I've never seen something mangle brass and ammo the same way a SAW can.

The SAW tends to suffer from the same fate as the M9.  The guns will work when maintained and through their service life but units tend to either not maintain them or try to keep them chugging along much longer than they should. As a result Joe gets a negative opinion on the gun due to only experiencing a clapped out weapon.

Over the span of a career I saw many, many small arms abused way past the point of reasonable rebuild.

I've been in a few units where the receivers were demilled (band-sawed or torched) and replaced with brand-new.

The results are remarkable.

I saw eight supposedly overhauled M60 machineguns choke after firing less than a belt, each -- and two MAG-58s (before we had M240s) shoot the ammo allocation (a pallet) for all ten weapons without so much as a stutter.

I've seen brand-new 249s and M60A4 light machineguns chatter away like they should.

So yes, if your service or program doesn't understand end-of-life when it comes to things mechanical (like wings and fuselages breaking while in-flight, let alone small arms) you create a vicious circle where things go bad and troops lose faith in their intimate individual and crew weapons.

The M60 was the most shockingly bad weapon I ever saw in use.  It rattled, parts slop was so huge you could see the parts move inside it when you shook it.  I only ran one stateside, but it never ran more than 10 rounds between failure.  19 year old me assumed all of them were like that.  


Seeing new ones in foreign mil units OCONUS was surprising.  They ran perfectly.  They were reliable.  They were also made in the last decade...not 1960s guns.  

I disagree with that if the suppressing fire is accurate enough to do its job.  You fucking know when rounds start snapping past you regardless of what noise is or isn't happening at the muzzle.

That was my experience too. As a bit marine at school of infantry we used M60s, can't remember which model, all I know is they were terrible.  Shoot two to five rounds and jam.  It rattled when shook like an old 1911a1. Once I hit the fleet we no longer had M60s as they were getting replaced by the M240s, pintle, coax, and for the scouts. They ran, like the SAWs, incredibly smooth.  This was between 93 and 97 so the SAWs were still fresh, some brand new as the 240s.

That will likely change as China continues to modernize its forces. QBZ-191 replacing the QBZ-95 for ground forces. The QJS-161 or QJB-201 (belt fed disintegrating link with box magazine fed capability) replacing the QJB-95 for machine gunner and the QBU-191 replacing the QBU-88 for the Sharpshooter.

QJS-201/QJB-201????(1/3)
?????,????????????? pic.twitter.com/iGRTU9EX8T

— ??\uD83C\uDF4A (@KushigumoAkane) October 1, 2021

Edit to add pic of QJB-95 LSW drum -

Great pics, thank you.

The Soviets had what, entire battalions of submachinegunners in the 2nd WW?  The Marines are finally adopting Soviet tactics?  

That tactic can make sense if you’re fighting in a rubbled city, but I thought the Marines were going to be taking over islands and PRISMing CHICOM ships in the next scrap? While jungle is a thing, there are certainly wide open spaces on some of these islands.

Probably one of the best vids I've ever seen of an auto-rifle in support-by-fire role:

I don't think they miss them right now, but the next time they find themselves wanting to suppress an area target they sure as hell will.  

I understand the philosophy of "suppression by accuracy", but sometimes you've got to lay down a blanket of misery.

You should see Iwo Jiwa now

Taking a close look at those, the designs make sense and the caliber choices make sense.

The Chinese have been unfucking themselves while we have been promoting trannies to command positions.

It's concerning.

I agree. As an outsider looking at it all, I have two thoughts. One being similar to Miles_Urbanus; a simple change in the interim until adoption of a new modernized belt fed LMG.



I sorta remember the old USMC video where I believe it was a Gunnery Sergeant (I think) talking about drum mags for the M27 IAR, specifically showcasing the Magpul D60. So it seems like the USMC thought process is trying to match what they think is the next near-peer conflict and integrate new technologies and small equipment (like drones) to fill in capability gaps.

The second thought being simply bad timing or wrong assumption. Assumption is that the near peer adversaries don't utilize LMGs in their squad composition, opting for LSWs with drum mags. China opting for drum mag QJB-95 and Russia doesn't appear to be fielding RPDs anymore, opting for RPK-74s and even the new RPK-16 (not fielded as far as I can tell) utilizing drum mags and supplementing with GPMGs (PKMs or PKPs, etc.) and the assumption that most conflicts will be centered around dense/compacted urban environments with narrow streets (like the streets of Taiwan) so mobility takes precedence.

