www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/11/27/national0151EST0420.DTL

3rd Army commanders felt ammunition was short before Iraq invasion, internal report says

JOHN J. LUMPKIN and DAFNA LINZER, Associated Press Writers

(11-27) 22:51 PST WASHINGTON (AP) --

Soldiers with the Army's 3rd Infantry Division charged into Iraq in April short of the ammunition their commanders had said was necessary to invade, according to the division's postwar evaluation of the fighting.

It was one of a number of supply problems encountered by the 3rd Infantry before and during its 21-day dash to Baghdad from Kuwait, according to the internal review, a 293-page after-action report created by the division's senior officers and troops.

During the run-up to the war, division commanders requested additional ammunition be delivered to front-line units. The request was approved, but the troops could not obtain all the ordnance despite months of war preparations.

"Every attempt to gain the ammunition assets resulted in some agency or another denying requests, short-loading trucks or turning away soldiers," the report said. "The entire situation became utter chaos. ... The division crossed (into Iraq) short the ammunition it had declared necessary to commit to combat."

The report, whose authors were not identified by name, catalogued serious problems with supply, security and the handling of prisoners of war. It blamed many problems on higher headquarters or other parts of the military, although it did point out some places where the division could train its own soldiers better.

A spokesman for the division, Maj. Darryl Wright, characterized the report as a candid effort to pinpoint problems and refine tactics so the division fights better next time. He said the report, obtained by The Associated Press and other outlets, had not yet been finalized.

During the Iraq invasion, more than 12,000 troops of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) joined thousands of Marines and other soldiers in the northward thrust to Baghdad. The first U.S. infantry and armored units entered Iraq on March 20 and took Baghdad within three weeks.

The 3rd Infantry, based at Fort Stewart, Ga., suffered 44 killed during combat in Iraq. Much of its report focused on problems encountered during the rapid thrust into Iraq, which has since given way to an increasingly dangerous occupation.

The report praised the division's troops, leaders and front-line fighting gear, particularly the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle.

"The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) moved farther and faster than any other ground offensive operation in history," the report claimed.

"U.S. armored combat systems enabled the division to close with and destroy heavily armored and fanatically determined enemy forces with impunity, often within urban terrain," it said.

Yet the division had serious problems receiving supplies while on the move, including vehicle parts, ammunition, fuel and medical supplies. Had the division been required to move beyond Baghdad, or had it required more time to reach the city, its advance would have stalled, the report suggested.

"Most units literally spent 21 days in continuous combat operations without receiving a single repair part," the report said. "Shortages of predictably high-demand repair parts and vehicular fluids had the most lasting effect on fleet readiness."

In a section describing the problems combat engineers faced in receiving needed construction equipment, the report said, "The Army's current supply system failed before and during the operation."

Despite well-publicized fears that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would use chemical or biological weapons on advancing U.S. troops, not all soldiers had complete protective gear, the report said.

A battalion of air defense troops was among those. "More than half of the battalion deployed with some type of nuclear, biological and chemical equipment shortage," the report said.

Units ran into shortages of gloves, suits and mask filters. Some protective suits weren't fitted properly, and decontamination kits had expired. Some troops simply left their equipment at home.

The division also had problems handling enemy prisoners of war, the report said.

"Soldiers failed to properly record the circumstances of many captures," it said. "Later, we were unable to identify enemy soldiers who violated the law of war, and, therefore, cannot achieve a major goal set forth by President Bush: To punish those who violate the law of war."

Some units that operated away from the front lines had inadequate weapons to defend themselves as they faced guerrilla attacks, the report said. "Security was lacking for critical command and control nodes ... as well as for critical staff personnel."

Communications were another persistent problem. The division, along with other advancing units, stretched out across southern Iraq, with support units reaching back to Kuwait. But some transmitters didn't have the range to reach more distant units. Iridium satellite phones only functioned about half of the time, the report said.

The division also had difficulty delivering mail to the troops, the report said. Mail, in particular, is considered a critical morale booster for fighting soldiers.

Well, that gives me more confidence that bayonets are no longer needed, and don't have to be issued anymore.
One of these days, we are going to go so fast and so hard that the units will outrace their support/logistics by days, and it will come down to hand to hand combat.
Because the collective decision was that the support could keep up with the combat units, but forgot to actually make sure of that.
Oh, and they need more sensitivity training.

I agree doublefeed.

I mean WTF! saying there training needs to be better we ran right thought them like a hot knife through butter! what do they expect?

There were at least two knife kills by Marines, one with a bayonet and one with a fighting knife.

How many after action reports did I read after desert storm addressing some of these same factors.  How many after action reports from WWII, Korea, and Vietnam are collecting dust in archives somewhere that also address some of the same problems.  

I'm not saying we have to fight the last war, but simple things like spare parts, POL, and ammunition should be no brainers during a war.  

