This is perfect. Email everyone with an OA lower the PDF and we can just write in our own serial#

Couldn't be easier, ey.

That certificate also came with a receipt from OA showing I bought it.

You bought it from Olympic Arms?
If not what's the receipt worth?
I bought mine in a private sale from some guy in Illinois.

The more I'm reading on this the less I believe I need this kind of documentation.

See my post about  the prebans being sold at Delta Arsenals auction.
No mention of such documentation.

Yowza, no wondering I'm getting requests on date of manufacture for Chinese M14 rifles.  The numbers stamped on the receiver left side under the stock is the factory production / date code.  I have a data base of Chinese M14 serial numbers with the accompanying factory production / date codes.  The factory date code identifies the year and month of manufacture but it is not easily deduced.  I have never been an employee of State Arsenal 356 or any importer so I don't know how good my "said so" regarding date of manufacture is with CT DPS.  If you want to know when your Chinese M14 was made, send me an e-mail.  Ultimately, the BATF(E) has the ATF Form 6 records that prove when the various importers brought these rifles into the US.

FWIW, the U. S. Department of State issued a dispatch dated May 30, 1994 that specifically banned further importation of Chinese firearms and ammunition.  I have the dispatch reproduced in a .pdf file if anyone needs it.  E-mail me at [email protected]  I delete your e-mail upon reply.

Wish I could do more to help but agreed, the May 1994 ban should be sufficient proof of pre-Sep 94 status.  FWIW, the "newest" batch of Chinese M14 rifles imported into the United States were manufactured in December 1993 according to the information I have.

So all Norinco AK's are prebans including Mak,and Bwk's?

I got 3 of these for the rifles. I think Colt charges $35 bucks for a letter for my preban pistol (threaded barrel = assault weapon pistol)

i thought MAK90 chinese rifles were imported after 94?

as well as the norinco 320s (uzi clones)

I don't know the answer to that question.  My area of study is the M14 so I can only speak to the history of that firearm.  Here is the direct link to the US Department of State dispatch dated May 30, 1994 banning the importation of Chinese firearms and ammunition (I recommend keeping this link cold): http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1994/html/Dispatchv5no22.html

Not a rifle but just got my paperwork from Ruger for my MKII that has a threaded barrel stating it manufacture date of 1990 Go to the Ruger Records Department page print and fill out page for rifles and pistols then mail out 10 bucks per request to :
Ruger Records Department
411 Sunapee Street
Newport, New Hampshire? 03773

So an olympic target style .22 with a mag outside the grip does not have to be registered as long as it was make before 9/94 correct?  (walther GSP is the pistol in question)

Correct

Also , Olympic style pistols are exempted


Now to get the ruger 22/45 lite and M&P 22 recognized by the Olympics lol

Incorrect. Olympic type pistols that are assault weapons by features must still be registered but may be transferred pursuant to regulations to be promulgated by the DESPP.

Cite as B-West Imports, Inc., v. U.S., 75 F.3d 633 (Fed.Cir. 1996)

  B-WEST IMPORTS, INC. and HING LONG TRADING CO., Plaintiffs,

                              and

K-SPORTS IMPORTS, INC., CENTURY ARMS, INC., INTRAC CORPORATION,
NORTHWEST IMPORTS, J'S PACIFIC ENTERPRISE, INC. and SPORTARMS OF
FLORIDA, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                              v.

THE UNITED STATES,Warren Christopher, SECRETARY OF STATE, Robert E.
Rubin, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, George Wiese, COMMISSIONER
OF THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE, Karen J. Hiatt, ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE, Defendants-
Appellees.

    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

                            95-1326

    Appealed from: United States Court of International Trade
Judge Restani

                   DECIDED: January 25, 1996

    Donald R. Dinan, O'Connor & Hannan, Washington, D.C., argued
for plaintiffs-appellants. With him on the brief were William W.
Nickerson and Craig A. Koenigs.

