[ARCHIVED THREAD] - AF447 Crash Article (Page 1 of 2)
Posted: 4/30/2012 6:55:35 AM EDT
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Interesting read, it doesn't get overly technical, but it does talk about some of the systems on the A330 that crashed in back in 2009 into the Atlantic, both pluess and shortcomings of the A330 flight control and computer systems, as well as a pretty good description of what is suppositioned to have occured, and, if you read into it, certainly lessons learned to help avoid future incidents.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9231855/Air-France-Flight-447-Damn-it-were-going-to-crash.html |
| There's a bunch of a good material on this and other on You Tube as well as others, looks likte somone has posted nearly every episode of Mayday / Air Crash Investigations to youtube, definitely some worth watching. In the interests of understanding so you don't repeat. |
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The NatGeo show on it was very eye opening. In summary: Fuck Airbus. Sure, call me simple minded and slow, but I like an aircraft to do what I tell it to, regardless of what it thinks. Airbus is the opposite. Airbus' engineering is fine, for the most part. Their design principles are fucked up beyond all recognition. They build computers with wings, and the airlines fill them with systems managers. In that article, the one guy is arguing that Airbus' sidestick scheme is so very elegant. Sure it is. So elegant it killed 200+ people. Grats. 
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The NatGeo show on it was very eye opening. In summary: Fuck Airbus. Sure, call me simple minded and slow, but I like an aircraft to do what I tell it to, regardless of what it thinks. Airbus is the opposite. As I see it, the plane did exactly what the pilot told it to do. |
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The NatGeo show on it was very eye opening. In summary: Fuck Airbus. Sure, call me simple minded and slow, but I like an aircraft to do what I tell it to, regardless of what it thinks. Airbus is the opposite. As I see it, the plane did exactly what the pilot told it to do. Pretty much, and it did int exceptionally well.. fully stalled all the way in and completely controllable. Pretty impressive. |
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As I see it, the plane did exactly what the pilot told it to do. Pretty much, and it did int exceptionally well.. fully stalled all the way in and completely controllable. Pretty impressive. Very benign stall characteristics for a large transport category aircraft with swept wings. I was impressed by what I saw too. |
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I don't know that anyone is arguing to the contrary in this case. In this situation, the accident falls entirely on the crew, the best that can be determined from the CVR and FDR, the CP was pulling back on the stick the entire way into the water. He was able to do this because when the Air Data computer's lost airspeed reference it disable the Envelope Protection for lack of a better term out of confusion, since without the plane knowing how fast it was going, it wouldnt know where to limit the controls. This falls into the realm of crew coordination and situational awareness.
I think all CFII is saying is that, given a situation, generically speaking, where he wants the plane to do something, he wants the plane to do it, not decide for him what is best. The sidestick probably contributed to this accident because let's face it, if it had conventional yoke controls, everyone would have realized the CP was pulling back on the stick before he annouced it prior to impact. But again, crew coordination. The Nat Geo show put a couple of guys in a sim without telling them what was going to happen and recreated it the best they could, and that crew sucessfully flew the plane through the event without issue. I second wanting the aircraft to do what I tell it to, as an aviator, I've been trained to know the limits of my aircraft (according the book (-10)) I also want to know, that if I feel my chances of surviving a situation are greater by me over stressing the aircraft and taking the chance that it will break up, I want the freedom to make that choice, not be bound from doing so by a computer that 'knows better' TL;DR Accident crew's fault not planes, just want to be in control of plane, be able to overstress if I need to. |
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My hate filled generic comment was not specific to this incident. I know the aircraft did exactly what the "pilots" told it to. However, the whole system is broken.
Cruise pilots, 3rd pilots, whatever you want to call them. Cheap to make, cheap to pay, and they are getting more popular. Automation kills hand-flying skills. No argument. No AoA indication Limited visibility (but that is just an airliner for ya) I guess shit happens sometimes. I still hate Airbus. 
