Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Clausewitz still holds true: War is a continuation of politics by other means. This doesn't sit well with the American post- WW2 culture that has glorifies the large set-piece battles and is disdainful of mixing politics, diplomacy, business and military operations. It also doesn't sit well with the post Vietnam era generation that sees all war and violence as beyond the pale. Its an odd dichotomy in American political discourse that does you a great disservice, because the argument is always between "kick their ass" and "Kumbaya". This is the impetus behind my earlier post. The US military divides the world into seven different geographic areas and we appoint a 4 star officer to handle the military affairs therein. But most of that job isn't military, it's diplomatic. Why we don't have a joint DoS/DoD command for each of those areas run by someone who reports the the National Security Advisor, who reports the the CIC, is beyond me. Why the CIA is not the DoS's intelligence arm, like the DIA is the DoD's intelligence arm is beyond me. Great an entirely seperate additional chain of command, seperate beaurocracy and asshattery. We need to go back to the CinC system.  One CinC per area.  Controls all things US in said area.  DoS, Over Seas FBI, Military etc. We already have two chains of command, administrative and operational. I'm not suggesting to replace either. Rather I'm talking about building onto the operational chain of command and integrating the efforts of the politicians and the warfighters. After the experience in Iraq, it seems like the thing to do. The military was operating under the assumption that the Iraqi military would be reconstituted. The politicians decided to disband the Iraqi military at a critical time. As for going back to the CinC system, we never left it. They were simply renamed to COCOM. They still do what they did before Rummy changed the name.

Well we are saying the same thing then.

I'd put DoS folks uncer the combatant commanders as their own little staff position.

Quoted: This could get ugly... For starters, the DoD has a fundamentally different role to play than State - and all the diplomats in the world won't help if we can't secure 3/4th of the world's resources and trade for our economic engine - and that means several things: forward deployment of the Army in Europe, Japan and Korea and a world-wide presence (and therefore bases) for the Navy and Air Force. All this armament is required to keep the 'front lines' of our economic-political-military position as far away from our shores as is practical. Had Cuba not gone commie we'd literally have kept the Russians out of the entire half of our part of the globe. Sheer diplomacy has never defended us or kept the wolves at bay. Not that diplomats aren't useful. They are. But adding more of them to the demise of soldiers and sailors isn't wise. Now it might have been better had the CIA not been given the green light to play politics in other countries, but perhaps this very disjointedness of the US system has back end benefits by giving other powers a very reasonable expectation that if they play nice, it'll be possible to diplomatically engage us and 'turn' us to their liking rather than resort to terror or armed confrontation. As galling as the dimocrats and peaceniks are - useful idiots for the Soviets during the Cold War, they also served the Right in one spectacular way: they kept the Soviets from going 'hot' by holding out a serious prospect of them infiltrating us to the point of our capitulation to them peacefully.... so our very fractured political and governmental system  might just help dispel potential confrontations by giving would-be enemies hope in 'playing us' (just as we always talk about playing their domestic 'moderates' against the 'hardliners'). If we were monolithic Republicans, Osama and others might have not pulled punches... just as we hesitate to bomb Iran out of fear of hurting the 'moderate majority' so too they might be holding back from wave 2 for fear of cementing our 'hardliners' in power... It works both ways. Finally about oil. We produce 7m barrels per day but need 20m. Most comes from Canada and Mexico NOT SA or Iraq. But inasmuch as it's an open market, more fields on line helps stabilize the costs. Our technology will eventually make everything more efficient - but the growing economies of India and China are increasing faster than our efficiencies can keep up, so prices will rise in the foreseeable future even with huge finds like Brazil's. It's not Peak Oil, but increased demand that will keep the prices high. But big business loves predictability - so there are enormous interests involved in keeping the peace in oil bearing lands. Wars obviously inject unpredictability into a system heavily dependent on predictable logistics - so the middle east peace is vital not just for the moral sense of peace being better than war, but because a stabil economy is better than a global depression. As much as we tend to lump all elites together in satanic cults bent on world domination and destruction, I think we miss the obviousness that most elites got there the hard way - earning it from the ground up, creating wealth and building on wealth - all of which presupposes order. Most elites don't want war and depression as it'd wipe out their wealth. So I'd say most Americans, from state to DoD to the oil business are pro-peace with strength and not pro-war. I highly doubt we'll be going to war with Iran. But we will be an oil-based global economy until someone figures out how to do fusion.

