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I could go through scenarios like these all day.
And kill a battalion worth of my troops by lunchtime |
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Quoted: @blitzcraig173 My reasoning for the blocking position was more literal. Block forces from moving that direction, I don't expect them to provide cover for the sweep through the ORP due to the terrain. Looking back at distances, I realize my blocking MG cant move to far SE and still maintain contact with FT3. They're responsibility still remains the same though, albeit a tad less effective. edit ORP." We might be getting to deep into the what ifs, my apologies, but say your element hits a larger force on the way to ORP? What is the PACE plan that the TL at the ambush would then enact? I'm tracking up to that point. View Quote Fair enough. But if your blocking MG shoots, it is likely in the direction of friendlies. And why block? If they run that way, they run that way. As long as we can recover our men and equipment at the ORP(and even better, maintain the ambush), we'll be doing good in a fucked up scenario. I meant to say GOTWA, not PACE. As far as actions on contact for my element; engage and destroy with equal or greater odds(Army doctrine is 3:1 odds or break contact. Always seemed a bit much to me ). With worse odds, fight back to the ambush element and then move out at 90 degrees from previous path, SE back to the rest of the Company. Actions if the ambush takes contact: execute the ambush and egress to the ORP. No worries on the what-ifs. That's the fun |
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Quoted: @Ben I believe this was your question: Why did you choose to move to the hill east of the ORP? Why that position specifically? I chose to love to the hill to the East to get a vantage point and see what was going on, I posted my M240B there so if SHTF they could quickly return fire. Once I moved to this position I would radio command and see if the two guys at QRP are ok, if no reply I would move south of the hill I was positioned at then west to flank the QRP and take control of it. I hope this makes sense, again I’m new to this lol View Quote I'm not picking on you...rather trying to draw out your train of thought. How far is the hill from the ORP? How far is your visibility? |
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Quoted: I'm not picking on you...rather trying to draw out your train of thought. How far is the hill from the ORP? How far is your visibility? View Quote 200-250 meters 50 meter visibility Well shit, in that case I would probably still go to the hill try to see what I could and be in contact with command all the way through, then move directly south and west and still flank as planned My motive is to get off the X, once I’m getting shot at I need to move and the first thing that came to my mind was get the high ground, I still think it would be a good idea to flank the QRP, but of course that is subject to change I know you’re not picking on me, I’m here to learn |
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Radio to plt HQ a Spot report, possibly hard compromised
Pull one MG gun team to the rear and one fireteam from the assault element of the ambush. Leave the senior TL in charge of the ambush, have them go to weapons hold status until further ordered. If shit hits the fan, they are to fall back and move to the plt's position on their own. Accompany the fireteam and gun team towards the ORP. Place the MG in overwatch position from the NE, just outside of sight. Send the fireteam around from the east to linkup with the ORP, in wedge formation. If they spot enemy, engage. If number of enemy is small, kill them. If number seem high, break contact to the east. If they don't spot enemy, have them get to the ORP to see what happened. Have the TL send a runner back to you to report back what they find. |
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Whats the change in elevation between the contour lines on this map?
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Quoted: Is there a real danger in the possibility that your men from the ORP may try to linkup with you and get schwacked by your own unobserved claymores they were unaware of? View Quote Yes, however I made an assumption we had enough wire to command detonate claymores from the N side of the trail. Apologies, you said to be specific; I'll be more verbose next time to alleviate a second follow-up. Should be challenge/pass or other signal between elements if they are moving to rejoin the main party. |
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Quoted: OK, so your concern is the hunters have become the hunted, right? Under what conditions would MG1 and FT1s tasks change? View Quote In short, yes, that seems to be the best explanation at the moment. MG1 will keep rearguard until contact from the road or the situation at the ORP can be clarified. FT1 will keep rearguard with them, but if FT2 or FT3 hits something bigger than they can handle, or gets pinned down enough that they cant move back to the cover of MG2, FT1 is the only other mobile force available to try and flank whoever is beating on the other FTs. No real reason to it I guess with the mobility of modern GPMGs, but I really dont want the MG teams moving to contact. Id rather have them stationary and ready and do what I can to allow the contact to enter their engagement area (either in the ambush situation or in having friendly FTs drag whoever they are engaged with back to the MG). |
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I would send 4 men to see what happened, each one stopping at about 50 meters to cover each other and stay within eyesight.