    Jeffrey M. Telep, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., argued for
defendants-appellees. With him on the brief were Frank W. Hunger,
Assistant Attorney General and David M. Cohen, Director. Of counsel
were Imelda Koett and J. Harold Rees, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms, Department of Treasury. Also of counsel was Orde Kittrie,
Political-Military Affairs, Office of the Legal Advisor, United
States Department of State and Ellen McClain, Office of Chief
Counsel, United States Customs Service.

    Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges.

    BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

    The dispute in this case arises out of a ban on the
importation of arms from the People's Republic of China declared by
the President and instituted under the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA), 22 U.S.C. section 2778. The appellants, companies engaged
in the business of importing arms from China, filed suit in the
Court of International Trade challenging the ban on statutory,
regulatory, and constitutional grounds. The court rejected all of
the appellants' claims and dismissed their complaint. B-West
Imports, Inc. v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 853 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1995). We affirm.

                               I

    On May 26, 1994, President Clinton announced the renewal of
Most Favored Nation trading status for the People's Republic of
China. At the same time, however, in light of "continuing human
rights abuses" in China, he announced certain trading sanctions
against that country. One of the sanctions was a ban on the
importation of munitions from China.

    China is one of the countries on the State Department's
"proscribed list," a list of countries as to which it is "the
policy of the United States to deny licenses and other approvals"
for the importation of munitions. 27 C.F.R. section 47.52; 22
C.F.R. section  126.1(a). Although China's status on the proscribed
list has varied through the years, it has been explicitly listed
since 1993 as one of the countries with which the United States
maintains an arms embargo. 22 C.F.R. section 126.1(a). Arms may not
be imported from any country on the proscribed list, including
countries with which the United States maintains an arms embargo,
absent a special exception or suspension of the regulation by the
Office of Defense Trade Controls in the Department of State. 22
C.F.R. sections 126.1(a), 126.2, 126.3, 127.1(a)(2).

    Prior to 1994, China was exempted from the effects of its
inclusion on the proscribed list, which meant that for as long as
the exemption was in effect, arms could be imported from China by
licensed importers who obtained import permits. On May 28, 1994,
however, two days after the President announced the arms embargo
against China, the Secretary of State advised the Secretary of the
Treasury that China's exemption from the proscribed list was
terminated "effective immediately on the basis of U.S. foreign
policy." In light of the decision to revoke China's exemption from
the proscribed list, the Secretary of State requested the Secretary
of the Treasury to "take all necessary steps to prohibit the import
of all defense articles enumerated in the U.S. Munitions List."

    The two Treasury Department agencies principally responsible
for administering and enforcing arms import regulations -- the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) and the Customs
Service --thereafter embarked on a series of steps to implement the
Chinese arms embargo. Immediately after the President announced the
embargo, the Customs Service directed that all shipments of arms
from China be detained. Customs subsequently advised its field
agents that the embargo was effective as of May 28, 1994, and that
all permits for importing arms from China had been rendered null
and void. On June 27, 1994, BATF advised companies holding permits
to import munitions from China that the embargo became effective on
May 28 and that their permits were revoked as of that date.
Congress subsequently enacted legislation that ameliorated the
effect of the ban by providing that it would not be enforced with
respect to shipments that, as of May 26, 1994, were in a bonded
warehouse or foreign trade zone, in port, or in transit to the
United States. See Pub. L. No. 103-317, section 609, 108 Stat.
1724, 1774 (1994).

    The appellants challenged the government's actions in the
Court of International Trade. They argued that the AECA does not
authorize the President or his delegates to impose an arms embargo;
that BATF exceeded its authority when it purported to revoke the
appellants' permits; that the Customs Service exceeded its
authority in detaining goods for which the appellants held validly
issued import permits and in declaring the permits null and void;
and that the revocation of the permits violated the Due Process and
Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

    In a comprehensive opinion, the Court of International Trade
granted the government's motion for summary judgment, denied the
appellants' motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the
complaint. The court first found that the AECA authorized the
President to order a ban on the importation of arms from China. The
statutory grant of authority to "control" arms imports, the court
held, encompasses the authority to prohibit such imports altogether
in appropriate circumstances.