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I don't know that anyone is arguing to the contrary in this case. In this situation, the accident falls entirely on the crew, the best that can be determined from the CVR and FDR, the CP was pulling back on the stick the entire way into the water. He was able to do this because when the Air Data computer's lost airspeed reference it disable the Envelope Protection for lack of a better term out of confusion, since without the plane knowing how fast it was going, it wouldnt know where to limit the controls. This falls into the realm of crew coordination and situational awareness. I think all CFII is saying is that, given a situation, generically speaking, where he wants the plane to do something, he wants the plane to do it, not decide for him what is best. The sidestick probably contributed to this accident because let's face it, if it had conventional yoke controls, everyone would have realized the CP was pulling back on the stick before he annouced it prior to impact. But again, crew coordination. The Nat Geo show put a couple of guys in a sim without telling them what was going to happen and recreated it the best they could, and that crew sucessfully flew the plane through the event without issue. I second wanting the aircraft to do what I tell it to, as an aviator, I've been trained to know the limits of my aircraft (according the book (-10)) I also want to know, that if I feel my chances of surviving a situation are greater by me over stressing the aircraft and taking the chance that it will break up, I want the freedom to make that choice, not be bound from doing so by a computer that 'knows better' TL;DR Accident crew's fault not planes, just want to be in control of plane, be able to overstress if I need to. The feedback through the stick is possible, and probably wouldn't take too much effort to modify the current design. A few solenoids and some software could at least offer resistance if the control inputs were conflicting. A display that indicated the control inputs from each seat could also work, although that might take a significant redesign based on the differing panel configurations available. It could show the rear view of the plane so that it would picture a bank or an angle, then add a flashing, dashed outline to indicate conflicting input from the other seat. Or something like that. Of course, if they paid attention to the artificial horizon and the altimeter, this might not be an issue. |
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My hate filled generic comment was not specific to this incident. I know the aircraft did exactly what the "pilots" told it to. However, the whole system is broken. Cruise pilots, 3rd pilots, whatever you want to call them. Cheap to make, cheap to pay, and they are getting more popular. Automation kills hand-flying skills. No argument. No AoA indication Limited visibility (but that is just an airliner for ya) I guess shit happens sometimes. I still hate Airbus. Ever flown one? Just curious. 
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I don't know that anyone is arguing to the contrary in this case. In this situation, the accident falls entirely on the crew, the best that can be determined from the CVR and FDR, the CP was pulling back on the stick the entire way into the water. He was able to do this because when the Air Data computer's lost airspeed reference it disable the Envelope Protection for lack of a better term out of confusion, since without the plane knowing how fast it was going, it wouldnt know where to limit the controls. This falls into the realm of crew coordination and situational awareness. I think all CFII is saying is that, given a situation, generically speaking, where he wants the plane to do something, he wants the plane to do it, not decide for him what is best. The sidestick probably contributed to this accident because let's face it, if it had conventional yoke controls, everyone would have realized the CP was pulling back on the stick before he annouced it prior to impact. But again, crew coordination. The Nat Geo show put a couple of guys in a sim without telling them what was going to happen and recreated it the best they could, and that crew sucessfully flew the plane through the event without issue. I second wanting the aircraft to do what I tell it to, as an aviator, I've been trained to know the limits of my aircraft (according the book (-10)) I also want to know, that if I feel my chances of surviving a situation are greater by me over stressing the aircraft and taking the chance that it will break up, I want the freedom to make that choice, not be bound from doing so by a computer that 'knows better' TL;DR Accident crew's fault not planes, just want to be in control of plane, be able to overstress if I need to. The feedback through the stick is possible, and probably wouldn't take too much effort to modify the current design. A few solenoids and some software could at least offer resistance if the control inputs were conflicting. A display that indicated the control inputs from each seat could also work, although that might take a significant redesign based on the differing panel configurations available. It could show the rear view of the plane so that it would picture a bank or an angle, then add a flashing, dashed outline to indicate conflicting input from the other seat. Or something like that. Of course, if they paid attention to the artificial horizon and the altimeter, this might not be an issue. The system does warn of dual input. |
