User Panel
Posted: 1/5/2006 8:18:09 PM EDT
and the Iranians try to counter attack with their air force wont the American forces in Iraq have to deal with them? Hopefully the Iranian army wont try to go through Iraq! It looks like something could happen soon. Hopefully the new Iraqui government wont allow the Iranians to use their airspace or cross their country.
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I know one thing, I wouldn't want to be hostile forces flying over occupied land and and unknown number of SAMs, AAMs, AAGs, etc.
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The Isreali's don't have to fly anywhere. They have subs with cruise missiles with a 1500+ km range that can be nuke tipped. They can launch them from the Indian Ocean.
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It would be a mess. The Iranians would probably start shooting missiles into Israel, and encourage or order their proxies in Iraq to attack the US. Maybe they'd try to shut down the straits of Hormuz, too.
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It aint the Israelis Air Force that I'm worried about. And another thing, wouldn't the Israelis have to travel over Iraq to hit Iran or do they have carriers? |
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They'd be sending cruise missiles anyways. The point is that they don't have to go anywhere. There's probably missiles pointing at those locations waiting for a number of safeties to be deactivated before they can be launched. |
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They DO have submarines. |
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Yes, the Isrealis would have to fly over Iraq as well as Jordan and/or Syria. However, I thought I had heard or read somewhere that the Isreali Airforce doesn't have the range to attack Iran, since they don't have airial refueling tankers. |
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Pffffft! Funny in a sick kind of way. |
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I think it would certainly be interesting at any rate. And I would expect there would be consequences for our troops in Iraq, Asskrackistan, and the Balkans too.
I just hope they warn us so we would get back on a war footing there first - SAM's loaded up and on alert, soldiers in MOPP gear, tanks&helos loaded up and ready, fighters and bombers in the air, etc. -K |
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Why do I get the feeling a 'human error' will cause some sort of problem at one of these sites before then? Well it's a hopeful feeling....
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Why must there ALWAYS be nukes . There will be NO nukes used, do you understand that? There will be only conventional weapons (bunker buster) used for all sites and they will be sufficient as it should be. It's as simple as that. Stop hoping for nukes to be used. Eventually, it'll catch up with you. I'd fully expect Russia to respond and rightfully so if nukes were used since they'd most likely be irradiated also. Use some common F*(&)*(^ sense! Common sense does NOT equal weakness. |
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So, they land and refuel at some obscure, well-guarded airfield in Northern Iraq. The American ground crews are told to keep their mouths shut and that those F-16s and F-15s they just refueled did NOT have stars of David on them. Or hell, we could even loan them the airfield, leave some fuel and the Israelis fly their own ground crews in. US radar operators in the area are told to "look the other way". |
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With GWB in office? Highly doubt it. Also nukes are a point of no return unless Israel itself will be overrun it will not happen. |
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If Israel attacks nuclear sites in Iran nothing will come from it, Iran will take it like a bitch and whine to the UN.
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I "heard" that during gulf war 1, the isrealis were going to bomb bahgdad, nuclear, after the iraqi scud missle attacks in isreal, but the u.s. wouldn't authorize them access to iraqi airspace. Not certain if that's factual, especially the nuclear. |
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if iran is attacked by anybody, all bets are off. if they have nuclear material and sites get destroyed, i would not be suprised to see some leftovers in dirty bombs in telaviv an elsewhere. also, i'm not military but they iranians know without a doubt that the israelis in particular might come looking to destroy their sites. so they have done things to counter. like 350 separate sites and many buried very deep in reinforced underground sites. anything is possible but i wonder if tactical nukes might not be the only sure way of getting at those sites. its a very messy situation. and will only get more so with sharon gone. |
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For the most part, yes. However, take a look at the conformal fuel tanks on their F-16Is (?) I believe that is the correct designation. That should give those aircraft range to Tehran. http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v515/IsraeliAirForcePilot/F-4F-16I.jpg |
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the iranian army will have to go through iraq?