    The court also rejected the appellants' argument that the
Customs Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms had
acted unlawfully in implementing the arms embargo. Once the
President and the Secretary of State made the determination to ban
the importation of arms, the court held, BATF was authorized to
implement the ban by withholding regulatory approval to import
particular arms shipments. That power, the court explained,
included the authority to revoke any import permits and licenses of
persons seeking to import arms covered by the ban. The court also
found that the Customs Service did not act unlawfully by detaining
shipments of arms from China following the announcement of the
embargo. When China's exemption from the list of proscribed
countries was terminated, the importation of arms from China became
unlawful, the court explained, and Customs was therefore entitled
to rely on its broad general authority to detain goods whose
importation is unlawful.

    Finally, the court rejected the appellants' constitutional
claims under the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment. The court found that there was no statute or regulation
that accorded the appellants a property right to import arms into
this country from China. Accordingly, the court concluded that the
premise of their due process argument -- that property was taken
from them without due process of law -- was unfounded. Exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over the appellants' taking claim, see 28
U.S.C. section 1367(a) (made applicable to the Court of
International Trade by 28 U.S.C. section 1585), the court found
that the revocation of the appellants' import permits did not
effect a taking of their property for which the government must pay
compensation. The court held that the statutes and regulations
governing the importation of arms made it clear that the right to
import arms from overseas is subject to such extensive control that
the denial or revocation of an import permit cannot be regarded as
a taking of property within the meaning of the Takings Clause.

                              II

    In this court, the appellants renew their argument that the
AECA does not authorize an arms embargo. Although section 38 of the
Act, 22 U.S.C. section 2778, grants the President the authority to
"control" arms imports, the appellants argue that the term
"control" limits the President to creating and operating a
licensing system for arms importation, and does not allow the
President to ban the importation of arms for which import permits
have been granted.

    The appellants' statutory argument is unconvincing. They
concede that the term "control" is broad enough to allow the
President to ban imports by denying licenses or permits for future
imports. Their contention is thus limited to the assertion that
"control" does not include the right to revoke licenses and permits
after they are granted. But if the term "control" includes the
power to prohibit, as the appellants concede it does, we are unable
to discern any basis for construing the statute to convey the power
to deny permits and licenses in advance, but to withhold the power
to revoke them once they have been issued.

    The appellants have pointed to nothing in the language or the
legislative history of the AECA that supports their restrictive
interpretation of the statute. The ordinary meaning of the term
"control" is to "regulate," to "exercise restraining or directing
influence over," or to "curb," Webster's New International
Dictionary 580 (2d ed. 1955), and the authority to regulate is
normally understood to include the authority to prohibit. Moreover,
the appellants' narrow construction of the term "control" is
contrary to the principle that statutes granting the President
authority to act in matters touching on foreign affairs are to be
broadly construed. Our predecessor court put that point well in
South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334
F.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965):

    In the external sector of the national life, Congress does not
ordinarily bind the President's hands so tightly that he cannot
respond promptly to changing conditions or the fluctuating demands
of foreign policy. Accordingly, when Congress uses far-reaching
words in delegating authority to the President in the area of
foreign relations, courts must assume, unless there is a specific
contrary showing elsewhere in the statute or in the legislative
history, that the legislators contemplate that the President may
and will make full use of that power in any manner not inconsistent
with the provisions or purposes of the Act. In a statute dealing
with foreign affairs, a grant to the President which is expansive
to the reader's eye should not be hemmed in or "cabined, cribbed,
confined" by anxious judicial blinders.



    As the court noted in South Puerto Rico Sugar Co., Presidents
acting under broad statutory grants of authority have "imposed and
lifted embargoes, prohibited and allowed exports, suspended and
resumed commercial intercourse with foreign countries." 334 F.2d at
633. Thus, the broad statutory delegation in the AECA incorporates
"the historical authority of the President in the fields of foreign
commerce and of importation into the country." Id. at 634. We
therefore agree with the Court of International Trade that the AECA
authorizes the President not only to regulate arms importation
through a licensing system, but also to prohibit particular
importations altogether when the circumstances warrant.

