[ARCHIVED THREAD] - Lessons Learned/Fallujah (Page 1 of 2)
Posted: 4/7/2005 5:22:06 AM EDT
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This After Action report was put together by some enlisted Devil Dogs. It is one of the most brilliant pieces of analysis/tactics/MOUT study, I have ever read. It is concise, yet comprehensive. If you are going over, and you're going to be fighting, this is a must read. Read it a few times. Make diagrams. Use it as a teaching aid. Read it again. Fallujah: Operation Phantom Fury For the Record: Infantry Squad Tactics in Fallujah Introduction Historically speaking, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) have created casualty figures that are extraordinary compared to similar operations conducted in different types of environments. The casualties in MOUT present a significant challenge to small unit leaders. Casualties hit Marine infantry squads and fire teams extremely hard because generally speaking they were already under the table of organization (T/O) standards. Some squads in 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) commenced the assault on the Jolan with only six Marines. It is the small unit leaders’ duty to accomplish the mission with the least amount of casualties possible. In order for small unit leaders to complete the above task they need tactics and techniques that will prevent casualties. Section 1 of the Scout/Sniper Platoon has attacked and cleared buildings with all the line companies in 3/5. The authors have observed nearly all the squads in the battalion and have “rolled in the stack” with many of them. This is an experience which few in the battalion have. Knowing this, the authors believe it is their duty to consolidate their observations, produce a comprehensive evaluation of squad tactics and techniques, and pass it onto the squad leaders. The authors’ intent is to give the squad leaders options in combat. It is by no means a “bible,” but it is a guideline. All the tactics and techniques have been proven in combat by one squad or another. Section 1 does not take any credit for the information contained within. The information was learned through the blood of the infantry squads in 3/5. The entire evaluation has one underlying theme: Accomplish the mission with the least amount of casualties possible. Terrain and Enemy Terrain: The city of Fallujah, Iraq is unlike any city in which Marines have trained for. The layout of the city is random. Zoning distinguishing between residential, business, and industrial is non-existent. An infantry squad could be clearing a house and next door may be clearing a slaughterhouse or furniture wood shop. The streets are narrow and are generally lined by walls. The walls channelize the squad and do not allow for standard immediate action drills when contact is made. This has not been an issue because the majority of contact is not made in the streets, but in the houses. The houses are densely packed in blocks. The houses touch or almost touch the adjacent houses to the sides and rear. This enables the insurgents to escape the view of Marine overwatch positions. The houses also are all made of brick with a thick covering of mortar overtop. In almost every house a fragmentation grenade can be used without fragments coming through the walls. Each room can be fragged individually. Almost all houses have an enclosed courtyard. Upon entry into the courtyard, there is usually an outhouse large enough for one man. The rooftops as well as a large first story window overlook the courtyard. Generally, all the windows in the house are barred and covered with blinds or cardboard restricting visibility into the house. The exterior doors of the houses are both metal and wood. The wood doors usually have a metal gate over top on the outside of the house forming two barriers to breach. The doors have two to three locking points. Some doors are even barricaded from the inside to prevent entry. There are generally two to three entrances to the house. The entrances are the front, the kitchen, and the side or rear. The interior doors are also made of metal and wood. The differences between the interior and exterior doors are the strength and durability of the doors. Interior doors only have one locking point and most of them can be kicked in. All doors inside and outside of the house are usually locked and must be breached. The layout of all the houses is generally the same. Initial entry in the front door leads to a small room with two interior doors. The two doors are the entrance to two adjacent open seating rooms. The size of the rooms varies according to the size of the house. At the end of the sitting rooms are interior doors that open up into a central hallway. The central hallway is where all the first floor rooms lead and it contains the ladderwell to the second deck. The second deck will contain more rooms and an exit to the middle rooftop. The middle rooftop will have an exterior ladderwell leading up to the highest rooftop. Enemy: The two types of insurgents that the squads are engaging will be labeled the Guerrillas and the Martyrs in this evaluation. The Guerillas are classified by the following principles: Their purpose is to kill many Marines quickly and then evade. They DO NOT want to die. Dying is an acceptable risk to the Guerillas, but their intention is to live and fight another day. The tactics used are classic Guerilla warfare. The Guerillas will engage Marines only on terrain of their choosing when they have tactical advantage. After contact is made the Guerillas will disengage and evade. Their evasion route normally is out of sight of Marine overwatch positions. The Martyrs are classified by the following principles: The Martyrs’ purpose is to kill as many Marines as possible before they are killed. Time does not have any significance. The Martyrs want to die by the hands of Marines. The final outcome of their actions results in dead Marines as well as their death. Their tactics directly reflect their purpose. The Martyrs will make fortified fighting positions in houses and wait. Marines will come, they will fight, and they will die in place. Both the Guerillas and Martyrs employ the same weapons. The weapons used are mostly small arms, grenades, and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). The Martyrs have used heavy machine guns and anti-air machine guns, unfortunately, with good effects. The