Who got the first air bases to operate out of Pakistan, and the other stans to the north of Astan for OEF?  We didn't have bases in the region, we had to negoiate (read use DoS) to get access (virtually over night) for those bases.

Ditto with basing forces in Jordian for OIF 1.  And the failure of DoS to secure invasion route through Turkey.

DoS does have a very large role to let the military in.

It is kind of hard to strike a land locked country considering we are a sea and air based power.  Got to have bases somewhere nearbye to get into the fight.

Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Clausewitz still holds true: War is a continuation of politics by other means. This doesn't sit well with the American post- WW2 culture that has glorifies the large set-piece battles and is disdainful of mixing politics, diplomacy, business and military operations. It also doesn't sit well with the post Vietnam era generation that sees all war and violence as beyond the pale. Its an odd dichotomy in American political discourse that does you a great disservice, because the argument is always between "kick their ass" and "Kumbaya". This is the impetus behind my earlier post. The US military divides the world into seven different geographic areas and we appoint a 4 star officer to handle the military affairs therein. But most of that job isn't military, it's diplomatic. Why we don't have a joint DoS/DoD command for each of those areas run by someone who reports the the National Security Advisor, who reports the the CIC, is beyond me. Why the CIA is not the DoS's intelligence arm, like the DIA is the DoD's intelligence arm is beyond me. Great an entirely seperate additional chain of command, seperate beaurocracy and asshattery. We need to go back to the CinC system.  One CinC per area.  Controls all things US in said area.  DoS, Over Seas FBI, Military etc. We already have two chains of command, administrative and operational. I'm not suggesting to replace either. Rather I'm talking about building onto the operational chain of command and integrating the efforts of the politicians and the warfighters. After the experience in Iraq, it seems like the thing to do. The military was operating under the assumption that the Iraqi military would be reconstituted. The politicians decided to disband the Iraqi military at a critical time. As for going back to the CinC system, we never left it. They were simply renamed to COCOM. They still do what they did before Rummy changed the name. Well we are saying the same thing then. I'd put DoS folks uncer the combatant commanders as their own little staff position.

Can't work that way. Diplomacy is not subject to military policy. Military policy and diplomacy are two sides to the foreign policy coin.

The DoS and DoD components need to have equal footing. They need to report to someone who understands the big picture in theater as it pertains to US foreign policy. That person needs to either report the the President or a cabinet level person. Considering the President needs one belly button to press for everything. It needs to be a cabinet level person. SecDef and SecState are out because they have specific interests. It has to be the National Security Advisor.

So the Chain of Command for all foreign policy would be:
CIC
NSA
Theater Foreign Policy Executive
-COCOM
-DoS verson of COCOM that would unite all the diplomatic efforts in theater.

Dang, you're right!

Of course, had I been POTUS, my reaction to Turkey turning us down would have been to take the 'optional' route THROUGH Syria. "Just passing through, outta the way, outta the way".... "hey - you so much as look at our convoys the wrong way and we'll be settling in for a century".

Why don't we decide what might cause conflict (oil, cobalt, etc) and then move away from them to something we don't have to fight over?

What would getting off oil have to cost t be more economical than going to war over it every few years?

Remember, WWII was about oil as well.

ETA: Dport, I like where you are going.

And when I say pubic diplomacy, I mean polishing US image abroad.

Quoted: Quoted: The old governor/proconsul model worked well for the Brits. He titularly be the head of all British govt organisations in their area, and report to the Colonial Secretary. For non-Brit possessions, the Ambassador took on that role in everything but open warfare. I would suspect that the US Ambassador did a similar thing before the age of "convenient" communication. In the Brit case, the Governor was often a seconded or retired flag officer, so he understood military matters. An excellent example of this sort of civ/mil diplomacy came last year, when CinCPac in a press conf suggested that the USN undertake anti-piracy patrols in the Straits of Malacca. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were so incensed at this slur against their sovereignty that they've been running vigorous anti-piracy patrols ever since. This would probably rank as one of the most cost-effective operations the USN has ever run Whatever model proffered, what needs to be addressed is the disjointed efforts from two cabinet level organizations. Their operations are only marginally integrated. Partly because each is on their own damn program. That's got to stop.