                              III

    The appellants also renew their contention that, even if the
AECA authorizes the President to declare an arms embargo, the
agencies that implemented the embargo -- the Customs Service and
BATF -- did not act lawfully in this case. Once again, we agree
with the Court of International Trade, which held that the agencies
did not exceed their lawful authority in putting the embargo into
effect.

    The actions taken by the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of the Treasury under the AECA were authorized by Executive Order
11958, which delegates the President's "control" authority under
section 38 of the AECA to the Secretary of the Treasury, guided by
the views of the Secretary of State on matters affecting the
foreign policy of the United States. State Department regulations
further provide that "any license or other approval or exemption
granted [for arms transactions involving countries on the
proscribed list] may be revoked, suspended, or amended without
notice whenever . . . the Department of State deems such action to
be in furtherance of . . . the foreign policy of the United States,
or is otherwise advisable." 22 C.F.R. section 126.7(a). The
appellants are therefore incorrect in contending that they were
entitled to continue importing munitions from China, pursuant to
their previously issued permits, after the embargo became
effective. The revocation of their permits was authorized not only
by the broad authority granted under the AECA and delegated to the
Treasury Department, but also by the regulation that specifically
authorizes the revocation, without notice, of permits for importing
goods from "proscribed list" countries.

    The appellants contend that the Customs Service had no lawful
right to detain arms shipments from China that were supported by
import permits, even after the declaration of the import ban. But
a Treasury Department regulation notes that it is "the policy of
the United States to deny licenses and other approvals" to import
munitions from countries on the proscribed list, including
countries "with respect to which the United States maintains an
arms embargo." 27 C.F.R. section 47.52. A related regulation, 27
C.F.R. section 47.56(a), provides that officers of the Customs
Service are authorized "to take appropriate action to assure
compliance with [the Treasury Department regulations] as to the
importation or attempted importation of [munitions], whether or not
authorized by permit." 27 C.F.R. section 47.56(a). Following the
declaration of the Chinese arms embargo and the cancellation of
China's exemption from the proscribed list, Customs was therefore
authorized to take steps to ensure that goods falling within the
scope of the embargo were not admitted into the United States,
regardless of whether the goods were supported by an import permit.

    The appellants make much of the fact that, in a June 7, 1994,
directive, the Customs Service advised its field offices that BATF
was not processing any applications for permits to import arms from
China and that "all current permits to import articles from China
are null and void." The appellants argue that Customs has no
authority to revoke permits and that its June 7 directive was
therefore ultra vires. We do not interpret the June 7 directive as
an announcement that Customs had revoked the appellants' permits,
but rather as Customs' statement of its view that the permits were
effectively voided by the implementation of the embargo, a view
that was corroborated when BATF subsequently advised importers that
all permits for importing munitions from China were revoked as of
May 28, 1994. The June 7 directive therefore did not constitute an
administrative action for which Customs had no statutory or
regulatory authority.

    The appellants next challenge BATF's June 27 announcement
revoking the importers' outstanding permits for importing arms from
China. The appellants contend that BATF's own regulations
prohibited it from revoking the importers' permits once they were
granted.

    The BATF regulation that applies generally to permits to
import munitions provides that import permits may be revoked
without notice at any time. 27 C.F.R. section 47.44(a). While the
particular kinds of munitions the appellants were seeking to import
are governed by a separate regulation, 27 C.F.R. section  178.112,
nothing in that regulation evidences an intention to depart from
the rule set forth in the general BATF regulation giving the agency
broad authority to revoke arms importation permits.