battle positions and tactics that the both employ are somewhat similar. The major differences between the two are the egress route and the fortifications. Guerrillas have an evasion plan, while the martyrs do not. The Guerrillas normally do not have fortified positions. Marines have been engaged from mouse holes within the house, Guerrillas shooting down from the rooftops when they are moving into the courtyard, Guerrillas and Martyrs shooting and throwing grenades down the ladderwells, in second deck rooms that are fortified or blacked out, and upon breaching of interior doors. Martyrs have emplaced machine gun positions in rooms facing down the long axis of hallways. The egress routes the Guerrillas use are preplanned and well-rehearsed. They move in groups and withdrawal perpendicular to Marines’ forward line of troops (FLOT). Their movement is through windows of houses, down back alleys, and from roof to roof (only when obscured from Marine overwatch positions). The routes minimize exposure in the streets. Escape routes do not cross streets that run perpendicular to the FLOT, only parallel. This is done because Marine snipers during 2nd Battalion/1st Marines’ (2/1) attack last April devastated the insurgents when attempting to cross those streets. If contact is made with Guerrillas and the block is not isolated on all four sides then their chance of escape increases exponentially. Isolation of the block is absolutely necessary in order to prevent any “squirters.” Overall, the enemy has adapted their tactics and techniques in order to maximize their strong points and hit Marines when they are the most vulnerable. They have learned from 2/1’s attack last April. This is common sense, but it must be said in order that Marines realize the enemy they are fighting is somewhat intelligent. In MOUT it only takes a miniscule amount of intelligence in order to create massive amounts of casualties. Squad Tactics Squad Movement: During house-to-house detailed clearing attacks, squads must minimize exposure in the streets. The streets, especially in Fallujah, can become a death trap if a squad is engaged. The squad should run from house to house in a stack with all elements (security, assault and supporting) in their appropriate position. In the street the stack should be slightly staggered like a tight tactical column. The Marines should have some dispersion, and the pace of the running should not be so fast that the Marines are uncontrolled and not maintaining all around security. As soon as the point man/one man reaches the courtyard breach the stack should close the gaps of dispersion and swiftly move to accomplish their tasks. All danger areas while on the move must be covered. Security must be three-dimensional and all around. Each Marine in the stack looks to the Marines to his front, assesses danger areas that are not covered, and then covers one of them. If every Marine does this then all danger areas will be covered. Top Down verse Bottom Up Assaults: An infantry squad can assault structures using two different methods. Traditionally, the top down assault is taught as being the most ideal method for clearing a structure. Realistically, this may not be the best option for the infantry squad. Below are the advantages and disadvantages of both top down and bottom up assault methods. Top Down: Advantages - Surprising the enemy by moving from the top down may throw the enemy off balance. The enemy’s defenses may not be prepared for a top down assault and the squad could overwhelm the enemy rapidly. The squad has more momentum when moving down the ladderwells. If the squad knows that the enemy is inside the roof can be breached in order so grenades and explosives could be dropped on top of the enemy. The enemy’s egress routes are greatly reduced because the squad can isolate the house by holding security on the back alleys and the front of the house from the roof. Disadvantages - Once the squad makes entry and contact is made, pulling out of the structure is extremely difficult. This limits the options for the squad leader on how to engage the enemy. The structure must be flooded and Marines have to go overtop of casualties in order to kill the enemy. Momentum must not be lost. Marines have been left behind in houses because the momentum was lost. If the squad decides to break contact they are moving opposite of their momentum and more casualties will result. Marine squads may not have enough Marines to effectively flood the structure. If casualties are taken they are nearly impossible to pull up the ladderwell with all their gear and a limp body. This is another reason why the structure must be flooded. The casualties will not receive the immediate first aid because the entire squad must be committed to neutralization of the threat. The swiftness of medical attention may mean the difference between life and death. Bottom Up: Advantages - The squad leader has a slew of options when contact is made. The structure does not have to be flooded. Momentum can be maintained in assaulting or breaking contact and the squad leader can switch rapidly from one to the other relatively quickly. The structure can be cleared with fewer Marines because the clearing is more controlled and smooth whereas top down is always in high gear. Casualties can be pulled out faster and easier simply because gravity is working for the squad. Disadvantages - The squad is moving into the enemy’s defenses. It is easy for the enemy to hold the second deck and ladderwell. The squad is slow moving up the ladderwell, which makes it harder to maintain momentum. The enemy has the ability to escape by using its preplanned routes. Overall, there should not be a standard assault method. Rather the squad leader should understand the advantages and disadvantages of each, assess each structure quickly, make a decision on which method to employ, and then take actions that maximize its advantages while minimizing its disadvantages. Gaining Footholds: Footholds are extremely important. By establishing footholds the squad establishes strong points during the assault that can be used for consolidation, coordination, base of fire positions, rally points, and casualty collection points. The squad must move from one foothold to another, never stopping until each foothold is attained. The succession of footholds that the squad establishes will be different when assaulting from either the top