it helped, and was of dubious value.  Ask yourself how many sand bags it would take to stop an "88" anti-tank shell, and whether a Sherman could even carry that many.
The fact that these crudly modified AFVs (note that I did not say "up-armored", since that description was seldom true)  weighed more, and thus burned more scarce gasoline was also a hindrance to the war effort.  The availability of Gasoline at the Front was the foremost limitation to the Allies in the autumn of '44.  Had there been enough gas, it is possible the war could have ended in 1944, instead of 1945.

Off topic, but I would rather have served under a more humane officer like MacArthur...compare Mac's casualty lists to Patton's and you will see why...Mac was much more sparing of his men's lives, and his fights were just as hard.

I myself have commented upon MacArthur's low casualty rates during the Pacific War.  However, the picture changes when the forces under his command in the Philippines, (where Mac allowed his entire air Force to be shot up on the ground, despite a day's warning after Pearl Harbor), and the forces in Korea (where Mac allowed himself to be surprised by 500,000 Chinese "volunteers") are factored in.

Both men were complex personalities.  However, to say that one was callous, and the other humane is simplistic, if not ludicrous. I have read a great deal about Patton, just about everything I could find in 40 years, in fact.  If you would be so kind as to point out to me a primary source that offers proof that Patton: "...did not give a damn about the men's lives...in that he was clearly an Army officer cast in the old frontal-assault mold" ., I would be obliged...and surprised.

Quoted: Quoted: Off topic, but I would rather have served under a more humane officer like MacArthur...compare Mac's casualty lists to Patton's and you will see why...Mac was much more sparing of his men's lives, and his fights were just as hard. After reading RAID! The Untold Story of Patton's Secret Mission, I would agree with that statement.

There is more than one book that describes the Hammelburg Raid.  You might want to read a few of them before coming to a final conclusion.  Some of the authors have axes to grind, believe it or not.

Quoted: Quoted: The author fingers General Patton as one of the main reasons for failure to get the T-26 into full production; I knew General McNair was mostly responsible for the failed "tank destroyer" doctrine, but Patton's involvement in supressing the T-26 came as a suprise.    How/why did they do that ? Patton was a sticler for following doctrine, and Armored Forces Doctrine stated that the main Tank units did not fight other tanks- their purpose was to rapidly exploit break-throughs, and shoot up the enemy's rear area units; therefore, tanks did not need heavy armor or anti-armor main gun. Destroying enemy tanks was the responsibility of Tank Destroyer Command. Before the Normandy invasion, the T-26 was only availale in small numbers; films demonstraing it were shown to the invasion commanders in England, but Patton (who was in charge of Armored Forces) rejected it, saying it used too much gas, and did not fit into Armored Forces doctrine anyway. He could have had it placed into volume production, but preferred large numbers of M-4 Shermans instead. The author points out that the most lowly US Army armor lieutenant could see that Germans would not fight according to our doctrine; OF COURSE our tanks would have to fight theirs. He also points out that Patton went ape shit when he found out that US tank crews were addiing field-expedient armor to their Shermans...that caused them to burn more gas, and wear out quicker. Get the picture? Patton did not give a damn about the men's lives...in that he was clearly an Army officer cast in the old frontal-assault mold...Men did not matter, Victory did. Off topic, but I would rather have served under a more humane officer like MacArthur...compare Mac's casualty lists to Patton's and you will see why...Mac was much more sparing of his men's lives, and his fights were just as hard.

The Pershing was not avaliable AT ALL before Normandy and didn't make it into combat until March 45.  And then only about 20 saw combat.  The M-4 Sherman fought the war.


Good book, really no axe grinding.  Just telling it like it was.