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Regardless of how good the latest F-15/16/18s are, how much sense does it make to buy them at $80+ mill a pop, when they will have ZERO chance of survival against a decent air defense a decade from now- or sooner? Josh has sold me on the F-35. We've already paid for it (mostly), and we really don't have an alternative. We have not already paid for the F-35. We are still paying for it. The development is not done and the technology therein isn't working as advertised. The F/A-18E/F, by the way is under $60 mil a pop, and there are other, more efficient ways, of solving the IADS problem. If the USAF really wanted to know how to defeat an IADS they'd talk to a bunch of Navy Aegis guys. They don't. You beat my edit. I'm assuming the more efficient ways you're referring to are electronic in nature? If it's that effective, why go to the absolutely enormous expense of developing stealth technology at all? Sorry about beating your edit. I can think of several ways, and yes some are electronic in nature. God, I want to say more, but shouldn't. |
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if there is a defect in the materials used, shouldn't the contractor be required to cover the costs of fixing it? thats how it is in pretty much every other industry... Defense contracts aren't usually written like that. In this case, it's not that they have to fix a fleet of jets; there's only a dozen of them. They have to incorporate fixes into the design, which may, or may not be a big deal, depending on who's writing the article. |
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What does McCain propose we do? The F-15 is a nearly a 40 year old design. If 25 years from now we're still relying on them as our primary air superiority fighter, we're quite likely going to find ourselves in a really bad situation. So the answer is to keep dumping money into an underperforming program that has about 18% of its flight testing done because there are no other alternatives? I don't think so. What do you mean 18%? You need to understand, the F-22 is very unique in its capability for these days. The same can be said when the F-16 first show up in the 70's. Everyone of them have teething problems,(engine falling off F-15 mid flight), every one of these problems will eventually be solved, instead of rushing to cancel the program. Case and point, the YB-49 yaw instability problem was solved by using a different autopilot, by the time the program got cancelled by the congress. No, the solution is not to limit the military arms to Joint programs, and load up a system with so much compromise that no one service can use. Reduce the design cycle of each system, and start to rethink multi-role systems. On the other hand, need to fix what we are stuck with, not buying more old obselete system that serves nothing but numbers. To a point, that is what UAV programs are doing, each service is developing their own unique system, and each UAV design are single role. The F-35 is 18% complete with its flight test regime. We were told that simulations were good enough, so we could cut back on flight testing and build aircraft at the same time we were testing to get the aircraft into the field sooner. What we have found is that more flight testing has been added back into the program. What we have found is that flight testing is showing that parts of the aircraft we have already bought need to be replaced, already. What that means is that we either undergo expensive retrofits to the aircraft that are already built when flight testing is complete, or we write them off sooner, much sooner, than expected. Fun huh? http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3abcb29d8f-6a85-40c5-8f1d-c84d20afe997&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest You are mixing apples and oranges, we were talking F-22, why drag in the F-35, besides, I was part of the F-22 flight test program a few years back, a flight test program that seems like it will never end. |
| Maybe McCain should resign, use his political influence to get appointed to run the procurement programs I'm sure he could fix everything. Certainly as a senator he has failed to get the programs on track. For years he has said the AF doesn't need the F-22 knowing full well the F-15s and 16s are long past their time and are worn out. He has not gotten any realistic alternatives or procurement fixes passed and seems to be just grandstanding. What a gas bag. |
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What does McCain propose we do? The F-15 is a nearly a 40 year old design. If 25 years from now we're still relying on them as our primary air superiority fighter, we're quite likely going to find ourselves in a really bad situation. So the answer is to keep dumping money into an underperforming program that has about 18% of its flight testing done because there are no other alternatives? I don't think so. No, but putting money into an obsolete weapon that will be unable to compete isn't an answer either. Yes, the F-22 and the F-35 programs both have been mismanaged. Something should be one about that, but I'm worried the leadership is simply going to throw the whole project out and not propose any other solution. You're making the assumption that the F-15 is obsolete. I wouldn't make that assumption. One thing it has going for it is internal volume. Internal volume allows you to stuff all sorts of goodies in it. Just look at the AESA radars that have been added. Hell, look at the engine upgrades other nations have added. Hell, look at the F-15XX. There are plenty of things you can do with the airframe. Yes, it's RCS isn't optimal, but stealth, IMO is over-rated. It is probably the most expensive way to tackle the problem of IADS. A single seat F-15 has a giant equipment bay where the WSO sits in a two seat airplane. There is lots and lots of room for all sorts of equipment containing computers, even ECM. Even the nose barrel probably has space freed up with the installation of production AESA. The airframe will last a long time barring unforeseen load spectra or unusual corrosion environments; we sized the F-15E for 32000 hours total (analytical) life. That's a long time, and the airplanes will become obsolete for some other reason than basic integrity of the primary structure. This links the F-35 thread with the long ass post I put up last week: http://www.ar15.com/forums/t_1_5/1263997_F_35_in_the_News___New_Article_About_Tailhook_Design__13_Dec_2011___Links__Lots_of_Links.html Av Week has a blog where there is a pile of great information for getting up to speed on the public releases. |