down or the bottom up. The following footholds should be seized in this order when assaulting from the top down: * All rooftops * The inside top deck * Each individual lower level to the bottom deck * The courtyard The footholds seized when assaulting from the bottom up are in the reverse order. They are the following: * The front courtyard * The first two seating rooms * The central hallway * Each successive upper deck with its respective rooftop * Uppermost rooftop At each individual foothold the squad can consolidate and coordinate its further clearing of the structure. If contact is made the footholds can be used to establish a base of fire in order to assault or break contact. When breaking contact they are used as rally points in order for the squad and fire team leaders to get accountability of all their Marines. The squad will bound back through each foothold. A foothold can also be used as a casualty collection point. Structure Clearing: Types of entry – During the assault on a structure there are three different tactics that the squad can use for entry into the structure. The three types of entry are dynamic, stealth and subdued. The dynamic entry is violently aggressively from start to finish. The commands are verbal and yelled. The squads lead by fire placing one or two rounds in every door that is closed or window that is blacked out. Fragmentation grenades, stun grenades, and flashbangs are used. At night, surefire flashlights are employed in order to clear. The movement of the squad is swift and overwhelming for the enemy inside. The stealth entry is exactly the opposite of the dynamic entry. The squad breaches quietly, moves slowly, speaks only in whispers, and listens for any movement within the house. There is extreme emphasis placed on initiative based tactics (IBT). During night clearing, night vision goggles and PE Q-2s are used instead of surefire flashlights. The stealth entry confuses the enemy on exactly where the squad is in clearing the house and allows the squad to maintain the element of surprise. Subdued entry is a combination of the two previous types. The squad moves quietly until they encounter a room. Upon entry into the room, Marines are violently aggressive. After the room is cleared, the Marines switch back to the stealth method of entry. This type of entry allows the squad leader to control the rate of clearing while maintaining some element of surprise. It is important to note that squad leaders must vary the type of entry. The squad must constantly mask its movement through every form of deception that may confuse the enemy inside the building or room. It is up to the entire squad to use its imagination and vary the entry tactics and techniques as much as possible. The objective is to keep the enemy off balance and not allow him to get into the squad's rhythm. Breaching: There are three types of breaching that were used in Fallujah. The types of breaching are mechanical, ballistic and explosive. Mechanical breaching of the exterior walls of the courtyard or gate was mostly done by amphibious assault vehicles (AAV's), tanks, D-9 bulldozers, or HMMWVs. Sledgehammers and hooligans were used to breach both the metal and wooden doors of the house, but this was and is not the preferred method for breaching. Sledgehammers and hooligans are slow and they require the breacher to stand in front of the door being breach. Obviously, standing in front of the door allows the enemy to engage the breacher through the door. Ballistic breaching was used mostly on exposed pad locks. Both M16A4s and shotguns were used. The M16A4s were employed because there was not enough shotgun ammunition for the amount of locks that had to be breached. They were fairly effective on first round breaching of pad locks if the round was placed near the center. The M203 was also used for breaching. Squads would breach doors of houses that were 50 to 100 meters in front of their position with the M203. It worked extremely well on the exterior metal doors. The last type of breaching employed was explosive. A multitude of charges were used in order to breach walls, gates, exterior doors and interior doors. Some of these will be discussed later in this evaluation. An important principle in breaching that was learned is the Marine making entry is NEVER the breacher. The breacher should always fall in the back of the stack and never go in first. Marines have died because they followed their own breach. Speed is the most significant factor in all types of breaching. If one method of breaching is not working then the breacher must quickly transition to a different type. Standing in front of a door and beating it with a sledgehammer for ten minutes is unacceptable. The breacher must be able to employ different methods. The squad leader must ensure that the breacher has the necessary equipment and explosives for each method. Every time the squad is stalled because of a breach it is placed in a vulnerable position. Breaching swiftly and effectively is necessary in order for the squad to maintain momentum. Movement of the Squad within the Structure: Within the structure the squad should move from one foothold to another. The initial foothold is established by the security element. The security element rolls into the courtyard or rooftop and clears every room on the outside. The assault element proceeds directly to an entry point to prepare for the breach. The support element falls in trace and makes the breach. After the breach is made the assault element makes entry and clears the first two sitting rooms simultaneously by splitting the stack or clears the entire top deck. The support element will assist the assault element by peeling off and clearing rooms or breaching any doors. Security will be left at the courtyard or rooftop foothold in order to isolate the structure and secure the squad’s egress route. Security can be maintained by only two Marines. The rest of the security element will fall in the stack. After the initial foothold in the structure, the stack will consolidate and then advance and clear to the next foothold. The succession will continue until the entire structure is cleared. At all times the squad will move by using IBT and adhere to its principles which will be addressed later. No Marine should make an uncovered move. The squad should move at a pace that is swift, but controlled, exercising “tactical patience.” Actions upon