The Battle of the Bulge and Pearl Harbor discussions prompted me to post some stuff on other military disasters, not limited to the US military.

Most of the following on the Battle of Savo Island is from "Guadalcanal" by Richard B. Frank.

The US Marines had just invaded Guadalcanal, a Japanese held island with a partially complete airstrip, on 7 August 1942.  The USN was joined by a few Austrailian navy ships for a total of

6 heavy cruisers
2 light cruisers
8 destroyers

These were split into a northern group, a southern group, an eastern group, and 2 destroyers on patrol to the west.  All were in the vicinity between Guadalcanal and Tulagi (also invaded on 7 August) Additional destroyers were in the immediate area of the transports unloading the USMC units and supplies.

In a daring move, a Jap navy force under one Vice Admiral Mikawa steamed into the area with

5 heavy cruisers
2 light cruisers
1 destroyer

In terms of firepower, the USN and allies had
USN: heavy cruiser 52 x 8" guns  Jap 34 x 8" guns
USN:  light cruiser 8 x 6" guns  Jap 10 x 5.5"
USN:  all ships    80 x 5" guns  
                  20 x 4" guns  Jap 24 x 4.7"
USN:  torpedo tubes 144 x 21"    Jap 70 x all sizes

One of the picket destroyers sent a radio warning at 2345  "WARNING!  WARNING!  PLANE OVER SAVO HEADED EAST" when a Jap float plane flew over the area.  Despite this, a series of errors and misunderstandings followed that ensured that almost none of the US and allied warships got the word.  Most kept sailing in their preplanned squares which was one step above anchored and motionless.      

To make a long battle description short, the Jap task force sank 5 ships and damaged 2 more and got away with extremely light casualties despite the advantage on paper of the US/allied forces.

Jap losses were 129 killed and 85 wounded.
86 of these casualties were from one of the Jap cruisers being torpedoed by a US submarine a day after the battle.

US/Allied losses were 1077 killed and 700 wounded.

About the only good news of the battle was that the Jap task force didn't press their advantage to attack/sink the transports offloading Marines and their supplies.  Of course, the next morning the transports up-anchored and vamoosed pronto while the Marines on shore watched most of their supplies and heavy equipment sail away.  (they got used to eating a lot of captured Japanese food for a while)

The Battle of Savo Island prompted a special  investigation similar to Pearl Harbor's aftermath.  The USN Admiral over the inquiry board stated in his report:

"The primary cause of this defeat must be ascribed generally to the complete surprise achieved by the enemy."

Reasons for this:

-An inadequate state of readiness on all ships to meet a sudden night attack.
-The failure to recognize the implications of the presence of enemy planes in the vicinity prior to the attack
-Misplaced confidence in the capability of the radar pickets
-Communications failures which resulted in the lack of the timely receipt of vital enemy contact information
-A lapse in both communications and doctrine to timely warn that practically no effective reconnaissance had been flown covering the enemy approach during the day of August 8.

Adm Nimitz added his thoughts to the list of causes:
-communications weaknesses
-failures of the various air search plans
-failure of the search planes that saw Mikawa to track him (his task force was spotted by 2 separate patrol planes and a US submarine on their way to Guadalcanal!)
-erroneous estimate of the enemy's intentions
-overdependence on radar
-failure to repond to the presence of enemy planes
-lack of flag officers in the cruiser force engaged  
-"probability that our Force was not psychologically prepared for battle"

Admiral Turner's thoughts on the battle:

"The Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy.  In spite of ample evidence as to enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the enemy and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances.
   "The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which induced a confidence without readiness, and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct.  I believe that this psychological factor as a cause of this defeat, was even more important than the element of surprise."

Edmund comment:  depressing to see that 9 months after Pearl Harbor some lessons still weren't learned!

I was privileged to receive the following as forwarded email some time ago.  Lest we think that military disasters are only a US phenomena, I present the following:
********************

Submitted by John Farnam
18 July 01

Britain's own "Pearl Harbor," Singapore and the Malay Peninsula, 1941-1942

Churchill characterized it as, "the worst disaster and largest capitulation
in British history."  It is no wonder that virtually every anti-colonial
revolt in the postwar era drew its inspiration from the victory of a
numerically inferior Japanese force over the vaunted British Army and Navy at
Singapore.

