Justice  
<author> Souter</author>   announced the judgment of the Court



^[n.1]
or, if the pistol's barrel is
left on the gun, a short barreled rifle that is regulated.  We
hold that the statutory language may not be construed to
require payment of the tax under these facts.

   The word "firearm" is used as a term of art in the NFA.  
It means, among other things, "a rifle having a barrel or
barrels of less than 16 inches in length . . . ."  § 5845(a)(3). "The term `rifle' means a weapon designed or redesigned,
made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder
and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the
energy of the explosive in a fixed cartridge to fire only a
single projectile through a rifled bore for each single pull of
the trigger, and shall include any such weapon which may
be readily restored to fire a fixed cartridge."  § 5845(c).  

 The consequence of being the maker of a firearm are
serious.  § 5821(a) imposes a tax of $200 "for each firearm
made," which "shall be paid by the person making the
firearm," § 5821(b).  Before one may make a firearm, one
must obtain the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury,
§ 5822, and § 5841 requires that the "manufacturer, importer, and maker . . . register each firearm he manufactures,
imports, or makes" in a central registry maintained by the
Secretary of the Treasury.  A maker who fails to comply
with the NFA's provisions is subject to criminal penalties of
up to 10 years' imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000, or
both, which may be imposed without proof  of willfulness or
knowledge.  § 5871.

 Respondent Thompson/Center Arms Company manufactures a single shot pistol called the "Contender," designed
so that its handle and barrel can be removed from its  "receiver," the metal frame housing the trigger, hammer
and firing mechanism.  See 27 CFR § 179.11
(1991) (definition of frame or receiver). For a short time in 1985
Thompson/Center also manufactured a carbine conversion kit consisting
of a 21 inch barrel, a rifle stock, and a wooden fore end. If one joins
the receiver with the conversion kit's rifle stock, the 21 inch barrel,
and the rifle fore end, the product is a carbine rifle with a 21 inch
barrel. If, however, the shorter, pistol length barrel is not removed
from the receiver when the rifle stock is added, one is left with a
10-inch or "short barreled" carbine rifle. The entire conversion, from
pistol to long barreled rifle takes only a few minutes; conversion to a
short barreled rifle takes even less time.

 In 1985, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
advised Thompson/Center that when its conversion kit was
possessed or distributed together with the Contender pistol,
the unit constituted a firearm subject to the NFA.  Thompson/Center responded by paying the $200 tax for a single
such firearm, and submitting an application for permission
under 26 U.S.C. § 5822 "to make, use, and segregate as a
single unit" a package consisting of a serially numbered
pistol, together with an attachable shoulder stock and a 21 inch barrel.  Thompson/Center then filed a refund claim.  
After more than six months had elapsed without action on
it, the company brought this suit in the United States
Claims Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491
arguing that the unit registered was not a firearm within
the meaning of the NFA because Thompson/Center had not
assembled a short barreled rifle from its components.  The
Claims Court entered summary judgment for the Government, concluding that the Contender pistol together with its
conversion kit is a firearm within the meaning of the NFA.  
19 Cl. Ct. 725 (1990).

 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that a short barreled rifle "actually must be
assembled" in order to be "made" within the meaning of the
NFA.  924 F. 2d 1041, 1043 (1991).  The Court of Appeals
expressly declined to follow the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Drasen,
845 F. 2d 731, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988), which had
held that an unassembled "complete parts kit" for a short barreled rifle was in fact a short barreled rifle for purposes
of the NFA.  We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.  
502 U. S. ___ (1991).

   The NFA provides that "[t]he term `make', and the
various derivatives of such word, shall include manufacturing (other than by one qualified to engage in such business
under this chapter), putting together, altering, any combination of these, or otherwise producing a firearm."  26 U.S.C. § 5845(i).



^[n.2]
But the provision does not expressly
address the question whether a short barreled rifle can be  "made" by the aggregation of finished parts that can readily
be assembled into one.  The Government contends that
assembly is not necessary; Thompson/Center argues that it
is.

   The Government urges us to view the shipment of the
pistol with the kit just as we would the shipment of a
bicycle that requires some home assembly.  "The fact that
a short barrel rifle, or any other `firearm,' is possessed or
sold in a partially unassembled state does not remove it
from regulation under the Act."  Brief for United States 6.

 The Government's analogy of the partially assembled
bicycle to the packaged pistol and conversion kit is not, of
course, exact.  While each example includes some unassembled parts, the crated bicycle parts can be assembled into
nothing but a bicycle, whereas the contents of Thompson/Center's package can constitute a pistol, a long barreled
rifle, or a short barreled version.  These distinctions,
however, do define the issues raised by the Government's
argument, the first of which is whether the aggregation and
segregation of separate parts that can be assembled only
into a short barreled rifle and are sufficient for that
purpose amount to "making" that firearm, or whether the
firearm is not "made" until the moment of final assembly.  
This is the issue on which the Federal and Seventh Circuits
are divided.