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Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: What does McCain propose we do? The F-15 is a nearly a 40 year old design. If 25 years from now we're still relying on them as our primary air superiority fighter, we're quite likely going to find ourselves in a really bad situation. So the answer is to keep dumping money into an underperforming program that has about 18% of its flight testing done because there are no other alternatives? I don't think so. No, but putting money into an obsolete weapon that will be unable to compete isn't an answer either. Yes, the F-22 and the F-35 programs both have been mismanaged. Something should be one about that, but I'm worried the leadership is simply going to throw the whole project out and not propose any other solution. You're making the assumption that the F-15 is obsolete. I wouldn't make that assumption. One thing it has going for it is internal volume. Internal volume allows you to stuff all sorts of goodies in it. Just look at the AESA radars that have been added. Hell, look at the engine upgrades other nations have added. Hell, look at the F-15XX. There are plenty of things you can do with the airframe. Yes, it's RCS isn't optimal, but stealth, IMO is over-rated. It is probably the most expensive way to tackle the problem of IADS. A single seat F-15 has a giant equipment bay where the WSO sits in a two seat airplane. There is lots and lots of room for all sorts of equipment containing computers, even ECM. Even the nose barrel probably has space freed up with the installation of production AESA. The airframe will last a long time barring unforeseen load spectra or unusual corrosion environments; we sized the F-15E for 32000 hours total (analytical) life. That's a long time, and the airplanes will become obsolete for some other reason than basic integrity of the primary structure. Serious question: Is it maneuverable enough to dominate dogfights with SU-37s and other aircraft that the American pilots could come up against? That's the reason we built the F-22 right, so that we could continue to dominate enemy aircraft? |
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What does McCain propose we do? The F-15 is a nearly a 40 year old design. If 25 years from now we're still relying on them as our primary air superiority fighter, we're quite likely going to find ourselves in a really bad situation. So the answer is to keep dumping money into an underperforming program that has about 18% of its flight testing done because there are no other alternatives? I don't think so. What do you mean 18%? You need to understand, the F-22 is very unique in its capability for these days. The same can be said when the F-16 first show up in the 70's. Everyone of them have teething problems,(engine falling off F-15 mid flight), every one of these problems will eventually be solved, instead of rushing to cancel the program. Case and point, the YB-49 yaw instability problem was solved by using a different autopilot, by the time the program got cancelled by the congress. No, the solution is not to limit the military arms to Joint programs, and load up a system with so much compromise that no one service can use. Reduce the design cycle of each system, and start to rethink multi-role systems. On the other hand, need to fix what we are stuck with, not buying more old obselete system that serves nothing but numbers. To a point, that is what UAV programs are doing, each service is developing their own unique system, and each UAV design are single role. The F-35 is 18% complete with its flight test regime. We were told that simulations were good enough, so we could cut back on flight testing and build aircraft at the same time we were testing to get the aircraft into the field sooner. What we have found is that more flight testing has been added back into the program. What we have found is that flight testing is showing that parts of the aircraft we have already bought need to be replaced, already. What that means is that we either undergo expensive retrofits to the aircraft that are already built when flight testing is complete, or we write them off sooner, much sooner, than expected. Fun huh? http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3abcb29d8f-6a85-40c5-8f1d-c84d20afe997&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest You are mixing apples and oranges, we were talking F-22, why drag in the F-35, besides, I was part of the F-22 flight test program a few years back, a flight test program that seems like it will never end. No I am not. Perhaps you should read what McCain said. He wasn't just on about the F-22. He was on about defense procurement in general. The F-35 is a perfect example of what he was talking about. In fact, he talked about the F-35... He also cited Lockheed’s Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite and F-35 jet, the Pentagon’s most expensive weapon, as flawed programs sustained by the institutional influence of defense companies, retired military officials they hire and the military services.
