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Posted: 8/28/2026 2:23:20 PM EDT
| I understand in April 1967 SOG ordered 510 e2 carbines but was their another batch ordered or did that batch last them the whole war? |
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I've never been privy to the procurement numbers, but 510 carbines wouldn't have spread around that much. We know this because not everyone lucked-out and got issued a CAR-15 up front, on their Day 1. John Plaster wrote about having to carry a suppressed Swedish-K into Laos until he was asked by someone inside his leadership if there was anything he needed. So he recounted the most recent trip across the fence in which he'd shot a guy with the Swedish-K, only to realize the guy had simply crawled away when he wasn't watching. And before his team went back out, Plaster had finally gotten his CAR-15. In other instances, guys who were rotating home would bequeath their carbines to the newest guy on the team. I've had a number of guys tell me that's how they got theirs, and they did the same in kind when they left. But there's simply no way 510 carbines was enough to go 'round for the entire unit. I'd figure a couple thousand, if not more. Everybody wanted one; it was a status symbol. Ask any of the ol' timers hanging around the forums who had time in RVN, and they'll probably be able to recount the first time they saw somebody carrying one. So not only did SOG's kinetic arm demand CAR-15s, but so too did all the various security detachments responsible for compound security, all the guys who ran the launch sites, guys who ran the safe-houses, etc. And after the 23 August 1968 raid on CCN, not a soul around was caught dead on-base without a gun, several mags, and a grenade or three. Then we got all the Hatchet Force raiders. Not everyone got one, but I'd wager by 1970, anyone who was frequently going outside the wire to run missions was carrying one. I'll say 93%, SWAG. Ain't no way 510 carbines was enough. |
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Originally Posted By RTUtah: I've never been privy to the procurement numbers, but 510 carbines wouldn't have spread around that much. We know this because not everyone lucked-out and got issued a CAR-15 up front, on their Day 1. John Plaster wrote about having to carry a suppressed Swedish-K into Laos until he was asked by someone inside his leadership if there was anything he needed. So he recounted the most recent trip across the fence in which he'd shot a guy with the Swedish-K, only to realize the guy had simply crawled away when he wasn't watching. And before his team went back out, Plaster had finally gotten his CAR-15. In other instances, guys who were rotating home would bequeath their carbines to the newest guy on the team. I've had a number of guys tell me that's how they got theirs, and they did the same in kind when they left. But there's simply no way 510 carbines was enough to go 'round for the entire unit. I'd figure a couple thousand, if not more. Everybody wanted one; it was a status symbol. Ask any of the ol' timers hanging around the forums who had time in RVN, and they'll probably be able to recount the first time they saw somebody carrying one. So not only did SOG's kinetic arm demand CAR-15s, but so too did all the various security detachments responsible for compound security, all the guys who ran the launch sites, guys who ran the safe-houses, etc. And after the 23 August 1968 raid on CCN, not a soul around was caught dead on-base without a gun, several mags, and a grenade or three. Then we got all the Hatchet Force raiders. Not everyone got one, but I'd wager by 1970, anyone who was frequently going outside the wire to run missions was carrying one. I'll say 93%, SWAG. Ain't no way 510 carbines was enough. Correct me if I'm wrong but if I recall the whole logic behind early MACV ops were to not use any US weapons or gear as to not have any proof that they were actually US operators, thus why they would be using stuff like Swedish K's, Type 56s, sawed down RPDs, etc. But if I recall at some point in like 1967 or 68 they were told it didn't matter what weapons they used anymore as enough US sourced weapons were being captured by ARVN and NLF forces that it was plausible that they could still be "not ours" while using stuff like XM177s. |
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Originally Posted By RTUtah: I've never been privy to the procurement numbers, but 510 carbines wouldn't have spread around that much. We know this because not everyone lucked-out and got issued a CAR-15 up front, on their Day 1. John Plaster wrote about having to carry a suppressed Swedish-K into Laos until he was asked by someone inside his leadership if there was anything he needed. So he recounted the most recent trip across the fence in which he'd shot a guy with the Swedish-K, only to realize the guy had simply crawled away when he wasn't watching. And before his team went back out, Plaster had finally gotten his CAR-15. In other instances, guys who were rotating home would bequeath their carbines to the newest guy on the team. I've had a number of guys tell me that's how they got theirs, and they did the same in kind when they left. But there's simply no way 