Quoted:
So what is the point of a required OAL if you can circumvent it by having a collapsable stock? Jeeesus, gun laws are stupid. |
...to protect the children.
and I took it upon myself to read up on some case law in other states on this subject last night and every single one I read goes by the collapsed length needing to be a minimum of 26".
I highly doubt (but I remain optimistic) that Washington would be any different.
Here is one for exmaple:
Cite as People v. Rooney, 17 Cal.App.4th 1207 (1 Dist. 1993)
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Daniel Patrick ROONEY, Defendant and Appellant.
No. A057283.
Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2.
Aug. 13, 1993.
Robert J. Spangler, Woodland, for defendant and appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst.
Atty. Gen., Ronald A. Bass, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Violet M. Lee,
Deputy Atty. Gen., Sharon G. Birenbaum, Deputy Atty. Gen., San
Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.
KLINE, Presiding Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Daniel Rooney appeals from a conviction for
possession of a short-barreled rifle. Appellant contends that the
trial court used the wrong method to measure the rifle, and that if
another method had been used, the weapon would have been over the
minimum legal length.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By information filed on October 1, 1991, the Solano County
District Attorney charged appellant, Daniel Patrick Rooney, with
possession of a short-barreled rifle in violation of Penal Code
section 12020, subdivision (c)(2)(B) (count 1) and with possession
of an unregistered assault weapon under Penal Code section 12280,
subdivision (b) (count 2). On November 27, 1991 the court granted
the district attorney's motion to dismiss count 2, and amend the
information accordingly. Both parties waived trial by jury, and a
court trial was held on December 2, 1991. On December 13, 1991,
the trial court found appellant guilty of possessing a short-
barreled firearm, i.e., a rifle with an overall length of less than
26 inches. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence on
February 14, 1992, and placed appellant on formal probation for
three years, which required that appellant serve a nine-month jail
term. A timely notice of appeal was filed on April 13, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 19, 1991, at 12:46 a.m., Deputy Francis King of the
Solano County Sheriff's Department noticed an unfamiliar ye]low
Corvette being driven in Allendale. A little while later, Deputy
King noticed that the car had stopped for no apparent reason in the
middle of the road with the lights off. Deputy King asked the
driver of the car, appellant Daniel Rooney, what he was doing in
the area. Appellant replied that he was out to see some friends,
but was unable to say what street he was on or what address he was
looking for. After letting appellant drive on, Deputy King and a
partner searched the area around the car, and found a black bag
some 20 feet behind the car. Inside the bag Deputy King found a
rifle with a folding stock, several rounds of ammunition and a
telescopic sight. The bag was warm and dry, while the night was
cold and wet, suggesting that the bag had only recently been placed
on the ground. When appellant was arrested later that night, he
did not deny that the gun had been in his possession, although he
denied ownership.
The rifle in the bag was a Chinese-made AK-47 with a removable
folding shoulder stock, or shoulder, rest. Measured in a straight
line from the end of the butt plate to the end of the flash
suppressor (i.e., with the stock folded under the rifle) the rifle
was 25 3/4 inches in length. With the folding stock extended for
shoulder firing, the rifle measured about 35 inches. According to
testimony at the trial, the gun could be fired with the stock
folded. It would; however, be dangerous to the user to fire the
weapon using a telescopic sight without the stock extended.
DISCUSSION
Penal Code section 12020 [footnote 1] provides in pertinent
part:
"(a) Any person in this state who manufactures or causes to be
manufactured, imports into the state, keeps for sale, or offers or
exposes for sale, or who gives, lends or possesses an ... short-
barreled rifle ... is guilty of a felony...
"....................................
"(c)(2) As used in this section, a 'short-barreled rifle'
means any of the following:
".....................................
"(B) A rifle with an overall length of less than 26 inches.
"(C) Any weapon made from a rifle (whether by alteration,
modification, or otherwise) if that weapon as modified has an
overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of
less than 16 inches in length.
"...............................
"(c)(20) As used in this section, a "rifle" means a weapon
designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired
from the shoulder......"
Neither section 12020 nor any other section of the Penal Code
specifies how a rifle is to be measured. Nor does case law answer
the precise question presented by this case: Where a rifle with a
folding stock would be less than the minimum legal length with the
stock folded, but exceeds the legal length with the stock extended,
should the weapon be measured with the stock folded or extended?