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Quoted: As a general rule I avoid saying someone has the right answer- and I am not speaking for or against your overall plan, but this is very good. I'd like to emphasize the importance of communications. Your radio is mobile, right? So could you actually inform higher without potentially losing any real amount of time at all? Your point bears repeating that notifying higher that you are in trouble allows them to spool up all kinds of help that takes time. As a general rule, if you take contact everyone needs to shoot back first thing- except one guy. A message from a squad leader that takes 1 second can be extraordinarily valuable "(Unit callsign) in contact" or "(Unit callsign) taking fire" instantly, followed by what everyone else is doing, prevents you from getting tunnel vision and forgetting to send it til later, or from getting schwacked before sending a message and higher being left with no idea what is going on. If the scenario posted, you have time for a more thorough message than that, but the principle remains the same. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: I'm non-mil and never called in any sort of sit-rep, but I figured a quick update would not take very long - and given that I have already sat on my fingers for 3 minutes, if the two guys at the ORP are bleeding out then the time I spend on the radio is probably not going to matter much either way when it comes to just stabilizing them. However, having my leadership in the loop may mean that they can be looking at how to get medevac or reinforcements to me while I'm moving back to the ORP and possibly engaging with enemy forces - something I'll probably have to do just to recover the guys at the ORP before I can start giving them any aid. Not blind-siding them with this may mean that they can get resources to me quicker overall. Basically gambling that the time I spend on the radio is not the difference between life and death because if they're going to die in that time, I would not have been able to save them anyway. But the time an early update to leadership could get me on the back end could make a difference. As a general rule I avoid saying someone has the right answer- and I am not speaking for or against your overall plan, but this is very good. I'd like to emphasize the importance of communications. Your radio is mobile, right? So could you actually inform higher without potentially losing any real amount of time at all? Your point bears repeating that notifying higher that you are in trouble allows them to spool up all kinds of help that takes time. As a general rule, if you take contact everyone needs to shoot back first thing- except one guy. A message from a squad leader that takes 1 second can be extraordinarily valuable "(Unit callsign) in contact" or "(Unit callsign) taking fire" instantly, followed by what everyone else is doing, prevents you from getting tunnel vision and forgetting to send it til later, or from getting schwacked before sending a message and higher being left with no idea what is going on. If the scenario posted, you have time for a more thorough message than that, but the principle remains the same. Good point. In rereading the scenario, I forgot about the radio, and the claymores. Really easy to get tunnel vision for sure. |
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I'd try to make radio contact with the ORP.
If that doesn't work, I wouldn't want to abandon the mission, and I would need to stay with the bulk of the men, so I would send Fireteam 1 back to the ORP with a spare radio to see what's what. If the sentries are alive and well, I'd have them leave the radio and come back. Fireteam 1 moving towards a potential threat at a known location will have an advantage over an enemy moving through the dark with no specific destination or target; assuming the sentries were met with a superior force that is now looking around for the rest of us based on the number of packs they found. I'd let the rest of the guys know what was going on so they could be ready to reposition if necessary, and I'd have them look around for cover/fighting positions facing the ORP so they could be mentally prepared and quickly transition. I'd have Fireteam 3 designate two guys to reposition and watch towards the ORP until the situation resolves, with the understanding that friendlies may be returning from that direction. I would also take two guys from each remaining team (2 and 3) and we would go take the place of Fireteam 1 on the trail. This is so we don't lose visibility of that section, even if we do lose some strength by investigating. Everyone else would stay on their original task of watching the trail. Of my remaining forces, Fireteam 2 would remain strongest in case we ambush an enemy on the trail and they try to assault through the center. Both MGs would remain on the original mission. Without any further info this could be as simple as two sentries shooting at shadows, or even successfully killing a single enemy, and that doesn't justify abandoning the mission or repositioning the main force. If we can't see the ORP, any potential enemy at the ORP can't see us either. |
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Based off the way the ambush arrows are pointing, we were expecting contact from the east along the trial. I'm assuming that there is no one coming down the trial now due to the gunfire, or they will be ready for an ambush. That's at best. At worst they knew we were there and the possibility exists we are about to be caught between two enemy forces.
I radio in about the attack and begin to arrange relief forces and potential fire support at the ORP. I leave booby traps on the trail and move as fast as I safely can west down the trail. I move far enough west that I can move south to a point west of the summit of the hill and due west of the ORP. Once there circle the summit to the south until I can look down at the ORP. Will reevaluate once we make that position. Attached File |
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Quoted: Based off the way the ambush arrows are pointing, we were expecting contact from the east along the trial. I'm assuming that there is no one coming down the trial now due to the gunfire, or they will be ready for an ambush. That's at best. At worst they knew we were there and the possibility exists we are about to be caught between two enemy forces. I radio in about the attack and begin to arrange relief forces and potential fire support at the ORP. I leave booby traps on the trail and move as fast as I safely can west down the trail. I move far enough west that I can move south to a point west of the summit of the hill and due west of the ORP. Once there circle the summit to the south until I can look down at the ORP. Will reevaluate once we make that position. https://www.AR15.Com/media/mediaFiles/86202/TDG-1358861_pngasd_jpg-1359165.JPG View Quote The assumption on where the enemy will come from: in their position now, what direction does the ambush team have the longest sight line? Reinforcements are SE as well. Would that indicate threat direction more than the arrows, where you have 360 security regardless? Not picking on you at all, just you're the first to move your forces west like that. |
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Contact report to HHQ. RTO to begin pre-filling medevac 9-line (or whatever SOP alternate is available).