510 carbines was enough to go 'round for the entire unit. I'd figure a couple thousand, if not more. Everybody wanted one; it was a status symbol. Ask any of the ol' timers hanging around the forums who had time in RVN, and they'll probably be able to recount the first time they saw somebody carrying one. So not only did SOG's kinetic arm demand CAR-15s, but so too did all the various security detachments responsible for compound security, all the guys who ran the launch sites, guys who ran the safe-houses, etc. And after the 23 August 1968 raid on CCN, not a soul around was caught dead on-base without a gun, several mags, and a grenade or three. Then we got all the Hatchet Force raiders. Not everyone got one, but I'd wager by 1970, anyone who was frequently going outside the wire to run missions was carrying one. I'll say 93%, SWAG. Ain't no way 510 carbines was enough. Originally Posted By RTUtah: I've never been privy to the procurement numbers, but 510 carbines wouldn't have spread around that much. We know this because not everyone lucked-out and got issued a CAR-15 up front, on their Day 1. John Plaster wrote about having to carry a suppressed Swedish-K into Laos until he was asked by someone inside his leadership if there was anything he needed. So he recounted the most recent trip across the fence in which he'd shot a guy with the Swedish-K, only to realize the guy had simply crawled away when he wasn't watching. And before his team went back out, Plaster had finally gotten his CAR-15. In other instances, guys who were rotating home would bequeath their carbines to the newest guy on the team. I've had a number of guys tell me that's how they got theirs, and they did the same in kind when they left. But there's simply no way 510 carbines was enough to go 'round for the entire unit. I'd figure a couple thousand, if not more. Everybody wanted one; it was a status symbol. Ask any of the ol' timers hanging around the forums who had time in RVN, and they'll probably be able to recount the first time they saw somebody carrying one. So not only did SOG's kinetic arm demand CAR-15s, but so too did all the various security detachments responsible for compound security, all the guys who ran the launch sites, guys who ran the safe-houses, etc. And after the 23 August 1968 raid on CCN, not a soul around was caught dead on-base without a gun, several mags, and a grenade or three. Then we got all the Hatchet Force raiders. Not everyone got one, but I'd wager by 1970, anyone who was frequently going outside the wire to run missions was carrying one. I'll say 93%, SWAG. Ain't no way 510 carbines was enough. And.. Don't forget about all of the XM177E2's that found their way over to the Air America compound in Da Nang via trade. ![]() Originally Posted By ArtifactDecay: Correct me if I'm wrong but if I recall the whole logic behind early MACV ops were to not use any US weapons or gear as to not have any proof that they were actually US operators, thus why they would be using stuff like Swedish K's, Type 56s, sawed down RPDs, etc. But if I recall at some point in like 1967 or 68 they were told it didn't matter what weapons they used anymore as enough US sourced weapons were being captured by ARVN and NLF forces that it was plausible that they could still be "not ours" while using stuff like XM177s. It's true that early on in the program that weapons were sourced to reinforce the "deniability" factor in cross border operations. But the XM177E2's weren't sterilized. No rhyme or reason as to the why, they just weren't. |
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Yes, at least 2 procurements were made, more would have been possible given the total production estimates based on known serial numbers, although enough of them can be seen being used by non SOG personnel that I think at least some of them must have been issued to other units, rather than SOG loaning or otherwise losing control of several dozen minimum of them. Edward Ezell The Black Rifle quotes the Project Manager Rifles weekly report for the week of 17-21 April 1967 as saying XM177/XM177E1 submachine gun: Consistent with improvements made. .a new designator, XM177E2, has been assigned to the current model. Contractual actions are in process to procure 510 each M177E2 submachine guns with concurrent repair parts for the Studies and Observation Group, Vietnam [MAC-SOG], Delivery date is anticipated by 30 September.. MACV's 1969 Command History, Annex F: Studies and Observations Group says XM177E2 Rifles. Arrangements were made to purchase 1,200 of these weapons for use by reconnaissance personnel. The weapons arrived in October 1969 and are in use. Given how inconsistent unit quarterly or yearly reports were in what they chose to record or not I think it is possible SOG made a procurement between those two. However I think it is unlikely that any further procurements were made later than that because it seems a decision had been made in 1969 to stop any procurement of XM177E2s. Also for reference in 1968 CCN had a total of 567 US and 3052 Vietnamese personnel organized across 36 total exploitation platoons (4 US and 41 Vietnamese each) and 64 total Recon Teams (3 US and 9 Vietnamese each), while CCS had a total 158 US and 1070 Vietnamese personnel across 20 Reaction Platoons and 24 Recon Teams. SOG of course had other branches but the majority of the personnel, especially the combat personnel were in the ground studies branch. |