In November of 1941, with the monsoon rainy season in full force, no one in
Singapore believed the Japanese would or could launch an attack.  Singapore,
sitting on the southern shore of a tiny island at the very southern tip of
the Malay Peninsula, boasted fifteen-inch shore batteries, capable of sinking
any kind of ship.  They would surely repel an attempted amphibious landing,
and the only other conceivable avenue of attack, down the Malay Peninsula,
would have to wait until spring.  One can imagine everyone's astonishment
when a large Japanese invasion force, under General Tomoyuki Yamashita,
oblivious of the rain, landed at Kota Bharu on the Malay Peninsula on 8
December 1941, the very next day after the Japanese air attack at Pearl
Harbor!

In his Singapore headquarters, Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brook-Popham
immediately called a Council of War.  The two major players, other than
Brook-Popham himself, were Sir Arthur Percival, the ground commander, and
Admiral Thomas Phillips, commander of "Force Z," consisting of two capital
ships and four destroyers, which had been sent to Singapore as a deterrent.  
The British battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse
constituted the centerpiece.  Before their meeting was even concluded,
Japanese aircraft appeared over the city and started bombing.  All of
Singapore was stunned and panicked.  

An indecisive Phillips, aboard the Prince of Wales, immediately set sail
northward for Kota Bharu with his two capital ships, while he left his
destroyers in Singapore harbor.  Halfway there, he decided to turn back and
return to Singapore.  No sooner had he turned around, than he decided to turn
around again, this time heading for Kuantan, where he had learned of another
Japanese landing.  He arrived but found nothing, so he ordered his two ships
further away from shore while he contemplated the situation.  Phillips' ships
were being shadowed by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft the entire time he
was at sea, but he never radioed for air cover, which was available at
Singapore in the form of a squadron of (obsolete, but still functional)
"Buffalo" fighters.

(continued)

On the morning of 10 December 1941, over eighty Japanese bombers suddenly
appeared in the sky above the two British ships and attacked in open water.  
A fierce battle ensued.  Torpedo bombers arrived a short time later.  
Phillips still did not ask for air support!  He apparently thought he could
hold them off with indigenous AAA.  Only after both ships were grievously
damaged were fighter aircraft finally dispatched.  By the time British
aircraft arrived, both ships had been sunk, and the Japanese planes were long
gone.  Destroyers, arriving shortly thereafter, picked up survivors in the
water.  Phillips himself was not among the survivors, and his body was never
found.

The entire British admiralty had disdainfully chided the Americans about
their unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor.  They spoke too soon!  Here, only three
days later, this time with a British admiral in charge, the British, too,
were outsmarted by the Japanese.  No one expected Japanese to fly well, sail
well, fight well, or plan well.  British competence and Japanese incompetence
had both been substantially overestimated!

Percival was now worried!  In a single battle, Force Z had been largely
destroyed, and it was now obvious that the Japanese would not attempt an
amphibious landing at Singapore.  They would, instead, attack down the Malay
Peninsula and hit the city from the north.  His worry intensified when he
learned that the vaunted, fifteen-inch Singapore shore guns could not be
turned around and fired to the north.  They were useless!  

The Malay Peninsula was the main source of rubber and tin (critical military
commodities) for both the British and the Americans.  Churchill therefore
instructed that Singapore and the entire Peninsula be held (although he knew
full well that they couldn't be).  Percival had at his disposal nearly
100,000 soldiers.  He was confident that he could hold off the Japanese,
trading space for time, until a rescue fleet arrived from Britain.  Like
MacArthur in the Philippines, Percival was foolish enough to believe his
superiors when they "assured" him he would not be abandoned.  Like so many
field commanders, both Percival and MacArthur had been lied to.  No rescue
fleet would be sent to either location, by the British or the Americans, nor
had either Roosevelt or Churchill ever intended to send one, despite their
flowery speeches to the contrary.

General Yamashita's troops, after fighting in China for ten years and never
suffering a significant defeat, were confident.  They pushed south with a
vengeance, quickly bypassing pockets of resistance and leapfrogging
obstacles, via well planned, multiple amphibious landings.  Japanese tanks,
against which the British had fielded no effective weapons, smashed through
strong points unhindered.  Japanese aircraft and extremely accurate AAA
prevented British aircraft from effectively attacking Japanese ships or
ground formations.  