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The system does warn of dual input. Audible warning? Still, it would be good to see the differences since the control inputs can't be felt. I suppose it could be integrated into the artificial horizon, although it would take some research to get an effective design. |
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The system does warn of dual input. Audible warning? Still, it would be good to see the differences since the control inputs can't be felt. I suppose it could be integrated into the artificial horizon, although it would take some research to get an effective design. Yes, voice audible "dual input" call, with a light next to the master caution/warning. |
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The system does warn of dual input. Audible warning? Still, it would be good to see the differences since the control inputs can't be felt. I suppose it could be integrated into the artificial horizon, although it would take some research to get an effective design. There is no reason that fly by wire aircraft can't give tactile feedback to the pilots. The C-17 does. I think it's a waste of space, cost, and complexity to have a motor and geartrain to drive every throttle, and a roll and pitch autopilot actuator that do nothing but move the sticks in response to flight control computer outputs. In normal conditions the sticks are mechanically decoupled from the flight controls. There is no reason you couldn't integrate control force outputs into the indications on the MFD, but it would just clutter up the PFD. |
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There is no reason that fly by wire aircraft can't give tactile feedback to the pilots. The C-17 does. I think it's a waste of space, cost, and complexity to have a motor and geartrain to drive every throttle, and a roll and pitch autopilot actuator that do nothing but move the sticks in response to flight control computer outputs. In normal conditions the sticks are mechanically decoupled from the flight controls. There is no reason you couldn't integrate control force outputs into the indications on the MFD, but it would just clutter up the PFD. I'm still trying to get past the fact that they didn't look at the artificial horizon and the altimeter and realize what those two things were telling them. But if it was there, it would have told the rest of the crew that one guy had cranked the elevator all the way back and wouldn't let go. |
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There is no reason that fly by wire aircraft can't give tactile feedback to the pilots. The C-17 does. I think it's a waste of space, cost, and complexity to have a motor and geartrain to drive every throttle, and a roll and pitch autopilot actuator that do nothing but move the sticks in response to flight control computer outputs. In normal conditions the sticks are mechanically decoupled from the flight controls. There is no reason you couldn't integrate control force outputs into the indications on the MFD, but it would just clutter up the PFD. I'm still trying to get past the fact that they didn't look at the artificial horizon and the altimeter and realize what those two things were telling them. But if it was there, it would have told the rest of the crew that one guy had cranked the elevator all the way back and wouldn't let go. You are right in the fact they relired on the flight director which was giving them faulty info. This is a training/experience problem, not A/C related. Remember, FLY THE AIRPLANE! It is too easy these days to become techno cripples with a too high reliance on the machine even when it is giving eronious onfo. It is unfortunate that it was the most inexperienced person at the controls.
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Quoted: My hate filled generic comment was not specific to this incident. I know the aircraft did exactly what the "pilots" told it to. However, the whole system is broken. Cruise pilots, 3rd pilots, whatever you want to call them. Cheap to make, cheap to pay, and they are getting more popular. Automation kills hand-flying skills. No argument. No AoA indication Limited visibility (but that is just an airliner for ya) I guess shit happens sometimes. I still hate Airbus. Pretty much every jet on planet earth has an AoA indicator. The flight crew in this case were so incompetent they would have killed themselves in a 172. Airbus makes a fine product and the plane responded impressively well (fully controllable in a high altitude stall, no spin etc..) There is an equal amount of automation in the 744 and 777 series but the stick looks different so you assume otherwise.