Enemy Contact: The squad leader’s options for actions upon enemy contact vary according to where the squad is in its clearing and whether any casualties have been taken. In any contact, the squad and squad leader have two priorities. The two priorities are eliminating the immediate threat and pulling out any casualties. More often than not, the two priorities are connected because in MOUT the enemy is usually close (within feet) and the enemy fire has wounded a Marine. If contact is made in the courtyard or rooftop the squad should break contact, isolate the house or block, and call in supporting arms (tanks, tracks, etc.). There is no reason to place Marines into the building until it is thoroughly prepped. If contact is made in the house then the squad leader must quickly evaluate the situation and decide the best course of action. Generally, the squad leader has the following three options: Break Contact - Breaking contact is more of an option during the bottom up assault because of the difficulties in changing the momentum during the top down assault. If casualties are taken or the enemy resistance is strong then this may be the best action for the squad leader to take. Upon breaking contact, the squad will bound from one foothold to another getting accountability of all Marines and ensuring that no Marine is left behind. When leaving the house the squad can place a satchel charge or another explosive device in order to bring down the house or burn the enemy out. Flood the House - Squad leaders may choose to flood the house with Marines if a casualty is taken during the top down assault or if the enemy threat is not significant. Casualties cannot be dragged up the stairs quickly, therefore, Marines must neutralize or suppress the threat in order to extract the casualties. In some situations the only way to do this may be to flood the house. Hold the Last Foothold and Clear by Fire - Footholds are strongpoints where the squad can fight from. At the foothold Marines can return fire, throw grenades, and use explosive devices to neutralize the enemy. After the enemy has been damaged the squad can move in and clear the house. If the rooftop is the foothold the squad is holding, then the roof could be breached by a directional charge. Grenades or incendiary devices can be thrown into the structure flushing out the enemy. CASUALTIES MUST NEVER BE LEFT BEHIND! The squad leader must ensure that every Marine moves with a buddy. Each buddy is responsible for pulling the other out of the fight if he goes down. The squad leader and fire team leaders must have accountability for all their Marines at all times. There is no excuse for Marines being left behind in a building while the squad pulls out. Organization of the Squad: Some squad leaders in the battalion split their squads in two and assigned different sectors to the two different parts. They did this to move faster through the houses because they were tasked with clearing a lane that may have contained up to fifty or sixty houses. Although this worked and the squads moved faster through their assigned sector, it is not the best employment of their squad. The following reasons are given on why splitting the squad is not advisable: If the squad contained twelve Marines and is split in two, that leaves two teams of six Marines. Clearing a structure with six Marines, even though the house is small, is extremely risky. If a buddy team of two Marines got hit and went down there would not be enough Marines to provide covering fire while pulling the casualties out. Critical seconds would be wasted waiting for the other team of the squad to come in the house and support the extraction of the casualties. The chances of wounded Marines getting left behind increases exponentially. If contact is made by both teams simultaneously, then the squad could be cut down in a piecemeal fashion within a matter of seconds before other squads could even move to reinforce. When the squad leader organizes his squad he must think about enemy contact always. Squads must not be split in order to increase the speed of clearing. Commanders should not put stress on the squad leaders to clear at a speed that would force the squad leaders to split their squad. Tactical patience must be exercised at every level. The squad should be organized by using the traditional three elements of assault, support and security. The amount of Marines contained within each element will vary according to the squad's number of Marines, the skills and abilities that each individual Marine possess, and the weapons systems that each Marine employs (M249 SAW, M203, and ACOG scoped M16A4s). The assault element must contain no SAWs if that is possible. A SAW gunner must never clear rooms. The assault element should contain the most number of Marines because every room must be cleared with two Marines. The support element will supplement the assault by falling in the stack and peeling off to clear rooms. Support should include any engineers or assaultman attached to the squad. A SAW gunner should be included in this section in order to provide massive firepower in the house if contact is made. The corpsman is also located in support because he can use his shotgun to breach as well as provide quick medical attention to casualties. The support section will fall in the stack behind the assault element to assist in any way. Security should contain the other remaining SAWs in the squad. The security element is responsible for clearing and securing the courtyard or rooftop foothold prior to the assault element moving to the entry point. When assault and support make entry into the structure, two Marines are left behind to isolate the house (rooftop) and secure the squad’s entry point. The rest of the Marines will fall in the stack behind the support section. The security Marines will hold security on all danger areas (mostly the stairs) when the assault and support are clearing each foothold. Squad leaders must appoint each fire team leader as an element leader. There are no longer fire teams, only assault, support and security sections. Each element leader will maintain accountability for his section. It is easier for the squad to maintain this organization until the attack is completed and then the traditional four-Marine fire team can be reinstated. The squad leader should emphasis unity of command and succession of command should the squad leader