Posted: 1/30/2006 6:21:59 PM EDT
[#3]
some douments from their team: HB 823 - Intent.doc
HB 823 - STATEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
It is well established in Texas that a person who is traveling has a right to
possess a handgun for personal protection. The practical problem with this right
has historically been that courts have disagreed on the definition of "traveling".
The legislature has likewise never defined "traveling" because a definition
invariably has the unintended effect of unfairly limiting the term to a narrow set
of circumstances.
HB 823 shores up the right of citizens to carry a concealed handgun while
traveling by further underscoring the inapplicability of the offense of unlawfully
carrying a weapon ("UCW") (Penal Code §46.02) to persons under particular
factual circumstances. It does this by providing for a legal presumption in favor
of citizens that they are travelers if they are in a private vehicle with a handgun
that is not in plain view, they are not otherwise engaged in unlawful activity nor
otherwise prohibited by law from possessing a firearm, and they are not a
member of a criminal street gang.
In plain terms, a law-abiding person should not fear arrest if they are
transporting a concealed pistol in a motor vehicle. There is no longer the need for
a law enforcement officer to apply a subjective definition of what constitutes
"traveling" where the citizen is cloaked with the presumption per the terms of the
new statute. Under those circumstances the citizen should be allowed to proceed
on their way.
HB 823 represents the first time a presumption has been crafted in favor of a
defendant in the modern penal code of Texas. The presumption applies unless the
prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts giving rise to the
presumption do not exist. If the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the facts giving rise to the presumption do not exist, the jury must find that
the presumed fact exists. By enacting this unprecedented evidentiary standard
under §2.05 in conjunction with the substantive terms of the presumption in
§46.15, the legislation is intended to have the practical effect of preventing in the
first place the arrest of citizens who meet the newly specified prerequisites of
being a presumed traveler.
It should be noted that the very real problem of citizens having to prove their
innocence after arrest by the assertion of their right to carry a firearm while
traveling was the reason the 75th Legislature replaced the "defense" of traveling
with a classification of the statute of UCW as instead entirely "inapplicable" to a
4908 79th LEGISLATURE — REGULAR SESSION
traveler. This change was well-intentioned but did not have the intended effect of
protecting honest citizens from potential arrest because the term "traveling" was
still left to individual police or judicial officials to define on a case-by-case basis.
As a consequence, law-abiding citizens who availed themselves of their right to
have a handgun while traveling continued to face arrest and often later prevailed
only in a court of law after proving that they were indeed traveling. As originally
filed, HBi823 proposed to classify traveling as an "exception" (per Penal Code
§2.02) to prosecution for UCW. However, after further consideration, the
Criminal Jurisprudence Committee concluded that such an approach would be as
ineffective as the 1997 change for the very same reasons.
In passing HB 823, this legislature, like all previous legislatures, has
declined to define traveling, avoiding limiting the term to a narrow set of
particular circumstances. For example, to require someone to have an overnight
stay in a journey in order to be classified as a traveler would be unfair to persons
traveling great distances in one day. Likewise, a requirement that a citizen be
"crossing county lines" may make no sense, such as in areas of Texas where
travelers drive hundreds of miles without leaving a single county. Moreover, the
ability of police to elicit such evidence and consistently apply its subjective terms
on the street in a traffic stop has not proven practical, at all. HBi823 instead
focuses on creating a specific set of relevant, objective facts that are capable of
being determined on the spot by law officers.
There are several additional important points that should be made in regard
to the enactment of HBi823 and its interface with current law.
HBi823 does not give "everyone the right to carry a gun in a car". State and
federal laws applicable to firearms must be noted in conjunction with the new
statute’ s terms, particularly the limitation of the presumption to persons who are
"not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing a firearm." For example,
persons subject to an active protective order are not covered by the presumption,
nor are persons with any felony conviction or even some misdemeanor
convictions for offenses, e.g., family violence. The presumption is likewise
inapplicable to persons associated with a criminal street gang, even if they have
no conviction for any offense. These as well as all other existing limitations on
firearm ownership and/or possession make the new statute inapplicable to persons
covered by such prohibitions.
Furthermore, as stated in the statute, the presumption will not apply to
persons who are otherwise engaged in any criminal conduct. This would include
persons who are driving while intoxicated, driving recklessly, committing
criminal mischief, or committing any other criminal offense outside that of a
minor traffic infraction.
The presumption also does not apply where the gun is openly displayed.
This was added by the Senate in response to concerns that citizens would
otherwise possibly inadvertently have a weapon visible in a fast food or bank
drive thru, etcetera, and alarm others. (Note, however, that the requirement that
the gun be concealed is pertinent only to the issue of whether the defendant is
eligible to receive a presumption instruction per the new terms of §2.05. It is not a
new element required of a person who is traveling within the context of §46.15).
The enactment of HBi823 was the culmination of study, committee hearings
and debate by the House Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence. The new law is
intended to assist law enforcement in doing its job while at the same time
Friday, May 27, 2005 HOUSE JOURNAL — 79th Day 4909
protecting law-abiding citizens from the threat of arrest for merely exercising
their right to arm themselves while traveling——a right to which they are already
entitled.
