[b]In 1973, when Ariel Sharon's armored column came within artillery range of Cairo, that war was brought to a rapid end[/b]. The Palestinian war, in which Arafat issues daily calls for a million suicide bombers, requires entirely different tactics.
To give the IDF some credit, many of the commanders did a good job of foreseeing at least some of the tactics and challenges that they have been facing. Clearly, the death toll of both civilians and soldiers would have been much higher if they had not spent the past five years preparing for guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks. In the past week alone, alongside the painful failures, numerous suicide bombings were foiled.
Slowly, and often invisibly, the combination of very detailed intelligence and precise attacks on the terrorist leadership and infrastructure is grinding down the Palestinian ability to attack. The pressure resulting from Arafat's isolation in Ramallah is also beginning to pay off.
At the same time, there are far too many failures, and in this case, as in 1973, the army and the political leadership were locked into a conception that grossly underestimated the threat. Israeli cities, roads, settlements, and checkpoints are open and generally unprotected, providing the Palestinians with a plethora of soft and vulnerable targets. The IDF has far more power than has been displayed to date, as Sharon noted in his speech, but in terms of manpower, it is also over-extended, and there are far too many soft targets to defend effectively. In response, the decision to deploy heavy battle tanks and other weapons, designed for use in totally different kinds of warfare, was ill-considered.
To reverse the chain of Palestinian successes, the short-term tactical responses of the IDF and government need to be replaced by a long-term strategy. In terms of defense, priorities need to be set, headed by Israeli population centers and including all settlements and military positions. Limited unilateral withdrawal in some form is belatedly on the agenda, although, in contrast to the botched exit from Lebanon, it will have to be accompanied by a very visible increase in the display of Israeli military strength.
In addition, Israel's doctrine based on deterrence and preemption needs to be adapted for warfare against Palestinian terrorist groups and militias.
By greatly expanding the number of small and highly mobile groups operating in the Palestinian areas to destroy key targets, the IDF will force Arafat and his forces to divert far more resources to defense, while highlighting their vulnerability to attack. Evidence of deep divisions in Palestinian society is mounting, and without effective leadership and basic economic resources, they will eventually collapse. In contrast, and despite the exaggerated media images that confuse democratic debate with civil strife, the Israeli consensus remains solid.
After Arafat and the Palestinians had eight years of a false peace process to acquire weapons and prepare for this war, Israel was faced with a very difficult situation at the outset of this war. While the counterattacks have begun, lingering misconceptions and ideological blinders still slow the political and military changes that are necessary.
It is impossible to know how long this war will last, or how far it will escalate, but ultimately, as in the past wars, the strength of Israeli society and the drive for national survival will determine the outcome.