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My hate filled generic comment was not specific to this incident. I know the aircraft did exactly what the "pilots" told it to. However, the whole system is broken. Cruise pilots, 3rd pilots, whatever you want to call them. Cheap to make, cheap to pay, and they are getting more popular. Automation kills hand-flying skills. No argument. No AoA indication Limited visibility (but that is just an airliner for ya) I guess shit happens sometimes. I still hate Airbus. Pretty much every jet on planet earth has an AoA indicator. The flight crew in this case were so incompetent they would have killed themselves in a 172. Airbus makes a fine product and the plane responded impressively well (fully controllable in a high altitude stall, no spin etc..) There is an equal amount of automation in the 744 and 777 series but the stick looks different so you assume otherwise. I do not assume otherwise. I am a dumb army helicopter pilot, but I know that traditional Boeing aircraft do not include hard performance limitations in their automation (who knows about the 777 and 787). I actually don't care about the stick arrangement. I am sure its comfortable. And to answer someone above me, no, I have not flown an Airbus. I have a bit of time in various airliner simulators (MD80, 707, 757). If people that fly airbus are offended by me, then I do apologize for that. I know that what you fly is the greatest aircraft on the planet. However, that does not change my opinion on Airbus products, which strangely enough I share with just about every Boeing pilot I know. Go figure. Anyway, at the end of the day, Automation kills hand flying skills, and the Ab-Initio training most foreign carriers give pilots is a simple recipe for disaster. |
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What bugs me about that accident is that the flight crew didn't pay attention even to cues that a rank novice pilot like myself would notice, like the sound of the airflow around the cockpit. After flying in Cessna 150s and Piper 140s for just a COUPLE of hours, I could accurately guess my airspeed by the sound of the airflow on the windscreen and around the cockpit. I'm pretty sure that the soundproofing in commercial airliners is far from perfect, and that includes in the cabin, so if I were thrown into a position where I needed to learn to fly that pig or die trying, and the instruments were in various stages of uselessness, I'd listen for airflow around the cabin. If I didn't hear much, I'd reasonably figure that I could stand to add some throttle. Yeah, that's a really simplistic way of looking at a complex problem, but I believe that a pilot should never abandon the use of his own senses to feel how the aircraft is flying. That includes looking out the windows and listening to everything going on, including listening for wind noise. There are times when I'd trust my own senses a LOT more than I'd trust a computer. CJ |
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What bugs me about that accident is that the flight crew didn't pay attention even to cues that a rank novice pilot like myself would notice, like the sound of the airflow around the cockpit. After flying in Cessna 150s and Piper 140s for just a COUPLE of hours, I could accurately guess my airspeed by the sound of the airflow on the windscreen and around the cockpit. I'm pretty sure that the soundproofing in commercial airliners is far from perfect, and that includes in the cabin, so if I were thrown into a position where I needed to learn to fly that pig or die trying, and the instruments were in various stages of uselessness, I'd listen for airflow around the cabin. If I didn't hear much, I'd reasonably figure that I could stand to add some throttle. Yeah, that's a really simplistic way of looking at a complex problem, but I believe that a pilot should never abandon the use of his own senses to feel how the aircraft is flying. That includes looking out the windows and listening to everything going on, including listening for wind noise. There are times when I'd trust my own senses a LOT more than I'd trust a computer. CJ In a zero-visibility environment, like over the ocean at night, that's a good way to get dead. |
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My hate filled generic comment was not specific to this incident. I know the aircraft did exactly what the "pilots" told it to. However, the whole system is broken. Cruise pilots, 3rd pilots, whatever you want to call them. Cheap to make, cheap to pay, and they are getting more popular. Automation kills hand-flying skills. No argument. No AoA indication Limited visibility (but that is just an airliner for ya) I guess shit happens sometimes. I still hate Airbus. Pretty much every jet on planet earth has an AoA indicator. The flight crew in this case were so incompetent they would have killed themselves in a 172. Airbus makes a fine product and the plane responded impressively well (fully controllable in a high altitude stall, no spin etc..) There is an equal amount of automation in the 744 and 777 series but the stick looks different so you assume otherwise. I do not assume otherwise. I am a dumb army helicopter pilot, but I know that traditional Boeing aircraft do not include hard performance limitations in their automation (who knows about the 777 and 787). I actually don't care about the stick arrangement. I am sure its comfortable. And to answer someone above me, no, I have not flown an Airbus. I have a bit of time in various airliner simulators (MD80, 707, 757). If people that fly airbus are offended by me, then I do apologize for that. I know that what you fly is the greatest aircraft on the planet. However, that does not change my opinion on Airbus products, which strangely enough I share with just about every Boeing pilot I know. Go figure. Anyway, at the end of the day, Automation kills hand flying skills, and the Ab-Initio training most foreign carriers give pilots is a simple recipe for disaster. OK, here we go again. First off, I have ten years in Airbus aircraft (320/330) with type rating in 330's. I also have 8 years in Boeing (727/757) and 10 in McDonnell/Douglas (DC-10 and A-4 Skyhawk), Over 15,000 hours. I was also a Navy trained safetyofficer and accident investigator and flight instructor. Those are my bonifides. I too have noticed many Boeing pilots don't like Airbus, they are the ones who never flew it. It is an airplane. For those who have little or no experince with the subject matter (sorry, a bit of time in sims don't count) I suggest seeking knowledge from those that know before proclaiming oracle status. I have never flown helos, I have friends who have so when I have a question on rotor dynamics, I ask them. If they have questions about swept wing aerodynamics and Airbus vs. Boeing, they ask me. The AF crash was NOT an Airbus vs. Boeing issue. It was an issue of training and experience of the man at the controls. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have about A/C differences and to dicuss training issues, but please don't jump to conclusions out of ignorance. |
I like you. You like arguing, so do I. Its fun.  Yes, hatred of Airbus generally comes from Boeing only guys, but there are lots of things I don't like that I didn't have to try.
