Posted: 5/22/2012 3:58:50 PM EDT
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Damn good reporting about real war fighters.
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/the-battle-for-mosul.htm |
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Yeah, Mosul is one of the important and most untold stories about Iraq. It was much like Fallujah, IIRC. Big Army laying the smack down. 
Yep, hope they tell the untold story of how it was pretty much buttoned down and considered one of the great success stories the entire year before somebody had the wisdom to replace a division with a brigade. |
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Quoted: this is why sometimes, i feel that something needs to be done about the whole idea of rotation. completely different units coming in and changing how things are done seems to be bad juju from what ive gleaned from stories on here and other places.Quoted: Yeah, Mosul is one of the important and most untold stories about Iraq. It was much like Fallujah, IIRC. Big Army laying the smack down. Yep, hope they tell the untold story of how it was pretty much buttoned down and considered one of the great success stories the entire year before somebody had the wisdom to replace a division with a brigade. |
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Quoted: Quoted: this is why sometimes, i feel that something needs to be done about the whole idea of rotation. completely different units coming in and changing how things are done seems to be bad juju from what ive gleaned from stories on here and other places.Quoted: Yeah, Mosul is one of the important and most untold stories about Iraq. It was much like Fallujah, IIRC. Big Army laying the smack down. Yep, hope they tell the untold story of how it was pretty much buttoned down and considered one of the great success stories the entire year before somebody had the wisdom to replace a division with a brigade. Reading about counterinsurgency or similar types of campaigns in the pre-WWII era (which were generally successful), it seems that the units that participated, and the men in them, were there for the duration, although individuals got furloughs periodically. In more than one work this is contrasted to the way things were done in Vietnam, to the extent these sorts of operations conducted (such as what is described in West's The Village), which is also the origin (as I understand it), of relatively frequent rotations of units in "small wars." A unit can come in, get to know the terrain, know the people and gain their trust, and start depriving the enemy of areas in which it can safely operate (resulting, at times, in the deaths of the enemy), and when it is at its peak of performance, it is replaced by one which has to start over from scratch, and the whole thing can go to hell in a handbasket. I've heard stories of this sort of thing happening in the more recent campaigns in Irq and Afghanistan, as well. |
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Bump for the day crew. I was there Feb '04 to Feb '05.
I missed most of what Yon talks about, but damn. Brings back a lot of memories. I witnessed/experienced a lot of what he refers to in the beginning of 1-24's deployment, from the overunning of nearly all the west-side IP Stations in November to the subsequent increase in insurgents captured. Hell, shortly after the entire city went to shit on 8 November, elements from 1-24 reinforced us as our PLT of MPs held Bridge 4 for several hours in an effort to contain the AIF on the west side of the river. We spent the next month or so patrolling all over that damn city with IP Commandos and getting our asses shot off. Such is the life of a general support MP. It was a relief, but bitter sweet, to transfer to the confinement facility to decompress before going home. Having experienced the fighting after 101st left, I feel that this battle deserves the same recognition as Fallujah, Najaf, Nasiriyah, et al. I don't understand why it hasn't featured as prominently. It really was a hard won success story. |
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Bump for the day crew. I was there Feb '04 to Feb '05. I missed most of what Yon talks about, but damn. Brings back a lot of memories. I witnessed/experienced a lot of what he refers to in the beginning of 1-24's deployment, from the overunning of nearly all the west-side IP Stations in November to the subsequent increase in insurgents captured. Hell, shortly after the entire city went to shit on 8 November, elements from 1-24 reinforced us as our PLT of MPs held Bridge 4 for several hours in an effort to contain the AIF on the west side of the river. We spent the next month or so patrolling all over that damn city with IP Commandos and getting our asses shot off. Such is the life of a general support MP. It was a relief, but bitter sweet, to transfer to the confinement facility to decompress before going home. Having experienced the fighting after 101st left, I feel that this battle deserves the same recognition as Fallujah, Najaf, Nasiriyah, et al. I don't understand why it hasn't featured as prominently. It really was a hard won success story. How was the 1-24? I ask because they didn't seem real interested in what we had to tell them during ride alongs priior to the turn over. |
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Bump for the day crew. I was there Feb '04 to Feb '05. I missed most of what Yon talks about, but damn. Brings back a lot of memories. I witnessed/experienced a lot of what he refers to in the beginning of 1-24's deployment, from the overunning of nearly all the west-side IP Stations in November to the subsequent increase in insurgents captured. Hell, shortly after the entire city went to shit on 8 November, elements from 1-24 reinforced us as our PLT of MPs held Bridge 4 for several hours in an effort to contain the AIF on the west side of the river. We spent the next month or so patrolling all over that damn city with IP Commandos and getting our asses shot off. Such is the life of a general support MP. It was a relief, but bitter sweet, to transfer to the confinement facility to decompress before going home. Having experienced the fighting after 101st left, I feel that this battle deserves the same recognition as Fallujah, Najaf, Nasiriyah, et al. I don't understand why it hasn't featured as prominently. It really was a hard won success story. How was the 1-24? I ask because they didn't seem real interested in what we had to tell them during ride alongs priior to the turn over. That was my experience as well. Soldiers will be soldiers, but when the seniority started putting concertina wire between the '03 guys and them, telling their soldiers to not mix with us, we all figured it wouldn't turn out well. I got the chance to talk to a civie from Mosul back in '07 or '08 and he said people were still asking when the 101st would come back, then showed pics of of how blown to shit the commercial area in front of the university was. We worked with some really good people there. 