(continued)

British defenders were so overwhelmed that they neglected to destroy critical
supplies and facilities before abandoning them.  Japanese troops captured
storehouses, fuel, and equipment in tact.  Worse yet, hastily abandoned
airfields were not cratered by exiting British troops, so Japanese planes
were able to use them immediately.  Bridges were not blown in time, so
Japanese soldiers followed right on the heels of retreating British units,
capturing many and scattering the rest.  In fact, the entire British
"defense" was so poorly coordinated that it hastily deteriorated into a
full-scale rout.  There were some bright spots, and several British and
Australian units held out courageously, but dithering and panicked Percival
could not get any kind of organized defense synthesized, and the Japanese
pushed forward relentlessly, oblivious of losses (which were substantial).  
Percival had waited too long before organizing, equipping, and training his
forces.  He and his forces were woefully unprepared, and it showed!


By the end of January, the entire Malay Peninsula had been captured by
Japanese forces, leaving only Singapore Island still in British hands.  
Percival's retreating forces were badly shot up but still fully capable of
putting up a credible fight.  Without hesitation, the Japanese invaded the
island and pressed their attack on the City of Singapore itself.  

Unknown to Percival (due to inadequate intelligence), by now Yamashita's
forces had long since run out of food, were nearly out of ammunition and
fuel, and were badly attrited.  In fact, Yamashita's entire offensive had
sputtered and stalled!  British lines were finally holding firm, and there
were even several successful counterattacks.  Yamashita had already concluded
that he would have to withdraw from the island, regroup, and wait for
resupply before continuing.  He was therefore understandably (albeit
pleasantly) shocked when Percival, on the 15th of February, sheepishly
pleaded for a truce.  Without even waiting for a reply, Percival ordered a
cease fire!  Later that day, he met with Yamashita and unilaterally
surrendered all his troops and the entire civilian population.  

(continued)

Percival had literally snatched defeat from the jaws of victory!  His forces
had turned the tide of battle (despite his inept leadership), but Percival
himself was already defeated in his mind, and no amount of good news could
persuade him to think any other way.  Years later, Percival would excuse his
dismal performance by insisting that the Japanese vastly outnumbered him and,
in addition, were expert jungle fighters.  Both contentions are nonsense.  
Japanese soldiers were no more familiar with the Malay jungle than were the
British, and Japanese forces were actually outnumbered by British forces!  
What led to Percival's ignominious defeat was indecision, poor planning, poor
coordination, and arrogant thinking which continuously discounted Japanese
capabilities, in spite of obvious and ample evidence to the contrary!

Another notable Japanese capability was brutality!  In the wake of the
surrender, wounded prisoners (and many others, including women and children)
were summarily executed, most by bayoneting and beheading.  This pattern
would be shortly repeated with MacArthur's captured forces in the
Philippines.  Women were brutally raped and then murdered.  Universal slave
labor and forced prostitution were the realities of Japanese occupation, as
the Chinese had discovered earlier and as Filipinos would discover shortly.  
Slaughter and butchery were everywhere!  Prisoners, along with dependents,
were herded into makeshift prison camps without food, medicine, or
sanitation.  They died by the thousands.  Native Malayans who had resented
British "oppressors," were soon begging for the British to return!  


The twin disasters at Pearl Harbor and Singapore assured that it would be a
long war.  Eventually, Japanese soldiers and civilians would pay dearly for
their brutality, but it would take several years.

Lessons:

"High morale," is largely meaningless when it has no legitimate foundation
and is, in fact, based on fraud and wishful thinking.  Under such
circumstances, "high morale" is little more than mass self deception.  It
will predictably fall apart when the first shots are fired!  

Any time politicians "assure" you of something, assume they are lying.

Weapons and other critical equipment must be continuously in the hands of the
people who need it, so they can train with it and have it handy when it is
required.  Percival has ample quantities of antitank mines and antitank guns,
but, when they were critically needed, they were still in warehouses,
gathering dust.  No one had ever used them or trained with them.

No matter how bad things look, it may be even worse for your opponent!  Never
give up, lest you lose your only opportunity to be victorious.

In warfare, death is usually better than captivity.
/John Farnam

(posted by Edmund Rowe)