Agreed, although I doubt either could ever lose their cabinet status. The way it works here is that there is a pecking order in govt with the PM 1st, the Treasurer 2nd and Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General equal 3rd. Defence would be ranked with Health, and has been staffed by non-entities & intellectual pygmies for years. The Defence Minister here is responsible making sure the dept works properly and that the ADF can do what's asked of it. Now this is a rubbery arrangement, but usually holds true.

An example: When the ADF went into the Solomon Islands to reestablish order, the overall commander of the operation was the head of the Australian Federal Police contingent. The AFP has a uniformed division and an "FBI style" division, so can undertake constabulary tasks. As order was restored, and the police didn't need the combat power, the ADF was withdrawn.

Something similar took place in East Timor. In 1999 the AFP went to help monitor the independence vote. When things got out of control, the ADF was sent in under Gen. Cosgrove, with the AFP contingent subordinate to him.

In both examples, Foreign Affairs was the primary agency, with Defence acting as the tool of Foreign Affairs' policy.

This arrangement has served us well over the years.

Quoted: Agreed, although I doubt either could ever lose their cabinet status.

I wouldn't think of it. In my model they would become the top of the administrative chain of command for both departments. They would even advise in operational decisions, but the orders would come from elsewhere.

Still an important job, but more focused on logistics.

In both examples, Foreign Affairs was the primary agency, with Defence acting as the tool of Foreign Affairs' policy. This arrangement has served us well over the years.

It is the model that has proven successful for the British Empire as well, IIRC.

But like you said, it looks like the US isn't looking for examples of what works well. We're too engrossed in our own ideology.

Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Clausewitz still holds true: War is a continuation of politics by other means. This doesn't sit well with the American post- WW2 culture that has glorifies the large set-piece battles and is disdainful of mixing politics, diplomacy, business and military operations. It also doesn't sit well with the post Vietnam era generation that sees all war and violence as beyond the pale. Its an odd dichotomy in American political discourse that does you a great disservice, because the argument is always between "kick their ass" and "Kumbaya". This is the impetus behind my earlier post. The US military divides the world into seven different geographic areas and we appoint a 4 star officer to handle the military affairs therein. But most of that job isn't military, it's diplomatic. Why we don't have a joint DoS/DoD command for each of those areas run by someone who reports the the National Security Advisor, who reports the the CIC, is beyond me. Why the CIA is not the DoS's intelligence arm, like the DIA is the DoD's intelligence arm is beyond me. Great an entirely seperate additional chain of command, seperate beaurocracy and asshattery. We need to go back to the CinC system.  One CinC per area.  Controls all things US in said area.  DoS, Over Seas FBI, Military etc. We already have two chains of command, administrative and operational. I'm not suggesting to replace either. Rather I'm talking about building onto the operational chain of command and integrating the efforts of the politicians and the warfighters. After the experience in Iraq, it seems like the thing to do. The military was operating under the assumption that the Iraqi military would be reconstituted. The politicians decided to disband the Iraqi military at a critical time. As for going back to the CinC system, we never left it. They were simply renamed to COCOM. They still do what they did before Rummy changed the name. Well we are saying the same thing then. I'd put DoS folks uncer the combatant commanders as their own little staff position. Can't work that way. Diplomacy is not subject to military policy. Military policy and diplomacy are two sides to the foreign policy coin. The DoS and DoD components need to have equal footing. They need to report to someone who understands the big picture in theater as it pertains to US foreign policy. That person needs to either report the the President or a cabinet level person. Considering the President needs one belly button to press for everything. It needs to be a cabinet level person. SecDef and SecState are out because they have specific interests. It has to be the National Security Advisor. So the Chain of Command for all foreign policy would be: CIC NSA Theater Foreign Policy Executive -COCOM -DoS verson of COCOM that would unite all the diplomatic efforts in theater.

This is what I meant about going back to CinC's.  They had more leeway in foreign policy in their AO.  Think more along the lines of Roman Proconsuls in the field, or territorial govenors.  They are entrusted with not only fighting the wars in that area, but shaping and fostering US policy goals through whatever means they have at their disposal.

I agree you need to balance at the decision making level, but at the operational level they need to be working hand in hand.