Fireteam 3 with one M240 to remain as rear security on the LOC/reserve in existing position. Fireteam 1 with SL and second M240 to setup base of fire on the high ground overlooking ORP. Bringing the SL so there's an extra shooter to do rear security on the high ground and an RTO that isn't in the assault element. Fireteam 2 to conduct movement to contact to ORP. All fireteam leaders to backbrief squad leader on near/far recognition signals prior to moving out to mitigate fratricide. If each team has a combat live saver, great. Otherwise CLS to be detailed with Fireteam 1 & the SL. CLS will join fireteam 2 if required once ORP is clear and security re-established. ETA: Also brief a new, alternate rally point. Probably on the other side of one of the terrain features, METT-TC dependent. I could go either way on bringing the second M240 with FT1 as well. Will be METT-TC dependent based on what we saw moving through there. I'd prefer speed, surprise and violence of action to catch any assaulters that hit our ORP while they're re-consolidating to having an extra M240 that's tough to maneuver in the vegetation so if its too thick I'd just leave it in place on the LOC. |
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Quoted: Based off the way the ambush arrows are pointing, we were expecting contact from the east along the trial. I'm assuming that there is no one coming down the trial now due to the gunfire, or they will be ready for an ambush. That's at best. At worst they knew we were there and the possibility exists we are about to be caught between two enemy forces. I radio in about the attack and begin to arrange relief forces and potential fire support at the ORP. I leave booby traps on the trail and move as fast as I safely can west down the trail. I move far enough west that I can move south to a point west of the summit of the hill and due west of the ORP. Once there circle the summit to the south until I can look down at the ORP. Will reevaluate once we make that position. https://www.AR15.Com/media/mediaFiles/86202/TDG-1358861_pngasd_jpg-1359165.JPG View Quote The trail will be the most dangerous spot on this map. High speed avenue of approach, and in this scenario you are even expecting enemy to be there. If you're doing this movement, I would handrail the trail. You will be spending a lot of time just to get the high ground. And it's a hill, not a mountain. With vegetation that thick it won't help visibility to be 10m up. If by booby traps you mean set up the claymores with a tripwire across the trail; I think that'll be a no-go these days, unfortunately. |
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Quoted: The trail will be the most dangerous spot on this map. High speed avenue of approach, and in this scenario you are even expecting enemy to be there. If you're doing this movement, I would handrail the trail. You will be spending a lot of time just to get the high ground. And it's a hill, not a mountain. With vegetation that thick it won't help visibility to be 10m up. If by booby traps you mean set up the claymores with a tripwire across the trail; I think that'll be a no-go these days, unfortunately. View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Based off the way the ambush arrows are pointing, we were expecting contact from the east along the trial. I'm assuming that there is no one coming down the trial now due to the gunfire, or they will be ready for an ambush. That's at best. At worst they knew we were there and the possibility exists we are about to be caught between two enemy forces. I radio in about the attack and begin to arrange relief forces and potential fire support at the ORP. I leave booby traps on the trail and move as fast as I safely can west down the trail. I move far enough west that I can move south to a point west of the summit of the hill and due west of the ORP. Once there circle the summit to the south until I can look down at the ORP. Will reevaluate once we make that position. https://www.AR15.Com/media/mediaFiles/86202/TDG-1358861_pngasd_jpg-1359165.JPG The trail will be the most dangerous spot on this map. High speed avenue of approach, and in this scenario you are even expecting enemy to be there. If you're doing this movement, I would handrail the trail. You will be spending a lot of time just to get the high ground. And it's a hill, not a mountain. With vegetation that thick it won't help visibility to be 10m up. If by booby traps you mean set up the claymores with a tripwire across the trail; I think that'll be a no-go these days, unfortunately. Agree on handrailing the trail. Just using to move as quickly as possible from current position. Hopefully being next to trail will balance time to get to higher ground. what if we just accidently left the claymores there? ;) Also, by being on south of hill I believe I could still retreat south, away from trail if I had to. May not be in direct line to rest of group, but still closer. |
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A couple thoughts:
- It seems to me that it's important to recognize when an objective is no longer viable. The ambush was toast the second there was automatic gunfire from the ORP. We have to be able to recognize our new objective and pivot (determine status of ORP, render aid if needed, GTFO). we don't really know what's happened at this point. - 3 minutes seems like a long time to take action - First thing is to radio command and let them know you are compromised. They have more resources at their disposal - air support, arty, reinforcements, etc. - My instinct is to establish high ground and a base of fire (hill to the southeast looks nice, also already in the direction of the rest of the platoon), but doesn't do much good when you can only see 50m (and it's dark) - Traversing around on a flanking maneuver also seems too slow - hacking our way though dense jungle doesn't seem like a great idea, we've already wasted 3+ minutes now - That's why what I'm going to do is fan out and advance directly back towards the ORP, MGs on our flanks. Enemy already knows we're here. We're going to be fighting uphill, which is going to suck, but I don't see the better option. |
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I would have given orders to the ORP to fall back to the east and link up with the rest of the platoon in an emergency instead of trying to come up on the ambush site to begin with.