Where I see bad timing is basically the USMC didn't anticipate (wild speculation) that the Chinese PLA would begin to shift more towards a western military style squad composition in terms of equipment. China replacing drums with belt fed LMG, still keeping GPMGs (assuming on a platoon level) but changing caliber 7.62x51, shifting to conventional layout assault rifles, etc. Something that I've noticed that modularity seems to be the in thing with them as well. It's like they've also been data mining/studying civilian American gun trends, example being going with MLOK (or MLOK lookalike, which is something that even Russia didn't really do with the RATNIK program, AK12/15/19, RPK16, etc.) rather than sticking with picatinny like the M27. A good example of this is the QBU-191 their "sharpshooter/designated marksman" rifle with a MLOK tubular style free float handguard. The role seems to be similar to a SDM-R, SAM-R, MK12 SPR.

QBU-191 Rifle in the back of this image.


Anyways, I think that eventually the USMC will reassess the threat if China is the next neer peer adversary conflict and Taiwan as the battlegrounds. Just looking at a map of Taiwan and Google Street view, in order to get to the more populated areas from the eastern half of the island, people would have to travel through mountainous terrain with thick vegetation. As far as I know, thick vegetation is great concealment against drone surveillance and ambush points along these roads can easily be set up. An example below is around the roads around the hospital on the outskirts of Taichung City.

https://www.google.com/maps/@24.1967577,120.7231221,3a,90y,141.72h,83t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1swnoInvPIcIOLLkCSLy0VCQ!2e0!7i16384!8i8192!5m1!1e4?entry=ttu




Anyways, a video below of the QJB201 in 5.8 with field strip and firing via box mag feeding.

First off, I was AF, and held/fired an M16 every 2 years. I have NO concept of field operations except what I watched/read. But if you're squad/platoon/company is trying to cross open ground under fire, wouldn't you WANT a belt fed to suppress the enemy?

Hold my vodka comrade!

That’s what I was taught. Move under lead so the other guys can’t shoot you.

Maneuver is equally, if not more, important than suppressing fire. Volume of inaccurate fire doesn't suppress a capable enemy, only accurate fire.

At this point, I would argue that the optic is more important than the automatic rifle. 87% of SAWs I came across back in the day were open sight, or 1st gen out of date 90s tech.

The new buzzword -- China is our most dangerous "Pacing Threat."

They have studied and dissected the American Brigade Combat Team and structured theirs to fight ours without requiring air power or outside supporting artillery.  His battalion has two tank companies, two infantry companies, nine self-propelled arty or full-auto mortar tubes, an air defense battery, and an anti-tank battery.

Their organic squad is nine men -- but the TC and driver always stay with the vehicle.  Light (including amphibious and airborne), wheeled, and tracked squads are seven men.

Each squad has a SAW, a DM, and a dedicated 120mm rocketman -- the Chinese no longer issue first-line squads RPG-7s.  Light formations (airborne and PLA Marines) carry a seven-shot automatic grenade launcher (think the Marine revolver, but theirs shoots a Mark 19 equivalent grenade direct-fire a thousand yards in the day and 800 at night with a thermal).

His weapons platoon and weapons company has 34-pound light .50 cals and more automatic grenade launchers.

They have neat equipment but sh!t leadership, no combat experience, and no NCO corps worth a damn.

Accurate suppression is of course important. Can’t ‘lift and shift’ unless you know where to put the rounds and can do so. But everyone doing mag changes every 30rds is not my idea of sustained fire and I’ve never tried to ‘talk the guns’ with automatic rifles. Though I suspect/hope the Corps knows better.

The following are the answers to the than Commandant’s  (James Conway) concerns over adopting the IAR

CMC Concern 1: SAW may not be particularly accurate, but that's not the most important.  This is the most difficult aspect of CMC's personal position to counter because it is rooted in a belief that mere volume of fire equates to effectiveness.  Data demonstrates that the accuracy of the IAR surpasses that of SAW in the offensive and defensive modes it was tested in.  The definition of fire superiority includes both volume and accuracy; separating accuracy from the effect on the enemy is not a good policy decision in our estimation.  In discussions with CMC, it is recommended that accuracy and effectiveness be discussed as inseparable.  The psychological effect of a high-volume of inaccurate fire diminishes over time as our adversaries adapt.