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Originally Posted By myitinaw: It's true that early on in the program that weapons were sourced to reinforce the "deniability" factor in cross border operations. But the XM177E2's weren't sterilized. No rhyme or reason as to the why, they just weren't. Originally Posted By myitinaw: It's true that early on in the program that weapons were sourced to reinforce the "deniability" factor in cross border operations. But the XM177E2's weren't sterilized. No rhyme or reason as to the why, they just weren't. The 1969 Command History says: Action was taken toward a departure from the sterile equipment policy of the past. With the exception of the items mentioned below, it is felt that sterilization of equipment carried into either the PF or SHAO is not necessary and in fact weakens the cover story. sterilized equipment, foreign weapons, etc., are not carried by CIDG patrols. If an RT is to purport to be a lost CIDG patrol then its members should do as much as possible to look like such. Equipment which is intentionally left behind, such as mines and wire tap devices, should be sterilized in accordance with presently applicable policy in SHAO. Granted that is in 1969, and the first procurement of XM177E2s was in 1967. Perhaps a similar logic was used earlier before being formalized. Or perhaps the XM177E2s were originally intended only for SOG's in-country operations and were misused "across the fence". |
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Originally Posted By Cap_Camouflage: Yes, at least 2 procurements were made, more would have been possible given the total production estimates based on known serial numbers, although enough of them can be seen being used by non SOG personnel that I think at least some of them must have been issued to other units, rather than SOG loaning or otherwise losing control of several dozen minimum of them. Edward Ezell The Black Rifle quotes the Project Manager Rifles weekly report for the week of 17-21 April 1967 as saying MACV's 1969 Command History, Annex F: Studies and Observations Group says Given how inconsistent unit quarterly or yearly reports were in what they chose to record or not I think it is possible SOG made a procurement between those two. However I think it is unlikely that any further procurements were made later than that because it seems a decision had been made in 1969 to stop any procurement of XM177E2s. Also for reference in 1968 CCN had a total of 567 US and 3052 Vietnamese personnel organized across 36 total exploitation platoons (4 US and 41 Vietnamese each) and 64 total Recon Teams (3 US and 9 Vietnamese each), while CCS had a total 158 US and 1070 Vietnamese personnel across 20 Reaction Platoons and 24 Recon Teams. SOG of course had other branches but the majority of the personnel, especially the combat personnel were in the ground studies branch. Originally Posted By Cap_Camouflage: Yes, at least 2 procurements were made, more would have been possible given the total production estimates based on known serial numbers, although enough of them can be seen being used by non SOG personnel that I think at least some of them must have been issued to other units, rather than SOG loaning or otherwise losing control of several dozen minimum of them. Edward Ezell The Black Rifle quotes the Project Manager Rifles weekly report for the week of 17-21 April 1967 as saying XM177/XM177E1 submachine gun: Consistent with improvements made. .a new designator, XM177E2, has been assigned to the current model. Contractual actions are in process to procure 510 each M177E2 submachine guns with concurrent repair parts for the Studies and Observation Group, Vietnam [MAC-SOG], Delivery date is anticipated by 30 September.. MACV's 1969 Command History, Annex F: Studies and Observations Group says XM177E2 Rifles. Arrangements were made to purchase 1,200 of these weapons for use by reconnaissance personnel. The weapons arrived in October 1969 and are in use. Given how inconsistent unit quarterly or yearly reports were in what they chose to record or not I think it is possible SOG made a procurement between those two. However I think it is unlikely that any further procurements were made later than that because it seems a decision had been made in 1969 to stop any procurement of XM177E2s. Also for reference in 1968 CCN had a total of 567 US and 3052 Vietnamese personnel organized across 36 total exploitation platoons (4 US and 41 Vietnamese each) and 64 total Recon Teams (3 US and 9 Vietnamese each), while CCS had a total 158 US and 1070 Vietnamese personnel across 20 Reaction Platoons and 24 Recon Teams. SOG of course had other branches but the majority of the personnel, especially the combat personnel were in the ground studies branch. Thank you Cap_Camouflage for the enlightenment. |
A socialist may indeed be academically superior.
And yet, they are most certainly emotionally retarded.
Public education is the opiate of the masses.
And yet, they are most certainly emotionally retarded.
Public education is the opiate of the masses.