Now after hearing the gunfire and not being in contact with the ORP I can assume they are either dead or falling back to the east per their orders. Then I either stick with the ambush and see it through and then pull back to the east and linl up with the rest of the platoon or pull my three fire teams back to the rest of the platoon and set up a counterattack plan. |
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Quoted: Agree on handrailing the trail. Just using to move as quickly as possible from current position. Hopefully being next to trail will balance time to get to higher ground. what if we just accidently left the claymores there? ;) Also, by being on south of hill I believe I could still retreat south, away from trail if I had to. May not be in direct line to rest of group, but still closer. View Quote Speed is definitely a factor in this situation, and if we weren't actually expecting enemy I'd say take the trail. However, moving 200m directly to the ORP would be quicker than moving west and then south up the hill. Lol. The fact that we even have claymores shows how fictional this scenario is. |
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Quoted: I would have given orders to the ORP to fall back to the east and link up with the rest of the platoon in an emergency instead of trying to come up on the ambush site to begin with. Now after hearing the gunfire and not being in contact with the ORP I can assume they are either dead or falling back to the east per their orders. Then I either stick with the ambush and see it through and then pull back to the east and linl up with the rest of the platoon or pull my three fire teams back to the rest of the platoon and set up a counterattack plan. View Quote It would likely be a specialist(maybe SGT) and a private left at the ORP. There is no way they would be trusted to do a 3km movement. Plus they leave all the packs in that scenario. Fighting to the ambush element is the only option for them. I like the last part. Accomplish the mission and link up with the larger element. You must maintain men, weapons, and equip(MWE) though. |
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Quoted: Dearest Mother, Today marked the 8th day of the campaign, and I fear the spirit of all the OPTs is flagging. Yesterday, we fought a fierce wargame around two COAs, and the action was hotly contested. Nary a planner escaped without some wound, and many were grievous, I fear. A major from the J-2 lost his leg when his collection plan broke loose and fell on him. Yet some part of me sees him as the lucky one. For him, this war is over. The rest of us remain. Today, we engaged in hand-to-hand to seize COA 2.5, but it looks no different to me than what we fought for yesterday. The logistics planner says that we will use multi-mode sustainment, but none of us know what that means. I pray that, tomorrow, the IO and fires effects are coordinated. How I miss you and my sisters. I remain, Your son View Quote LOL. |
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Try and radio the two Marines. If radio contact is made, send one fire team back to ORP for visual assessment. If the gunfire resulted from contact with the enemy, then move remaining men to the ORP and withdraw. If gunfire was due to negligence, then move ORP and ambush to a different location.
If radio contact cannot be established with ORP: Plant claymores inside the brush line on south side of road facing towards the ORP. Send two fire teams and both machine gun teams southeast to the elevated location to the east of the ORP. Remaining fire team will set fire to the forest on the north side of the road and will detonate a grenade or two in the same location while withdrawing to the south east elevated location. When this third fire team has met back up with the rest of the group, everyone will move in a line towards the ORP with one fire team in lead as recon. If a small enemy force occupies the ORP all teams will ambush the enemy and retake supplies/men. If a large force occupies the ORP all teams will withdraw without engaging. If the ORP is empty all teams will recover supplies/men if possible and withdraw. |
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Shoot, move and communicate are the primary actions, so in this case my first choice is communicate.