Quoted: This is what I meant about going back to CinC's.  They had more leeway in foreign policy in their AO.

I think this is the only real point of disagreement. Perhaps its a point of reference thing.

Think more along the lines of Roman Proconsuls in the field, or territorial govenors.  They are entrusted with not only fighting the wars in that area, but shaping and fostering US policy goals through whatever means they have at their disposal. I agree you need to balance at the decision making level, but at the operational level they need to be working hand in hand.

Agreed.

Quoted: Quoted: Agreed, although I doubt either could ever lose their cabinet status. I wouldn't think of it. In my model they would become the top of the administrative chain of command for both departments. They would even advise in operational decisions, but the orders would come from elsewhere. Still an important job, but more focused on logistics. In both examples, Foreign Affairs was the primary agency, with Defence acting as the tool of Foreign Affairs' policy. This arrangement has served us well over the years. It is the model that has proven successful for the British Empire as well, IIRC. But like you said, it looks like the US isn't looking for examples of what works well. We're too engrossed in our own ideology .

Winston Churchill said it best "Americans always do the right thing, after they've exhausted all other alternatives". The US has been on top for too long. There's nothing like a good foreign policy disaster to clear out the dead wood. Unfortunately, that usually involves lots of dead bodies.

Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Agreed, although I doubt either could ever lose their cabinet status. I wouldn't think of it. In my model they would become the top of the administrative chain of command for both departments. They would even advise in operational decisions, but the orders would come from elsewhere. Still an important job, but more focused on logistics. In both examples, Foreign Affairs was the primary agency, with Defence acting as the tool of Foreign Affairs' policy. This arrangement has served us well over the years. It is the model that has proven successful for the British Empire as well, IIRC. But like you said, it looks like the US isn't looking for examples of what works well. We're too engrossed in our own ideology . Winston Churchill said it best "Americans always do the right thing, after they've exhausted all other alternatives". The US has been on top for too long. There's nothing like a good foreign policy disaster to clear out the dead wood. Unfortunately, that usually involves lots of dead bodies.

The British Empire was on top for 100 years. We've been on top for 60. It really isn't the length of time so much as it is what has shaped our perception of foreign policy.

We were an isolationist nation, at least as it pertained to anything other than manifest destiny, until 1898. Between 1898 and 1941 we only defended our marginal overseas interests and still had very isolationist tendencies.

Our defining moment was WWII. A largely military action. What should have been our defining moment was the Marshall Plan, but it was overshadowed by the Cold War. Again our foreign policy was defined in military terms.

It's hard to break the paradigm that catapults you to the top position, you know?

Quoted: We spend a little less than 4% of our GDP on defense every year.  We spend more on defense than the net half of the world... combined. At the same time it has been pointed out that the Department of State has fewer people than the various military bands. So what I'm thinking is maybe some of the money that we funnel into the DoD year after year would be better spent on public diplomacy, language training from kindergarten through college, and on reducing dependence on imported energy. Think of it as a way to head off war before it becomes necessary. Any thoughts?

Diplomacy is the art of saying 'nice doggie' to the rabid mutt that's snarling at you, hoping to keep him from attacking long enough for you to get a gun & shoot him...

Diplomacy is useless unless backed up by credible & overwhelming military force...

Just ask the Europeans, pre-WWII...

Quoted: Quoted: We spend a little less than 4% of our GDP on defense every year.  We spend more on defense than the net half of the world... combined. Depends on which half of the world you pick to out spend. Lots of the 190 or 200 or so countries have populations smaller than the city I live in.

We spend more than the next 24 countries, in terms of spending, combined.

Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: We spend a little less than 4% of our GDP on defense every year.  We spend more on defense than the net half of the world... combined. Depends on which half of the world you pick to out spend. Lots of the 190 or 200 or so countries have populations smaller than the city I live in. We spend more than the next 24 countries, in terms of spending, combined.

Now add up the populations of said countries, and count how many are 'protected' US allies...

Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: We spend a little less than 4% of our GDP on defense every year.  We spend more on defense than the net half of the world... combined. Depends on which half of the world you pick to out spend. Lots of the 190 or 200 or so countries have populations smaller than the city I live in. We spend more than the next 24 countries, in terms of spending, combined. Now add up the populations of said countries, and count how many are 'protected' US allies...