The point is about defense procurement. We can point to any service and cite examples of runaway procurement problems. And that is McCain's point. The F-22's procurement is over. The F-35 will be pressed into service as a supplemental air superiority fighter, relying greatly on technology over kinematic performance. JamesP81 asked what we should do if we don't continue on the same path we are going down. That's part of the problem. The Congressional-Military-Industrial complex makes it sound like if we don't buy what is the favored system we'll be at a disadvantage for decades. That is simply not the case. |
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These airplanes are less about how you perceive they look and more about the way they compute. Yep. The look of the plane may be 40yrs old but a newly constructed airframe with modern internals (engines, hydraulic systems, avionics, radar, weapons, etc..) makes all the difference. |
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What does McCain propose we do? The F-15 is a nearly a 40 year old design. If 25 years from now we're still relying on them as our primary air superiority fighter, we're quite likely going to find ourselves in a really bad situation. So the answer is to keep dumping money into an underperforming program that has about 18% of its flight testing done because there are no other alternatives? I don't think so. No, but putting money into an obsolete weapon that will be unable to compete isn't an answer either. Yes, the F-22 and the F-35 programs both have been mismanaged. Something should be one about that, but I'm worried the leadership is simply going to throw the whole project out and not propose any other solution. You're making the assumption that the F-15 is obsolete. I wouldn't make that assumption. One thing it has going for it is internal volume. Internal volume allows you to stuff all sorts of goodies in it. Just look at the AESA radars that have been added. Hell, look at the engine upgrades other nations have added. Hell, look at the F-15XX. There are plenty of things you can do with the airframe. Yes, it's RCS isn't optimal, but stealth, IMO is over-rated. It is probably the most expensive way to tackle the problem of IADS. A single seat F-15 has a giant equipment bay where the WSO sits in a two seat airplane. There is lots and lots of room for all sorts of equipment containing computers, even ECM. Even the nose barrel probably has space freed up with the installation of production AESA. The airframe will last a long time barring unforeseen load spectra or unusual corrosion environments; we sized the F-15E for 32000 hours total (analytical) life. That's a long time, and the airplanes will become obsolete for some other reason than basic integrity of the primary structure. Serious question: Is it maneuverable enough to dominate dogfights with SU-37s and other aircraft that the American pilots could come up against? That's the reason we built the F-22 right, so that we could continue to dominate enemy aircraft? What dog fights? An AESA equipped F-15 is a giant killer. |
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I think the question we have to ask ourselves is why the last two major aircraft development programs the military has run have been basically failures. We have to fix acquisitions or we're going to loose the industrial base and our military will become a paper tiger.
