Posted: 8/2/2005 12:04:11 AM EDT
Remember a few weeks ago, someone posted how we had hired the Swedish Navy to send one of their diesel boats to the Pacific to pretend to be a Chinese submarine for our drills? It was a fair guess that the reason why we weren't using the Canadians batch of ex-Royal Navy Upholder class diesel boats was all the design problems that turned up with them after one nearly sank off of Ireland combined with Canada cutting their defense budget so much that they could not pay to fix them. That however, left the question of why we weren't using the Austrailians boats, the new Collins class which were supposedly state of the art, even having a non electric, and non-nuclear "Air Independant Propulsion" system to extend their underwater speed and range. Well, someone on TankNet.com just posted the answer... Submarine fleet riddled with risks By Cameron Stewart 30-07-2005 From: The Australian
THREE of Australia's six Collins-class submarines have suffered potentially "catastrophic" fires, floods or equipment faults at sea. An explosive internal navy report on submarine safety hazards - written in May 2002 and obtained by The Weekend Australian - reveals that the six subs were plagued by far more serious safety issues than has been publicly admitted.
The report, which details the contents of "hazard logs" for the entire fleet, looked at 468 reported hazards and found 67 of these to be "unacceptable" faults that needed to be "promptly resolved".
It also criticises the navy for adopting an "out of sight and out of mind" attitude to less serious faults on the multi-billion-dollar subs - widely considered Australia's most valuable defence asset.
The report, which was distributed to 26 naval commanders, revealed several potentially "catastrophic" incidents at sea, including a fire on board HMAS Waller and damage to crucial battery cables aboard HMAS Farncomb and HMAS Sheean.
Nine months after the report was written, HMAS Dechaineux (pictured) and her crew of 55 almost sank after suffering a major flood off the coast of Perth - as revealed for the first time in The Weekend Australian last Saturday.
The report shows the navy knew that the anti-flood systems on its submarines were "inadequate and dangerous" before the Dechaineux accident and reveals that a flood also occurred aboard HMAS Collins.
The report says that in April 2000, HMAS Waller suffered an on-board fire in the "main propulsion starter resistor" at the back of the submarine. "The fire, adjacent to a main battery circuit-breaker cabinet, could have had catastrophic consequences," it says.
Yet the findings of those who investigated the accident could not be implemented because "funding is not available".
The report revealed that all of the Collins-class submarines were at risk of main battery short-circuit faults.
"Such faults would be uncontrollable and catastrophic," it says. "Submarines have suffered cable damage, through poor installation and wear, which could have resulted in battery short-circuit faults."
It warned that the submarines' diesel and hydraulic oil systems "may fail and cause fires", yet at the same time questioned "the effectiveness of the Collins' Halon fixed firefighting system".
The report also disclosed that audits had raised doubts about the integrity of the submarine's pressure hulls, but gave no further details. "Cracks in the hull! This could be catastrophic," it said.
The navy said yesterday it had addressed the major safety issues raised in the report. "The issues outlined in the minute of May 24, 2002, have not been ignored and have all been acted upon either by eliminating the risks or mitigating against them. Safety is the navy's most important priority," the navy said.
The hazard report reveals that the "overheating and breakdown of one battery cable insulation" on HMAS Waller "may have had catastrophic consequences" and that this same hazard was "also present on HMAS Sheean".
It warned that, under certain conditions, the submarines could face "total loss of propulsion", while a separate set of conditions could lead the autopilot to "drive the boat to a 20-degree bow-down aspect".
The report also says that "Collins submarines roll badly in some circumstances while surfaced" and that these had resulted in several injuries to sailors, including one who had to be medically discharged from the navy.
It also criticised the attitude taken within the navy to submarine safety, saying that only the most serious safety hazards were being actively managed. "(Less serious hazards) are less actively managed and, in some cases, ignored", it said.