|
Originally Posted By ArtifactDecay: Correct me if I'm wrong but if I recall the whole logic behind early MACV ops were to not use any US weapons or gear as to not have any proof that they were actually US operators, thus why they would be using stuff like Swedish K's, Type 56s, sawed down RPDs, etc. I’ve seen photos of sterile Ruger Mk1 suppressed .22 pistols that were unmarked, but I think that was a CIA thing, and not specifically a Vietnam thing. No other country was manufacturing those pistols either. Project AGILE put the first AR-15 rifles in Vietnam by 1962 (maybe late 1961). The captured RPDs were utilized because U.S. operators liked them; not because they were trying to blend in by carrying enemy weapons, although that was probably a secondary benefit when firing them way behind enemy lines. |
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Originally Posted By Cap_Camouflage: Yes, at least 2 procurements were made, more would have been possible given the total production estimates based on known serial numbers, although enough of them can be seen being used by non SOG personnel that I think at least some of them must have been issued to other units, rather than SOG loaning or otherwise losing control of several dozen minimum of them. Edward Ezell The Black Rifle quotes the Project Manager Rifles weekly report for the week of 17-21 April 1967 as saying MACV's 1969 Command History, Annex F: Studies and Observations Group says Given how inconsistent unit quarterly or yearly reports were in what they chose to record or not I think it is possible SOG made a procurement between those two. However I think it is unlikely that any further procurements were made later than that because it seems a decision had been made in 1969 to stop any procurement of XM177E2s. Also for reference in 1968 CCN had a total of 567 US and 3052 Vietnamese personnel organized across 36 total exploitation platoons (4 US and 41 Vietnamese each) and 64 total Recon Teams (3 US and 9 Vietnamese each), while CCS had a total 158 US and 1070 Vietnamese personnel across 20 Reaction Platoons and 24 Recon Teams. SOG of course had other branches but the majority of the personnel, especially the combat personnel were in the ground studies branch. Originally Posted By Cap_Camouflage: The 1969 Command History says: Granted that is in 1969, and the first procurement of XM177E2s was in 1967. Perhaps a similar logic was used earlier before being formalized. Or perhaps the XM177E2s were originally intended only for SOG's in-country operations and were misused "across the fence". I never knew a lot of this, so thanks for posting! I'm not at all surprised about the inaccuracy of whatever records they actually kept back then. It would seem my guess of a few thousand carbines wasn't that far off. And we know SOG didn't only get E2s because there absolutely were E1s in their inventories. The horse-trading and bartering that went on between random units back in those days was undoubtedly widespread; every outfit had a scrounger or three they relied on to procure items they didn't all have. It's a time-honored tradition amongst fighting men, and nobody's gonna keep those records for obvious reasons. |
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Originally Posted By ArtifactDecay: Correct me if I'm wrong but if I recall the whole logic behind early MACV ops were to not use any US weapons or gear as to not have any proof that they were actually US operators, thus why they would be using stuff like Swedish K's, Type 56s, sawed down RPDs, etc. But if I recall at some point in like 1967 or 68 they were told it didn't matter what weapons they used anymore as enough US sourced weapons were being captured by ARVN and NLF forces that it was plausible that they could still be "not ours" while using stuff like XM177s. Do you know how SOG got around the boot-print problem out across the fence? Obviously, USGI jungle boots made a very distinct imprint in soft terrain. Problem was, of all the gear America fielded in SEA, the ol' classic Panama-soled jungle boot was one of the best pieces of kit for that sorta fighting in wet environments, so nobody wanted to give them up. So RT members tried everything to obscure their footprints but nothing worked... UNTIL some intrepid enlisted guy had the genius idea to airdrop however-many-thousands of pairs of USGI jungle boots along the Trail. North Vietnamese forces moving south slowly started finding those boots and wearing them, thus, eliminating the once-correct assumption of a USGI boot-print guaranteeing an American had made it. This was a transformative play, and I wager the blackmarket weapons trade had a similar effect. Of course, that meant you might get shot with 5.56mm or eat an M67 at some point, but at least you didn't hafta worry so much about every single footprint along the way. |
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Originally Posted By BerettaGuy: And high-ranking Marines also got them like this officer in Vietnam with an XM177E1: https://i.imgur.com/pjjZRW6.jpg The man pictured is Colonel Robert H. Sigholts Sr., commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion 503rd Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate), not a Marine. |
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Originally Posted By BerettaGuy: Contrary to what some on this board believe, the USMC also got them. Here is a photo of a Recon Marine with one: https://i.ibb.co/WVWh5rq/20231114-212834.jpg This photo is featured on the USMC Tilt Rotor Association website. Do you happen to know what year this was? As much as I know about SOG, I know next to nothing about Marine Recon, for the most part. |
