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This would have been really ugly if it had happened.

Civil Rights Era Secret
Military planned Alabama invasion
Newly obtained documents reveal that the federal government quietly prepared to take over Alabama with thousands of troops in 1963 as violent civil rights resistance loomed.
Sunday, October 24, 2004
By COKE ELLINGTON
For the Mobile Register
MONTGOMERY -- In the weeks before Gov. George Wallace's attempt to block enrollment of two black students at the University of Alabama, the Kennedy administration was poised to send more than 20,000 troops into Alabama if resistance to integration had become more violent, according to declassified documents and interviews with former military and civilian sources.

The contingency plan was drawn up after a University of Mississippi desegregation riot in 1962 and in advance of Wallace's June 1963 stand in the schoolhouse door at Tuscaloosa, Ala.

Dubbed Operation Palm Tree, the plan is outlined in 160 pages of documents obtained from the National Archives under the Freedom of Information Act. The documents detail the number of troops that would have been mobilized, their instructions on use of force, maps showing distances to target areas and even a fill-in-the-blank news release to announce the military operation.
"Civil disturbances beyond the capability of local and State civil authorities to handle are a strong possibility," says an operation plan dated May 31, 1963.

John Seigenthaler, an aide to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in 1961 and 1962, said in a recent telephone interview that the plan, which was never executed, was a direct result of "a major foul up" and extended delays in getting troops to the University of Mississippi riot in 1962.

The attorney general, Seigenthaler said, was determined not to let that happen again.

At that time, Alabama was known for explosive white opposition to integration. A now-declassified military summary of the situation begins, "As of 30 May 1963, the racial situation in Birmingham ... remains relatively quiet." The paragraph ends, "although sporadic bomb threats continue to be received, no actual bombings have been reported since 11 May 1963."

Richard Bene, then an enlisted man at Fort Campbell, Ky., and now a barber in Montgomery, Ala., remembers the era as "the time I almost got to invade Alabama."

The Ole Miss riot started at 7 p.m. on Sept. 30, 1962, and, when it was over, 79 of 127 U.S. deputy marshals were wounded, according to a historical account on the Justice Department's Web site. A company of military police got there shortly before sunrise the next morning, but the Web site says that in the final toll, two people were killed and 166 wounded, including the deputy marshals and others.

"When the University of Alabama came," Seigenthaler said regarding Wallace's stand, "they (administration officials) made absolutely certain that they were on go and ready to go and would go.

"My recollection is that the commitment to have troops ready for Alabama was that in the case that there was a riot, there would be troops immediately available."

He added, "Whether it was overkill, I don't know. I think that it was an effort to make sure you got some troops there when they were needed, if you needed them."

Nicholas Katzenbach, who was deputy attorney general at the time, said in a telephone interview, "They probably were about nine times over-prepared" to avoid a repeat of the Ole Miss problems.

President Kennedy was reluctant to use federal troops in such situations because he remembered from his Senate days the criticism of President Eisenhower over that type of action in Little Rock, Ark., according to J. Mills Thornton III, a University of Michigan history professor and Montgomery native.

The delays at Oxford, "began changing Kennedy's mind," Thornton said.

Katzenbach said there had been concern in the administration that the presence of federal troops could spark a riot in Alabama. "If you put troops in," he asserted, "you have the whole problem of how the hell do you get them out."

The decision to use troops later during the March 1965 Selma voting rights march was easy, he added, because Wallace refused to pay to protect the marchers: "He asked for the troops."

Ed Guthman, Justice Department press secretary when he went to Tuscaloosa for the 1963 integration showdown with Wallace, said that a major operational plan "is counter to my recollection."

He said it took four hours to get troops the 60 miles from Memphis, Tenn., to Oxford, Miss., in 1962. "There was a combat team sitting at Fort Benning (Ga.) in helicopters, and if they were needed at Alabama, they would get there a hell of a lot quicker," said Guthman, who now teaches investigative reporting at the University of Southern California.

Retired Col. David Hackworth, who was in charge of logistics for the Fort Campbell, Ky.-based Task Force Cassidy, recalled in e-mail correspondence the "plans to use city stadiums as containment areas for the unruly." He said the units on alert reported directly to the Department of the Army and were closely monitored by Attorney General Kennedy.