The last line of my post blamed automation as a whole, and inadequate training, not Airbus. I have 10 years of fixed wing flying before switching over to the dark side. You obviously have more experience than I do. I am not trying to have a dick measuring contest. I never claimed oracle status, believe me. I do have really good sources on airline flying, rather impeccable to be honest. I was right, though. You fly airbus, and therefore like them. 
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I like you. You like arguing, so do I. Its fun. Yes, hatred of Airbus generally comes from Boeing only guys, but there are lots of things I don't like that I didn't have to try.
The last line of my post blamed automation as a whole, and inadequate training, not Airbus. I have 10 years of fixed wing flying before switching over to the dark side. You obviously have more experience than I do. I am not trying to have a dick measuring contest. I never claimed oracle status, believe me. I do have really good sources on airline flying, rather impeccable to be honest. I was right, though. You fly airbus, and therefore like them. I am like the Lord, I love 'em all, I just love to fly!!!!
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My hate filled generic comment was not specific to this incident. I know the aircraft did exactly what the "pilots" told it to. However, the whole system is broken. Cruise pilots, 3rd pilots, whatever you want to call them. Cheap to make, cheap to pay, and they are getting more popular. Automation kills hand-flying skills. No argument. No AoA indication Limited visibility (but that is just an airliner for ya) I guess shit happens sometimes. I still hate Airbus. Pretty much every jet on planet earth has an AoA indicator. The flight crew in this case were so incompetent they would have killed themselves in a 172. Airbus makes a fine product and the plane responded impressively well (fully controllable in a high altitude stall, no spin etc..) There is an equal amount of automation in the 744 and 777 series but the stick looks different so you assume otherwise. They have an AOA vane, but the indicator is an option that not many airlines purchase. I can't think of any Airbus operators that purchased the AOA indicator. |
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My hate filled generic comment was not specific to this incident. I know the aircraft did exactly what the "pilots" told it to. However, the whole system is broken. Cruise pilots, 3rd pilots, whatever you want to call them. Cheap to make, cheap to pay, and they are getting more popular. Automation kills hand-flying skills. No argument. No AoA indication Limited visibility (but that is just an airliner for ya) I guess shit happens sometimes. I still hate Airbus. Pretty much every jet on planet earth has an AoA indicator. The flight crew in this case were so incompetent they would have killed themselves in a 172. Airbus makes a fine product and the plane responded impressively well (fully controllable in a high altitude stall, no spin etc..) There is an equal amount of automation in the 744 and 777 series but the stick looks different so you assume otherwise. I do not assume otherwise. I am a dumb army helicopter pilot, but I know that traditional Boeing aircraft do not include hard performance limitations in their automation (who knows about the 777 and 787). I actually don't care about the stick arrangement. I am sure its comfortable. And to answer someone above me, no, I have not flown an Airbus. I have a bit of time in various airliner simulators (MD80, 707, 757). If people that fly airbus are offended by me, then I do apologize for that. I know that what you fly is the greatest aircraft on the planet. However, that does not change my opinion on Airbus products, which strangely enough I share with just about every Boeing pilot I know. Go figure. Anyway, at the end of the day, Automation kills hand flying skills, and the Ab-Initio training most foreign carriers give pilots is a simple recipe for disaster. OK, here we go again. First off, I have ten years in Airbus aircraft (320/330) with type rating in 330's. I also have 8 years in Boeing (727/757) and 10 in McDonnell/Douglas (DC-10 and A-4 Skyhawk), Over 15,000 hours. I was also a Navy trained safetyofficer and accident investigator and flight instructor. Those are my bonifides. I too have noticed many Boeing pilots don't like Airbus, they are the ones who never flew it. It is an airplane. For those who have little or no experince with the subject matter (sorry, a bit of time in sims don't count) I suggest seeking knowledge from those that know before proclaiming oracle status. I have never flown helos, I have friends who have so when I have a question on rotor dynamics, I ask them. If they have questions about swept wing aerodynamics and Airbus vs. Boeing, they ask me. The AF crash was NOT an Airbus vs. Boeing issue. It was an issue of training and experience of the man at the controls. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have about A/C differences and to dicuss training issues, but please don't jump to conclusions out of ignorance. would you say airbus' design philosphy leads to poorly trained (or, if you prefer, poorer trained) crews vis a vis boeing? |
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Interesting question. As far as this being an AB vs. Boeing issue I would have to say no.
