I was reading this
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-02/marines-adapt-long-war-concept and got to thinking about it.
Excerpt in case it doesn't come up fully:
A core characteristic for the success of the SC MAGTFs and MCTAGs is regionalization. In the recent past, Marine regiments have focused on environmental conditions. The Long War Concept adopts this same theme, but the focus is now on the cultural landscape instead of environmental conditions. By assigning a regiment a specific geographical region of expertise (such as Second Marines being assigned Sub-Saharan Africa)—and thus SC focus—the service will be able to focus human talent and proficiency together while simultaneously expanding and further developing the skills and capabilities necessary for effective partner-capacity building. (For a comprehensive discussion of regionalization, see Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Novack's accompanying article "Regionalization: Optimizing Security Cooperation").
Developing and maintaining cultural and regional expertise is an obvious requirement for successful engagement operations. Additionally, local cultural knowledge is now recognized as a decisive factor in counterinsurgency operations that succeed. Because we understand that future conflicts are likely to be dominated by opponents with indigenous knowledge, it is important that the Corps also develop a substantial base of this knowledge.
In addition to serving obvious benefits to MCTAG and SC MAGTF activities, this will lead to more informed planning and execution of future contingency operations while greatly facilitating our information operations efforts.
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I then went to a general internet search on the Long War Concept and, if this might be considered cherry-picking, saw this 2010 article:
http://prospect.org/article/end-long-war-0
The other document was the Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR. Every four years, the Department of Defense reports to Congress on its long-term strategic and procurement plans. The QDR gives the White House the opportunity to both lay the tracks of future equipment procurement and to make a statement about its strategic orientation.
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Some critics of the 2010 QDR have argued that the document fails to serve its purpose in that it does not sufficiently lay out a long-term force structure and strategy for the United States military. For example, the current QDR does not offer a sweeping vision for future U.S. competition with China, and critics suggest that the document is bogged down with practical solutions to immediate military problems. Gates essentially concedes this point, writing:
This is truly a wartime QDR. For the first time, it places the current conflicts at the top of our budgeting, policy, and program priorities, thus ensuring that those fighting America's wars and their families -- on the battlefield, in the hospital, or on the home front -- receive the support they need and deserve.
In other words, this QDR is about fighting, winning, and recovering from the conflicts in which the United States currently finds itself embroiled. The implication is that long-term strategic planning can be put off until at least 2014, when the United States will presumably be out of Iraq and nearly out of Afghanistan.
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Now ISIS actually controls territory and has no compunction whatsoever to continue on.
edit: Great thesis explaining ISIS. Worthwhile read.
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/
Virtually every major decision and law promulgated by the Islamic State adheres to what it calls, in its press and pronouncements, and on its billboards, license plates, stationery, and coins, “the Prophetic methodology,” which means following the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail. Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all do. But pretending that it isn’t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to counter it. We’ll need to get acquainted with the Islamic State’s intellectual genealogy if we are to react in a way that will not strengthen it, but instead help it self-immolate in its own excessive zeal.
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