Retired Col. Joe Wilson, then a major in charge of the task force's operations and plans, remembered "a real sensitive operation. The potential of U.S. troops confronting U.S. civilians was very closely watched."

Another retired officer, Col. F.G. "Gil" Stephenson, was a major and assistant plans officer with the 2nd Infantry Division, based at Fort Benning. It sent units to Oxford in 1962 for the riots and later to Fort McClellan in Anniston, Ala., in preparation for a possible action in Alabama. He said the situation was "very tense," and "it wouldn't have taken a hell of a lot more" for the plans to have proceeded.

Wilson, now retired in San Antonio, said he believes "had there been actual confrontation between ... whites and blacks that put U.S. citizens in jeopardy," the plan would have been implemented.

While the plan was called Operation Palm Tree, the declassified documents do not explain the origin of the name. Subordinate parts were named after generals, such as Task Force Cassidy, named for Wilson and Stephenson's commanding general at Fort Campbell, Brig. Gen. Patrick Cassidy. That task force had a minimum strength of 5,891, similar to the size of three other task forces that were part of the operation.

The documents show that a total of 23,400 troops would have been involved. By comparison, Eisenhower had sent 1,000 troops to Little Rock to enforce school desegregation in September 1957.

"They wouldn't have sent 23,000 troops in there at once," said Seigenthaler, who had worked for Robert Kennedy before 1963.

A contingent from Fort Campbell went to Fort McClellan to prepare to put the plan into action, Wilson recalled.

Military documents describe a federal judge's refusal to de lay the admission of black students to University of Alabama campuses in Tuscaloosa and Huntsville, followed by an outline of Wallace's plan to prevent their enrollment.

The papers summarize: "There are three main groups in the objective areas that could be expected to be most active in opposing friendly forces: Knights of the KKK, The National States Rights Party, and the Volunteers for Alabama and Wallace."

Although none of the groups was credited with gathering more than 300 people, the memo adds that "inactive elements, splinter groups and sympathizers could increase the size of these elements."

Retired Col. Wilson recalls having gone to Little Rock as an observer and to Selma, site of civil rights demonstrations, to perform reconnaissance.

Asked what precedents existed, other than perhaps Mississippi and Arkansas, retired Col. Stephenson said: "I think there were not any, and that's the problem. What we were, a combat division ... doing things we never anticipated getting involved in. ... We were playing it by ear, almost all the way. That means from the division commander on down."

Now retired in Midland, Ga., Stephenson remembered Katzenbach -- "a rumpled-looking fellow" -- at "a discussion on that subject in Birmingham." He said the discussion "involved the legal ramifications and constitutional basis."

Katzenbach said the justification was "the statute which says that you can use troops when a state is unwilling or unable to enforce the law ... maintain peace and order."

As for precedents beyond Little Rock and Oxford, "that was about all you had. I can't think what else you could have."

One of the documents describing the 1963 situation in Alabama says, "Local hostile forces are considered to have the capability of ... causing possible disruption of communications, intercepting friendly radio nets, and tapping friendly wire circuits."

If the plan had been implemented, a May 12 message says, the priority on application of force would have been as follows:

"Unloaded rifles with bayonet fixed with scabbard on bayonet.

"Unloaded rifles with bare bayonet fixed.

"Tear gas (CS and CN)."

CS, o-cholorobenzylidene malononitrile, is said to be a stronger tear gas, while CN, chloroacetophenone is longer-lasting.

"Loaded rifles with bare bayonet fixed."

Wilson remembered, "The control of ammunition was a major concern."

Operation Palm Tree called for troops to move into Birmingham, Tuscaloosa and Huntsville.

A proposed government news release, according to a June 4, 1963, document, would have stated:

"The Department of Defense at (time) today, ordered the Army to move a )))))-man task force to ))))))))))))))))), prepared to assist Federal marshals to enforce Federal court orders in )))))))))))) if the President decides to use Federal troops for that purpose.

"In addition, the ))))) Engineer Battalion (Reinforced), from )))))), has been ordered to provide logistical support ...

"Commander of the task force is ...

"In the event the President orders the Army to assist the Federal Marshals in enforcing the court orders ....