 We think the language of the statute provides a clear
answer on this point.  The definition of "make" includes not
only "putting together," but also "manufacturing . . . or
otherwise producing a firearm."  If as Thompson/Center
submits, a firearm were only made at the time of final
assembly (the moment the firearm was "put together"), the
additional language would be redundant.  Congress must,
then, have understood "making" to cover more than final
assembly, and some disassembled aggregation of parts must
be included.  Since the narrowest example of a combination
of parts that might be included is a set of parts that could
be used to make nothing but a short barreled rifle, the
aggregation of such a set of parts, at the very least, must
fall within the definition of "making" such a rifle.

 This is consistent with the holdings of every Courtof Appeals, except the court below, to consider a combi  
nation of parts that could only be assembled into an NFA regulated firearm, either under the definition of rifle at
issue here or under similar statutory language.  See United
States v. Drasen, supra; United States v. Endicott, 803 F. 2d
506, 508-509 (CA9 1986) (unassembled silencer is a
silencer); United States v. Luce, 726 F. 2d 47, 48-49 (CA1
1984) (same); United States v. Lauchli, 371 F. 2d 303,
311-313 (CA7 1966) (unassembled machineguns are
machineguns).



^[n.3]
We thus reject the broad language of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to the extent that
it would mean that a disassembled complete short barreled
rifle kit must be assembled before it has been "made" into
a short barreled rifle.  The fact that the statute would servealmost no purpose if this were the rule only confirms the
reading we have given it.



^[n.4]

 We also think that a firearm is "made" on facts one step
removed from the paradigm of the aggregated parts that
can be used for nothing except assembling a firearm.  Two
courts to our knowledge have dealt in some way with claims
that when a gun other than a firearm was placed together
with a further part or parts that would have had no use in
association with the gun except to convert it into a firearm,
a firearm was produced.  See United States v. Kokin, 365 F.
2d 595, 596 (CA3 1966) (carbine together with all parts
necessary to convert it into a machinegun is a machinegun),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966); see also United States v.
Zeidman, 444 F. 2d 1051, 1053 (CA7 1971) (pistol and
attachable shoulder stock found "in different drawers of the
same dresser" constitute a short barreled rifle).  Here it is
true, of course, that some of the parts could be used without
ever assembling a firearm, but the likelihood of that is
belied by the utter uselessness of placing the converting
parts with the others except for just such a conversion.  
Where the evidence in a given case supports a finding of
such uselessness, the case falls within the fair intendmentof "otherwise producing a firearm."  See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(i).



^[n.5]

 

Here, however, we are not dealing with an
aggregation of parts that can serve no useful purpose except the
assembly of a firearm, or with an aggregation having no ostensible
utility except to convert a gun into such a weapon. There is, to be
sure, one resemblance to the latter example in the sale of the
Contender with the converter kit, for packaging the two has no apparent
object except to convert the pistol into something else at some point.
But the resemblance ends with the fact that the unregulated Contender
pistol can be converted not only into a short barreled rifle, which is
a regulated firearm, but also into a long barreled rifle, which is not.
The packaging of pistol and kit has an obvious utility for those who
want both a pistol and a regular rifle, and the question is whether the
mere possibility of their use to assemble a regulated firearm is
enoughto place their combined packaging within the scope of "making"
one. ^[n.6]

Neither the statute's language nor its structure
provides any definitive guidance. Thompson/Center suggests guidance may
be found in some subsections of the statute governing other types of
weapons by language that expressly covers combinations of parts. The
definition of "machinegun," for example, was amended by the Gun Control
Act of 1968 to read that "[t]he term shall also include . . . any
combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such
parts are in the possession or under the control of a person." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).



^[n.7]
In 1986, the definition of "silencer" was amended by the Firearm
Owners' Protection Act to "includ[e] any combination of parts, designed
or redesigned,and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a
firearm silencer . . . ." See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(7); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(24).

 Thompson/Center stresses the contrast between these
references to "any combination of parts" and the silence
about parts in the definition of rifle, in arguing that no
aggregation of parts can suffice to make the regulated rifle.  
This argument is subject to a number of answers, however.  
First, it sweeps so broadly as to conflict with the statutory
definition of "make," applicable to all firearms, which
implies that a firearm may be "made" even where not fully  "put together."  If this were all, of course, the conflict might
well be resolved in Thompson/Center's favor.  We do not,
however, read the machinegun and silencer definitions as
contrasting with the definition of rifle in such a way as to
raise a conflict with the broad concept of "making."

 The definition of "silencer" is now included in the NFA
only by reference, see 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(7), whereas its
text appears only  at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(24), in a statute
that itself contains no definition of "make."  Prior to 1986,
the definition of "firearm" in the NFA included "a muffler
or a silencer for any firearm whether or not such firearm is
included within this definition."  26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(7)
(1982 ed.).  Two Courts of Appeals held this language to
include unassembled silencers that could be readily and
easily assembled.  See United States v. Endicott, 803 F. 2d,
at 508-509; United States v. Luce, 726 F. 2d, at 48-49.