The Airbus was the first to come out with this level of automation with Boeing close behind so now more automation is the norm vice the exception. What I think may be happening is that some companies and countries are using this level of technology to reduce the required level of experience/training required in order to get people in the cockpit faster and CHEAPER. This is for both AB and Boeing. Technology is great until it craps out then it is time to fly the airplane. |
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The system does warn of dual input. Audible warning? Still, it would be good to see the differences since the control inputs can't be felt. I suppose it could be integrated into the artificial horizon, although it would take some research to get an effective design. There is no reason that fly by wire aircraft can't give tactile feedback to the pilots. The C-17 does. I think it's a waste of space, cost, and complexity to have a motor and geartrain to drive every throttle, and a roll and pitch autopilot actuator that do nothing but move the sticks in response to flight control computer outputs. In normal conditions the sticks are mechanically decoupled from the flight controls. There is no reason you couldn't integrate control force outputs into the indications on the MFD, but it would just clutter up the PFD. Hell, the KC-10 boom flight controls are all fly by wire and we have feedback in the stick. With 1970's tech. When you're latched up and passing gas and fight against the automatic tracking, you get a stick shaker. It can't be that hard of a system to integrate. |
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What bugs me about that accident is that the flight crew didn't pay attention even to cues that a rank novice pilot like myself would notice, like the sound of the airflow around the cockpit. After flying in Cessna 150s and Piper 140s for just a COUPLE of hours, I could accurately guess my airspeed by the sound of the airflow on the windscreen and around the cockpit. I'm pretty sure that the soundproofing in commercial airliners is far from perfect, and that includes in the cabin, so if I were thrown into a position where I needed to learn to fly that pig or die trying, and the instruments were in various stages of uselessness, I'd listen for airflow around the cabin. If I didn't hear much, I'd reasonably figure that I could stand to add some throttle. Yeah, that's a really simplistic way of looking at a complex problem, but I believe that a pilot should never abandon the use of his own senses to feel how the aircraft is flying. That includes looking out the windows and listening to everything going on, including listening for wind noise. There are times when I'd trust my own senses a LOT more than I'd trust a computer. CJ In a zero-visibility environment, like over the ocean at night, that's a good way to get dead. Yep. You can not estimate airspeed by noise level in a big airplane. |
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What bugs me about that accident is that the flight crew didn't pay attention even to cues that a rank novice pilot like myself would notice, like the sound of the airflow around the cockpit. After flying in Cessna 150s and Piper 140s for just a COUPLE of hours, I could accurately guess my airspeed by the sound of the airflow on the windscreen and around the cockpit. I'm pretty sure that the soundproofing in commercial airliners is far from perfect, and that includes in the cabin, so if I were thrown into a position where I needed to learn to fly that pig or die trying, and the instruments were in various stages of uselessness, I'd listen for airflow around the cabin. If I didn't hear much, I'd reasonably figure that I could stand to add some throttle. Yeah, that's a really simplistic way of looking at a complex problem, but I believe that a pilot should never abandon the use of his own senses to feel how the aircraft is flying. That includes looking out the windows and listening to everything going on, including listening for wind noise. There are times when I'd trust my own senses a LOT more than I'd trust a computer. CJ In a zero-visibility environment, like over the ocean at night, that's a good way to get dead. Yep. You can not estimate airspeed by noise level in a big airplane. bullshit, what would you know? |