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Originally Posted By RTUtah: we know SOG didn't only get E2s because there absolutely were E1s in their inventories. The horse-trading and bartering that went on between random units back in those days was undoubtedly widespread; every outfit had a scrounger or three they relied on to procure items they didn't all have. It's a time-honored tradition amongst fighting men, and nobody's gonna keep those records for obvious reasons. I will admit I have not studied SOG all that much. But I have seen enough photos of SOG to notice that the E1, while they did have a few, was quite uncommon with them. And there aren't very many that would have been available to SOG. The E1 was procured for a field test which began sometime after they had arrived in Vietnam in November and December 1966. Before it was even completed Colt had already updated the design to the E2 and SOG's first order of E2s mentioned in the 17-21 April 1967 weekly report had already been placed. Therefore there is virtually no window of time for another order of E1s to have been placed and it is is a pretty safe assumption that all E1s produced/issued in Vietnam came from the field trial. The final test report lists all of the units that the E1 was issued to and SOG is not one of them. But it could be reasonably argued that due to SOG's classified nature that they were simply omitted from the report. However 2,800 E1s were procured for the test, and at a fairly conservative estimate I can account which units around 2,300-2,400 or so were issued to, which would not leave very many for SOG. I think at most they would have received 100 or so for testing based on what other units received. Or given how few E1s they appear to have had, I would not be surprised if they were all "scrounged" which as you say was very common, most likely from the 100 that the 5th Special Forces Group received considering the majority of SOG's personnel were from the 5th SFG. |
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Originally Posted By Cap_Camouflage: I will admit I have not studied SOG all that much. But I have seen enough photos of SOG to notice that the E1, while they did have a few, was quite uncommon with them. And there aren't very many that would have been available to SOG. The E1 was procured for a field test which began sometime after they had arrived in Vietnam in November and December 1966. Before it was even completed Colt had already updated the design to the E2 and SOG's first order of E2s mentioned in the 17-21 April 1967 weekly report had already been placed. Therefore there is virtually no window of time for another order of E1s to have been placed and it is is a pretty safe assumption that all E1s produced/issued in Vietnam came from the field trial. The final test report lists all of the units that the E1 was issued to and SOG is not one of them. But it could be reasonably argued that due to SOG's classified nature that they were simply omitted from the report. However 2,800 E1s were procured for the test, and at a fairly conservative estimate I can account which units around 2,300-2,400 or so were issued to, which would not leave very many for SOG. I think at most they would have received 100 or so for testing based on what other units received. Or given how few E1s they appear to have had, I would not be surprised if they were all "scrounged" which as you say was very common, most likely from the 100 that the 5th Special Forces Group received considering the majority of SOG's personnel were from the 5th SFG. I feel pretty good about those numbers, yeah. I think we're pretty spot-on with how a limited number of E1s found their way inside the unit. I also wonder if the E1 trail could be followed back to certain RTs and raider companies, specific to a particular FOB, and its proximity to supply chains. I believe many of the E1s I've seen were in the hands of some HF guys assigned to FOB-4 in Da Nang, in '68. Problem is, all things SOG-related went thru FOB-4/CCN, for the most part. It's also worth mentioning House-50, located in Saigon, over by the Phu Tho racetrack. Apparently, it was a gated compound consisting of three industrial-like buildings, low to the ground, under guard by an untold number of Chinese-Nung pirates. One building I know was strictly an admin office, the largest being a stocked warehouse, and the third, I'm assuming, living quarters for the indigs; I would guess any American personnel lived off-site, but there was always someone there to babysit the Nungs. Anyway, House-50 was SOG's in-country supply depot. I previously wrote a scene in the sequel to my first novel where the main character goes to House-50 to replace some stuff he lost on the previous mission; he was in town, and decided to go check it out. This wasn't entirely uncommon for House-50, but apparently most who frequented the facility were unit HQ-types who wanted something cool to carry while touring around CLT (B-53, Camp Long Thanh) for an afternoon. Lord only knows what was behind the fence and under the roof at House-50... I also suspect that's where the CISO (Counter Insurgency Supply Office) shipped its goods and trinkets for distribution to SOG's operational arm. Back to the E1... I've never actually written this part in the story, but in my head, the main character's CAR-15 is an E1. It was issued to him at CCC when he first showed up, and I described it as being very weathered and missing a lot of the factory anodizing. When I was chopping it up with Robert "Castro" Castillo, he casually mentioned the CAR-15 he was issued up at CCN was completely shot-out. He told me a story about flying in on a hot target, shooting from the door of the Huey during insertion, watching his tracers peel off-target in wild arcs because the rifling was absolutely smoked. He had a couple experimental E2 setups, one featuring an M203, and another using an M16 upper and a carbine lower; he also carried an unmodified RDP at one point. |