heck, i thought half the iranian army was already in iraq. |
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The Soviets have radar coverage of that region and satellites... |
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The IDF flies mostly American designed/built aircraft correct? Those airplanes do in fact have aerial refueling capability do they not? The United States does have KC-135s in theater don't we? Get the point I'm trying to make? If Isreal attacks Iran, they will need to fly through Iraqi airspace, this will require American permission. If we grant them the permission neccessary to carry out the raid, we are already involved. What will keep us from taking an active roll in facilitating the Isreali strikes? We've already sold them the weapons to do it. |
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Realistically, haven't the Iranians had too many years in which to dig deep holes and pour concrete? |
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Every time there is a thread about teh Iran strike i say this and I'll say it again. In order to definatly destroy Irans capability to Refine nuclear material The Isrealis are going to have to GO IN! Of course I'm no Expert on the capabilities of "bunker buster" Bombs. But if say the Site was buried under a huge mountain how could any missle penetrate that? They are going to have to land and personally go into the bases and blow the place to shit then get out. All this with the Iranian Air force on their ass. That is a very very tall order. Also Russia dont give a shit about Iran. She has her own problems with Muslim insurgents. She does'nt want a nuclear Iran more than anyone else. Thought she might give "ohhh that's so wrong of the Little Satan" support to the Iranians to keep them on their good side. The whole question is can Isreal pull off the same luck as she had in '67 with total suprise and wiping out Irans Air farce? (this is the Key) And in what way will the US help? (crucial factor) I forsee no problems with Isrealis on the ground, they'll whip the "persians" good! And after all that Cyrus did for the jews! Tisk tisk tisk! PS- did you hear that Iran is hosting a "holocost" conference? I bet a lot of guys in their 80's who live in Argentina are gonna show up and explain how killin 6 million was impossable! 5.9 million maybe, but 6?????? They are all Zionist liars!
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Last Updated: Sunday, 15 January 2006, 18:00 GMT E-mail this to a friend Printable version Iran to host debate on Holocaust Ahmadinejad's remarks have been condemned at the UN Iran says it will hold a conference to assess the scale and consequences of the Holocaust, which its president recently described as a "myth". President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has also sparked international condemnation by calling for Israel to be "wiped off the map", or moved to Europe or the US. An Iranian spokesman said the seminar would examine the "scientific evidence" supporting the Holocaust. Six million Jews were killed in Nazi persecution during World War II. Mr Ahmadinejad's comments received a sympathetic ear in some parts of the Muslim press, but resulted in two rebukes from the UN Security Council. 'Strange world' Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said debate of the issue should not be off limits. "It is a strange world. It is possible to discuss everything except the Holocaust," he said. "The foreign ministry plans to hold a conference on the scientific aspect of the issue to discuss and review its repercussions." He did not say where or when the conference would be held, nor who would attend. Increased tension Iran's attacks on Israel have coincided with increasing tension between Tehran and the West on other issues. The US and Europe are pushing for Iran to be referred to the UN Security Council over its nuclear programme, which Tehran insists is meant only to produce energy, but which the West suspects has the goal of producing nuclear weapons. Iran has warned the West against going to the council, saying any sanctions against the world's fourth biggest oil exporter could lead to a rise in the price of oil. In other words, says the BBC's world affairs correspondent Jonathan Charles, "don't hurt us, or we'll hurt you". Iran's representative to the oil-producing cartel Opec on Sunday called for it to reduce output - a move likely to put more pressure on prices. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4615172.stm |
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So, the US should not only allow Isreal to use Iraqi airspace on thier mission to strike an Arab nation with a Shiite (or whatever) population, the US should also aid the Isrealis by refueling the Isreali warplanes which are attacking Iran directly over Iraq... You don't see the US using the nation we are "occupying" to aid "zionist invaders" in the destruction of "fellow muslims" as having the potential to impact our situation on the ground in Iraq at all? |
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Step away from the keyboard Sir! You are having an attack of logical thought and common sense.... ANdy |