In determining whether the rifle in question is prohibited by
section 12020, it is appropriate to consider the purpose of the
statute. (People v. Stinson (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 497, 500, 87
Cal.Rptr. 537; People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620-621, 47
Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100.) The article of the Penal Code of
which section 12020 forms a part is entitled "Unlawful Carrying and
Possession of Concealed Weapons." (Pen.Code, Part 4, Title 2,
Chapter I, Article 2.) A major purpose of the minimum limitations
on gun lengths is to prevent possession of guns which are suitable
for unlawful purposes because of their concealability and ease of
handling. (People v. Stinson, supra, 8 Cal.App.3d at p. 500,.@7
Cal.Rptr. 537.) Appellant possessed a rifle which, with the stock
folded, measured slightly less than the statutory lower limit of 26
inches. There is nothing in the record to suggest that, when
folded, the rifle in question was any more difficult to conceal
than a weapon which was short for some other reason, such as a
sawed off barrel. It would defeat the purpose of the statute to
allow possession of weapons that can be concealed during part of a
criminal enterprise and only extended for more reliable use when
needed. [footnote 2]
Appellant's main argument runs as follows. The rifle he
possessed had an attachment for a telescopic sight (a "scope"); a
scope was found with the rifle; therefore the rifle was intended to
be fired with a scope attached. Since it would be dangerous (to
the user) to fire the rifle using the scope without the stock
extended, the rifle must be measured with the stock extended. This
argument is fallacious. The rifle could be fired with the stock
folded, and without the use of a scope. Indeed, Deputy King, who
was an expert in firearms, was unable to determine how the scope
found with the gun could be attached to it.
Nor is there merit to appellant's argument that the stock must
be included in the measurement of the rifle's overall length
because the statutory definition of rifle refers to "a weapon ...
intended to be fired from the shoulder." (section 12020, subd.
(c)(20).) In keeping with the statutory purpose, a weapon which
need not be fired exclusively from the shoulder but which readily
can be is still a rifle. (United States v. Rose (1982) 695 F.2d
1356 [Uzi designed for firing from hip but fitted with collapsible
stock still a rifle]; Kanarr Corporation v. United States (1969)
413 F.2d 1143 [grenade launcher which could be fired from shoulder
counted as a rifle]; Sipes v. United States (1963) 321 F.2d 174,
178.) [footnote 3]
The cases to which appellant looks for support are
unpersuasive. In People v. Stinson, supra, 8 Cal.App.3d at p. 500,
87 Cal.Rptr. 537, the court held that it best met the legislative
purpose of the statute to determine the "overall length" of a rifle
by measuring in a single straight line, either from the tip of the
barrel to the back of the stock or from the tip of the barrel to a
point just above the back of the stock, rather than in two straight
lines, first along the barrel and then down the long side of the
stock. While Stinson included the stock in the measurement of the
weapon, the rifle in that case had neither a detachable nor a
folding stock, and was not fireable in two different
configurations. That a fixed stock is included in the measurement
of a conventional rifle in no way compels the conclusion that a
detachable or folding stock-which can be easily moved to make the
weapon concealable-must be so included. Indeed, to hold that a
detachable or folding stock must be included would be contrary to
section 12020 subdivision (c)(2)(C), which includes within the
definition of short-barreled rifle "any weapon made from a rifle
(whether by alteration, modification, or otherwise) if that weapon
has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels
of less than 16 inches in length."
Nor may appellant derive support from cases in which a folding
or detachable stock was included in the measurement of a firearm.
In United States v. Zeidman (1971) 444 F.2d 1051 and United States
v. Rose, supra, 695 F.2d 1356, it was determined that weapons with
detachable or folding stocks were rifles, despite the fact that
they could be fired without the shoulder stock. These cases do not
stand for the proposition that detachable or folding stocks must
always be included in the measurement of a firearm, but rather that
a concealable weapon which can very easily and quickly be made
shoulder-fireable is illegal. To find illegal a shoulder-fireable
weapon which can quickly and easily be made concealable is
consistent with those rulings, and with the purpose of the law.
The judgment is affirmed.
BENSON and PHELAN, JJ., concur.
FOOTNOTES
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are
to the Penal Code.
2. Appellant urges that because the statute does not specify the
means of measurement, the court should use a measurement which
finds the weapon legal, on the ground that ambiguities should be
resolved in favor of the defendant. (People v. Superior Court
(Douglass) (1979) 24 Cal.3d 428, 435, 155 Cal.Rptr. 704, 595 P.2d
139; United States v. Bass (1971) 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515,
522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488.) However, statutes relating to dangerous
weapons have been broadly interpreted in California courts, as
courts look to the gravity and importance of the legislative
purpose. For example, it is unlawful for felons to possess
firearms even if they are inoperable (People v. Thompson (1977) 72
Cal.App.3d 1, 5, 139 Cal.Rptr. 800); it is unlawful to possess even
disassembled machineguns (People v. Tallinadge (1980) 103
Cal.App.3d 980, 988, 163 Cal.Rptr. 372); and knowledge that a
weapon is unlawful is not an element of the crime. (People v.
Azevedo (1984) 161 Cal. App.3d 235, 241, 207 Cal.Rptr. 270.) "[T]he
principle of lenient construction does not require a court to
ignore the obvious intention of the legislature in enacting the
statute." (U.S. v. Drasen (7th Cir.1988) 845 F.2d 731, 738.)
3. 26 United States Code section 5845(c) in pertinent part defines
a rifle as "a weapon ... intended to be fired from the
shoulder...." The prohibitions against short-barreled weapons in
the federal criminal code (18 U.S.C. section 921(a)(7) and 18
U.S.C. section 921(a)(8)) and provisions concerning such weapons in
the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. section 5845) are written in
language almost identical to that of the California Penal Code, and
reflect the same concerns. Both parties encourage this court to
look to federal cases for guidance.
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-Rob
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Thanks for the help.
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