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Originally Posted By RTUtah: Do you happen to know what year this was? As much as I know about SOG, I know next to nothing about Marine Recon, for the most part. Originally Posted By RTUtah: Originally Posted By BerettaGuy: Contrary to what some on this board believe, the USMC also got them. Here is a photo of a Recon Marine with one: https://i.ibb.co/WVWh5rq/20231114-212834.jpg This photo is featured on the USMC Tilt Rotor Association website. Do you happen to know what year this was? As much as I know about SOG, I know next to nothing about Marine Recon, for the most part. I found the photo here a few years ago: The USMC/Combat Helicopter and Tiltrotor Association https://www.popasmoke.com Here is the photo gallery (it took a while to dig it up - over 4,000 photos in the Vietnam section: https://www.popasmoke.com/gallery/wppaspec/oc1/lnen/ao1/cv0/abS88Go8G8S4e8 I found the photo: ![]() No other info, but you can contact the organization, maybe they have some or members you can reach out to. |
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Originally Posted By RTUtah: Do you know how SOG got around the boot-print problem out across the fence? Obviously, USGI jungle boots made a very distinct imprint in soft terrain. Problem was, of all the gear America fielded in SEA, the ol' classic Panama-soled jungle boot was one of the best pieces of kit for that sorta fighting in wet environments, so nobody wanted to give them up. So RT members tried everything to obscure their footprints but nothing worked... UNTIL some intrepid enlisted guy had the genius idea to airdrop however-many-thousands of pairs of USGI jungle boots along the Trail. North Vietnamese forces moving south slowly started finding those boots and wearing them, thus, eliminating the once-correct assumption of a USGI boot-print guaranteeing an American had made it. This was a transformative play, and I wager the blackmarket weapons trade had a similar effect. Of course, that meant you might get shot with 5.56mm or eat an M67 at some point, but at least you didn't hafta worry so much about every single footprint along the way. Originally Posted By RTUtah: Originally Posted By ArtifactDecay: Correct me if I'm wrong but if I recall the whole logic behind early MACV ops were to not use any US weapons or gear as to not have any proof that they were actually US operators, thus why they would be using stuff like Swedish K's, Type 56s, sawed down RPDs, etc. But if I recall at some point in like 1967 or 68 they were told it didn't matter what weapons they used anymore as enough US sourced weapons were being captured by ARVN and NLF forces that it was plausible that they could still be "not ours" while using stuff like XM177s. Do you know how SOG got around the boot-print problem out across the fence? Obviously, USGI jungle boots made a very distinct imprint in soft terrain. Problem was, of all the gear America fielded in SEA, the ol' classic Panama-soled jungle boot was one of the best pieces of kit for that sorta fighting in wet environments, so nobody wanted to give them up. So RT members tried everything to obscure their footprints but nothing worked... UNTIL some intrepid enlisted guy had the genius idea to airdrop however-many-thousands of pairs of USGI jungle boots along the Trail. North Vietnamese forces moving south slowly started finding those boots and wearing them, thus, eliminating the once-correct assumption of a USGI boot-print guaranteeing an American had made it. This was a transformative play, and I wager the blackmarket weapons trade had a similar effect. Of course, that meant you might get shot with 5.56mm or eat an M67 at some point, but at least you didn't hafta worry so much about every single footprint along the way. This morning, my roommate and I were discussing the GWOT era JIEDDO - also not transformative. Giving the enemy boots is perhaps a clever idea, but ultimately was not a war-winning idea. |
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Originally Posted By RTUtah:I also wonder if the E1 trail could be followed back to certain RTs and raider companies, specific to a particular FOB, and its proximity to supply chains. I believe many of the E1s I've seen were in the hands of some HF guys assigned to FOB-4 in Da Nang, in '68. Problem is, all things SOG-related went thru FOB-4/CCN, for the most part. Originally Posted By RTUtah:I also wonder if the E1 trail could be followed back to certain RTs and raider companies, specific to a particular FOB, and its proximity to supply chains. I believe many of the E1s I've seen were in the hands of some HF guys assigned to FOB-4 in Da Nang, in '68. Problem is, all things SOG-related went thru FOB-4/CCN, for the most part. Yes it would be very interesting to see if there is any rhyme or reason to which SOG teams used E1s. Unfortunately even though I have collected over a thousand pics of soldiers using E1s, I have neglected studying SOG photos and so have only half a dozen examples. Originally Posted By RTUtah: