Posted: 5/4/2004 11:42:15 AM EDT
Got this E-mail first Security Alert April 30, 2004
The Transportation Security Administration has identified United Airlines flight 200, from
Los Angeles to Washington-Dulles as a “flight of interest”.
Passengers are being subjected to secondary screening at the boarding gate for this flight
by a team of TSA employees. Passengers’ bags are also being sniffed by bomb-sniffing dogs
prior to being loaded in the baggage compartment and additional security measures are
being applied. The TSA refuses to provide the reason for such overwhelming security
applied to this flight to the flight crew responsible for the flight’s safety.
Of greater concern is that all flight and cabin crewmembers are being directed to empty
their personal belongings, pockets and bags for additional inspection. While passengers
are being inspected at random, ALL flight crew are being subjected to additional wanding
and rifling of their bags in front of their passengers. It is unclear what TSA’s response
will be if the crew simply declines the additional inspection.
Additionally, the pilot conducting the exterior preflight inspection is being “shadowed”
by an average TSA screener as he inspects the aircraft. It is unclear if the screener is
cleared for access to the ramp or has training in the myriad hazards associated with close
aircraft operations on the ramp. It is also unclear if this is an attempt by the TSA to
begin targeting flight crews for special screening in general, or if intelligence suggests
terrorist imposters are trying to infiltrate legitimate flight crew. In either case, APSA
considers TSA’s action completely unacceptable.
It should be obvious that a weapon is superfluous to any pilot in gaining control of an
airliner, since the pilot is granted such control by definition. Additionally, there
exists a foolproof crewmember identification system to verify the flight and cabin crew
members assigned to a flight. The system is undefeatable. Finally, it is absolutely
impossible to spend even five minutes prior to flight with an “imposter” crewmember, since
the imposter’s complete lack of knowledge and familiarity with proper airline procedures,
responses and protocols would be immediately obvious.
We are also very concerned that numerous Federal Aviation Regulations specifically require
the Pilot In Command be provided all available information which may threaten the safety
of the flight, in order to exercise his responsibility to ensure the passengers’ and the
flight’s safety. Without information on the specific nature of a terrorist threat, it is
virtually impossible for the pilot to make this assessment. TSA’s refusal to provide the
pilot in command with specific information concerning the nature of an obvious security
concern may not only interfere with the pilot in command’s role as the Inflight Security
Coordinator, it may actually cause the pilot to violate federal law and to subject the air
carrier to essentially boundless civil liability should the pilot elect to conduct the
flight, especially should something go wrong. The air carrier, too, should evaluate
whether the flight should be conducted.
CITE:
91.103 Preflight action. Each pilot in command shall, before beginning a flight, become familiar with all available
information concerning that flight.
“Special FAR No. 60 - Each person shall, before conducting any operation under the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR chapter I), be familiar with all available information
concerning that operation;” and,
“FAR 121.551 Restriction or suspension of operation: Domestic and flag operations. When a certificate holder conducting domestic or flag operations knows of conditions,
including airport and runway conditions, that are a hazard to safe operations, it shall
restrict or suspend operations until those conditions are corrected.”
Our last item of concern is simply for the fitness of the pilots and cabin crews to
conduct the flight. Numerous crews have reported the very real stress and frustration
associated with being singled out for excessive forced inspection without cause or reason
has caused them to have serious concerns as to whether they are safe to fly. We worry a
pilot who is additionally burdened with the prospect of possibly being coerced to violate
federal aviation regulations, may be distracted from performing his duties in the safe
manner required by law.
We have made every attempt to be accurate, but inaccuracies in this information may exist.
This information should not be construed as legal advice.
But, we urge all flight crews to carefully evaluate the situation and to use good judgment
as to the safest course of action, should you encounter this event.
Other regulations of interest are attached which may be freely copied should you wish to
share them with the TSA if you are denied information about a manifest threat to your
flight.
Federal Aviation Regulations Relating to Information Required by Pilot In Command
91.3 - Pilot in command means the person who: (1) Has final authority and responsibility for the operation and safety of the flight;
91.103 - Preflight action. Each pilot in command shall, before beginning a flight, become familiar with all available
information concerning that flight.
121.627 Continuing flight in unsafe conditions. (a) No pilot in command may allow a flight to continue toward any airport to which it
has been dispatched or released if, in the opinion of the pilot in command or dispatcher
(domestic and flag operations only), the flight cannot be completed safely;
FAR 135.69 requires that the operator restrict or suspend operations when either the pilot
in command (PIC) or the operator becomes aware of a hazardous condition.
91.7 Civil aircraft airworthiness. (a) No person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition. (b) The pilot in command of a civil aircraft is responsible for determining whether
that aircraft is in condition for safe flight.
SFAR No. 60 - Each person shall, before conducting any operation under the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR chapter I), be familiar with all available information
concerning that operation
121.533 Responsibility for operational control: Domestic operations. (c) The aircraft dispatcher is responsible for - (3) Canceling or redispatching a flight if, in his opinion or the opinion of the pilot in
command, the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or released. (c) Each pilot in command of an aircraft is, during flight time, in command of the
aircraft and crew and is responsible for the safety of the passengers, crewmembers, cargo,
and airplane.
§ 121.551 Restriction or suspension of operation: Domestic and flag operations. When a certificate holder conducting domestic or flag operations knows of conditions,
including airport and runway conditions, that are a hazard to safe operations, it shall
restrict or suspend operations until those conditions are corrected.
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It was followed by this E-mail this morning: Urgent Request from the Airline Pilots Security Alliance
The Washington Times reports today that United Airlines flight 200 (LAX-IAD) is designated a "flight of interest" by TSA and unusual security is being applied to the flight.
The Department of Homland Security is denying the story is true.
If you are a crewmember who has personally witnessed increased security on this flight OR if you are in possession of an original copy of a crew email issued by United Airlines to its crews about such increased security, please email
[email protected] immediately.
We would also appreciate a copy of the UAL crew email or a screenshot of it [(ALT-PRTSCRN) then paste into a Word document] with all headers in place.
Of course, we will never release the identity of anyone who responds without your permission.
Thanks.
David Mackett President, Airline Pilots Security Alliance"
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Is it normal for the Feds to not tell the flight crew they might be in danger? Are they afraid that the pilots won't fly and they will lose a chance to trap potential terrorists?
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