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the Israelis aren't going to use nukes to target their nuclear sites. And their conventionally equipped cruise missiles don't have the capacity to knock out deeply buried sites. They will have to use their air force and bunker busters... and they will have to score several hits with the bunker buster to have any hope of destorying the target. In Operation Iraqi freedom, our bunker busters (the same ones we sold Israel) failed to destroy Saddam's bunkers even with several direct hits. |
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I'm sure the Iraqis would tell us "please continue to use our country as you see fit" after that. They would be demanding we leave the next day. |
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Is the Begin Option Still a Viable Option for Israel
by Shlomo Brom In Getting Ready for a for a Nuclear Ready Iran Report by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2005 (starts on pg. 133 of the PDF) ------------------------------------------------------------- CHAPTER 6 IS THE BEGIN DOCTRINE STILL A VIABLE OPTION FOR ISRAEL? Shlomo Brom [snip] The Nature of the Iranian Nuclear Program and Its Vulnerabilities. The Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor, Osiraq, had a deep impact on the evolution of other nuclear programs in the Middle East. States that were determined to continue with such programs learned the lessons of the attack and concluded that they should strive to decrease the vulnerability of their program by adding more protection and more redundancy. The new nuclear projects are much more dispersed and well-protected. That is also true for the Iranian nuclear program. The most essential part of every military nuclear program is the production of fissile materials. According to recent revelations concerning the Iranian nuclear program, Iran intends to produce fissile materials in two tracks; the uranium track and the plutonium track. First, using the excuse of a plan to produce fuel for nuclear power plants, Iran is building uranium enrichment capabilities. Iran is also pursuing different methods of enrichment to ensure redundancy. It is vigorously building an industrial size facility for uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges in Natanz, and it pursued also LASER enrichment of uranium. In parallel, it is striving to control technologies that will enable it to build a plutonium production heavy water reactor. In this context, it was recently discovered that Iran is building a heavy water production facility in Arak, and also has an intention to build at the same location a heavy water so-called “research reactor,” which will probably be used for irradiating of uranium, and later separation of plutonium from the irradiated uranium rods.27 Uranium enrichment specifically enables dispersion of the production facilities in a relatively large number of small facilities. It is very difficult to assure that there are no additional facilities other than those that were already traced. According to one estimate, there are 19 traced suspected nuclear facilities in Iran without assurance that this number is finite.28 The nuclear facilities that Iran is constructing are also welldefended. The centrifuge plant built at Natanz is underground, and it is defended by an extensive ground air defense system.29 It is very difficult to find in the Iranian nuclear program one vulnerable point that, once it is attacked and destroyed, the Iranian program is stopped or stalled for a long time. The Bushier nuclear power plant, which is relatively vulnerable to attacks, is not really a part of the military nuclear program, and it mostly serves as an excuse for an Iranian wish to have control over the full fuel cycle, namely building a capacity for uranium enrichment. Its attack would not have a real effect on the military program. The net effect is that any attempt to attack the Iranian nuclear program would necessitate sustainable attacks on a relatively large number of targets that are well-defended, passively and actively. Israeli Operational Capabilities vis-à-vis Iran. Iran is situated more then 1,000 kms from Israel. It is a vast country, and all the meaningful nuclear targets are, and most probably will continue to be, situated far from its Western borders. That means that once Israel decides to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, it will have to plan a sustainable attack on a number of targets that are situated 1,500-1,700 kms from Israel. For that purpose, Israel can use only its air force. The targets usually are far from the Indian Ocean, and Israel has no significant seaborne air power assets. Although Israel has some military relationships with friendly states that are situated closer to Iran, most notably, Turkey and India, these states also are keeping a friendly relationship with Iran, and it is highly unlikely that they would let Israel use their territories for the purpose of attacking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This means that the Israeli attack aircraft would have to take off from air bases in Israel, fly 1,500-1,700 kms to the targets, destroy them, and then fly back 1,500- 1,700 kms. It is also possible that the flight would be even longer for the Israeli planes because they would have to fly through the air space of Jordan