When I was chopping it up with Robert "Castro" Castillo, he casually mentioned the CAR-15 he was issued up at CCN was completely shot-out. He told me a story about flying in on a hot target, shooting from the door of the Huey during insertion, watching his tracers peel off-target in wild arcs because the rifling was absolutely smoked. Interestingly laboratory testing found that not only did accuracy (both dispersion and yaw) worsened the more a XM177E2 was fired and thus the more the suppressor got clogged up, tracer rounds were even more affected than ball ammo. Although I have not found a primary source that explicitly connects the two, based on the timing I suspect this may have been at least one of the factors that ultimately stopped procurement of them, despite the earlier plans to issue them en-masse in similar fashion to how the M1 Carbine had been issued in WW2. |
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Originally Posted By backbencher: This morning, my roommate and I were discussing the GWOT era JIEDDO - also not transformative. Giving the enemy boots is perhaps a clever idea, but ultimately was not a war-winning idea. War-winning? Certainly not, but my perspective is that of a recon dude worried about covering his team's back-trail away out in Laos somewhere. Definitely not war-winning tho, I agree. |
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Originally Posted By Cap_Camouflage: Interestingly laboratory testing found that not only did accuracy (both dispersion and yaw) worsened the more a XM177E2 was fired and thus the more the suppressor got clogged up, tracer rounds were even more affected than ball ammo. Although I have not found a primary source that explicitly connects the two, based on the timing I suspect this may have been at least one of the factors that ultimately stopped procurement of them, despite the earlier plans to issue them en-masse in similar fashion to how the M1 Carbine had been issued in WW2. I've always heard how tracers burn barrels out, but I've never heard anything bad about the moderators on those old carbines. Perhaps it's the heat that ultimately did them in. I just wrote a scene where the main character had the whole team go thru all their guns and gear for standard maintenance and repair. Eventually, all the hard-use stuff, like their CAR-15s, went back to CCC's armory and all received a full-spectrum tear-down and rebuild. Comprehensive servicing. It's a bit of fantasy, tho, because after hearing Castro's story, I seriously doubt those guys were able to repair those things with factory parts, at their convenience or as needed. Still tho, I wrote the scene that way because I want people reading to understand how professional they were and how serious they took the mission. |
https://www.amazon.com/Gentle-Propositions-J-S-Economos/dp/0615997635
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Originally Posted By RTUtah: I just wrote a scene where the main character had the whole team go thru all their guns and gear for standard maintenance and repair. Eventually, all the hard-use stuff, like their CAR-15s, went back to CCC's armory and all received a full-spectrum tear-down and rebuild. Comprehensive servicing. It's a bit of fantasy, tho, because after hearing Castro's story, I seriously doubt those guys were able to repair those things with factory parts, at their convenience or as needed. The Preliminary Operation and Maintenance Manual for the XM177E2, published in July 1967, does say that spare parts were shipped with the weapons, but that it was part of the one-time purchase of the rifles, not an ongoing supply. I assume the October 1969 delivery would also have come with spare parts, but I can't say definitively. Around the same time, in August 1969, US Army Vietnam replied to a couple unit's (who almost certainly would have had E1s leftover from the 1967 trial) requests for further CAR-15s by telling them they would no longer be procured and to repair them by cannibalization once they were out of spare parts. |
| I was one of the many who lusted after a CAR-15 in VN in 1969. As an intelligence officer I was issued an M-16 (and a .45) but was not expected to actively engage in combat operations, so no CAR-15 for me. My hootchmate was the commander of the Ranger company and he had one. No pics or details remain in my memory about the fine points, but he did complain that it occasionally jammed, which he blamed on the high cyclic rate of fire. |
Nothing lasts forever but the earth and sky
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Originally Posted By miragetex: I was one of the many who lusted after a CAR-15 in VN in 1969. As an intelligence officer I was issued an M-16 (and a .45) but was not expected to actively engage in combat operations, so no CAR-15 for me. My hootchmate was the commander of the Ranger company and he had one. No pics or details remain in my memory about the fine points, but he did complain that it occasionally jammed, which he blamed on the high cyclic rate of fire. Your hootch-mate CO probably had an E1. The biggest improvement with the E2 was lengthening the barrel from 10 to 11.5-inches, which would've given it more dwell-time, back-pressure, and a slightly lower RoF. And better accuracy and a few other things, but all that was to improve reliability. |
https://www.amazon.com/Gentle-Propositions-J-S-Economos/dp/0615997635
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Originally Posted By grondike: He wrote Gentle Propositions, a novel based in Vietnam. www.amazon.com/dp/B00JQXSF0O Thank you.