How to we avoid the mistakes of the F-22 and F-35 on the NGB/LRS? |
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What does McCain propose we do? The F-15 is a nearly a 40 year old design. If 25 years from now we're still relying on them as our primary air superiority fighter, we're quite likely going to find ourselves in a really bad situation. So the answer is to keep dumping money into an underperforming program that has about 18% of its flight testing done because there are no other alternatives? I don't think so. No, but putting money into an obsolete weapon that will be unable to compete isn't an answer either. Yes, the F-22 and the F-35 programs both have been mismanaged. Something should be one about that, but I'm worried the leadership is simply going to throw the whole project out and not propose any other solution. You're making the assumption that the F-15 is obsolete. I wouldn't make that assumption. One thing it has going for it is internal volume. Internal volume allows you to stuff all sorts of goodies in it. Just look at the AESA radars that have been added. Hell, look at the engine upgrades other nations have added. Hell, look at the F-15XX. There are plenty of things you can do with the airframe. Yes, it's RCS isn't optimal, but stealth, IMO is over-rated. It is probably the most expensive way to tackle the problem of IADS. A single seat F-15 has a giant equipment bay where the WSO sits in a two seat airplane. There is lots and lots of room for all sorts of equipment containing computers, even ECM. Even the nose barrel probably has space freed up with the installation of production AESA. The airframe will last a long time barring unforeseen load spectra or unusual corrosion environments; we sized the F-15E for 32000 hours total (analytical) life. That's a long time, and the airplanes will become obsolete for some other reason than basic integrity of the primary structure. Serious question: Is it maneuverable enough to dominate dogfights with SU-37s and other aircraft that the American pilots could come up against? That's the reason we built the F-22 right, so that we could continue to dominate enemy aircraft? If only McDonnell-Douglas had developed an alternative in the 1990s that built on the F-15, but had more maneuverability.
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I think the question we have to ask ourselves is why the last two major aircraft development programs the military has run have been basically failures. We have to fix acquisitions or we're going to loose the industrial base and our military will become a paper tiger. How to we avoid the mistakes of the F-22 and F-35 on the NGB/LRS? Competition. We don't have any. Requirements creep. We keep adding on. Impossible requirements. We ask for the moon, instead of what we really need. Go after technologies that are feasible, and then ask for space and weight reserved for future technologies. |
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Put it this way, if we have internets and forum likt these, the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 are all POS when they initially fielded, and should never get built.
Eventually their problems got resolved and become premium systems of their time. This will always hold true with the F/A-18 E/F, F-22, and F-35, and other up and coming manned and unmanned systems. Just don't jump on the any information and assume it is the latest and react to it. By the time most people, including aviation leak and the politicians, get ahold of the information, it was several months behind. |
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Put it this way, if we have internets and forum likt these, the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 are all POS when they initially fielded, and should never get built. Eventually their problems got resolved and become premium systems of their time. This will always hold true with the F/A-18 E/F, F-22, and F-35, and other up and coming manned and unmanned systems. Just don't jump on the any information and assume it is the latest and react to it. By the time most people, including aviation leak and the politicians, get ahold of the information, it was several months behind. At what cost? The difference between then and now is we don't have the money for business as usual. |
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I think the question we have to ask ourselves is why the last two major aircraft development programs the military has run have been basically failures. We have to fix acquisitions or we're going to loose the industrial base and our military will become a paper tiger. How to we avoid the mistakes of the F-22 and F-35 on the NGB/LRS? Competition. We don't have any. Requirements creep. We keep adding on. Impossible requirements. We ask for the moon, instead of what we really need. Go after technologies that are feasible, and then ask for space and weight reserved for future technologies. Do you think fixed price contracting and legally binding procurement numbers would help? |
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I think the question we have to ask ourselves is why the last two major aircraft development programs the military has run have been basically failures. We have to fix acquisitions or we're going to loose the industrial base and our military will become a paper tiger. How to we avoid the mistakes of the F-22 and F-35 on the NGB/LRS? Competition. We don't have any. Requirements creep. We keep adding on. Impossible requirements. We ask for the moon, instead of what we really need. Go after technologies that are feasible, and then ask for space and weight reserved for future technologies. Do you think fixed price contracting and legally binding procurement numbers would help? Not really. There are too many outs and with fixed price we'll end up with Spruance-class destroyers vice Kidd-class destroyers, if you know what I mean. |