become a casualty. Squad Communications: Inter-squad communication between the Marines in the stack is both verbal and visual. Simple, clear, and universal language should be used. Universal language is words and phrases that are standardized so every Marine understands the other. Words and phrases such as, “Hold right,” “clear left,” and “Frag out.” The one man should describe to the stack what he is seeing. In other words, the one man verbally paints the picture for the stack behind. Marines in the stack should be listening, not talking. Talking should be kept to a minimum. After Clearing-Continuing Actions: After the structure has been cleared, the squad must immediately conduct the detailed search of the house for weapons. The search must be quick but thorough leaving nothing untouched. Weapons were found in every conceivable place, underneath couches in the cushions, in between piled up blankets, etc. Another continuing action would be to render the interior and exterior doors unable to close. This will help if the structure needs to be re-cleared later. Marines will use their creativity to think of ingenious ways to accomplish this task. Mission or Time has Priority: In detailed clearing attacks, time should never be the priority. Marines should never be rushed because they become sloppy and are forced to create shortcuts in order to accomplish the mission under the time restraints. This does not mean that the squads shouldn't be pushed. This means that a realistic timeline for the attack should be made; a timeline that takes into account the overwhelming task of clearing multiple blocks of houses that may contain platoon sized elements of insurgents. Individual Techniques and Tactics Training: Training is continuous, whether in a combat zone or not. The responsibility of the squad leader is to ensure his squad is combat ready. The individual Marines in his squad must be continuously trained otherwise the Marines will lose proficiency in MOUT skills learned through experience during the attack. Training does not have to be physical, it can be verbal. The most effective training in this environment is for the squad leader to sit down with his squad and talk. The squad should run through combat scenarios and have individual Marines tell the squad what their jobs are and how they will do it. Communication between Marines can be practiced by talking through universal language, such as, “Open door right, closed door left,” or, “Peel right,” and telling each other what is meant. All Marines must exercise initiative during combat. Squad leaders must design training techniques in order to stress initiative. Marines must be able to look around, assess what his squad or partner is doing, feed off it, and act in order to support them. Initiative based training is paramount. Constructive criticism should be encouraged. Every Marine debriefs each other, telling good and bad observations. The squad leader will also be critiqued by his Marines in an appropriate fashion. The criticism is not meant to undermine the squad leaders’ authority. It is to allow the squad leader to instruct the Marines on why he chose to run the squad the way he did. Young Marines will gain knowledge about squad tactics that they may never have figured out if the squad leader did not tell them. It will prepare them for leadership billets. It will also give them confidence in their squad leader because they will trust him and his knowledge. Techniques: Techniques that individual Marines need to be taught and practiced are the following: Pieing off all danger areas. Even before entry into a room as many danger areas as possible should be pied off leaving only one or two corners that need to be cleared. Don’t blindly rush into a room, especially if the door is opened. Using the buddy system. Two Marines always peel off the stack, never one. Picking up uncovered danger areas, including when opening doors to furniture when it can fit a man inside. Clearing obstacles, such as furniture. Prepping rooms with grenades. If the room is too small for two Marines or not enough Marines are clearing the house to hold security on all the danger areas, the two-man turns around and covers the rear of the Marine clearing the room. Moving stealthily through a structure even with broken glass on the ground. Making a stealth entry with NVGs and PEQ-2s. Making breaching charges and placing them on the locking points of different types of doors. These are just some of the techniques that need to be practiced and passed on to younger Marines. Tactics: Initiative based tactics (IBT) should be taught. There are four rules of IBT. They are the following: Cover all immediate danger areas. Eliminate all threats. Protect your buddy. There are no mistakes. Every Marine feeds off each other and picks up the slack for the other. Go with it. Every Marine needs to understand and memorize the rules governing IBT. These rules should not only apply to MOUT, but all small unit infantry engagements. Rule number four must be pounded into the squad. There are no mistakes when clearing a structure in combat, only actions that result in situations; situations that Marines must adapt to, improvise, and overcome in a matter of seconds. Supporting Arms Throughout contemporary American military history there has not been any opponent that could not be overwhelmed by American supporting arms. The United States Marine Corps has historically been an innovator with the employment of supporting arms. The Marine Corps created the concept of close air support (CAS) in Haiti during the Banana Wars, helicopter envelopment in Korea, and the combined arms team portrayed in the modern Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Fallujah has been another proving ground for American supporting arms. The insurgents were completely overwhelmed by the massive indirect fires and close air support on the first two days of the battle. At the squad level the results of the fires were felt through the type of enemy they encountered. The enemy dug in deep into the houses, not allowing themselves to get caught in the open. The infantryman of 3/5 have learned the advantages and disadvantages of fixed wing CAS, rotary wing CAS, tanks, combined anti-armor team (CAAT), AAVs, artillery, bulldozers, and 81 and 60 mm mortars through practical experience. Fixed wing CAS is an enormous weapon that has great effects on the ground. The major