Your point?

Quoted: Quoted: But like you said, it looks like the US isn't looking for examples of what works well. We're too engrossed in our own ideology . Winston Churchill said it best "Americans always do the right thing, after they've exhausted all other alternatives". The US has been on top for too long. There's nothing like a good foreign policy disaster to clear out the dead wood. Unfortunately, that usually involves lots of dead bodies. The British Empire was on top for 100 years. We've been on top for 60. It really isn't the length of time so much as it is what has shaped our perception of foreign policy. We were an isolationist nation, at least as it pertained to anything other than manifest destiny, until 1898. Between 1898 and 1941 we only defended our marginal overseas interests and still had very isolationist tendencies. Our defining moment was WWII. A largely military action. What should have been our defining moment was the Marshall Plan, but it was overshadowed by the Cold War. Again our foreign policy was defined in military terms. It's hard to break the paradigm that catapults you to the top position, you know?

I understand. It also doesn't help that the people who did the catapulting are either still alive or not long dead. There just hasn't been the time to reflect on things.

Sure the Brits were on top for 100 years, but Britain hadn't been isolationist since at least the Spanish Armada of 1588, and really, had been embroiled in continental politics since before 1066, so by the time Britain got to the top of the pile in the early 1800s, she had been playing the game for almost a thousand years. The US is truly an aberration in that respect (with the exception of maybe imperial Japan pre-1945), because, as you said, you were an isolationist nation until 1941 mainly playing in the near aboard. To go from zero to top dog in 150ish years is truly astonishing.

The Marshall plan was genius, and it would have been a hell of a start, but like you say, the Cold War reinforced the WW2 mentality, although the CIA's shenanigans before they went PC were also good, if overdone.

The other thing too is that America's success has led to a can-do attitude that is overpowering and a mindset that says "it works for us, so it will work for you". Thus wherever America goes, it isn't overly subtle.

The best thing that ever happened to Japan was losing the war. It taught them that military power is tool that is much more useful in its menace than in its use. Same with Russia losing the Cold War. The US hasn't had that experience yet. Vietnam and now Iraq won't teach that lesson, because they were (and will be) defeats engineered from within, so the wrong lessons were learned.

Quoted: Quoted: We spend a little less than 4% of our GDP on defense every year.  We spend more on defense than the net half of the world... combined. At the same time it has been pointed out that the Department of State has fewer people than the various military bands. So what I'm thinking is maybe some of the money that we funnel into the DoD year after year would be better spent on public diplomacy, language training from kindergarten through college, and on reducing dependence on imported energy. Think of it as a way to head off war before it becomes necessary. Any thoughts? Diplomacy is the art of saying 'nice doggie' to the rabid mutt that's snarling at you, hoping to keep him from attacking long enough for you to get a gun & shoot him... Diplomacy is useless unless backed up by credible & overwhelming military force... Just ask the Europeans, pre-WWII...

I'd have to disagree there. Diplomacy, commerce and 'shenanigans' works well right up to the point where the mutt starts snarling, and if done right, massively reduces the need to use the military.

Pre WW2, the Euros didn't know when to put down the pen and pick up the gun. Thats more a comment on the competence of the leaders of the day, rather than the effectiveness or otherwise of diplomacy.

Quoted: .... some of the money that we funnel into the DoD year after year would be better spent on ....

It'll be better spent on young individuals willing to excel in the technology sector, among other things.



:}

Quoted: The other thing too is that America's success has led to a can-do attitude that is overpowering and a mindset that says "it works for us, so it will work for you". Thus wherever America goes, it isn't overly subtle.

To be honest, I've often wondered why our system of government isn't more widely used. After all, it works for us, it'll work for other countries too.

The best thing that ever happened to Japan was losing the war. It taught them that military power is tool that is much more useful in its menace than in its use. Same with Russia losing the Cold War. The US hasn't had that experience yet. Vietnam and now Iraq won't teach that lesson, because they were (and will be) defeats engineered from within, so the wrong lessons were learned.

The lessons from VN were valid in some respects. Because defeat really was engineered from within.

If we avoid the same situation in IZ, we risk learning the wrong lessons here as well. Not from defeat, but from victory. The military plan, the surge, will be seen as the key and once again the military will look like THE answer to foreign policy challenges.