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Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: Quoted: What does McCain propose we do? The F-15 is a nearly a 40 year old design. If 25 years from now we're still relying on them as our primary air superiority fighter, we're quite likely going to find ourselves in a really bad situation. So the answer is to keep dumping money into an underperforming program that has about 18% of its flight testing done because there are no other alternatives? I don't think so. No, but putting money into an obsolete weapon that will be unable to compete isn't an answer either. Yes, the F-22 and the F-35 programs both have been mismanaged. Something should be one about that, but I'm worried the leadership is simply going to throw the whole project out and not propose any other solution. You're making the assumption that the F-15 is obsolete. I wouldn't make that assumption. One thing it has going for it is internal volume. Internal volume allows you to stuff all sorts of goodies in it. Just look at the AESA radars that have been added. Hell, look at the engine upgrades other nations have added. Hell, look at the F-15XX. There are plenty of things you can do with the airframe. Yes, it's RCS isn't optimal, but stealth, IMO is over-rated. It is probably the most expensive way to tackle the problem of IADS. A single seat F-15 has a giant equipment bay where the WSO sits in a two seat airplane. There is lots and lots of room for all sorts of equipment containing computers, even ECM. Even the nose barrel probably has space freed up with the installation of production AESA. The airframe will last a long time barring unforeseen load spectra or unusual corrosion environments; we sized the F-15E for 32000 hours total (analytical) life. That's a long time, and the airplanes will become obsolete for some other reason than basic integrity of the primary structure. Serious question: Is it maneuverable enough to dominate dogfights with SU-37s and other aircraft that the American pilots could come up against? That's the reason we built the F-22 right, so that we could continue to dominate enemy aircraft? If only McDonnell-Douglas had developed an alternative in the 1990s that built on the F-15, but had more maneuverability. ![]() The Silent Eagle? |
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What does McCain propose we do? The F-15 is a nearly a 40 year old design. If 25 years from now we're still relying on them as our primary air superiority fighter, we're quite likely going to find ourselves in a really bad situation. So the answer is to keep dumping money into an underperforming program that has about 18% of its flight testing done because there are no other alternatives? I don't think so. What do you mean 18%? You need to understand, the F-22 is very unique in its capability for these days. The same can be said when the F-16 first show up in the 70's. Everyone of them have teething problems,(engine falling off F-15 mid flight), every one of these problems will eventually be solved, instead of rushing to cancel the program. Case and point, the YB-49 yaw instability problem was solved by using a different autopilot, by the time the program got cancelled by the congress. No, the solution is not to limit the military arms to Joint programs, and load up a system with so much compromise that no one service can use. Reduce the design cycle of each system, and start to rethink multi-role systems. On the other hand, need to fix what we are stuck with, not buying more old obselete system that serves nothing but numbers. To a point, that is what UAV programs are doing, each service is developing their own unique system, and each UAV design are single role. The F-35 is 18% complete with its flight test regime. We were told that simulations were good enough, so we could cut back on flight testing and build aircraft at the same time we were testing to get the aircraft into the field sooner. What we have found is that more flight testing has been added back into the program. What we have found is that flight testing is showing that parts of the aircraft we have already bought need to be replaced, already. What that means is that we either undergo expensive retrofits to the aircraft that are already built when flight testing is complete, or we write them off sooner, much sooner, than expected. Fun huh? http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3abcb29d8f-6a85-40c5-8f1d-c84d20afe997&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest You are mixing apples and oranges, we were talking F-22, why drag in the F-35, besides, I was part of the F-22 flight test program a few years back, a flight test program that seems like it will never end. No I am not. Perhaps you should read what McCain said. He wasn't just on about the F-22. He was on about defense procurement in general. The F-35 is a perfect example of what he was talking about. In fact, he talked about the F-35... He also cited Lockheed’s Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite and F-35 jet, the Pentagon’s most expensive weapon, as flawed programs sustained by the institutional influence of defense companies, retired military officials they hire and the military services.