problem with it is the amount of time it takes to get bombs on target. It took entirely too long for bombs to be dropped when Marines were in contact. The minimum safe distance of the ordnance was too great in order for even the block to be isolated and that allowed the enemy to escape countless times. Fixed wing CAS should be used for deep targets. It should not be used when Marines have isolated the structure and trapped the enemy inside. A tank or CAAT section can be more effective Marines do not have to be withdrawn from the cordon. In contrast to fixed wing CAS, rotary wing CAS was extremely timely, but the effects on target were not extraordinary. The hellfire missiles used did not bring down entire structures, but they did do some damage. By far the best two supporting arms used were tanks and CAAT. Tanks and CAAT were the infantryman’s best friend. The battle would have been incredibly bloodier if it hadn’t been for tanks and CAAT. The tanks were able to provide a 120 mm direct fire weapon on the spot of any contact within a matter of minutes. The thermal sites were able to pinpoint exact position of snipers and then effectively neutralize them within seconds. CAAT was able to use its M2 .50 caliber machine guns and Mk19 grenade launchers to breach as well as destroy buildings were fire was received from. CAAT also helped the squads by clearing the buildings that lined the street in their lane. The infantry should never attack in MOUT without tanks or CAAT. Mortars and artillery proved effective by forcing the enemy to stay in the houses and not allowing the enemy to fight the Marines in the streets. Demolitions The variety of explosives used during the fight for Fallujah will not be mentioned here. The few that will be explained have a common theme of being obscure and may be forgotten if they are not written down. Each explosive device was developed in response to the enemy's tactics and has been proven to work. The following is a list of explosives, a description, and their uses: “Eight Ball” - 1/8 stick of C-4 - Used for breaching both interior and exterior doors, effective and doesn’t use a lot of C-4. “House Guest” (Named by 2nd squad, 1st platoon, I Company) - Propane tanks placed in the central hallway with C-4 used to ignite it, creates a fuel air explosive - Used for bringing down a house when contact is made inside, propane tanks must be full. A 60 or 81 mm white phosphorous mortar round, wrapped three times with detonation cord and a 1/4 or 1/2 stick of C-4 - Used when contact is made in a house and the enemy must be burned out. Molotov cocktails - one part liquid laundry detergent, two parts gas - Used when contact is made in a house and the enemy must be burned out All Marines should be familiar with explosives and proper placement of the charge for breaching. Any Marine should be able to cut time fuse, crimp a blasting cap, and put the blasting cap in C-4. Randomness of Tactics and Techniques The infantry squad must have a tool box of tactics and techniques. The squad should not fall into a pattern where they become predictable. Being predictable allows the enemy to prepare and modify his tactics in order to exploit the squad’s weaknesses. The squad must be trained well enough to flow through or combine each tactic and technique fairly easily. Marines must use their imagination to think of ways to vary their tactics. The enemy must be kept off balance by changing, at random, squad tactics. For instance, vary the method of entry into the structure, lead by fire then don’t, assault top down then bottom up, don’t use the same entry point every time, throw a fragmentation grenade on the middle roof then assault bottom up. Avoid patterning by all means. Combat Mindset Preparing Marines for battle is a difficult task for the squad leader. Squad leaders must be the rock and drill into his Marines that no Marine will be left behind. Marine combat infantrymen understand the meaning of Semper Fidelis. No Marine is left behind. Marines have to prepare mentally for casualties and be able to rebound quickly in order to kill the enemy swiftly to prevent more casualties. The old saying, “Anything that can go wrong, will,” is always in effect in combat. Every time a squad makes entry they should expect to make contact. Surprise, speed, and maximum violence wins small unit battles. Marines and leaders need to make quick decisions on the move and under fire, always remembering unity of command. In combat, Marine leaders are required to stand up and take charge. Unfortunately, sometimes there are too many chiefs and not enough Indians. The “chief syndrome” will create mass confusion on the battlefield. Being a good combat leader sometimes means stepping back and allowing the Marines to do their jobs. Platoon commanders must allow squad leaders to lead their squads, squad leaders must allow element leaders to lead their elements, and element leaders must allow their Marines to take initiative. Conclusion In conclusion, this evaluation is nothing more than a guideline for infantry Marines. Squad leaders should take this evaluation, study it, critique it, give it to their squad, have them study it, critique it, and then sit down together to discuss it. The tactics and techniques contained in the evaluation were gained at an enormous price. Marines were killed on the field of battle developing these tactics. It is the duty of every Marine infantryman to not allow these lessons to die with time. This evaluation is only one step in passing on the knowledge. |
I thought something like this would have been extremely evidant after what happened in Somalia in 1993. But maybe it wasn't. Good point though. ETA: I like the names they came up with in the breeching explosives part. |
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Another reason to use smokeless tobacco: We use a small charge to open doors to courtyards made out of an empty Copenhagen can with det cord wrapped up in it and a loop of det cord hanging out of it so you can run it through a door handle or hang it off of a doorknob. We set it off using command detonation and immediately bust in after it. We used to use the whole 1/4 stick of C4 on the front gate, but we quit doing that after we ninja-starred the front gate through the living room after it chopped the top off the station wagon in the driveway. And remember kids, never put a primed demolition charge in your pocket. 