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https://www.amazon.com/Gentle-Propositions-J-S-Economos/dp/0615997635
Nothing lasts forever but the earth and sky
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Originally Posted By RTUtah: Thank you. ![]() Originally Posted By RTUtah: Originally Posted By grondike: He wrote Gentle Propositions, a novel based in Vietnam. www.amazon.com/dp/B00JQXSF0O Thank you. ![]() ![]()
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This is a picture of a man that has been my best friend for 50 years and one of the finest individuals you could ever meet. He was MACVSOG with RT Sidewinder and this is Monkey Mountain DaNang in early 1972 about two weeks before he got shot up. XM177E2 on full display. He turns 76 this Thursday and is still in great shape. Attached File I gave him this for his birthday a few years ago. He shoots the crap out of it. Attached File |
It takes a brave man to be a coward in the Russian Army! Stalin-WWII
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Originally Posted By GUTS: This is a picture of a man that has been my best friend for 50 years and one of the finest individuals you could ever meet. He was MACVSOG with RT Sidewinder and this is Monkey Mountain DaNang in early 1972 about two weeks before he got shot up. XM177E2 on full display. He turns 76 this Thursday and is still in great shape. https://www.ar15.com/media/mediaFiles/131280/doc_22_jpg-3823196.JPG I gave him this for his birthday a few years ago. He shoots the crap out of it. https://www.ar15.com/media/mediaFiles/131280/3-18-08_038_JPG-3823198.JPG That is totally fk'n awesome. Bad deal about his right hand tho, but I'm told the boys showed up to the hospital to give him a proper sendoff before he was medevac'd back to the World. |
https://www.amazon.com/Gentle-Propositions-J-S-Economos/dp/0615997635
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I talked to my compadre today and he said it would be OK if I posted this picture of his team(I think he took the picture). I told him I wouldn't use any names. He said the man in front was a VC that like our side better and the rest of the little people behind his Army buddy were all from Laos and were all teenagers. Even thought he picture isn't a zillion pixels you can still makeout some gear. Attached File |
It takes a brave man to be a coward in the Russian Army! Stalin-WWII
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Originally Posted By RTUtah: Thank you. ![]() Originally Posted By RTUtah: Originally Posted By grondike: He wrote Gentle Propositions, a novel based in Vietnam. www.amazon.com/dp/B00JQXSF0O Thank you. ![]() Awesome. Just added it to my queue. |
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Originally Posted By GUTS: This is a picture of a man that has been my best friend for 50 years and one of the finest individuals you could ever meet. He was MACVSOG with RT Sidewinder and this is Monkey Mountain DaNang in early 1972 about two weeks before he got shot up. XM177E2 on full display. He turns 76 this Thursday and is still in great shape. https://www.ar15.com/media/mediaFiles/131280/doc_22_jpg-3823196.JPG I gave him this for his birthday a few years ago. He shoots the crap out of it. https://www.ar15.com/media/mediaFiles/131280/3-18-08_038_JPG-3823198.JPG Originally Posted By GUTS: I talked to my compadre today and he said it would be OK if I posted this picture of his team(I think he took the picture). I told him I wouldn't use any names. He said the man in front was a VC that like our side better and the rest of the little people behind his Army buddy were all from Laos and were all teenagers. Even thought he picture isn't a zillion pixels you can still makeout some gear. https://www.ar15.com/media/mediaFiles/131280/doug_l_jpg-3825028.JPG Outstanding. Great pics and thank your friend for his service. He is truly a giant. |
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Originally Posted By RTUtah: I've always heard how tracers burn barrels out, but I've never heard anything bad about the moderators on those old carbines. Perhaps it's the heat that ultimately did them in. I just wrote a scene where the main character had the whole team go thru all their guns and gear for standard maintenance and repair. Eventually, all the hard-use stuff, like their CAR-15s, went back to CCC's armory and all received a full-spectrum tear-down and rebuild. Comprehensive servicing. It's a bit of fantasy, tho, because after hearing Castro's story, I seriously doubt those guys were able to repair those things with factory parts, at their convenience or as needed. Still tho, I wrote the scene that way because I want people reading to understand how professional they were and how serious they took the mission. The tracers were closer to the edge of being stable, being longer. |
Preferred Pronoun: Space Lord Mutherfucker
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Here's the part I wrote recently about servicing their guns and gear before a big mission: Nonetheless, Ethan left the briefing feeling a little scattered about the whole thing. It would be several days, at a minimum, before Cunningham would have a real grasp of the intelligence picture, so in the meantime, Ethan turned his focus toward the basics of preparation. Every gun in the team’s inventory was dragged out and function-tested on the range first, then cleaned, and eventually inspected and serviced through their armory, if necessary; crucial internal workings such as bolts, gas rings, gas tubes, and even the small bits like pins and springs. They even took the time to inspect their gun barrels —especially those that saw heavy use in full-auto, or with tracer ammunition, as both were particularly abusive to the rifling grooves, which effected accuracy. They also took time to dismantle, clean, and inspect all their magazines, as well as the modified drums for their RPDs. With all that done, they moved on to their individual equipment and gear —items such as their STABO extraction rigs, weapon slings, rucks, and cross-border uniforms. Anything they couldn’t easily replace or quickly mend themselves, they took to the local tailoring shop, just outside the wire. With Captain Cunningham quietly in motion and busy working on the intelligence picture, and all of Utah consumed with pre-mission housekeeping tasks, Major Zune got busy organizing the logistics necessary to get the entire party there and back, including any kinetic assets they might need on the ground. He was uniquely-qualified, having been a One-Zero himself in his earlier days, and now, as the head of the S-3 Operations shop, where mission-planning was his forte. Ironically, the good major had also become a sort of bulwark against any bad ideas coming out of headquarters, unless of course they were his own. Zune was, after all, the progenitor of the gentle proposition, and Ethan was thoroughly reminded of this a few days later when the major called them back in for an update. “How do you two feel about HALO?” Sorry, I couldn't help myself.
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https://www.amazon.com/Gentle-Propositions-J-S-Economos/dp/0615997635
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