The point is about defense procurement. We can point to any service and cite examples of runaway procurement problems. And that is McCain's point. The F-22's procurement is over. The F-35 will be pressed into service as a supplemental air superiority fighter, relying greatly on technology over kinematic performance. JamesP81 asked what we should do if we don't continue on the same path we are going down. That's part of the problem. The Congressional-Military-Industrial complex makes it sound like if we don't buy what is the favored system we'll be at a disadvantage for decades. That is simply not the case. I have already stated the solutions, no more Joint programs, and screw the multi-role system. Single role system are so much better, lower cost, but the services have been beaten by the congress to go that route. |
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What does McCain propose we do? The F-15 is a nearly a 40 year old design. If 25 years from now we're still relying on them as our primary air superiority fighter, we're quite likely going to find ourselves in a really bad situation. So the answer is to keep dumping money into an underperforming program that has about 18% of its flight testing done because there are no other alternatives? I don't think so. No, but putting money into an obsolete weapon that will be unable to compete isn't an answer either. Yes, the F-22 and the F-35 programs both have been mismanaged. Something should be one about that, but I'm worried the leadership is simply going to throw the whole project out and not propose any other solution. You're making the assumption that the F-15 is obsolete. I wouldn't make that assumption. One thing it has going for it is internal volume. Internal volume allows you to stuff all sorts of goodies in it. Just look at the AESA radars that have been added. Hell, look at the engine upgrades other nations have added. Hell, look at the F-15XX. There are plenty of things you can do with the airframe. Yes, it's RCS isn't optimal, but stealth, IMO is over-rated. It is probably the most expensive way to tackle the problem of IADS. A single seat F-15 has a giant equipment bay where the WSO sits in a two seat airplane. There is lots and lots of room for all sorts of equipment containing computers, even ECM. Even the nose barrel probably has space freed up with the installation of production AESA. The airframe will last a long time barring unforeseen load spectra or unusual corrosion environments; we sized the F-15E for 32000 hours total (analytical) life. That's a long time, and the airplanes will become obsolete for some other reason than basic integrity of the primary structure. Serious question: Is it maneuverable enough to dominate dogfights with SU-37s and other aircraft that the American pilots could come up against? That's the reason we built the F-22 right, so that we could continue to dominate enemy aircraft? What dog fights? An AESA equipped F-15 is a giant killer. That is if the giant did not see it first. |
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I have already stated the solutions, no more Joint programs, and screw the multi-role system. Single role system are so much better, lower cost, but the services have been beaten by the congress to go that route. That is a very narrow solution set. How is LCS or DDG-1000 a joint program? How was F-22 a joint program? V-22 is technically a joint program, but truly it was driven by USMC requirements. Was EFV a joint program? Was FCS a joint program? I can go on. It goes much deeper than Joint and/or multi-role systems. By the way, the F/A-18E/F is multirole and came in at a reasonable development cost and production cost. How about Link-16, aka JTIDS? Should we have not developed it because it was "joint"? Should the USAF, USA, USMC and USN have different tactical data links between their aircraft and air defense assets? I don't think so. Your solution is very simplistic and does not address the fundamental problems. |
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I think the question we have to ask ourselves is why the last two major aircraft development programs the military has run have been basically failures. We have to fix acquisitions or we're going to loose the industrial base and our military will become a paper tiger. How to we avoid the mistakes of the F-22 and F-35 on the NGB/LRS? Remove the services from major procurement. Secretaries are focused on whats good for the service. They need to be focused on whats needed for the mission. As long as we maintain Service secretaries the problems will continue. Eliminate the SECARMY, AF, NAV etc and make two secretaries: Strategic and Strike (or expeditionary, if you prefer) They will procure based upon their mission requirements and decide what capability best meets the mission. not what mission best meets the promises of LM or Boeing. |