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Unfortunately, this was originally released as a No Foreign/For Official Use Only document. However the internet has spread this far and wide to the point that some of those the Marine Corps didn't want to read it have. And I am not talking about this site either, it was out there available on the net when it was in the .mil only access sites for II MEF. |
| I know, but the problem is the internet and email has circumvented many of the precautions used to prevent disclosure of FOUO and lower classified materials. Personnel will send out AARs, surveys and reports to a mass distribution list because most of those people have a need to know. They don't take the time to check if everyone on that list should see it, and than begins cascading cycle. When someone gets that email, they do the same and forward because it came on the NIPR and so they not even thinking about it. So allot of info that shouldn't haven't been released because it discusses enemy and friendly weapons effects and limitations, TTP and their effects, and enemy/friend COAs, is sent all over the place. |
That info isn't any different from any other TTPs being taught at TBS/IOC in Quantico. ALL of that info is available online. There is nothing classified or secret about it. The distribution list SHOULD be huge. It's good scoop. (It WAS the front page story in the Marine Times). |
| Well you need to read the DON policy on release of info and what falls under opsec, release of ours or the enemys' TTP with it effects on the other side, information on effect or lack of effect of our or enemys' weapons, along with observed trends in enemy TTP all fall under items that are considered sensitive. |
I guess the Marine Times needs to brush up on that as well... ...as does our Regt. OpsO and Bn Cmdr, who forwarded this to the Companies as a helpful training aid. By the way, You should pass this on to the folks at the Warfighting Lab, TBS/IOC, and SOI, who are making so much recently gained LLs and TTPs available online. |
Since the various Times are run by Gannet and have no official connection to the US military they are pretty much free to publish what they want, regardless of accuracy, regulation or effect on troops. Publishing of TTP itself is considered acceptable, hence you can down load much of it at the doctrine home page. But publishing of how the enemy is reacting to our TTP and our counter reaction is not. Sites like MCLLs, MC Center for Small War Excellence, II MEF go to war primer and even the MCWL have pass word protected areas, most of the lessons learned you read here and on other sites started on those sites and the Army's CALL, restricted access area, but because of people forwarding them, that protection was OBE. The reason that protection existed was there was an intention to prevent the enemy, in this case the jihadist, the ability to quickly determine what was working and what was not, but because of the tendency of the internet to spread information regardless of consequences those protection often fail. Everyone at one time or another has done it and maybe the guidance/message put out by DON after Sept 11 is unworkable because of human nature, who knows. |
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Here is the the exact message when you attempt to access the AARs at MC Small Wars Center of Excellence: After Action Reports from Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq to include 1st MarDiv After Action of Operation Fajr - Fallujah November 2004 (user authentication required) When you click on the link the follow appears
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We used a 10x10 or so piece of cardboard. Cut 6-8 crossed cuts across the center to make a star, then loop det cord around it. When you get to teh dorknob, simply press it on and the knob slides in where you cut the star and it stays. |
When I was reading the post (as a lifelong civilian), I did wonder if Zarcowardly and Friends might also be able to read this here.  I enjoyed the post tremendously, and read it word-for-word, but for the sake of OpSec, I wouldnt mind having not seen it! In the future, I'd like to suggest that such posts be restricted to the Team Forum (if posted at all) and nobody get in a snit when <gasp> Mod's kill the post if its NOT in team forum. Then again, I supposed UBL himself could have bought a membership.  The link listed is now dead..... and I realize that posting THIS makes the topic bubble up again to the top of the Active Topics list.  |
Genltemen, PLEASE. There is no OpSec about this. Discussions of TTPs are public, as well they should be. Every single issue of the Marine Gazette conteains ENDLESS "lessons learned" articles, and other discussions of TTPs. We NEED these things to be easily accessible for our Marines and Soldiers. Again, this is in NO WAY Opsec material. No matter how you say it, or how many times. It's just not. In some ways it makes me think that you haven't read the article. What EXACTLY is in it that the enemy would find so useful? The descriptions of HIS OWN tactics? Perhaps the chance the Marines might come from above OR below? There is nothing in this that would make its release a violation of OpSec. So relax. This report is UNCLASSIFIED. It is public information. I'm not surprised that there was once SOMEONE who thought it shouldn't be released (isn't there always?) Fact is: It is NOT a classified document. Period. Frankly, I take it as a personal insult that someone would suggest that I would release classified or restricted access information. |
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Did you not read what you get when you go to official Marine sites and attempt to access AARs? It say something about scope and not for general release doesn't it? FOUO and classified are two different things, many unclass documents are FOUO and not for foreign release. This one started as actually one of those documents. However that has obviously been OBE. The Marine Corps Gazette is published by the MCA and similar to Gannett is not governed by Marine Corps, Dept of the Navy or DOD orders. They may have Marines on the board of governors and a retired Marine as their director but they are not an official organization. My general screed was not direct at you, since someone else released this and a whole bunch of other information of this nature to websites like SFTT, etc. But the tendency I have seen over the years for to forward items without actually taking the step to see if those forwarded to are authorized to and they actually have a need to know. I know you are an officer of Marines and would not intentially release or provide confirmation of information the enemy could use, but some times it happens. |
But in this case, it did not happen. This is simply a discussion of tactics on a basic level. There is a line where NOT making available good info like this becomes a hinderance to the betterment of Marines and Soldiers. Any decent PME could be of use to the enemy. That doesn't mean we should try to restrict the public's access to The Art Of War. This particular AAR is SO public, it's beyond any control measures, AND it has been thus for MONTHS. If you read it, though, you will find that there is VERY little, if anything that could be of use to the enemy (unless they plan on goin house to house in squads, supported by air and armor). It is mostly a discussion of the enemy, about whom the enemy already knows. Otherwise, the breaching section provides no useful or defensible info. I understand your concern, but in this case it is misplaced. My Marines are turning this AAR into a Power Point presentation, with which to teach their squads. When we're through with it, we inted to deseminate it widely. ANY grunts heading into offensive ops will do well to study this. The value of it be spead among US outweighs any danger of it being spread amongst THEM. THAT is why almost everything being taught at The Basic School is available to the public. It's worth it.
Agreed. Before we know it we will be telling people to keep the notion of Baby Wipes and clean socks secret. 