Notify higher 1- Maybe they got some useful info that may have an effect on your future decisions. 2- Or maybe they'll change your orders. 3- Tell you to deal with it as you deem appropriate. I wouldn't take any other beyond attempting to communicate first. |
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Some considerations as I see it:
1. What is my comms situation? I need to tell my higher HQ that we're in contact, the ORP is compromised and the ambush is at risk. I also want to get comms with my ORP element to get their status and contact report 2. What was the 5 point contingency plan I left with the ORP? I can anticipate their reaction based on what I told them to do. They made contact so they either fought it off, displaced themselves, or died in place. If they displaced which direction and what are their actions now? 3. What are my far/near recognition signals with my ORP? Far is likely radio contact, near at night is probably IR flash number combo from my PVS-14. That will be important if I take any element back to the ORP. 4. Controlling my element at night is difficult. I have three fire teams and two MG teams with me, a 2 man ORP that may be in the wind, and an unknown number/composition of enemy. We are in restricted terrain at night. I would hesitate to split my elements up any more than I have already as that creates new difficulties in linking back up. For the plan: Unless my higher HQ directs me to continue with the ambush I am going to abandon that mission for now. Assuming I can't make radio comms with my ORP I'm going to maneuver the ambush element back to their position. My reasoning is the ORP should be in a defensible location; I want to regroup my patrol, get accountability of all my men and weapons and then determine how to react to the enemy contact. We will move in a fire team wedge, platoon file. The goal is to get back to the ORP quickly and minimize the patrol's signature until we can regroup. If the near recognition flashes are not returned, then we will conduct an envelopment on the ORP. |
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My CoA:
1. Radio a contact report to the platoon leader (or whatever HHQ I can reach on my radio) to let him know there's likely enemy activity in the area, and asking for any relevant intel to be forwarded to me (e.g. from overhead ISR, SIGINT, etc.). 2. Assuming that "you are equipped with a radio" means *one* radio for me to communicate with HHQ, not for me to communicate with my subordinates, I would gather my three fire team leaders and the two machine gun team leaders near fire team 2, and tell them what the new plan is. 3. The new plan: leave the two MG teams in place (but have them move closer together) to interdict any enemy traveling on the trail, in case the attack on the ORP was done by an enemy element linked to a larger enemy movement along the trail. Leave fire team 2 in place to provide rear security (east-south-west arc) for the MG teams, in case there are additional bad guys in the woods. 4. Have fire teams 1 and 3 come with me (bounding) towards the ORP to see what's going on. Hopefully our side has NODs and the other doesn't, and hopefully the two Marines at the ORP remember the IFF challenge so they don't shoot at us as we are approaching. Tell my troops to be prepared to engage any unknown contact but only after IFF, in case the two Marines are E&Eing towards our ambush site near the trail. OK, five minutes are up! Looking forward to reading what everyone else came up with, and what the "best" CoA is. |
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Quoted: My CoA: 1. Radio a contact report to the platoon leader (or whatever HHQ I can reach on my radio) to let him know there's likely enemy activity in the area, and asking for any relevant intel to be forwarded to me (e.g. from overhead ISR, SIGINT, etc.). 2. Assuming that "you are equipped with a radio" means *one* radio for me to communicate with HHQ, not for me to communicate with my subordinates, I would gather my three fire team leaders and the two machine gun team leaders near fire team 2, and tell them what the new plan is. 3. The new plan: leave the two MG teams in place (but have them move closer together) to interdict any enemy traveling on the trail, in case the attack on the ORP was done by an enemy element linked to a larger enemy movement along the trail. Leave fire team 2 in place to provide rear security (east-south-west arc) for the MG teams, in case there are additional bad guys in the woods. 4. Have fire teams 1 and 3 come with me (bounding) towards the ORP to see what's going on. Hopefully our side has NODs and the other doesn't, and hopefully the two Marines at the ORP remember the IFF challenge so they don't shoot at us as we are approaching. Tell my troops to be prepared to engage any unknown contact but only after IFF, in case the two Marines are E&Eing towards our ambush site near the trail. OK, five minutes are up! Looking forward to reading what everyone else came up with, and what the "best" CoA is. View Quote Very similar to my solution. I have truly enjoyed reading the responses in this thread. It has been educational and has given me insight into my own assumptions and decision-making abilities. Thanks Ben. |
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1. my current mission is compromised
2. I don't have a decision to make, I've already made it with my last instructions to the ORP security element in case they took contact. that process begins at the first sound of gunfire from anywhere that isn't my current mission 3. if I'm the patrol leader, I need to be fucking fired for setting my ORP within a kilometer of my objective without the use of an acceptable terrain feature in lieu of that limit |
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Quoted: Shoot, move and communicate are the primary actions, so in this case my first choice is communicate. Notify higher 1- Maybe they got some useful info that may have an effect on your future decisions. 2- Or maybe they'll change your orders. 3- Tell you to deal with it as you deem appropriate. I wouldn't take any other beyond attempting to communicate first. View Quote Odds of higher having useful info on your ORP in 3 mins seem low. Maybe they'll know about a larger force on the LOC... but wouldn't they have relayed that already if there was anything to pass along knowing you are in ambush on said LOC? Getting ISR overhead will take awhile, if it's even available, unless it's already there. Totally enemy dependent but there's good odds once you key that mic for a longer transmission the gig is up. Any adversary with reasonable DF/EW/SIGINT will know you're there. Even without sigint, opfor that bumped the orp and found a dozen rucksacks with two dudes knows there are a bunch more folks not far away. I dont want to give them time to consolidate and go hunting. I think seizing the initiative is far more important then waiting for some FGO to break away from updating the TPS reports at BN and tell me to restore security at my ORP 200 yards thru the woods. Best case Pvt Snuffie just had a ND and it's nothing, but I think you have to assume a most dangerous COA that the OP is overrun by opfor recce and the opfor main body is coming down the LOC. Sitting tight and waiting for higher to tell you something means there is a good chance you get engaged in a fight with the main body in the kill zone with an opfor recon element free to manuever in the backfield which would be no bueno. |
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Without reading any responses, and with the knowledge that I have precisely zero military experience...