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What bugs me about that accident is that the flight crew didn't pay attention even to cues that a rank novice pilot like myself would notice, like the sound of the airflow around the cockpit. After flying in Cessna 150s and Piper 140s for just a COUPLE of hours, I could accurately guess my airspeed by the sound of the airflow on the windscreen and around the cockpit. I'm pretty sure that the soundproofing in commercial airliners is far from perfect, and that includes in the cabin, so if I were thrown into a position where I needed to learn to fly that pig or die trying, and the instruments were in various stages of uselessness, I'd listen for airflow around the cabin. If I didn't hear much, I'd reasonably figure that I could stand to add some throttle. Yeah, that's a really simplistic way of looking at a complex problem, but I believe that a pilot should never abandon the use of his own senses to feel how the aircraft is flying. That includes looking out the windows and listening to everything going on, including listening for wind noise. There are times when I'd trust my own senses a LOT more than I'd trust a computer. CJ In a zero-visibility environment, like over the ocean at night, that's a good way to get dead. Yep. You can not estimate airspeed by noise level in a big airplane. bullshit, what would you know? I dont have all the time needed to nswer that apprpriately. |
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What bugs me about that accident is that the flight crew didn't pay attention even to cues that a rank novice pilot like myself would notice, like the sound of the airflow around the cockpit. After flying in Cessna 150s and Piper 140s for just a COUPLE of hours, I could accurately guess my airspeed by the sound of the airflow on the windscreen and around the cockpit. I'm pretty sure that the soundproofing in commercial airliners is far from perfect, and that includes in the cabin, so if I were thrown into a position where I needed to learn to fly that pig or die trying, and the instruments were in various stages of uselessness, I'd listen for airflow around the cabin. If I didn't hear much, I'd reasonably figure that I could stand to add some throttle. Yeah, that's a really simplistic way of looking at a complex problem, but I believe that a pilot should never abandon the use of his own senses to feel how the aircraft is flying. That includes looking out the windows and listening to everything going on, including listening for wind noise. There are times when I'd trust my own senses a LOT more than I'd trust a computer. CJ In a zero-visibility environment, like over the ocean at night, that's a good way to get dead. Yep. You can not estimate airspeed by noise level in a big airplane. bullshit, what would you know? I dont have all the time needed to nswer that apprpriately. get in the sim and get yourself some hours already. |
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I stopped reading that article when the author claimed the pilot was disoriented because he thought he was at low altitude because he said he was in TOGA,
That author has no idea what he is talking about. In a high altitude stall situation,the recovery procedure is to place the throttles in to TOGA mode which stands for take off and go around thrust. It has absolutely nothing to do with low altitude or taking off and everything to do with the thrust setting of the throttles. In a high altitude stall, you want TOGA power setting. The author is an diot. If the author did not understand that, than he likely understood nothing about what he was talking about. |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. You are a highly skilled aviator with a variety of training and experience. You are the antithesis of the type of pilot the airlines and licensing bodies want. |
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I had the fortunate experience of being on a 3 hour commercial flight stuck in a middle seat with a retired airline pilot next to me. The topic of this crash and the one in upstate NY came up in conversation.
He said the stall characteristics of both aircraft would allow them to be recoverable, but that they would just sink in a stall and would achieve sink rates of 11,000ft/min if they pilot did not recover. Both crashes made them revise their training programs. He mentioned the woman in the tapes of the upstate NY crash saying, "I'll get the flaps," or something like that. He said that pilots are trained to not make any configuration changes while in recovery. He also discussed issues with some pilots having real issues with decision making when it comes to radar usage, or even turning it on when approaching adverse weather. |
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What Mach has said about it being difficult to judge that "air rushing past" sound / feeling at night without visual reference is accurate. Even in a comparatively lighter aircraft such as a UH60. We train to do autorotations at night, unaided (no night vision goggles). depending on factors such as speed and whether or noth the aircraft is in trim we can drop at up to 5-6000 feet per minute, and I assure you, from personal experience, that you do not in any way what so ever get the "ground rushing up at you" feeling, nor is there an air rushing sound thats audible over the rest of the aircraft noises. That's a situation that has to be done completely on instruments, no amount of "seat of your pants" will help you.