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It didn't "leak out", to the consternation of of anyone. It was determined to be not a problem as a public document. It was initially a FOUO document, because of where and when it was generated. It had very little to do with the content. It was about info coming from a unit IN Iraq. Just as all iridiums and emails are shut down immediately after an op, or when there is a casualty. It's not the content as much as it's the circumstances. Bottom line: This document has no business being a FOUO document. I holds little or no value to the enemy. It is mostly ABOUT the enemy. It does not compromise sources, nor does it unveil much in terms of new tactics. It is LESS of a source of info, than the documents anyone can download from TBS/IOC. Point to specifics in this document that you find the enemy could exploit (Did you read it?). Otherwise, what exactly is your point? |
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You really need to look at MarAdmin 071/04, it details a study of USMC web sites and how they released info they shouldn't have. In 2003 there where over 1500 from Marine sites alone and I am sure every one of those 1500 plus also didn't see the error until it was pointed out and I am equally sure some still didn't after they were told also. Some how you believe I am accusing you of leaking, I am not. I am just point to the fact that many people don't do the first things they teach you in any security managers course: before I give this info to someone, do they actually have a need to know? The person who initially sent this and many other things like out, should have asked himself that. I have to assume your a good 0302, there are several nuggets if I were an enemy I could pull and use in setting a D or to predict how how Marines would react to my defense plan. Beside why would you have your troops doing PMEs from this info, if in fact you cannot learn anything from it? You can post TTP all day long and there would be nothing wrong with. However when you post TTP, enemy reaction to that and our counter reaction you are technically are providing information that by DON regs that should not be released. |
It's one of the many variations of a Halligan tool (a Google search for 'Halligan tool" will explain everything). Since the word 'Halligan' is patented, any variation of the original tool has a similar but different name. The tool was designed by John T. Halligan, an FDNY Firefighter, as a means for Firefighters to efficiently and quickly breach a door.....
Not if used correctly. Any firefighter worth his salt can show you how to use that tool without ever standing directly in front of the doorway, although I must say that det-chord is much faster, efficient, and puts less Marines at risk...Besides, explosions are fun...
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Cincinnatus, I intended no insult whatsoever to you or anyone (except for the shitbags whose names I intentionally mispelled). I was merely sharing my concern and making a general statement, and perhaps went over the top with the retro-posters. I agree this should be readily available to our troops, but *I* don't NEED to see it. Again, I enjoyed the read and I thank you for that. You asked what would the enemy find useful? Well, lotsa stuff... details on footholds and top-down or bottom-up pro's and con's... Blowing doors you've been thru... and by stating what you KNOW about the enemy, they can decide that those tactics should be changed (I'd rather they keep making the same mistakes). My apologies if my message was insulting to you or anyone. Please let this be the last tangent post in this thread. |
Good, sound basic tactics are always useful for PME. Universal, in fact. These specific tactics are not any different from BUST. BUT, what makes this such a great piece from which to conduct PME, is its readability. It's a great read. It's not boring. LCpls can read this and have "Oh yeah..." moments. It's not as tedius as the BUST CDs or most articles in the Gazette. It's not a question of US not being able to learn anything useful from it. For US, it very useful (as stated above, MOSTLY because of its eloquence). Things that are basic, yet well written, make that which is basic NOT BORING. Is the composition of a MAGTF important info that every young Marine needs to know? Yes. Is there ANYTHING that an insurgent could learn and exploit from such info? Not really. Here's an idea... Start a thread devoted to OpSec issues and the internet. (hint) |
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I'm so tired of people ruining a good post, or altering a thread into a completely different subject so that they can get in their self-righteous/Sunday school lectures. The enitre debate over what is proper/improper to post concerning OPSEC should have happened on the back channels. The article was posted, many read it and many more good guys benefited from it than bad guys. RON, sorry Devil Dog. I was quite harsh. I know you mean well, but my tolerance for what I consider frivolous over analysis is lowering exponentially by the day. Now, let me go and unasshole myself. |
Yeah, Yeah... I know what you're talking about! Those rock! we had to come up with something different when we came across a gate to a courtyard that was held with a steel rod locking the gate to the ground. If we can't get the bumper to the hummer or stryker in there that is... So, we came up with the copenhagen charge. Man, talk about watching an irresistable force meeting an immovable object. The results are beautiful. The charge is very versatile, easy to hang, easy to prime... hell, you can hang it off of just about anything. Exterior window security bars, gates, doors, lockboxes, etc. Just tighten the loop you use to hang it and you can wedge it pretty tightly around a large padlock, be careful with those though. they fly a ways when you do that, make sure you're behind protection. The doorknob charges you were talking about are great too, we used a different way to carry those when we firt got here. Kinda weird, but here goes; we taped them to our back. The next man would grab it off of a pair of thin zip ties holding the cardboard at the corners... just a simple tug and the thing comes right off. Just be careful when it rains, the cardboard gets really soggy and if your breach charge gets wet there's a chance that the cardboard will lose it's stiffness (decreasing the tamping effect) and losing it's looped shape neccessary for placement. we've since gone to using the copenhagen charges to breach. We got the idea for hanging those that way from a bunch of batt guys, they use the same concept to carry flash-bangs. The man behind them grabs one from an elastic loop on the others' back, deploys it and they don't lose security or momentum. Genius. Sorry, I have a tendancy to wax poetic when talking about explosives. |
Don't use a hooligan tool, you're in front of the door. Use the thing as an interior search tool if used at all. It's great for smashing out and prying into things that the homeowners would rather you didn't find. Like I always say about dynamic entry: Go big or go home. Use demo. THEN go home afterwards. |
you work in my battalion S2 shop, don't you? |