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I think the question we have to ask ourselves is why the last two major aircraft development programs the military has run have been basically failures. We have to fix acquisitions or we're going to loose the industrial base and our military will become a paper tiger. How to we avoid the mistakes of the F-22 and F-35 on the NGB/LRS? Remove the services from major procurement. Secretaries are focused on whats good for the service. They need to be focused on whats needed for the mission. As long as we maintain Service secretaries the problems will continue. Eliminate the SECARMY, AF, NAV etc and make two secretaries: Strategic and Strike (or expeditionary, if you prefer) They will procure based upon their mission requirements and decide what capability best meets the mission. not what mission best meets the promises of LM or Boeing. That is not without merit. MDA is sort of filling this role. They are building systems and then asking for services to take over the systems once developed. It makes sense in a way. |
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Quoted: Quoted: I have already stated the solutions, no more Joint programs, and screw the multi-role system. Single role system are so much better, lower cost, but the services have been beaten by the congress to go that route. That is a very narrow solution set. How is LCS or DDG-1000 a joint program? How was F-22 a joint program? V-22 is technically a joint program, but truly it was driven by USMC requirements. Was EFV a joint program? Was FCS a joint program? I can go on. It goes much deeper than Joint and/or multi-role systems. By the way, the F/A-18E/F is multirole and came in at a reasonable development cost and production cost. How about Link-16, aka JTIDS? Should we have not developed it because it was "joint"? Should the USAF, USA, USMC and USN have different tactical data links between their aircraft and air defense assets? I don't think so. Your solution is very simplistic and does not address the fundamental problems. I agree with your previous assessment, it's scope creep and unrealistic expectations that are killing us on price, at least with the F-35 anyway. Stupid STOVL requirement. |
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The major problem, THE FUCKING EPA.
The paint was non-zinc chromated. Same shit they are forcing down all the military throats. Its fucking garbage. Now with shit paint, without the EPA hated zinc, the aluminum is undergoing galvanic corrosion. Way to go EPA and .mil for listening to them. |
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I have already stated the solutions, no more Joint programs, and screw the multi-role system. Single role system are so much better, lower cost, but the services have been beaten by the congress to go that route. That is a very narrow solution set. How is LCS or DDG-1000 a joint program? How was F-22 a joint program? V-22 is technically a joint program, but truly it was driven by USMC requirements. Was EFV a joint program? Was FCS a joint program? I can go on. It goes much deeper than Joint and/or multi-role systems. By the way, the F/A-18E/F is multirole and came in at a reasonable development cost and production cost. How about Link-16, aka JTIDS? Should we have not developed it because it was "joint"? Should the USAF, USA, USMC and USN have different tactical data links between their aircraft and air defense assets? I don't think so. Your solution is very simplistic and does not address the fundamental problems. I agree with your previous assessment, it's scope creep that is killing us on price, at least with the F-35 anyway. Stupid STOVL requirement. The question is if that is really creep. There were two programs that merged into one, so you can make the argument that it was creep. Or you could make the argument that JSF had that requirement from the beginning. |
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What does McCain propose we do? The F-15 is a nearly a 40 year old design. If 25 years from now we're still relying on them as our primary air superiority fighter, we're quite likely going to find ourselves in a really bad situation. So the answer is to keep dumping money into an underperforming program that has about 18% of its flight testing done because there are no other alternatives? I don't think so. No, but putting money into an obsolete weapon that will be unable to compete isn't an answer either. Yes, the F-22 and the F-35 programs both have been mismanaged. Something should be one about that, but I'm worried the leadership is simply going to throw the whole project out and not propose any other solution. You're making the assumption that the F-15 is obsolete. I wouldn't make that assumption. One thing it has going for it is internal volume. Internal volume allows you to stuff all sorts of goodies in it. Just look at the AESA radars that have been added. Hell, look at the engine upgrades other nations have added. Hell, look at the F-15XX. There are plenty of things you can do with the airframe. Yes, it's RCS isn't optimal, but stealth, IMO is over-rated. It is probably the most expensive way to