Assumptions: 1.) I have a radio, but the rest of the fireteams/squad with me do not - assuming the radio is connecting me only to the rest of the platoon 3 km away 2.) The road appears to be at the bottom of a valley, with ORP up a hill on the West. The adjoining hill to the East is too far away from ORP to get sight of ORP at same/better height. 3.) Primary importance was originally to keep the road covered while, you know, not dying. 4.) We have nods 5.) Moving in this type of wooded area is noisy business, especially with 240B's. Steps I would take: Notify the rest of the platoon as to what happened and what I'm about to do. Ask for support and expect it not to arrive for 25 minutes. Advise them to split - 1/2 move to the West sufficient that they can approach ORP from uphill, 1/2 take the top of the hill to the East. Since we're only 200 meters from ORP, set claymores at the current position, assuming that if the marines were ambushed whoever did that is headed to our position next. Send one fireteam and the two mg teams quickly and quietly cattycorner from where we're at on the road - that is, move across the road to the northeast 25m inside the wooded area, and cover to the SW. That puts them near a clearing that gives them additional sight distance. I take two fireteams down the road to the West to try to hook around the end of the hill and move up to the peak quietly. If we can approach ORP, radio platoon to let them know not to shoot us. Otherwise, sit tight/hold pos for the rest of the platoon to sandwich in any enemies. |
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Quoted: Shoot, move and communicate are the primary actions, so in this case my first choice is communicate. Notify higher 1- Maybe they got some useful info that may have an effect on your future decisions. 2- Or maybe they'll change your orders. 3- Tell you to deal with it as you deem appropriate. I wouldn't take any other beyond attempting to communicate first. View Quote your primary action should be think the rest is always mixed up |
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For what it’s worth, this TDG came out in 1998, so think of it in that equipment ?mindset
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Well my 5pt contingency plan would have covered the what to do in case of contact.
However my next move would rely on a few things, do we have comes with the ORP? and was the fire an attack on my ORP security team or just random harassing fire?. For my 5pt an attack on the ORP and we are asshole and elbows back to save our guys. For possible random harassing fire, I would probably send a fireteam with gun in trail. to go back and make contact with the ORP security team and leaving everyone else on the ambush line. There will be risks as your ORP team could have got rolled up and the enemy is setting in a ambush for any returning forces, my reasoning for the small force is we can sneak in undetected and either make comms and confirm our guys are good, or get eyes on the enemy and see what happened. I would find a good spot for the gun team to overwatch and take a few of my guys to see what happened. Second part is leaving the rest on the ambush site as to be able to accomplish the mission should opportunity present itself. Sometimes you can save your buddies and accomplish a seconday mission/Murphy playing fuck fuck games and still accomplish the mission, still alot of risk in my plan, but risk is part of the hunt. Another problem with my plan is making sure the guy that is left on the ambush site is tracking what to do if we make contact and what I will do if he makes contact(once again the 5pt should cover this). The book answer is probably to move your entire element to the ORP and bound across and kill the enemy, but what if it was just harassing fire or a company sized element just rolled across your ORP? now your compromised or even worse. With my plan we move a small element that either confirms harrassing fire, ORP had a ND/fell asleep or there is an ambush set in by a larger force. Better for me to take my small group and confirm the above and not risk the main part of my force/mission, might be off as I have been drinking but that's what I think off the top of my head. |
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A few more thoughts after reading everyone else's responses (and after thinking/writing for more than 5 minutes):
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Can we see more of the map? ORP is in a saddle and likely sited to provide early warning for threats from the rear. Enemy force knows our unit size and likely rough position.
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Quoted: Can we see more of the map? ORP is in a saddle and likely sited to provide early warning for threats from the rear. Enemy force knows our unit size and likely rough position. View Quote This scenario was orginally published in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1998. What you see is what you get. |
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Quoted: A few more thoughts after reading everyone else's responses (and after thinking/writing for more than 5 minutes):
View Quote I apologize that I haven't gotten around to responding to everyone yet. There are some great responses in this thread. EastcARstle brings up a good point that needs to be considered by all- no knocks against anyone who has made an attempt so far, as you just don't know what you don't know, but... Your platoon is 3km away. For planning purposes, men with NVGs (no white lights) and combat equipment move about 500m an hour in the treeline. Contemplate that. To move the distance you'd cover by walking around a track and then one more straight away, it is going to take an hour. So how long will it take help to arrive? |
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1. Attempt to make contact with the marines via radio.