The flip side is that as an Air Force logistician, I sometimes had frustrations with the way our unit mission was not really taken seriously, or that major decisions were being made way up the chain of command without consulting us or using assumptions and/or flawed data.  

This is an age-old problem. If everyone would look at the history of warfare, these problems occurred back then, and they still occur today, that is the problem of keeping the supplies flowing to the front lines. Didn't the WWII German Gen. Rommel outrun his supplies during his Africa campaign, and finally the tide turned because of that problem?

humans are makers of mistakes, it is a shame but this stuff happens, the ammo, and equipment should be a no brainer, and who was the guy in  charge of the communications, we need better for our fighters

That's why amateurs look at tactics,while professionals look at logistics.

Yes Marine units did run out of ammo and started the war on "Logistics Lite" which was basically reduced rations.  We did go a short while without food, but we were never as bad as the grunts.  Since I had a much larger organic lift ability than they did, I was able to get by better than they were.  One day we feed a rifle company on our flank, I have never seen a group so happy to get MREs in my life.  But at that point we were down to 1 a day and they had gone 2 days without eating.

So the Marines were dependant on the Army to keep them fed and supplied? And then as usual Army units got first dibs. Was it in part because the the Marines were having to use so many trucks to lift troops that they had none of their own left to lift supplies?

The Marines are going to ask for more trucks now right? Though if you had the Osprey already in service instead of those elderly Sea Knights they might have been able to make up the difference.

Yep!  I’m sure you (but maybe not everybody else on this board) have heard of the red ball express in WWII.

Very old problem.

So, it's the [i]Army's[/i] fault that your stepson shot up all his ammo and the USMC couldn't keep your stepson supplied?
Bullshit.

The Army's got enough of it's own problems without being blamed for USMC supply issues.  And I won't ask him about Lynch's outfit, [i]because he wasn't there when it happened[/i].

SJ

Army transpo unit were attached to I MEF to assist moving supplies, since allot of the MT assets for the MEF were attached to maneuver forces.  It wasn't so much an army problem we ran low on supplies, but ogisticians in general.  For the longest time logisticians have been pushing just in time logistics and that there was no need of large organic lift capability.  However, the logistician promises of their ability to keep us supplied never materialized.  I had 1 howitzer down for a large chunk of the war because not being able to get repair parts.

"just in time logistics"? You mean they were trying to run the supply lines like UPS!

They did such a good job in 91', what happened to screw things up?

Criticism of what was not performed well enough is necessary and critical in our ascension to a premier fighting force.

Its when we don't beat ourselves up over our logistical failures that we know we're going downhill.

Every Marine is infantry.......

Good thing the Army thought to have some truck drivers.

Just goshin' ya.

I don't understand if both USMC and Amry forces were heavily mechanised why they could be given large bits of supplies, ammo, MRE's, vehicle parts, vehicle fluids, water, etc, and just stow them in their units vehicles.

Lots of space in Bradleys if you have to make room. Heavy ammo would be more problematic, but individual ammo shouldn't be too tough?

I know, logisitians like to be able to see all "their" supplies.

----------------------------------------------------

Then again I wonder how much of this is caused because of the Army's appetite for fuel.

M-1's 1,500 gallons per day per vehicle. That's appx 6 tons of fuel. 3-ID has 300 tanks 1,800 tons of fuel per day just for those tanks.

Then they have appx 350 other armored vehicles, MLRS, M109, M2/M3/M9, if they use 250 per day per vehicle (and I bet the use way more when on the move) That's 350 more tons of fuel.

Figure another 100 tons for all the support vehicles.

2,250 tons of fuel per day. How many trucks, ships, and planes are needed to deilver all that fuel.

If the tanks would run on 1,000 gallons per day that would be 600 tons of transport that could be used for ammo, food, water, etc. Good thinking going with a turbine engine, which in other applications uses almost the same amount of fuel at idle as it does at WOT (wide open throttle).

I don't know about the USMC, but the Army has [i]always[/i] pushed heavily for Brigade and Divisional transportation assets, as well as individual unit augmentation, that were far and above what anybody expected would be necessary.  That's why amateurs at the Pentagon are always bitching about "tooth to tail" and not even considering the long fight.

When logistics started moving toward "push packages", the length of the supply trains became critical.  Longer distances from ammo and fuel supply points made the gap in delivery that much more apparent.  Combat crews can maneuver forward with their individual tracks, while the logisticians are still sitting on mountains of material that can't be un-assed on a moment's notice.  Not to mention that the movility of a 2.5 or 5-ton truck isn't on par with the M1, M2/3 or any of the other tracks in the desert.

The fact that Army logistics were attached to the I MEF says the opposite about Army logistics.  The Army planned ahead.  That young marine needs to start bitching to [i]his own[/i] service.