tackle the problem of IADS. A single seat F-15 has a giant equipment bay where the WSO sits in a two seat airplane. There is lots and lots of room for all sorts of equipment containing computers, even ECM. Even the nose barrel probably has space freed up with the installation of production AESA. The airframe will last a long time barring unforeseen load spectra or unusual corrosion environments; we sized the F-15E for 32000 hours total (analytical) life. That's a long time, and the airplanes will become obsolete for some other reason than basic integrity of the primary structure. Serious question: Is it maneuverable enough to dominate dogfights with SU-37s and other aircraft that the American pilots could come up against? That's the reason we built the F-22 right, so that we could continue to dominate enemy aircraft? What dog fights? An AESA equipped F-15 is a giant killer. That is if the giant did not see it first. The only way that will happen is with ground based RADAR, and that is a problem. Thing is, when the enemy has rows of RADAR sites, that means an airplane has to pass abeam of transmitters, not simply attack head on. The Soviets had an IRST advantage and tactic that is now gone, no matter which airplane enters the fight. |
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The only way that will happen is with ground based RADAR, and that is a problem. That internal volume thing at play again. Especially when it comes to the nose, and the number of T/R modules you can fit. The F-15 has a big aperture. Someone here might know the difference in the size of the antenna's on the F-15 and the F-22. It's not a large number. |
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The only way that will happen is with ground based RADAR, and that is a problem. That internal volume thing at play again. Especially when it comes to the nose, and the number of T/R modules you can fit. The F-15 has a big aperture. Someone here might know the difference in the size of the antenna's on the F-15 and the F-22. It's not a large number. As I recall, they are essentially the same. |
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Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT)’s F-22 jet is among several U.S. weapons that are flawed, waste taxpayer dollars and benefit from the military-industrial alliance, Senator John McCain said today. Looks like Ron Paul has gotten to McCain..... More like Eisenhower, another guy who had no idea how to think strategically, apparently. This thread is another perfect example of where military credentials are used when it suits some people's arguments, but once said prop dares stray from the party line, the personal attacks commence with a vengeance. |
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The only way that will happen is with ground based RADAR, and that is a problem. That internal volume thing at play again. Especially when it comes to the nose, and the number of T/R modules you can fit. The F-15 has a big aperture. Someone here might know the difference in the size of the antenna's on the F-15 and the F-22. It's not a large number. The physical diameter? |
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I think the question we have to ask ourselves is why the last two major aircraft development programs the military has run have been basically failures. We have to fix acquisitions or we're going to loose the industrial base and our military will become a paper tiger. How to we avoid the mistakes of the F-22 and F-35 on the NGB/LRS? Remove the services from major procurement. Secretaries are focused on whats good for the service. They need to be focused on whats needed for the mission. As long as we maintain Service secretaries the problems will continue. Eliminate the SECARMY, AF, NAV etc and make two secretaries: Strategic and Strike (or expeditionary, if you prefer) They will procure based upon their mission requirements and decide what capability best meets the mission. not what mission best meets the promises of LM or Boeing. That is not without merit. MDA is sort of filling this role. They are building systems and then asking for services to take over the systems once developed. It makes sense in a way. Or we could try having a separate cabinet department, like a Ministry of Supply or Defence Materiel Organisation, do the procurement for DoD. This would be the opportunity for a general house cleaning but then we would be faced with trying to ensure that the same problems did not develop again. |
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The only way that will happen is with ground based RADAR, and that is a problem. That internal volume thing at play again. Especially when it comes to the nose, and the number of T/R modules you can fit. The F-15 has a big aperture. Someone here might know the difference in the size of the antenna's on the F-15 and the F-22. It's not a large number. The physical diameter? Why does it matter? Anyone that really knows isn't going to open their mouth about radar... |

