There has been a lot of discussion lately about OPSEC.  This is cut and paste from the Email that was sent out today regarding what members of the military, DOD employees and some cases former members of both up to 25 years after leaving service cannot discuss and post on the internet or send via Email.  


THE FOLLOWING ARE CINCLANTFLT'S ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
INFORMATION FOR PROTECTION:
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A. GENERAL.
(1) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES OR CHANGES TO ROE.
(2) DETAILS OF COURSES OF ACTIONS OR PROPOSED COAS BEING
CONSIDERED.
(3) DETAILS OF SCHEDULES AND TIMELINES FOR
OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES.
(4) SPECULATION OR DISCUSSION OF TERRORISTS
EVENTS/ACTIVITIES/SUCCESSES/FAILURES OR OUR FORCE PROTECTION POSTURE AND TTP
B. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.
(1) EXTENT TO WHICH OPERATIONS UNDER A COURSE OF ACTION
REDUCE U.S. CAPABILITIES FOR OPERATIONS IN OTHER THEATERS.
(2) LOCATION, ACTIVATION, AND MISSIONS OF SPECIAL OPERATION
FORCES.
(3) DEPLOYMENT PLANS FOR U.S. FORCES.
(4) PHYSICAL SECURITY WEAKNESS OF U.S. BASES THEATER-WIDE.
(5) MOVEMENT PLANS AND PROCEDURES FOR NAVAL UNITS WITHIN
ALCOM AND CONTIGUOUS SUPPORT AREAS.
(6) DETAILS OF AIR COMBAT COMMAND (ACC) PLANS/CAPABILITIES TO
PROVIDE AIR STRIKE AND REFUELING SUPPORT.
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C. COMMUNICATIONS AND AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS.
(1) USER IDS/PASSWORDS COMBINATIONS AND IP ADDRESSES IN
ASSOCIATION WITH FUNCTION FOR ANY INFORMATION SYSTEMS.
(2) DETAILS OF AIS OUTAGES/LIMITATIONS/CAPABILITIES/
INTERCONNECTIVITY/DEPENDENCIES.
(3) EXISTENCE OF AND/OR DETAILS OF INTRUSIONS INTO
NETWORKS/COMPUTER SYSTEMS INCLUDING SUCCESS/FAILURE, TECHNIQUES USED, AND
VULNERABILITIES EXPLOITED.
D. PROTOCOL.
(1) MOVEMENT OF VIPS, KEY LEADERS, AND KEY COMMAND PERSONNEL,
INCLUDING VISITS TO THE ALCOM THEATER.
(2) VIP ITINERARIES, MEETING AGENDAS, HOTEL RESERVATIONS,
TRANSPORTATION PLANS/ROUTES, ETC.  WITHIN THE ALCOM THEATER.