Well that is because Marines forces weren't suppose to be fighting 750-1000 miles from the ocean, our ConOps is for fighting close to the sea with short LICs.  However we pushed farther inland than any Marines ever had.

He certainly talks a lot of shit considering he never served.  I dont care whether or not his step son served, thats not the issue.  Beekeeper has no right to call anyone a REMF or disrespect the Army even if its relaying information.  Id like to see him go drive on over to Ft leonard wood in MO and tell the guard at the gate that hes a REMF who screwed up the push to Baghdad for the Marines.  What a ***! [PISSED]

And I commend the USMC for it's fine operations.  It just galls me that this guy bitches about logistics provided by another service, without questioning his own service's ability to provide those services.  I spent my last four years of service in Service Support units (transpo, fuel, ammo) and those guys work HARD, 24/7, and they get the gratitude of being called REMFs by people who wouldn't hesitate to scream for them when their gas, ammo and beans get a little low.

And that is sometimes the problem when you get you speak to junior soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines.  They often don't see the big picture and  make statements based on their perspective, which is very limited.

From what I can tell OIF was an impossible logistical situation.  The base for the attack (Kuwait) was too small and had lousy port facilities.  Few if any roads went from Kuwait to Iraq.  Good airfields were few and far between.  There was really no working railroad system.  And it wasn't possible to live off the land.  

GunLvr

Logistics has always been the limiting factor in maneuver.  Gulf War I's speed was far slower, and the buildup was far longer ahead of time, than OIF.

As for carrying it all on the combat vehicles, once you get all your stuff and Infantry and their gear in a Brad, there isn't much room for anything else.  A tank is even worse, as everything extra has to be carried strapped on the outside.  The military buys these systems to fit a speciic number of people and their equipment.  Usually that requirement winds up being less space than what is needed in the real world.  The end result is over-stuffed vehicles.  

You can't carry all the logsitics on combat vehicles anymore than you can carry all the logistics in a rucksack.  That's why armies have used slaves, mules, carts, wagons, trucks, helicopters, etc.  Supplies are moved more efficiently when moved in bulk.  There's no getting around that.  You need to have the capacity and systems to maintain the flow.

Logistic systems don't carry the same price tag as frontline weapons systems.  As such they don't bring the big bucks to Congressional districts, nor do their manufacturers have the ability to line a Congresscritter's pockets with money.  All the gee-whiz toys that cost billions is what gets the attention, because everyone wants a piece of the big pie, not the small one that is really required.  It's the old, "How many trucks can you buy for one stealth bomber?" idea.  People will stand right up and say we need more bombers instead of trucks, but we'll never use all the bombers we have now at the same time.

The military mindset, and worse yet, the civillian government mindset is still locked in the military-industrial complex of the cold war.  We still buy things as a partial social program handout.  Alot of systems have gotten better, but until logistics is looked at as another combat system (since it certainly has the most impact on combat) things won't change that much.  This goes for ALL services.

You can look at it another way though.  It's not so much that our logistics suck, it's that our frontline forces are so good.  Outrunning your logistics means you are indeed kicking some serious ass out on the battlefield.  Also, as bad as it sounds (and it is indeed bad IMO) think about this: How many other countries could have even gotten people, let alone supplies over 13,000 miles, to the other side of the globe, to take over a whole country in a couple of weeks?  Answer: NO OTHER COUNTRY

Our fighting forces have progressed to the next level of ability.  Our logistics forces now need to catch up to that.  Every other country just slides farther and farther downhill.

Ross

Good thread, and a good post Ross....


Seems to me, it's a good thing we didn't meet much resistence on the way to Baghdad...

Mike,
Neither the **** or *** comment needs to be here.  Like i told George in my IM to him, which is probably posted in the staff forum, if you edit your comment I will edit mine.  I gave him reasons why the **** comment doesnt belong on this board.

As a logistics services provider, I am going to ditto Ross here.  The funny part is that even though US logistics may not be 100% of what we would like them to be, they are literally orders of magnitude above what any other country or coalition of countries could put together.

One other point that is worth considering.  The Combatant Commander accepted higher risk at the operational and tactical levels by launching the ground phase of OIF earlier than originally planned.  Gen Franks did this to minimize risk at the strategic level - risk of things like oil well fires, oil dumping, SCUD launches against Israel, and possibly WMD launches.  By forgoing a 10-14 day preliminary air phase during which time additional logistics supplies could have been built up, he was able to prevent the above mentioned actions which could have had strategic consequences.

This is why the 4 stars get paid the big bucks.  Gen Franks assessed the risks of going earlier than planned against the benefits and judged that the rewards for doing so outweighed the likely costs.  What do you know - he judged correctly.  A textbook example of what leaders are supposed to do.