2. If you can't contact the marines, leave one fire team and the machine gun squad with claymores to continue with the ambush. (Primary mission still being carried out.) 3. Take remaining two firesquads (along with all grenades) and make your way to the marines to see what's going on. |
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Quoted: Well my 5pt contingency plan would have covered the what to do in case of contact. However my next move would rely on a few things, do we have comes with the ORP? and was the fire an attack on my ORP security team or just random harassing fire?. For my 5pt an attack on the ORP and we are asshole and elbows back to save our guys. For possible random harassing fire, I would probably send a fireteam with gun in trail. to go back and make contact with the ORP security team and leaving everyone else on the ambush line. There will be risks as your ORP team could have got rolled up and the enemy is setting in a ambush for any returning forces, my reasoning for the small force is we can sneak in undetected and either make comms and confirm our guys are good, or get eyes on the enemy and see what happened. I would find a good spot for the gun team to overwatch and take a few of my guys to see what happened. Second part is leaving the rest on the ambush site as to be able to accomplish the mission should opportunity present itself. Sometimes you can save your buddies and accomplish a seconday mission/Murphy playing fuck fuck games and still accomplish the mission, still alot of risk in my plan, but risk is part of the hunt. Another problem with my plan is making sure the guy that is left on the ambush site is tracking what to do if we make contact and what I will do if he makes contact(once again the 5pt should cover this). The book answer is probably to move your entire element to the ORP and bound across and kill the enemy, but what if it was just harassing fire or a company sized element just rolled across your ORP? now your compromised or even worse. With my plan we move a small element that either confirms harrassing fire, ORP had a ND/fell asleep or there is an ambush set in by a larger force. Better for me to take my small group and confirm the above and not risk the main part of my force/mission, might be off as I have been drinking but that's what I think off the top of my head. View Quote left and right can O&S when you start a daisy around the ORP if the 5-point wasn't accomplished eta: it shouldn't take very long, some fuckhead put the ORP within range of the objective |
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Quoted: left and right can O&S when you start a daisy around the ORP if the 5-point wasn't accomplished eta: it shouldn't take very long, some fuckhead put the ORP within range of the objective View Quote View All Quotes View All Quotes Quoted: Quoted: Well my 5pt contingency plan would have covered the what to do in case of contact. However my next move would rely on a few things, do we have comes with the ORP? and was the fire an attack on my ORP security team or just random harassing fire?. For my 5pt an attack on the ORP and we are asshole and elbows back to save our guys. For possible random harassing fire, I would probably send a fireteam with gun in trail. to go back and make contact with the ORP security team and leaving everyone else on the ambush line. There will be risks as your ORP team could have got rolled up and the enemy is setting in a ambush for any returning forces, my reasoning for the small force is we can sneak in undetected and either make comms and confirm our guys are good, or get eyes on the enemy and see what happened. I would find a good spot for the gun team to overwatch and take a few of my guys to see what happened. Second part is leaving the rest on the ambush site as to be able to accomplish the mission should opportunity present itself. Sometimes you can save your buddies and accomplish a seconday mission/Murphy playing fuck fuck games and still accomplish the mission, still alot of risk in my plan, but risk is part of the hunt. Another problem with my plan is making sure the guy that is left on the ambush site is tracking what to do if we make contact and what I will do if he makes contact(once again the 5pt should cover this). The book answer is probably to move your entire element to the ORP and bound across and kill the enemy, but what if it was just harassing fire or a company sized element just rolled across your ORP? now your compromised or even worse. With my plan we move a small element that either confirms harrassing fire, ORP had a ND/fell asleep or there is an ambush set in by a larger force. Better for me to take my small group and confirm the above and not risk the main part of my force/mission, might be off as I have been drinking but that's what I think off the top of my head. left and right can O&S when you start a daisy around the ORP if the 5-point wasn't accomplished eta: it shouldn't take very long, some fuckhead put the ORP within range of the objective What's O&S? What's a daisy?? "What's a defilade? What's grazing fire?" |
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In 2020 someone better have a Mavic Air or similar organic to a squad. Pop that bad boy up and see if you can get eyes on the ORP. Then fly it down the trail. If recon is inconclusive call in possible contact and move ambush to other side of the trail. Call for reinforcements from the south. If there are bad guys the force moving north will sweep them into your ambush. Attached File
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At that point the ambush is compromised either way so it's time to break.