Terry Keel, Chair
Criminal Jurisprudence Committee
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HB 823 - Enrolled Version.pdf
H.B.ANo.A823 AN ACT relating to the applicability of the offense of unlawful carrying of weapons to certain persons and to the consequence of certain presumptions in the prosecution of a criminal offense. BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: SECTIONA1.AASection 46.15, Penal Code, is amended by adding Subsection (i) to read as follows: (i)AAFor purposes of Subsection (b)(3), a person is presumed to be traveling if the person is: (1)AAin a private motor vehicle; (2)AAnot otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic; (3)AAnot otherwise prohibited by law from possessing a firearm; (4)AAnot a member of a criminal street gang, as defined by Section 71.01; and (5)AAnot carrying a handgun in plain view. SECTIONA2.AASection 2.05, Penal Code, is amended to read as follows: Sec.A2.05.AAPRESUMPTION. (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), when [When] this code or another penal law establishes a presumption with respect to any fact, it has the following consequences:
Page 2 (1)AAif there is sufficient evidence of the facts that give rise to the presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury, unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly precludes a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the presumed fact; and (2)AAif the existence of the presumed fact is submitted to the jury, the court shall charge the jury, in terms of the presumption and the specific element to which it applies, as follows: (A)AAthat the facts giving rise to the presumption must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (B)AAthat if such facts are proven beyond a reasonable doubt the jury may find that the element of the offense sought to be presumed exists, but it is not bound to so find; (C)AAthat even though the jury may find the existence of such element, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the other elements of the offense charged; and (D)AAif the jury has a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a fact or facts giving rise to the presumption, the presumption fails and the jury shall not consider the presumption for any purpose. (b)AAWhen this code or another penal law establishes a presumption in favor of the defendant with respect to any fact, it has the following consequences: (1)AAif there is sufficient evidence of the facts that give rise to the presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury unless the court is H.B.ANo.A823 2 Page 3 satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly precludes a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the presumed fact; and (2)AAif the existence of the presumed fact is submitted to the jury, the court shall charge the jury, in terms of the presumption, that: (A)AAthe presumption applies unless the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts giving rise to the presumption do not exist; (B)AAif the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts giving rise to the presumption do not exist, the jury must find that the presumed fact exists; (C)AAeven though the jury may find that the presumed fact does not exist, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the offense charged; and (D)AAif the jury has a reasonable doubt as to whether the presumed fact exists, the presumption applies and the jury must consider the presumed fact to exist. SECTIONA3.AAThe changes in law made by this Act apply only to an offense committed on or after the effective date of this Act. An offense committed before the effective date of this Act is covered by the law in effect at the time the offense was committed, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose. For purposes of this section, an offense was committed before the effective date of this Act if any element of the offense was committed before that date. SECTIONA4.AAThis Act takes effect September 1, 2005. H.B.ANo.A823 3 Page 4 ______________________________ ______________________________ AAAAPresident of the Senate Speaker of the HouseAAAAAA I certify that H.B. No. 823 was passed by the House on April 20, 2005, by a non-record vote; and that the House concurred in Senate amendments to H.B. No. 823 on May 27, 2005, by a non-record vote. ______________________________ Chief Clerk of the HouseAAA I certify that H.B. No. 823 was passed by the Senate, with amendments, on May 24, 2005, by the following vote:AAYeas 29, Nays 2. ______________________________ Secretary of the SenateAAA APPROVED: __________________ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADateAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAA __________________ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGovernorAAAAAAA H.B.ANo.A823 4
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HB 823 - Bill Analysis.pdf
SRC-BEC, JSP C.S.H.B. 823 79(R) Page 1 of 1 BILL ANALYSIS Senate Research Center C.S.H.B. 823 79R17655 KCR-D By: Keel (Hinojosa) Criminal Justice 5/20/2005 Committee Report (Substituted) AUTHOR'S/SPONSOR'S STATEMENT OF INTENT Under Section 46.15 (Nonapplicability), Penal Code, Section 46.02 (Unlawful Carrying Weapons), Penal Code does not apply to a person who is "traveling." The word "traveling" has ben given various appellate interpretations, but it has never been defined in statute. C.S.H.B. 823 amends Section 46.15, Penal Code, to clarify that a person is presumed to be "traveling" if the person is in a private motor vehicle, is not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, is not prohibited by law from possessing a firearm, and is not a member of a criminal street gang. This bill further amends Section 2.05 (Presumption), Penal Code, to provide proper evidentiary instruction of the presumption. RULEMAKING AUTHORITY This bill does not expressly grant any additional rulemaking authority to a state officer, institution, or agency. SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS SECTION 1. Amends Section 46.15, Penal Code, by adding Subsection (i) to provide that for purposes of Subsection (b)(3), a person is presumed to be traveling if the person is engaged in certain activities. SECTION 2. Amends Section 2.05, Penal Code, as follows: (a) Makes a conforming change. (b) Provides that when this code or another penal law establishes a presumption in favor of the defendant with respect to any fact, it has certain consequences. SECTION 3. Makes application of this Act prospective. SECTION 4. Effective date: September 1, 2005.
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