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and this Sub 20 seconds from death By Cameron Stewart 23-07-2005 From: The Australian
AN Australian submarine carrying 55 sailors was seconds from sinking to the bottom of the Indian Ocean following a catastrophic on-board flood off the coast of Perth. The near-tragedy has forced the navy to permanently reduce the diving depth of its fleet of six Collins-class submarines for safety reasons - a move that has weakened their military capability.
An investigation by The Weekend Australian has revealed that an accident on board HMAS Dechaineux on February 12, 2003, was more serious than the navy has publicly admitted.
"I don't think there was anybody on our boat who wasn't shit-scared that day," said Able Seaman Geordie Bunting, who almost drowned in the flood and who has now spoken about it for the first time.
"Another five seconds and we would have been in big trouble ... another 10 and you have got to question whether we could have surfaced."
Mike Deeks, the then commander of the navy's submarine force, said: "We were talking seconds, not minutes. It was a very serious, significant flood."
The depth at which the accident occurred and the maximum depth to which the submarine fleet is now capable of diving is classified information. All operational details about the vessel are classified because they could aid an enemy.
The accident happened about 40 nautical miles off Perth when a sea water hose in the lower engine room failed just as the Dechaineux, the fourth of the navy's six Collins-class submarines, was at its deepest diving depth.
"There was a loud bang and something hard flew past my head," Seaman Bunting said. "Then the water flooded in and I got tossed around like in a washing machine. It was coming in so fast I thought it was all over."
Two sailors rushed to rescue Seaman Bunting from the flooded engine room as Dechaineux's captain Peter Scott and his crew tried desperately to stem the flow of sea water and make the stricken submarine climb.
The crew succeeded in stopping the flood but the submarine had taken so much water it did not respond immediately to the emergency commands.
"It was pretty bloody close, mate. There would have been a lot of people frozen in the moment," Seaman Bunting said.
Lieutenant Commander Geoff Wadley, who was in the control room when the flood occurred, said: "There was a period before the submarine reacted and there was a lot of tension in the air."
Able Seaman Greg Sullivan, who saved Seaman Bunting's life by fishing him out of the flooded room, said: "I was thinking we could be in trouble. You knew it was taking longer than it should (to start to surface)."
If the flood had not been stopped in time, Dechaineux and its crew would have sunk and been crushed by water pressure before hitting the seabed.
"It would have been like crushing an empty Coke can in your hand," Seaman Bunting said. "We were too deep to hit the bottom alive."
Senior naval sources estimate that if the flood had continued for another 15-25 seconds, Dechaineux would have become too heavy to climb back to the surface.
Asked by The Weekend Australian to confirm if Dechaineux was about 20 seconds from disaster, the navy said: "All floods in submarines are serious and time is clearly a critical factor."
At the time of the accident, the navy admitted Dechaineux had taken on water but hid the true gravity of the situation. It would have been Australia's worst military disaster since the 1964 HMAS Voyager tragedy near Jervis Bay on the New South Wales South Coast, which left 82 sailors dead.
The navy responded to the crisis by ordering the submarine fleet back to port and conducting exhaustive tests on the hose that failed.
However, it was never able to find a fault with the hoses, which are still used.
Instead, the navy has reduced the diving depth of the submarines, and as a result the pressure placed on the seawater hoses. There has not been a major flooding incident since.
Despite teething problems, the six Collins submarines have performed above expectation in operations, becoming one of the nation's most valuable military assets.
Captain Scott nominated two of his crew for bravery awards. But more than two years later, those medals have still not been presented.
"We all had a pretty good idea how completely catastrophic it could have been," said a senior crew member who asked not to be named. "If it had been any worse, we wouldn't have got up, and if our propulsion system had failed we wouldn't have made it. We were probably only 20 seconds away (from sinking)."
Seaman Bunting said the accident changed his life. "I'm still nervous about it. It's the closest I'd like to come to death."
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I must also say that this does not bode well for attempts by the diesel fleets to try and close the performance gap with our SSNs
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