and Iraq to use the direct shorter route to Iran. Flying through Jordan without the explicit or implicit permission of the Jordanians would hurt relations with a friendly Arab state. Flying over Iraq without coordination with the United States would lead to a clash with U.S. interceptors. Any attempt at coordination with the United States or asking permission from Jordan might compromise the operation. It is also very doubtful whether Jordan and the United States would be willing to be involved in such Israeli operations. As a result, the Israeli planes would have to use the longer route over the Indian Ocean, with minimal penetration of the air space of other states. The IAF does not have any bombers. Its air fleet consists only of fighter-bombers with limited range of action. Israel has 25 F-15I and 137 F-16C/D fighter-bombers. It is going to improve its long range capability in 2004 with few operational F-16I aircraft with greater range of action then the F-15I, but the burden of the attacks would be laid mostly on the F-15I aircraft that have better capabilities at longer ranges. F-15I has a radius of action of 1,270 kms. The corresponding one for F-16C/D is 925 kms and for F-16I, 2,100 kms (but Israel will have only few of them at the relevant time).30 The real operational radius is even shorter because for parts of the route, the planes would have to fly at low altitude to avoid radar detection. That shortens the range of flight because of higher fuel consumption at low altitudes. It means that the attack aircraft would need to be refueled at least twice, on their way to the targets and from the targets. That adds complication to the operation because Israel has only a few air refuelers based on Boeing 707 aircraft platforms. Such aircraft are very vulnerable, and therefore air refueling cannot take place in hostile air space. Assuming that the attack aircraft succeeded in entering the Iranian air space, they would have to avoid early detection and be capable of dealing with Iranian interceptors. Iran is a vast country, and the radar assets available to the Iranian air defense system are limited. If the Israeli planners had good information about their location, it would be possible to plan approach routes to the targets that would avoid early detection. If the attacking aircraft were detected and intercepted, the Israeli F-15s and F-16s enjoy vast superiority over the Iranian interceptors and would probably defend themselves successfully. The problem is that such long range attacks are very sensitive to interferences, and therefore the intercepted attack formation might have to abort its mission. If the Israeli attack aircraft succeed in avoiding early detection and interception, it can be safely assumed that they would be capable of avoiding the surface to air missile defenses and the antiaircraft artillery (AAA) defenses deployed closer to the targets and destroy the targets by use of a combination of tactics, ECM, and smart munitions. In any case, any Israeli attack on an Iranian nuclear target would be a very complex operation in which a relatively large number of attack aircraft and support aircraft (interceptors, ECM aircraft, refuelers, and rescue aircraft) would participate. The conclusion is that Israel could attack only a few Iranian targets and not as part of a sustainable operation over time, but as a one time surprise operation. Even if Israel had the attack capabilities needed for the destruction of the all elements of the Iranian nuclear program, it is doubtful whether Israel has the kind of intelligence needed to be certain that all the necessary elements of the program were traced and destroyed fully. Israel has good photographic coverage of Iran with the Ofeq series of reconnaissance satellites, but being so distant from Iran, one can assume that other kinds of intelligence coverage are rather partial and weak. Covert action demands different kinds of operational capabilities and intelligence. There is no indication that Israel has capabilities of covert operations in Iran. The recent information about the development of the Iranian program indicated that it reached a status of being independent of external assistance. Moreover, the assistance Iran got was mostly from Pakistan, another place which is not a traditional area of operations for the Israeli secret services, like Europe or South America. It seems that there is no real potential for covert Israeli operations against the Iranian Nuclear program. [SNIP] Iranian Possible Responses as a Constraint. Although presently Israel enjoys vast superiority in long range strike capabilities in comparison with Iran, Iran is succeeding in maintaining a balance of mutual deterrence with Israel. Until recently, Iran’s deterrence was based on the use of proxies, terror groups that operated from areas close to Israel or in the global arena. Iran could balance Israel’s ability to strike at targets in its territory with the ability of these proxies to attack Israeli towns in northern Israel or Israeli interests all over the world, using the infrastructure that these terror groups have established in many states. The most salient of these groups is Hezbollah in Lebanon. It succeeded, with the support of Iran, in building a large array of surface