Team 2 is going to head due west for 100 yards or more then turning south so they can approach the ORP from a position of advantage (working northeast down the slope toward the ORP instead of straight to the ORP up the slope) while Team 3 does the opposite scrambling southeast up the hill before turning west to provide overwatch for Team 2 moving in. Team 1 moves slowly up the draw to provide additional back up from a third direction if needed. Assuming no radio comms with the ORP there should be sign/countersign calls for approaching the ORP. Maybe give Team 2 twenty minutes to work their way around the 500 meters or so distance. Team 3 has a lot less distance to cover with the 240 so should have no problem getting into position. If the teams don't have comms between each other hopefully they've trained a lot together! Attached File How bad did I do? ETA - Now that I’ve read the responses not too well. I’m thinking daylight travel times for my recon Team 2 not night times. Was focused on solving the immediate issue without thinking about notifying higher ups. After I wipe out a few platoons of fire teams with incompetence I’ll start to get better (I hope)! |
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Quoted: I apologize that I haven't gotten around to responding to everyone yet. There are some great responses in this thread. EastcARstle brings up a good point that needs to be considered by all- no knocks against anyone who has made an attempt so far, as you just don't know what you don't know, but... Your platoon is 3km away. For planning purposes, men with NVGs (no white lights) and combat equipment move about 500m an hour in the treeline. Contemplate that. To move the distance you'd cover by walking around a track and then one more straight away, it is going to take an hour. So how long will it take help to arrive? View Quote Oh yeah... |
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I'd immediately reorient the majority of us to the new threat while maintaining 360* security. Simultaneously, higher up would be notified of the changing situation, claymores would be retrieved, and we'd prepare to move west up the hill overlooking the ORP by bounding overwatch. MG squad will provide overwatch for a fireteam attempting to recce and make contact with the ORP.
With limited METT-TC details I'm making some big assumptions: 1. "Equipped with a radio" means no intrateam radios. I'm going to extend that lack of tech to assume no or minimal NOD, IR, etc. 4 hours of darkness left means I don't want to split my forces anymore than I already have for control reasons. 2. The ORP is sited between two hills (uknown elevation change) unusually close to the OBJ. I'm going to assume the ORP was sited as such to act as an LP/OP along a natural line of drift to watch our backtrail. This means our rear security has just been bumped by the enemy and our ambush is well and truly compromised. 3. Without an infil/exfil plan I'm going to assume the plan to exfil was a 3 km walk back to linkup with the platoon to the south. That is too far for two privates at the ORP to do on their own. Their likely COA will be to successfully repel the enemy and remain at the ORP, die in place, or break contact back to the OBJ. Regardless, we're going to them if they don't show up. *edit for formatting/spelling |
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Here's my immediate reaction. I have not read any replies to this thread.
My overall plan is to keep the ambush in place, but investigate the shots from the ORP by myself with one fire-team. Specifics are below: - immediately call in to the platoon leader on the radio, giving him a brief outline of the situation. Tell him the ambush will remain in place, but I will investigate a possible firefight at the ORP. (Rationale: always keep my leadership in the loop) - leave the machine gun teams in position for the ambush, as well as two of the fire teams. (Rationale: Since our mission is the ambush, it is imperative that the mission continue with minimal disruption. The machine guns are crucial to an ambush, and no matter what I do, I cannot afford to remove them from the primary mission). - delegate authority to my most capable fire team leader to command the ambush. (Rationale: I need a responsible person in command so the ambush will go smoothly, and authority has to be CLEAR - especially when something unexpected happens) - order the delegated leader to re position one man from each fire team to keep watch towards the ORP, in case enemy forces might be approaching from that direction, and have a plan to re-position the machine gun teams to face and attack from the south-west direction. (Rationale: If it was an encounter with the enemy, they could be approaching our position from the direction of the ORP). - take one fire team and leave the ambush to return to the ORP in order to investigate. (Rationale: I believe it is my responsibility as a leader to know that is happening with all of my men, whether the gunfire i heard was an accidental discharge, or an encounter with the enemy. Going alone would be foolhardy, since the chance of me being killed and only adding to the uncertainty and ambiguity for the rest of my men would be counter-productive. However, ONE fire-team is all I can afford to remove from the ambush force, since I have no information on the possible size of an enemy force that may appear on the path). - take an indirect (circuitous) route back to the ORP, so I can approach it from the west. (Rationale: There is a possibility that the ORP was attacked by the enemy, AND that the enemy may know where our ambush is located, so rushing in a straight line back to the ORP could expose us to an enemy ambush. Furthermore, since it was just gunfire for a few seconds, with no follow-up, it suggests that whatever happened, it is over now, so there is no immediate urgency, and I can afford the extra time to approach the ORP from an unexpected direction). - approach the ORP cautiously in order to ascertain the situation. (OPTIONAL: - violently beat the fucking idiot who had an accidental discharge back at the ORP) |
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