What we needed was a strong showing from State and didn't get it.

Quoted: If you want to depend on DoS to be our vanguard and keep us on top and out front, the first thing you're going to have to do is clean house from Foggy Bottom to USEMB Burkina Faso. Aside from DS agents, my interactions with DoS have demonstrated that they are a bunch of pinky finger extended chardonnay sipping, terrorist hugging, aristocracy wannabe, careerist, no spine having little daisies who are in love with the sound of their own voices. This situation does not augur well for our diplomatic efforts, even when they are undertaken in earnest. The end result of entrusting this crowd of empty V-neck sweaters with the lion's share of America's international nation building budget would be, as Macbeth said, "a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing."

Excellent post.

I don't necessarily think that DoS is able to change things... I didn't carefully engineer the start of this thread and so it has wandered.

The best way to state what I think is that we ought to look at why we fight, and then work backwards from there.  Things like resource issues and misunderstood tensions cause wars.

I think if we spend more time studying, we'l fight fewer wars and win the ones that do start, or at least win them more handily.

Imagine how the situation in Vietnam might have gone if it were handled more appropriately in the early 60's or Somalia if we hadn't botched up or effort by killing those who would have made peace.

A more muscular diplomacy...  but a less aggressive stance.  Is that possible?

PS: I still think we should shoot terrorists and Communists.

Quoted: Quoted: If you want to depend on DoS to be our vanguard and keep us on top and out front, the first thing you're going to have to do is clean house from Foggy Bottom to USEMB Burkina Faso. Aside from DS agents, my interactions with DoS have demonstrated that they are a bunch of pinky finger extended chardonnay sipping, terrorist hugging, aristocracy wannabe, careerist, no spine having little daisies who are in love with the sound of their own voices. This situation does not augur well for our diplomatic efforts, even when they are undertaken in earnest. The end result of entrusting this crowd of empty V-neck sweaters with the lion's share of America's international nation building budget would be, as Macbeth said, "a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing." Excellent post. I don't necessarily think that DoS is able to change things... I didn't carefully engineer the start of this thread and so it has wandered. The best way to state what I think is that we ought to look at why we fight, and then work backwards from there.  Things like resource issues and misunderstood tensions cause wars. I think if we spend more time studying, we'l fight fewer wars and win the ones that do start, or at least win them more handily. Imagine how the situation in Vietnam might have gone if it were handled more appropriately in the early 60's or Somalia if we hadn't botched up or effort by killing those who would have made peace. A more muscular diplomacy...  but a less aggressive stance.  Is that possible? PS: I still think we should shoot terrorists and Communists.

Jarhead: great rant.

Jack: You need to take 2 steps further back.

Firstly, you need to ask "What are our national aims and objective?"

Then, you need to ask "What is the subset of national aims and objectives that need to be pursued in the foreign policy arena?"

Only then can you ask "What tools do I need to use, diplomatic, economic, cultural, espinonage and military, to achieve the stated goals?" To talk about warfighting first and formost is to put the cart before the horse.

The US really hasn't had a national set of goals since Regan left office. Bush mk. 2  tried with the whole "lets democratise the world" thing, but it wasn't clearly articulated, and only ever half-hearted. "Winning the WoT" doesn't cut it, because nobody has come up with a sensible picture of what that would look like, or why it needs to happen. Abstract ideals like Safety and freedom don't cut it in a cynical and post-modern society unless it can be made very tangible at a local level.

Sort out the national agenda issues first, and then you can work out the doctrine and force structure. A military doesn't exist for its own sake.

Quoted: Quoted: The other thing too is that America's success has led to a can-do attitude that is overpowering and a mindset that says "it works for us, so it will work for you". Thus wherever America goes, it isn't overly subtle. To be honest, I've often wondered why our system of government isn't more widely used. After all, it works for us, it'll work for other countries too. The best thing that ever happened to Japan was losing the war. It taught them that military power is tool that is much more useful in its menace than in its use. Same with Russia losing the Cold War. The US hasn't had that experience yet. Vietnam and now Iraq won't teach that lesson, because they were (and will be) defeats engineered from within, so the wrong lessons were learned. The lessons from VN were valid in some respects. Because defeat really was engineered from within. If we avoid the same situation in IZ, we risk learning the wrong lessons here as well. Not from defeat, but from victory. The military plan, the surge, will be seen as the key and once again the military will look like THE answer to foreign policy challenges. What we needed was a strong showing from State and didn't get it.