 In 1986, Congress replaced that language with "any
silencer (as defined in Section 921 of title 18, United States
Code)."  Pub. L. 99-308, §  109(b), 100 Stat. 460.  The
language defining silencer that was added to 18 U.S.C. § 921 at that same time reads: "The terms `firearm silencer'
and `firearm muffler' mean any device for silencing,
muffling, or diminishing the report of a portable firearm,
including any combination of parts, designed or redesigned,
and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a firearm
silencer or firearm muffler, and any part intended only foruse in such assembly or fabrication."  Pub. L. 99-308, § 101,
100 Stat. 451.

 Thompson/Center argues that if, even before the amendment, a combination of parts was already "made" into a
firearm, the "any combination of parts" language would be
redundant.  While such a conclusion of redundancy could
suggest that Congress assumed that "make" in the NFA did
not cover unassembled parts, the suggestion (and the
implied conflict with our reading of "make") is proven false
by evidence that Congress actually understood redundancy
to result from its new silencer definition.  Congress apparently assumed that the statute reached complete parts kits
even without the "combination" language, and understood
the net effect of the new definition as expanding the
coverage of the Act beyond complete parts kits.  "The
definition of silencer is amended to include any part
designed or redesigned and intended to be used as a
silencer for a firearm.  This will help to control the sale of
incomplete silencer kits that now circumvent the prohibition on selling complete kits."  H. R. Rep. No. 99-495, p. 21
(1986).  Because the addition of the "combination of parts"
language to the definition of silencer does not, therefore,
bear the implication Thompson/Center would put on it, that
definition cannot give us much guidance in answering the
question before us.



^[n.8]

 We get no more help from analyzing the machinegun
definition's reference to parts.  It speaks of "any combination" of them in the possession or control of any one person.  
Here the definition sweeps broader than the aggregation of
parts clearly covered by "making" a rifle.  The machinegun
parts need not even be in any particular proximity to each
other.  There is thus no conflict between definitions, but
neither is much light shed on the limits of "making" a
short barreled rifle.  We can only say that the notion of an
unassembled machinegun is probably broader than that of
an unassembled rifle.  But just where the line is to be
drawn on short barreled rifles is not demonstrated by
textual considerations.

   Thompson/Center also looks for the answer in the
purpose and history of the NFA, arguing that the congressional purpose behind the NFA, of regulating weapons
useful for criminal purposes, should caution against
drawing the line in such a way as to apply the Act to the
Contender pistol and carbine kit.  See H. R. Rep. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A395 (1954) (the adoption of the
original definition of rifle was intended to preclude coverage
of antique guns held by collectors, "in pursuance of the
clearly indicated congressional intent to cover under the
National Firearms Act only such modern and lethal
weapons, except pistols and revolvers, as could be used
readily and efficiently by criminals or gangsters").

 It is of course clear from the face of the Act that the
NFA's object was to regulate certain weapons likely to be
used for criminal purposes, just as the regulation of short barreled rifles, for example, addresses a concealable weapon
likely to be so used.  But when Thompson/Center urges us
to recognize that "the Contender pistol and carbine kit is
not a criminal type weapon," Brief for Respondent 20, itdoes not really address the issue of where the line should
be drawn in deciding what combinations of parts are  "made" into short barreled rifles.  Its argument goes to the
quite different issue whether the single shot Contender
should be treated as a firearm within the meaning of the
Act even when assembled with a rifle stock.

 Since Thompson/Center's observations on this extraneous
issue shed no light on the limits of unassembled "making"
under the Act, we will say no more about congressional
purpose.  Nor are we helped by the NFA's legislative
history, in which we find nothing to support a conclusion
one way or the other about the narrow issue presented
here.

   After applying the ordinary rules of statutory construction, then, we are left with an ambiguous statute.  The key
to resolving the ambiguity lies in recognizing that although
it is a tax statute that we construe now in a civil setting,
the NFA has criminal applications that carry no additional
requirement of willfulness.  Cf. Cheek v. United States, 498
U. S. ____, ____ (1991) (slip op., at 7) ("Congress has . . .
softened the impact of the common law presumption [that
ignorance of the law is no defense to criminal prosecution]
by making specific intent to violate the law an element of
certain federal criminal tax offenses"); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201
7203 (criminalizing willful evasion of taxes and willful
failure to file a return).  Making a firearm without approval
may be subject to criminal sanction,   as is possession of an
unregistered firearm  and failure to pay the tax on one, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861  5871.  It is proper, therefore, to apply the
rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in Thompson/Center's favor.  See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990) (applying lenity in interpreting a criminal
statute invoked in a civil action); Commissioner v. Acker,361 U.S. 87, 91 (1959).



^[n.9]
Accordingly, we conclude that the
Contender pistol and carbine kit when packaged together by
Thompson/Center have not been "made" into a short barreled rifle for purposes of the NFA.



^[n.10]
The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is therefore