CMC Concern 2: SAW is Light Machinegun and will win out in a fight with an automatic rifle.  Machineguns dominate when employed in pairs to provide a wall of lead for assaulting enemies to run through.  Machineguns are limited in actual effectiveness when employed in point shooting at individual targets from unstable platforms without the use of T&E's or tripods.  Machineguns have always had significant weaknesses when being employed over broken terrain where the only effect they can achieve is in the beaten zone.  The SAW is the least effective in the offense because of the relative lack of control of the beaten zone beyond 100 meters from all but prone or supported positions.  Even the improvements in the para-SAW, adjustable stocks, and optics have not been able to match the overall accuracy/effectiveness of the IAR at any range beyond 100 meters.

CMC Concern 3:  IAR fires 3-round burst.  CMC is mistaken, if his statement indicates that he believe the IAR fires on 3-round burst.  The IAR is a fully automatic rifle.  One of the chief advantages of the IAR is that it enables a squad to move more effectively together and therefore to more effectively position the IAR gunner for maximal effect.  A corollary advantage is that an IAR gunner is always able to select semi or automatic fire in response to the myriad circumstances presented to him on the battlefield.  This discriminatory aspect of the IAR makes it more useful to a broader range of military operations.

CMC Concern 4:  Psychology of fire superiority and the "200-round drum keeps on giving"  Unfortunately, the limitations of our range and training facilities have developed the tactically unfortunate practice of training Marines to move when "someone is shooting from my side" rather than moving when "the enemy is suppressed and is not firing".  Ineffective suppression gets assault elements killed, yet we prepare Marines to listen for audible cues of friendly fire rather than focus outwardly on the enemy.

There is an historical concern from the 1920-1960 period when rifle squads were armed with a variety of slow firing weapons, including the Browning Automatic Rifle.  This concern led to the development of a high-capacity ammunition source within the squad that could help overcome the relative lack of firepower.  The SAW gunner now typically moves with an assault pouch of 100-rounds and have 200 additional rounds on his gear; the remainder of his ammunition is spread loaded among the squad.   The development of the M-16 series of rifles has overcome the original concern about lack of firepower, but we remain tied closely to the SAW despite the fact that overall firepower from an infantry squad is significantly greater than previously.
When prone or stationary in a vehicle, the SAW gunner does have the ability to provide point suppression of targets effectively.  It is crucial to point out however, that his ammunition usage to achieve a similar effect on target is much greater than IAR.  This greater ammunition consumption forces additional ammunition and weight to be spread loaded among the squad.  Data demonstrates that ammunition usage is 50-100% greater for SAW than for IAR to achieve equal measurable results.  This not only reduces the time that a SAW gunner can effectively suppress a target, but also increases the rate at which required to cross-level ammunition.
In addition, there is ample anecdotal evidence of Marines and enemy personnel moving through seemingly impossible volumes of fire.  After actions reports demonstrate that often these personnel did not know they were being shot at.  The conditions of auditory exclusion and singular focus mean that it is possible for targets to ignore or block out near misses when being engaged by non-exploding-tip small arms fire.  The IAR is proven to be more accurate and therefore more effective than SAW.  For Marines going into harms way, it does not appear to be good policy to equip them with a heavier, bulkier, more complex weapon that is also more prone to stoppages. These factors are multiplied when conducted at night.

CMC Concern 5: Suppression is effected by more frequent magazine changes. The test data clearly demonstrated that there was a minor advantage to IAR in times required to change magazines.  The advantage for the IAR is much greater at night because the complexity of SAW function/operation means that it experiences a greater frequency of stoppages and malfunctions.  The IAR is so similar in layout and function to the M-16 series of rifles, that a Marine would have very little trouble in employing the IAR as a result of casualties.  Additionally, if the IAR is moved within the squad due to a casualty the new IAR gunner has a ready source of ammunition on his equipment and will be able to effectively employ the weapon.  Although the SAW is a core infantry weapon, it is more complex and difficult to employ without adequate and recent training.  

