The MP (mishap pilot) was a stupid motherfucker who killed a lot of good people.
This should piss you off....
s92270093.onlinehome.us/crmdevel/resources/paper/darkblue/darkblue.htmSelected excerpts:
On the 24th of June 1994, Czar 52, a B-52H assigned to the 325th Bomb Squadron, 92d Bomb Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, WA, launched at approximate 1358 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), to practice maneuvers for an upcoming airshow. The aircrew had the planned and briefed a profile, through the Wing Commander level, that grossly exceeded aircraft and regulatory limitations. Upon preparing to land at the end of the practice airshow profile, the crew was required to execute a "go-around" or missed approach because of another aircraft on the runway. At mid-field, Czar 52 began a tight 360 degree left turn around the control tower at only 250 feet altitude above ground level (AGL). Approximately three quarters of the way through the turn, the aircraft banked past 90 degrees, stalled, clipped a power line with the left wing and crashed. Impact occurred at approximately 1416 hours PDT. There were no survivors out of a crew of four field grade officers. 3
Killed in the crash were Lt Col Arthur "Bud" Holland, the Chief of the 92d Bomb Wing Standardization and Evaluation branch. Lt Col Holland, an instructor pilot, was designated as the aircraft commander and was undoubtedly flying the aircraft at the time of the accident. 4 The copilot was Lt Col Mark McGeehan, also an instructor pilot and the 325th Bomb Squadron (BMS) Commander. There is a great deal of evidence that suggests considerable animosity existed between the two pilots who were at the controls of Czar 52..
This was a result of Lt Col McGeehan's unsuccessful efforts to have Bud Holland "grounded" for what he perceived as numerous and flagrant violations of air discipline while flying with 325th BMS aircrews. Colonel Robert Wolff was the Vice Wing Commander and was added to the flying schedule as a safety observer by Col Brooks, the Wing Commander, on the morning of the mishap. This was to be Col Wolff's "fini flight," an Air Force tradition where an aviator is hosed down following his last flight in an aircraft. Upon landing, Col Wolff was to be met on the flightline by his wife and friends for a champagne toast to a successful flying career. The radar navigator position was filled by Lt Col Ken Huston, the 325th BMS Operations Officer.
While all aircraft accidents that result in loss of life are tragic, those that could have been prevented are especially so. The crash of Czar 52 was primarily the result of actions taken by a singularly outstanding "stick and rudder pilot," but one who, ironically, practiced incredibly poor airmanship. The distinction between these two similar sounding roles will be made clear as we progress in this analysis. Of equal or greater significance, was the fact that supervision and leadership facilitated the accident through failed policies of selective enforcement of regulations, as well as failing to heed the desperate warning signals raised by peers and subordinates over a period of three years prior to the accident. At the time of the accident, there was considerable evidence of Lt Col Holland's poor airmanship spanning a period of over three years.
Situation Six: Yakima Bombing Range
10 March 1994
Lt Col Holland was the aircraft commander on a single ship mission to the Yakima Bombing Range to drop practice munitions and provide an authorized photographer an opportunity to shoot pictures of the B-52 from the ground as it conducted its bomb runs. Lt Col Holland flew the aircraft well below the established 500 foot minimum altitude for the low level training route.
In fact, one crossover was photographed at less than 30 feet, and another crewmember estimated that the final ridgeline crossover was "somewhere in the neighborhood of about three feet" (emphasis added) above the ground, and that the aircraft would have impacted the ridge if he had not intervened and pulled back on the yoke to increase the aircraft's altitude. The photographers stopped filming because "they thought we were going to impact . . . and they were ducking out of the way." 50 Lt Col Holland also joined an unbriefed formation of A-10 fighter aircraft to accomplish a flyby over the photographer. This mission violated ACC Regulations regarding minimum altitudes, FAR Part 91 and Air Force Regulation (AFR) 60-16, regarding overflight of people on the ground. There were several occasions during the flight where other crewmembers verbally voiced their opposition to the actions being taken by Lt Col Holland. Following the flight, these same crewmembers went up the squadron chain of command with their story and stated they would not fly with Lt Col Holland again.
The Followers
During the flight, crewmembers strongly verbalized their concerns about the violations of air discipline and regulations.
At one point, Lt Col Holland reportedly called the radar navigator "a pussy" when he would not violate regulations and open the bomb doors for a photograph with live weapons on board. On another occasion, following a low crossover, the navigator told Lt Col Holland that the altitudes he was flying was "senseless." 51
**But the real hero on this flight was Capt Eric Jones, a B-52 instructor pilot who found himself in the copilot seat with Lt Col Holland during the low level portion of the flight. On this day, it would take all of his considerable skills, wits, and guile, to bring the aircraft safely back to Fairchild. After realizing that merely telling Lt Col Holland that he was violating regulations and that he (Capt Jones) was uncomfortable with that, was not going to work, Capt Jones feigned illness to get a momentary climb to a higher altitude. Capt Jones also said he needed training and flew a few more passes. But in the end it was once again Lt Col Holland at the controls. The following is Capt Jones recollection of the events that took place then:
We came around and (Lt) Col Holland took us down to 50 feet. I told him that this was well below the clearance plane and that we needed to climb. He ignored me. I told him (again) as we approached the ridge line. I told him in three quick bursts 'climb-climb-climb.' . . I didn't see any clearance that we were going to clear the top of that mountain ... It appeared to me that he had target fixation. I said 'climb-climb-climb.' again, he did not do it. I grabbed ahold of the yoke and I pulled it back pretty abruptly ... I'd estimate we had a cross over around 15 feet . . . The radar navigator and the navigator were verbally yelling or screaming, reprimanding (Lt) Col Holland and saying that there was no need to fly that low ... his reaction to that input was he was laughing--I mean a good belly laugh. 52
Following the low level portion of the mission at the Yakima Range, the crew was scheduled to fly another low level at a different route. Capt Jones convinced Lt Col Holland that the other copilot on the flight needed some training. When Lt Hollis climbed in the seat with Capt Jones (replacing Lt Col Holland at the other set of controls) Capt Jones "told Lt Hollis that he was not to get out of the seat again, (even if ) Col Holland ordered him to." 53
Upon returning from the mission, the crewmembers discussed the events among themselves and came to the conclusion that they would not fly with Lt Col Holland again.
Capt Jones reports, "I vowed to them that never again would they or myself be subjected to fly with him. That if it required it, I would be willing to fall on my sword to ensure that didn't happen." The next day, Captain Jones reported the events to Major Don Thompson, the squadron operations officer stating "I did not ever want to fly with Lt Col Holland again, even if it meant that I couldn't fly anymore as an Air Force pilot." 54 Major Thompson told Captain Jones that he didn't think it would come to that, because he "was joining a group of pilots in the squadron who had also made the same statement." 55