PICA seems to be written in spite of the
clear directives in Bruen and Heller, not in conformity with them. Whether well-
intentioned, brilliant, or arrogant, no state may enact a law that denies its citizens
rights that the Constitution guarantees them. Even legislation that may enjoy the
support of a majority of its citizens must fail if it violates the constitutional rights of
fellow citizens. For the reasons fully set out below, the overly broad reach of PICA
commands that the injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs be granted.

...........

Plaintiffs claimed that the “assault weapon” ban enacted by PICA is
unconstitutional as it contravenes the Second Amendment “right to keep and bear
Arms.” (Doc. 10). For some constitutional violations, particularly involving First
Amendment claims, irreparable harm is presumed. Christian Legal Society v. Walker,
453 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2006). Although the Supreme Court has not recognized a
presumption of irreparable harm in regard to Second Amendment violations, it has
emphasized that the Second Amendment and the constitutional right to bear arms
for self-defense is not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of
rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2156 (citing
McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion)). When a
law is facially challenged under the Second Amendment, “the form of the claim and
the substance of the Second Amendment right” create a “harm [that] is properly
regarded as irreparable and having no adequate remedy at law.” Ezell, 651 F.3d at
699-700.
Assuming arguendo that there is no presumption of harm for an alleged
violation of the Second Amendment, Plaintiffs still satisfy this element. For example,
Barnett and Norman are no longer able to purchase any firearm, attachment, device,
magazine, or other item banned by PICA, while Hoods and Pro Gun are now
prohibited from selling said any item banned by PICA. These harms are irreparable
and in direct violation of the Second Amendment right to bear arms in self-defense.
There is no question that the right to armed self-defense is limited by PICA, and in
some cases, may be prohibited altogether.

...........

This Court will first address Defendants’ contention that “non-essential
accessories” are not within the scope of the Second Amendment’s plain text. PICA
outlaws possession of a “semiautomatic pistol” with a detachable magazine if it is
equipped with any of the following: “a threaded barrel,” “a shroud attached to the
barrel or that partially or completely encircles the barrel,” “a flash suppressor,” or
“arm brace.”7 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9. PICA further outlaws possession of a magazine for
a handgun capable of holding more than 15 rounds of ammunition and of “[a]
semiautomatic pistol that has a fixed magazine with the capacity to accept more than
15 rounds.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9-10. Defendants contend that such items are not
necessary to the functioning of a firearm and are thus not “arms” and therefore not
protected by the Second Amendment. (Doc. 37, p. 17).

Defendants’ argument is not persuasive. The Seventh Circuit has recognized
the Second Amendment as extending to “corollar[ies] to the meaningful exercise of
the core right to possess firearms for self-defense.” See Wilson v. Cook County, 937
F.3d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708). It is hard to imagine
something more closely correlated to the right to use a firearm in self-defense than
the ability to effectively load ammunition into the firearm. The Third Circuit
recognized the importance of this corollary and held that “a magazine is an arm under
the Second Amendment.” See Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of
New Jersey, 910 F.3d 106, 116 (3d Cir. 2018). Further, Defendants’ own expert
defined “high-capacity firearms” as “hand-held arms with a capacity greater than ten
rounds, recognizing that Illinois’s statute allows up to 15 rounds for handguns.” (Doc.
37-13, p. 2). Defendants’ expert is clearly referencing magazines and incorporating
such into his definition of a “firearm[].” Id. This Court agrees that magazines are
“arms” as used in the plain text of the Second Amendment. Plaintiffs are correct that
“[t]his is not even a close call.” (Doc. 10, p. 16). If Defendants’ own expert incorporates
magazine capacity into his definition of a firearm, given his level of expertise, it would
be unreasonable to expect the original public meaning of the plain text to not reflect
a similar understanding.

...........

Therefore, because the “meaningful exercise” of the right to armed self-defense is
wholly dependent on the ability of citizens to utilize their arms and hit their intended
target, items that aid in accuracy may be considered “arms” and are presumptively
protected by the Second Amendment.

...........

There is no question that Plaintiffs are harmed by PICA and will continue to
be harmed if this Court denies the motion for preliminary injunction. A constitutional
right is at stake. Some Plaintiffs cannot purchase their firearm of choice, nor can
they exercise their right to self-defense in the manner they choose. They are bound
by the State’s limitations. Moreover, other Plaintiffs cannot sell their inventory, even
to residents of other states that do not ban the “arms” identified in PICA.

To the contrary, there can be “no harm to a [government agency] when it is
prevented from enforcing an unconstitutional statute.”

.........

Handguns, many of which are limited under PICA, are “the most
preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and
family.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 629). It is also
uncontroverted that many of the banned modifiers, including but not limited to pistol
grips, protruding grips, flash suppressors, and shrouds, have legitimate purposes
that assist law-abiding citizens in their ability to defend themselves. The other side
is less clear – there is no evidence as to how PICA will actually help Illinois
Communities.