CMC Concern 6: How do the Marines feel about it? And is this going to change the whole dynamic?  Anecdotally, Marines are in two distinct groups on their opinion about the IAR vs. the M249.  These two groups are separated by their recent employment experiences.  The first group who love the M249 are those who employed one of the 10,000 existing M249's from a non-mobile defensive position, or from the back of one of the vehicle variant options currently available.  Success was measured by "shooting towards the enemy in a suppressive manner" and by "surviving the incident".  Success was not measured by "closing with and destroying", or by "verifying the wounding or lethal effects of the engagement".  The majority of after action reports speak to this type of engagement and strengthens the desire to maintain this role for the M249 at the tactical level, without realizing the negative effects these actions have had at the strategic level when the populace who receives these errant fires during COIN operations become hostile to our presence.
The second group of Marines comes from our infantry units.  These are those rare squad members who have actually had to "fire and move" towards a defended position while armed with the M249.  While expected to be performed regularly, this type of action has become very rare in the last 7 years and it is hard to find anyone who has actually performed as expected.  When these individuals are found, they detest the heavy, cumbersome M249 for its inability to remain in the fight during the actual assault.
A third non-combat group exists as well.  This third group are those who actually conducted one of the experiments by MCOTEA while at 29 Palms in Nov-Dec 2009 and are very similar to the second group listed above. Having actually been forced to assault, been forced to measure results beyond the un-measurable psychological effects; this group preferred the IAR over the M249.
We do believe that it will change the squad dynamic for the better.  The IAR preserves the volume of fire, decreases stoppages, increases familiarity across the squad, makes ammunition common, reduces weight, streamlines tasks-to-train, and regains mobility to the entire small unit.  The IAR decreases negative strategic impact in the area of operations during low intensity while increasing positive tactical impact against a threat when effects are truly measured against a determined enemy.

CMC Concern 7: Volume of fire and impacts of having to exchange ammo among the squad.  The ammunition efficiency and enhanced accuracy of the IAR means the basic load of ammunition will be effective for longer than the SAW. This goes to the heart of the Commandant's issue with the IAR.  The SAW requires a greater spread load of ammunition, and complicates the ability to cross-level during a firefight because not every Marine will typically carry additional drums.  The IAR alternately is magazine fed from identical magazines to every other Marine in the squad.  This fact alone means the IAR is simpler to resupply in contact.
CMC Concern 8:  Variance with the US Army   The Marine Corps diverges from  the Army in a number of weapons in the small arms inventory, for a variety of reasons.  We are buying and fielding 2,000 Multi-Shot Grenade Launchers that the Army has no requirement for.  We issue the M40A5, they use the M24. They are fielding the M320 Grenade Launcher while we are sticking with the M203.  They are fielding a pure fleet of M4s, while we are committed to the M16A4. Variance is justifiable, is not a new thing, and doesn't necessarily cost the taxpayer any more money. The Army has articulated that the reason they are not participating in the IAR program is that smaller size of their squads necessitates that they hold on to the firepower of the M249. Testing results indicate that the Army is incorrect in their assumption that the M249 adds firepower to the squad.  The Army has already expressed interest in the IAR for some other roles such as designated marksmen.  They may be more interested in participating after reviewing our test data.

That all makes sense. Hope they’re right.

TL;DR

WE WANT BELT FEDS !!!

That strikes me as more of an opinion rather then an argument. I'll put it that way.  A lot of mythology by someone in the Pentagon.

6x scopes and 2moa rifles are nothing new, yet no army has every outfitted a platoon entirely with them.  The only force I knew of that had, de facto, every man a DM that maneuvered with precision rifle fire, routinely, were probably the Boers, and that wasn't really a doctrinal choice as a group of hunters on the veldt that came as they are. And they got away with it because the British came as they were.

If you look at TC3-22.249, M249 gunners routinely qualify by engaging E silhouettes out to 400 meters, and double Es out to 500 meters.  I'm going to say anecdotally that SAW gunners were getting hits with iron sights beyond the range of M4 riflemen with aimpoints.  So "accuracy" arguments have to be taken with a grain of salt.  

People claim the M27 is a 2moa weapon, and I'll take that at face value.  My recollection is out to 500meters, the cone of fire for a SAW was about two meters in diameter.  A 200 centimeter diameter at 500 equals approx 13.7 MOA.

The reasons Armies go to war with 13.7moa auto rifles vs 2moa rifles are two fold.  The biggest is that 5-7 round burst is on the target in half a second and the target isn't going to react in time. You get five to seven rolls of the dice per trigger squeeze and that's largely why the (in)accuracy is acceptable.   Secondly, your average shooter, even a Marine, is running, breathing, huffing and puffing, and isnt estimating range well, or windage well, and he is the weak link in the system and cant take advantage of a 2moa weapon anyway.