to surface rockets in South Lebanon that presents a constant threat over the civilian population in a large part of Israel. In recent years, Hezbollah has acquired from Iran longer range rockets (Fajr 3 and 5) and expanded its strike capability to a larger part of Israel.36 Iran also demonstrated its ability to hurt Israeli interests in others states when its agents were involved in the bombing of the Israeli embassy and the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. Iran is developing a 1,330 kms range ballistic missile, Sheab-3, that will give Iran the capability to strike directly at targets in Israel’s territory. The missiles have reached initial operational capabilities.37 Iran admitted after signing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that it developed and stockpiled chemical weapons, probably mustard gas and nerve agents. It was supposed to destroy these weapons in accordance with the provisions of the CWC, but there is no report that this was done and Iran is suspected of continuing its activities in this area.38 If Israel decides to attack Iran’s nuclear installations, it will have to take into account a response in kind. Iran may use its ballistic missiles to attack Israeli nuclear installations. Such attacks will not be effective because of the inaccuracy of its missiles. The probability of an attempted Iranian attack with aircraft is lower, although strike aircraft may be more accurate. Iran has a very small number of long range SU-24 strike aircraft and some air-refueling capability, but such a long range attack with the challenge of the Israeli air defense system is a formidable task for its air force. It is possible that Iran would follow the example of Iraq, and, being aware of the ineffectiveness of the missile attack on nuclear installations, it would launch its missiles against Israeli cities. Iran would probably use its proxies to hit at Israeli targets and interests in Israel and elsewhere. Under the present circumstances, striking Israel from Lebanon would be difficult because Israel probably would react harshly against Syria, Iran’s ally, which is in a position of weakness; and that does not serve Iran’s Interests. Hitting Israeli and Jewish targets abroad may look to the Iranians as less risky. If an Israeli strike in Iran caused some radioactive contamination, Israel would have to take into account Iranian use of chemical weapons. In all other circumstances, such use is highly improbable because an Iranian chemical attack would be a blatant violation of the CWC, and might lead to international action against Iran. It is not possible to ascertain accurately what would be the Iranian response, but the experience of the Israeli- Iranian relationship in the last 2 decades and the declarations of the Iranian leadership39 indicate clearly that there would be a violent Iranian reaction to any Israeli attack in Iran. Global and Regional Responses as Constraints. The Israeli leadership will have to assess the ramifications of such an attack on its foreign relations when it weighs arguments for and against the preemptive action. Israel enjoys the position of a state that already has been through such an experience, attacking the Iraqi reactor, absorbing general international condemnation, and being vindicated later. It seems that the Israeli leadership can only be encouraged by this experience. First, the political price it had to pay eventually was insignificant; U.S. sanctions were limited and stopped after a short time, and the negative effect on its relations with other states also subsided very quickly. Second, the environment is more conducive today for an Israeli preemptive action, because in 1991 Iraq was considered an ally of the West, while Iran is a member of the “Axis of Evil,” and because after 9/11 and the war on Iraq, the concept of preemption is not rejected by everyone as it was in 1991; at least the only global superpower, the United States, adopted it as part of its doctrine. Third, after the experience of Iraq, one can assume that some states will be more cautious in their reaction to the Israeli action. From Israel’s point of view, the ramifications of such an action would be in three arenas; the Middle East, the United States, and Europe. Israel can assume that the reactions in the Middle East would be mixed. On the one hand, the Arab States would look on the Israeli operation as another example of Israel’s intransigence and aggressiveness, and would object to the manifestation of Israel’s wish to retain a nuclear monopoly. But on the other hand, they would feel relieved, because the Iranian nuclear posture is a threat to them as well. It is quite probable that they would condemn the Israeli action but would not take any other steps. Assuming that the preemptive operation took place when it was clear that the Iranian program could not be stopped in any other way, it would be difficult for the United States to condemn an action that suits perfectly its own positions. Israel can be assured that the action would not harm its relationship with the United States. The EU is composed of a majority of states already voicing their opposition to the U.S. preemption doctrine and the war on Iraq as a manifestation of this doctrine. They would most probably