    Section 178.112(a) provides that arms of the type at issue in
this case may not be imported without BATF's authorization.
Although a valid, unrevoked permit constitutes authorization for
purposes of section 178.112(a), the regulation does not state or
imply that the authorization, once granted, becomes irrevocable.
Nor is there any reason to believe that the drafters of the BATF
regulations intended to create irrevocable permits for the
particular class of munitions covered by section 178, while
providing that permits for the general class of munitions covered
by section 47.44 could be freely revoked at any time. Moreover,
interpreting section 178.112(a) to deny BATF the right to revoke
permits after their issuance would be perverse, as it would be
contrary to other regulations governing arms imports, which make
clear that munitions may be excluded whenever a ban on arms imports
is declared for foreign policy reasons, even after the importer has
obtained a permit. See 22 C.F.R. section 126.7(a); 27 C.F.R.
section 47.56(a). We therefore conclude that after China's
exemption from the proscribed list was canceled, BATF was
authorized to withdraw its prior approval for the importation of
arms from China and to announce to the importers that their permits
had been revoked.

                              IV

    Finally, the appellants challenge the government's actions as
violative of the Takings and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment. In the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457
(1870), the Supreme Court rejected just such an argument, noting
that an embargo would not give rise to a compensable taking or a
valid due process claim:

    A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably
    bring upon individuals great losses; may, indeed, render
    valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth
    of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a
    tariff could not be changed, or a non-intercourse act, or an
    embargo be enacted, or a war be declared. . . . [W]as it ever
    imagined this was taking private property without compensation
    or without due process of law?

Id. at 551. While it is true that takings law has changed
significantly since 1870, the principles that the Supreme Court
articulated in the Legal Tender Cases have remained valid, see
Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 896-98 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
particularly as they apply to governmental actions in the sphere of
foreign relations.

    For example, in Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F.3d
212 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2100 (1994), this
court rejected a takings claim virtually identical to the one the
appellants have raised here. In Mitchell Arms, BATF revoked the
plaintiff's import permits for certain assault rifles, which
resulted in the plaintiff's losing the opportunity to sell the arms
under an already existing contract. The court held that BATF's
revocation of import permits for firearms did not effect a taking.
The court noted that the business of importing weapons is "subject
to pervasive Government control," and that as a result, "Mitchell's
expectation of selling the assault rifles in the United States --
which expectation necessarily flowed from the ATF permits -- could
not be said to be a property right protected under the Fifth
Amendment." 7 F.3d at 216. Because "Mitchell's ability to import
the rifles and sell them in the United States was at all times
entirely subject to the exercise of ATF's regulatory power,"
Mitchell did not acquire a sufficient interest in the permits to
prohibit the government from revoking them without paying
compensation. See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674
n.6 (1981) (because of President's "authority to prevent or
condition" pre-judgment attachments against Iranian assets,
American company "did not acquire any 'property' interest in its
attachments of the sort that would support a constitutional claim
for compensation" after those attachments were nullified).

    The same principle is directly applicable here. While an
individual who obtains a permit to import arms may make commitments
in the arms market on the assumption that the permit will not be
revoked before the importation is completed, that assumption does
not constitute a "reasonable investment backed expectation[]" of
the type necessary to support a takings claim. See Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). That is particularly true
with respect to importations of arms from a country with which the
United States has an arms embargo that is subject to an exemption
that could be terminated at any time. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v.
United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

    The appellants' due process claim fares no better. They assert
that the implementation of the Chinese arms embargo deprived them
of property without due process of law by denying them the
opportunity to sell in the United States the munitions for which
they had obtained permits prior to the announcement of the embargo.
As we have discussed, however, the appellants' right to import and
sell Chinese arms in the United States was subject at all times to
the hazard that their permits would be revoked, pursuant to statute
and regulation, on foreign policy grounds or for other reasons. The
Due Process Clause does not require the government to stand as a
surety against the adverse consequences sometimes suffered by
persons who knowingly undertake that kind of commercial risk.

    AFFIRMED.

so after reading that legal shit,


all chinese guns came in before sept94?

This law and everything about it just made me giggle like a little girl. I must need sleep...

ok, so are we still talking only Chinese ak in .223/5.56 legal to purchase or all calibers?