If I put seven rounds in a 200CM diameter circle, that is Pi x R^2, 31K square centimeters, or one round every 4400 square centimeters. (31k/7)  That is an area approx 15x39 inches.  It's about torso sized. Do the math.

My point is  that the cone of fire is putting enough rounds out, more or less instantly, that you may fire seven and hit one, and miss with six, but a burst on target is going to hit the target at least once, on average, and that's the goal. Less efficient, but more effective. Go to an Army unit with up to date M249s and you will see the evidence shows you that.  

In that same time interval a rifleman with an M27 gets off one shot, hit or miss, and that's that. Perhaps the M27 goes to full auto, but then we have a different problem for the same reason the mass of the M249, the issue that the gunners detest, is dampening out recoil and you now have greater effectiveness.   Same reason a Bren or a BAR was more effective in full auto then an FG42.  There is no such thing as a free lunch and a light auto rifle will have a greater cone of fire then a heavy one.  And while I hear people talk about selective fire on M27s, the accuracy quotes are in semi. Hmmmm.  I wonder why....

I suspect that if I had an automatic riflemen running down a lane with a series of briefly exposed targets at unknown distances, he would shoot seven times the rounds and get more hits.  My own personal experience is riflemen that were challenged to clear 300m targets that were exposed on a rifle range, were more effective with M249s on the 400m ranges for SAW qualification.  Obviously, as we get to closer and closer ranges, that MOA delta becomes less and less important and the advantages of a 5-7 round burst become more, under the reality where the 2moa cant really be utilized anyway.   A rifleman on the assault, or shooting at an assault force exposed for 3-5 seconds, isn't achieving sniper level accuracy and that is why, prior to this, noone has gone down this road.

It was put together by Gunner Community as CMC Conway was not on board with adopting the IAR

With an entire IAR squad, it does seem the equation changes a bit with every rifleman an automatic rifleman - while they lack a quick change barrel, another IAR can pick up suppression duties until its bbl is hot, then the next Marine with a cool bbl, etc.

Basically the equation they did was an IAR equipped automatic riflemen can produce a comparable volume of fire as the three A4/M4 equipped fire team members, so when the AR is suppressing the three other members of team are maneuvering and when the three others are shooting the AR is maneuvering.  

Back in the 1930s, when the US Army fielded the M1 garand, the exact same arguments were made.  A German MG34 was too heavy, the British Bren was too heavy, they slowed the squad down.  A squad full of riflemen with garands could generate more effective firepower with less weight, and move faster.  

Melvin Johnson, who invented the Johnson automatic rifle, wrote a book, "Automatic Arms" illustrating this exact concept.  A larger number of light semiauto weapons would be able to overwhelm a ponderous LMG-equipped squad with fire.

https://www.amazon.com/Automatic-Arms-Their-History-Development/dp/B001N0C63A

The reality, and historians such as Doubler and English, even the questionable SLA Marshal, write about this ad nauseum 20 years ago, is it didn't work.  Theoretically it worked.  In the bocage, 11 green soldiers, spread out over 75 meters, were uncontrollable and 2-3 might see the LMG, but they couldn't communicate the location and firing commands across the line and focus that fire, without getting picked off.  It worked on a flat range but not in reality, which is why one-two men with auto weapons could be controlled and directed to suppress, vice half a dozen guys with garands all over the place.  

The USMC had a better system, with three BARs per squad, and the Army doubled their allocation.   Simply put, if you spread the firepower too much, you cant control it under heavy fire.  If you concentrate it in 2-3 people, you can control and direct it and you have more.  I can see how mis-learned lessons of Afghanistan, where a clapped out M249 cant hit some Muj running away at 600 meters will drive a decision, but there are reasons why the fast moving rifle-only squad hasn't been adopted. Its not just accuracy and weight, its control of fire.  And remember the next time this system is used, it will be green troops.

When you look at the history as to why it didn't work, there is a healthy curiosity as to if those causal relationships were incorporated into the more recent testings to mitigate those reasons...or its just going down the same route the 1940 Army took.  And it was a Marine who came up with a better solution based on combat experience, for what its worth.

It is a tactical dead end, really.  Id like to hear about the Army and USMC coming up with UAV weapons platoons because that is the technological cutting edge.