Its off topic, but Mexico and the Phillipines both implimented your form of govt, and it fell apart very early in the piece. My guess is that they lacked the civil and cultural institutions to handle both strong executive & and legislative arms without one utterly dominating the other. We implimented a US style senate, and that's worked reasonably well

Back on topic, sure, State didn't step up, but why?  Its because the people at cabinet level have framed the insurgent problem almost purely as a military one, because they are reacting their political opposition's excellent spinning of Iraq as a failed military, rather than political, venture. By focussing on dead GIs and IEDs, they give the impression that the war can't be won, so Bush et al go out of their way to clamp down on the IEDs and reduce casualties, rather than focusing on the Iraqi nation-building project wholistically.

In the end, the America will loose and the Dems will win because Bush allowed them to set the agenda. It like what I said to Combat Jack: Get the nationl objectives worked out, then work out how to impliment them. Bush & co spend too much time thinking and talking about how to defeat the terrorists and not enough time thinking about how to build a stable, functioning nation. Cart before the horse.

IMHO

Quoted: Back on topic, sure, State didn't step up, but why?  Its because the people at cabinet level have framed the insurgent problem almost purely as a military one, because they are reacting their political opposition's excellent spinning of Iraq as a failed military, rather than political, venture. By focussing on dead GIs and IEDs, they give the impression that the war can't be won, so Bush et al go out of their way to clamp down on the IEDs and reduce casualties, rather than focusing on the Iraqi nation-building project wholistically.

It's this simple really. The VP was a former SECDEF. That tipped the balance IMO. And there was no government structure to make Defense and State play nice during the planning.

In the end, the America will loose and the Dems will win because Bush allowed them to set the agenda. It like what I said to Combat Jack: Get the nationl objectives worked out, then work out how to impliment them. Bush & co spend too much time thinking and talking about how to defeat the terrorists and not enough time thinking about how to build a stable, functioning nation. Cart before the horse. IMHO

No argument, except I don't think defeat is inevitable.

 It costs quite a bit of money to be the worlds policemen.

Quoted: Quoted: Back on topic, sure, State didn't step up, but why?  Its because the people at cabinet level have framed the insurgent problem almost purely as a military one, because they are reacting their political opposition's excellent spinning of Iraq as a failed military, rather than political, venture. By focussing on dead GIs and IEDs, they give the impression that the war can't be won, so Bush et al go out of their way to clamp down on the IEDs and reduce casualties, rather than focusing on the Iraqi nation-building project wholistically. It's this simple really. The VP was a former SECDEF. That tipped the balance IMO. And there was no government structure to make Defense and State play nice during the planning. In the end, the America will loose and the Dems will win because Bush allowed them to set the agenda. It like what I said to Combat Jack: Get the nationl objectives worked out, then work out how to impliment them. Bush & co spend too much time thinking and talking about how to defeat the terrorists and not enough time thinking about how to build a stable, functioning nation. Cart before the horse. IMHO No argument, except I don't think defeat is inevitable.

I didn't think of the VP.  That makes a lot of sense. How do State and Defence communicate normally? Surely there's some cooperation?

I hope you're right about avoiding defeat. I'm actually fairly confident that, provided things keep going the way they are now, Iraq will be ok. Counter-insurgencies and nation building take time, and this one's only been going for 4 years.

The way I see it, the problem is in US domestic politics. On that front win or loose in Iraq, the perception of defeat is almost certain. If Iraq becomes a stable, well governed country while the Republicans hold the White House, the Dems will put every effort into making sure that its spun as a disaster. They'll point to the waste of US blood and treasure, and bang on about the "atrocities" committed under Bush. If the Dems win the election, they'll either pull out, or do something stupid like move the troops to the borders, thereby leading to a real defeat that they can use as an "I told you so". I think that the only way that Iraq can be seen as a victory at this point in the US is if either the Dems win it, or if a genuinely popular (ie. not a 50% +1) Repub president wins it.

I'm just talking out of my rear now, so I'll stop