This accident really is a crew failure, a failure in crew coordination, poor communication, failure to properly recognize the events transpiring, and failure to properly respond. It's true that the level of automation in flight can lead to "lazy pilots" or pilots that are rusty with their flying skills. This is a training / industry / cooperate failure. Not an AB v Boeing issue. I do love Boeing acft. I wouldn't call myself a fanboy exactly, but, this crash wasn't Airbus' fault. It was the Crew's. As for the 777 and 787, according to Boeing while the aircraft retain conventional type flight controls in the cockpit. the aircraft are fly by wire, and do include a flight envelope protection system. Boeing states that this system can be completely overridden by either of the pilots applying "excessive force" to the flight controls, allowing for full control of the flight control surfaces with the safeties disabled. |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. You are a highly skilled aviator with a variety of training and experience. You are the antithesis of the type of pilot the airlines and licensing bodies want. That is sigline material screech |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. Given that something was obviously big time wrong with the system, would you have trusted the stall warning or would you have configured for straight and level at the best thrust you could estimate? |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. Given that something was obviously big time wrong with the system, would you have trusted the stall warning or would you have configured for straight and level at the best thrust you could estimate? Incorrect pusher/shaker is a really annoying emergency. Its usually got two memory items. 1) Autopilot yoke disconnect......Press and Hold 2) Aircraft attitude......................Maintain But, its just annoying. Unless you're in an aircraft that's ENTIRELY, and not completely intuitively, interconnected. |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. You are a highly skilled aviator with a variety of training and experience. You are the antithesis of the type of pilot the airlines and licensing bodies want. Then why am I not paid more? |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. Given that something was obviously big time wrong with the system, would you have trusted the stall warning or would you have configured for straight and level at the best thrust you could estimate? Aways honor the stall warning. It is an independant redundent system. If the stall warning is activated, it means multiple sensors indepenently sense an approach to stall or a stall. |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. You are a highly skilled aviator with a variety of training and experience. You are the antithesis of the type of pilot the airlines and licensing bodies want. Then why am I not paid more? Ask Dave Behncke. |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. Given that something was obviously big time wrong with the system, would you have trusted the stall warning or would you have configured for straight and level at the best thrust you could estimate? Aways honor the stall warning. It is an independant redundent system. If the stall warning is activated, it means multiple sensors indepenently sense an approach to stall or a stall. I think that might be true in large transport category aircraft. I don't think the system is as robust in smaller aircraft. I'm trying to dredge up either the ERJ's or Dash 8's stall system. The B1900 has the same one you'd find in a Beech Baron. |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. You are a highly skilled aviator with a variety of training and experience. You are the antithesis of the type of pilot the airlines and licensing bodies want. Then why am I not paid more? Ask Dave Behncke. Yea, fuck him |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. You are a highly skilled aviator with a variety of training and experience. You are the antithesis of the type of pilot the airlines and licensing bodies want. Then why am I not paid more? Ask Dave Behncke. Yea, fuck him I guess we'll agree to disagree on that one. |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. Given that something was obviously big time wrong with the system, would you have trusted the stall warning or would you have configured for straight and level at the best thrust you could estimate? Aways honor the stall warning. It is an independant redundent system. If the stall warning is activated, it means multiple sensors indepenently sense an approach to stall or a stall. I think that might be true in large transport category aircraft. I don't think the system is as robust in smaller aircraft. I'm trying to dredge up either the ERJ's or Dash 8's stall system. The B1900 has the same one you'd find in a Beech Baron. That could be, but cerainly that scarebus had it. |
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To start, I would have honored the stall indication and used the power and primary control instruments to to fly the jet without airpseed and used the ground speed and wind from the IRUs and GPS to fly a known ground speed that is typical for that altitude. Then I would tell the FO to look up the pitch and throtte setting in the ODM fr our current altitude for level flight. You are a highly skilled aviator with a variety of training and experience. You are the antithesis of the type of pilot the airlines and licensing bodies want. Then why am I not paid more? Ask Dave Behncke. Yea, fuck him I guess we'll agree to disagree on that one. I am assuming ALPA was as corrupt back then as it is now. That may not be a valid assumption. I honestly do not knw the history. |