The grunts still have access to LMGs, they are just not organic to the team and the command needs to make the decision they want to use elements of the team to provide LMG fire, employed similar to a crew served

At what level are those SAWs held and what’s the smallest element the USMC plans to drop on to an island in the future? If B is lower than A I see issues…

Attached File

Company own the guns

The forces planned to be put on islands are tasked organized, normally around a fires, sensing or FARPing element.  Those elements normally come pretty heavily equipped with LMGs, MMGs, HMGs and AGLs.

Maintenance and supply are the commanders program, the point f the story is that you've got some really fucked up incentives to not maintain things or order sufficient supplies.

I know another member of this board that was pushed off AD for deadlining vehicles according the manual.

You can get in serious shit for these things, often easier to lie about readiness than fix problems.

As for rocket units and small arms, in general they aren't that important but I imagine if you need a rifle not much else will do at that point. Specific theaters have specific threats that involve enemy light infantry tasked to seek out and destroy launchers, and that's all that needs to be said on that point.

Someone got the point, I see.

Glad to hear belt feds will be in the ISU90

This is how broken the Army is after 20 years of war.  It's been talked about for a decade or more that the amount of required training for a company exceeds the available training days.  We are forcing commanders to lie about readiness, thus unservicable machineguns and much other equipment is the result.

In the late 90s/early 00s you had tons of deadlined equipment in units.  Pretty much as long as you had a 2404 with the deficiencies on file you were going to be put on mission cycle once it was youre turn to be DRF 1-3.

that isn't new.


Pre GWOT, I had a supply officer joke that he intentionally ordered a BN worth of chem suits, masks, and boots in size Small.  He joked that it was on purpose so that nobody would take them and he could show as having the right # of suits on hand without having to constantly buy more.  


It was ironic is that it enabled him to meet his task...while being totally incapable of actually doing any real world mission with that gear as it was too small for anyone to wear.  

Idk why people think guns last forever.  They get worn out then need replacement.  It's not rocket surgery.

In terms of accuracy, the M249 at 10moa is reportedly on the less accurate side of LMG designs (I've heard someone mentioned it has a relatively loose Quick Change Barrel? but not sure.)

But this is not a universal LMG trait or argument for going to Automatic Rifles (much less going with assault rifles with bipods like the marines.)

The new FN EVOLYS for example is spec'd to 1.5-2.5 MOA. I've read that HK's MG4 (their M249 competitor) is also more accurate then the m249.



https://soldiersystems.net/2021/05/07/fn-evolus-the-details/

https://www.edrmagazine.eu/fn-details-its-evolys-super-light-mgs

The PK / PKM is also known to be plenty accurate at 2.9-4moa for bursts.

Keep in mind, most belted 5.56mm was M855 a 4-6MOA round. Imagine if you used  MK262 Belted.....
I fired a SAW on a small scaled down qual  back in the day. I was able to consistently fire 3 rd bursts (You squeeze, say "Press release" and viola, 3 rd burst. and keep the bursts on the target. Load the bipod and a little technique goes a long way to shooting any platform well.

Again, a big part of the issue with belt feeds

- Worn out guns, past their service life.
- M855 ball ammo- not known for its accuracy.
- Giving the belt feed to the junior, most in experienced guy.


And we act surprised at the results. and run to a Full auto HBAR AR with a scope as the answer.
Now if they started fielding 75 or 100 rd drum mags , that would be a step in the right direction.

Attached File

Yeah, you keyed on that too.

Most lethal weapon on the team, give it to the new guy.  Same can be spread across to other formations on other subjects as well.  Like advanced party for artillery-some experience could help there but the Army sends the new kid.

Not infantry. Did not read entire thread.

The IAR is a cool concept. Upgraded firepower vs the M16 family.

I don’t believe it’s an upgrade over the SAW except sheer weight. At the end of the day, the IAR is still magazine fed, and the barrels are not readily changed. If you want to put a lot of rounds downrange, you need a belt and quick change barrels. It’s just that dang simple.  It’s an “automatic rifle”, not a “light machinegun”, conceptually this is unavoidable and irreconcilable.

The down select on the HK was based the ability to shoot a 600 round basic load of ammo at 3x the rate of an M4/A4 without a cook off.

Waves hello

From the next county....

When I got to Bragg I was immediatly put on the SAW  since I was the cherry. Once anoher cherry came in; it went to him.   The only time that changed was when we were spinning up for something in Africa and they put me back on the 249 since I had experience with it.  Carrying it was basically a rite of passage which generally went like this: SAW - M203 - m16/m4.