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As a general support MP CO, we didn't really work with them closely at all. They inherited us, as we were originally assigned to 1SBCT from Lewis. This was before they had MPs assigned to the BCTs at the home stations, so we were not organic to them at all, and it was kind of a new concept . My company was from Stewart, and deployed independantly. Hell, it's been so long, that I couldn't tell you what BN was on which side of the river without looking at my awards and COAs. I do remember that towards the end of our time there we reported in to a BN from 11th ACR. Huge mix of units there.
When we first got to Mosul, they assigned us to the BDE, who then split us up. Two PLTs were direct support (one per BN), and two were general support (also one per BN). As general support, we really had no mission. Not before the TOS anyways. We checked in with our BN daily, and drove around trying to get IPs to do joint patrols, and waiting to get shot up, after which we'd call QRF and/or CAS. Sometimes we'd escort EOD and/or secure a site while they did their thing. Direct support PLTs had a specific misison, and worked a lot closer with the BN they were assigned to. I don't recall any complaints from them about 1-24 or 1SBCT. I will say that if we needed 1-24, they were there. Towards the end of our stay on Bridge 4, we got Kiowas on station, and the AIF quit shooting at us. I'll never forget seeing that PLT pull up with the giant taro leaf on the front of a bulldozer-like blade on the Stryker. We had been there for quite a while taking all kinds of fire, and were exhausted and low on M2 ammo. A little bit after they showed up, a dude gets out of the Stryker and walks down the bridge to draw out the AIF. Must have worked, because the Kiowas came in hot with rockets and guns and that was the end of that. Damndest thing I've ever seen. We also called QRF once while we were at 1-West IP station because we were taking sporadic SAF. QRF came out and fucked their world up. Truly a sight to behold. |
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Bump for the day crew. I was there Feb '04 to Feb '05. I missed most of what Yon talks about, but damn. Brings back a lot of memories. I witnessed/experienced a lot of what he refers to in the beginning of 1-24's deployment, from the overunning of nearly all the west-side IP Stations in November to the subsequent increase in insurgents captured. Hell, shortly after the entire city went to shit on 8 November, elements from 1-24 reinforced us as our PLT of MPs held Bridge 4 for several hours in an effort to contain the AIF on the west side of the river. We spent the next month or so patrolling all over that damn city with IP Commandos and getting our asses shot off. Such is the life of a general support MP. It was a relief, but bitter sweet, to transfer to the confinement facility to decompress before going home. Having experienced the fighting after 101st left, I feel that this battle deserves the same recognition as Fallujah, Najaf, Nasiriyah, et al. I don't understand why it hasn't featured as prominently. It really was a hard won success story. How was the 1-24? I ask because they didn't seem real interested in what we had to tell them during ride alongs priior to the turn over. That was my experience as well. Soldiers will be soldiers, but when the seniority started putting concertina wire between the '03 guys and them, telling their soldiers to not mix with us, we all figured it wouldn't turn out well. I got the chance to talk to a civie from Mosul back in '07 or '08 and he said people were still asking when the 101st would come back, then showed pics of of how blown to shit the commercial area in front of the university was. We worked with some really good people there. We did. To this day I wonder whatever became of our 'terp and his family. |