"The court orders involved are as follows ..."

The documents included Operation Plan 3-63, dated June 6, 1963, with a drawing of a palm tree on the cover. It orders:

"Weapons other than individual arms will not be utilized in this operation nor displayed during movement to objective areas.

"Equipment will accompany units when they depart Field Training Sites. Items of heavy equipment, i.e. artillery pieces, will be dropped en route at appropriate points within the State of Alabama without major deviation from shortest route to objective areas."

Looking back more than 40 years, Wilson said, "Bobby Kennedy was running the show" and "it was a puzzling time in the Army's history."

Stephenson recalled "going night and day on three or four hours of sleep a night. And as I recall, we must have been up there around two weeks, at least two weeks, at Fort McClellan. Exactly how long we were there, and when we came back, that is beyond my recollection."

About the author: Coke Ellington is a longtime former newspaperman in Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina, with a career dating to 1962. After 13 years at the Montgomery Advertiser, he began teaching journalism at Alabama State University in Montgomery seven years ago

I really wonder where something like this would have gone. Could the govenor have commanded the National guard to oppose the Fed forces? Would the public have risen up? Could this have kicked off a second civil war?

Neat things to ponder. The weaponry and training of the US army at the time would not have been as hard to deal with as today.

Quoted: Quoted: I really wonder where something like this would have gone. Could the govenor have commanded the National guard to oppose the Fed forces?No. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution places sole control of the state militias (when called into federal service) in the hands of the President. Would the public have risen up? who knows Could this have kicked off a second civil war? Highly doubtful, but possible. Neat things to ponder. The weaponry and training of the US army at the time would not have been as hard to deal with as today.

During those times i have to wonder if the Guard units here would have followed the orders of the fed government. Those were VERY different times in the south.

i think wallace would have mobilised the cub scouts if he needed to.

I don't think something like that would have gone unanswered in those days.

just how far do you think the feds would have gone IF the AL NG had opened fire on them? What implecations would this have had for the state?

mike

this is NOT a football thread.

To say the AL natl guard would have followed FEDERAL orders in those days shows a COMPLETE lack of understanding of events during those days.

i think there would have been a VERY serious mutiny within the al natl guard. Would they have fired, i don't know. I do think Wallace would have pushed the button if provoked to that point. I also think the first fed troops in would have found a serious force confronting them.

Say what you will about Wallace but he was no pussy. He enjoyed antagonising the fed gov and i do think he would have issued the orders.

mike

Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: I thought the Posse Comitatus Act prevented the use of US troops against US civilians.  Only National Guard under the command of a state governor could intervene in such rioting. BUT THEN WHO SAID THE US GOVERNMENT OBEYS THE CONSTITUTION OR THEIR OWN LAWS FOR THAT MATTER!  NOW DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE BATTLE FOR STATES RIGHTS IN THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES! Federal troops are expressly exempt from the Posse Comitatus Act when called to suppress domestic violence. The President is also authorized to waive the Act during a state of emergency. This is true. Here is another one for your tin foilers. One of the Army's infantry units trains for riot suppression and crowd control in the Nation's Capital.  Don your AFDB and return to the shelter. As for the actual deployment of troops to AL, I'd have to agree with its intent. Sometimes the greater good requires a strong hand. If you think that racism and separatism are good things and should still be around, then you're out of your freaking mind. Wallace was a madman and ranks right up there with David Duke on the racism scale. Both are domestic terrorists in my mind and should be(or should've been) dealt with just like the oath states.....against all enemies both foreign and domestic.

Wallace was not a madman and was cetranly NOT in the same league as david duke. He was a politician that favored segrgation <as did the majority of the votng public here at the time>. As i recall he was also a staunch states rights advocate and felt the federal government was overstepping it's constitutional authority. <this is not a discussion of right or wrong>. Wallace was wrong. Wallace also came DAMN close to getting in the whitehouse.

For the record I have several family members that new him personally. My uncle served as warden to hollman prison and worked directly with him regarding corrections and security issues. I was able to meet him on a couple of occasions but i was very young and don't remember much about it.

One thing i will say is that he was a VERY strong willed individual. He had no problem using force to get his way and he had a VERY strong support base here.

mike