condemn Israel. Nevertheless, Israel can assume that such an attack that came after an European failure to make Iran stop the nuclear program would not lead to sanctions other than verbal condemnation. CONCLUSION The Iranian decision to suspend its uranium enrichment activities and to sign the additional protocol with the IAEA implies to Israel that Israel does not yet have to decide on a violent preventive action against the Iranian nuclear program, and can postpone this difficult decision. As long as it is possible to stop the Iranian program and roll it back without resort to violence, Israel will prefer it because it will minimize risks and the price it would have to pay for this objective. The decision is difficult because the probability of success is not high, the risks are high, and the cost is certain. The probability of success is not high because, on one hand, the Iranian nuclear installations are dispersed, well-defended and have much redundancy; and on the other, the Israeli operational capabilities for sustainable operations, and not a one of its kind surgical strike, are limited. It is not certain at all whether any Israeli operation will stop the Iranian nuclear program or delay it substantially. The risks are high because the operational difficulties may lead to a high casualty rate and because of the high probability of failure. The cost is certain, because an Iranian violent reaction is almost a certainty. The Israeli leadership will have to consider whether it is willing to take the risks and pay the costs for an operation with doubtful results. On the other hand, there are no real political constraints domestically or in Israel’s foreign relations that should prevent it from making such a decision. The conclusion is that eventually the two parameters that will be decisive in the Israeli decision will be the assessment whether the Iranian program can be stopped by other means and the assessment of the operational feasibility. It is not surprising that, based on these assessments, Israel believes that the key to the fight against the Iranian nuclear program is in the hands of the United States, especially after the war in Iraq. On November 8, 2002, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said, in an interview given to the New York Post, that the U.S. war on terror should not end with Iraq. He added, “as soon as Iraq is dealt with, I will push for Iran to be at the top of the ‘to do’ list . . . Iran makes every effort to possess weapons of mass destruction . . . and ballistic missiles . . . That is a danger to the Middle East and a danger to the world.”40 Israel’s preferred policy is to let the United States and the European states help deal with Iran. It believes that keeping the ambiguity concerning possible Israeli reactions in case the attempts to stop Iran fail may help the U.S.-European effort because it may induce some actors—those who wish to prevent Israeli operations that may lead to further destabilization of the Middle East (especially the Europeans)—to increase their pressures on Iran, and it also may have a deterring effect on Iran. An examination of Israeli statements on the Iranian nuclear program shows a constant emphasis on the danger to the civilized world of this program; concern that the Iranians are using deceitful tactics; and threats of an Israeli action against the nuclear installations as a last resort, combined with declarations that Israel prefers peaceful solutions.41 The United States has to take into account the possibility of an Israeli preemptive strike against the Iranian nuclear facilities when considering its policy options. First, such an attack, especially if it did not achieve its planned objectives, would have a destabilizing effect on the Middle East. It could lead to acceleration of the Iranian program and to a chain of violent clashes between Iran and Israel. The United States should prepare contingency plans for such an event that include actions aimed at deterring Iran from destabilizing the Middle East, and the necessary political reactions, including prevention of initiatives aimed at a show of support for Iran internationally from such organizations as the UN. The United States has an interest in knowing the Israeli intentions and affecting them. That can be achieved only through an open, detailed, and continuous dialogue between the two nations. Second, if the United States is considering preemptive strikes against Iran, it should weigh the pros and cons of cooperation with Israel in such attacks. The main argument against such cooperation is that it would fortify the existing perception in the Moslem world of an anti-Islamic Judeo-Christian conspiracy. That could be balanced only by very convincing and clear operational advantages of such an alliance. Last, the United States should make use of the threat of a preemptive Israeli strike in its deliberations with its other allies, mostly its European allies. It may help convince them to take a more robust stand against the Iranian nuclear program. The Europeans most probably will consider an Israeli preemptive strike a disaster and will be ready to invest in an effort to induce Israel to avoid it. ETA: Did that unfuck your thread??? |
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