Joan Peterson lives in Duluth, Minnesota and has been involved in the issue of gun violence prevention since the Million Mom March in 2000. Joan lost a sister in a domestic shooting 20 years ago and is working to strengthen gun laws and educate people about the causes and effects of gun violence through blogging and her involvement in organizations working on the issue. Joan is Co-President of the Northland Brady Campaign chapter, Board Chair of Protect Minnesota (an organization working to end gun violence) and sits on the Board of Trustees of the Brady Campaign. She is also a Board member of Domestic Abuse Intervention Programs, nationally and internationally known for the "Duluth Model" as a coordinated community response to domestic abuse.Joan is blogging at www.commongunsense.com.

First, the FSA’s ban on se mi- automatic rifles and larger- capacity magazines burdens the availability and use of a class of arms for self- defense in the home, where the protection afforded by the Second Amendment is at its greatest. It implicates the “core” of the Second Amendment:“the right of law- abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Heller, 554 U.S. at634, 635; s ee Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (“What we know from [ Heller and McDonald] is that Second Amendment guarantees are at their zenith within the home.”). At stake here is a “basic right,” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767, “that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted . . . among those fundamental rights necessary t o our system of ordered liberty,” id. at 778. Indeed, “[t] he[Supreme] Court[in Heller] went to great lengths to emphasize the special place that the home— an individual's private property— occupies in our society.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244,1259 (11th Cir. 2012).

Second, we conclude that the challenged provisions of the FSA substantially burden this fundamental right. The burden imposed in this case is not merely incidental. Maryland law imposes a complete ban on the possess ion by law- abiding citizens of AR-15 style rifles— the most popular class of centerfire semi- automatic rifles in the United States. As we explained in Section III.A., these weapons are protected under the Second Amendment. We therefore struggle to see how Maryland’s law would not substantial ly burden the core Second Amendment right to defend oneself and one’s family in the home with a firearm that is commonly possessed by law- abiding citizens for such lawful purposes. Moreover, the FSA also reaches every instance where a n AR-15 platform semi- automatic rifle or LCM might be preferable to handguns or bolt- action rifles-- for example hunting, recreational shooting, or competitive marksmanship events, all of which are lawful purposes protected by the Constitut ion. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct.447 (Mem.) (December 7, 2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of cert.) (“[T] he ordinance criminalizes modern sporting rifles (e.g., AR- style semiautomatic rifles), which many Americans own fo r lawful purposes like self- defense, hunting, and target shooting.”). Thus, the FSA completely prohibits, not just regulates, an entire category of weaponry.11 As Judge11 Kavanaugh noted in dissent in Heller II, prohibiting this group of weapons might be “equivalent to a ban on a category of speech.” 670 F.3d at 1285.

Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the fact that handguns, bolt- action and other manually- loaded long guns, and, as noted earlier, a few semi- automatic rifles are still available for self- defense does not mitigate this burden. See, e.g., Jackson v. City & Cnty. of San Fran., 135 S. Ct. 2799,2801 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“[N] othing in our decision in Heller suggested that a law must rise to the level of the absolute prohibition at issu e in that case to constitute a ‘ substantial burden’ on the core of the Second Amendment right.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected essentially the same argument in Heller— that the District of Columbia’s handgun ban did not unconstitutionally burden the right to self- defense because the law permitted the possession of long guns for home defense. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“ It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms ( i.e., long guns) is allowed.”); accord Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the District’s argument that alternative weapons rendered handgun ban lawful, calling it “frivolous,” and noting that “[i]t could be similarly contended that all firearms may be banned so lon g as sabers were permitted”); cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556(1975) (“[O]ne is not to have the exercise of liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exe rcised in some other place.”). A semi- automatic rifle may not be “the quintessential self- defense weapon,” as Heller described the handgun, 554 U.S. at 629; nonetheless, as we explained previously, AR-15s and the like are commonly possessed by law- abiding citizens for self- defense and other lawful purposes and are protected under the Second Amendment.

There are legitimate reason s for citizens to favor a semi- automatic rifle over handguns in defending themselves and their families at home. The record contains evidence suggesting that“handguns are inherently less accurate than long guns” as they“are more difficult to steady” and“absorb less of the recoil . . . , reducing accuracy.” J.A. 2131. This might be an important consideration for a typical homeowner, who “under the extreme duress of an armed and advancing attacker is likely to fire at, but miss, his or her target.” J.A. 2123. “Nervousness and anxiety, lighting conditions, the presence of physical obstacles . . . and the mechanics of retreat are all factors which contribute to [the] likelihood” that the homeowner will shoot at but miss a home invader. J.A. 2123. These factors could also affect an individual’s ability to reload a firearm quickly during a home invasion. Similarly, a citizen’s ability to defend himself and his home is enhanced with an LCM.

In sum, for a law- abiding citizen who, for whatever reason, cho oses to protect his home with a semi- automatic rifle instead of a semi- automatic handgun, or possesses an LCM for use in firearms kept in the home, the FSA significantly burdens the exercise of the right to arm oneself at home. “The right to self- defense is largely meaningless if it does not include the right to choose the most effective means of defending oneself.” Friedman, 784 F.3d at 418 (Manion, J., dissenting); see id. at413 (“[T]he ultimate decision for what constitutes the most effective means of defending one’s home, family, and property resides in individual citizens and not the government. . . . The extent of danger— real or imagined— that a citizen faces at home is a matter only that person can assess in full.”). The FSA “restrict[s] the right[] of [Maryland’s] citizens to select the means by which they defend their homes and families.” Id. at 419.

As we have noted on previous occasions, “any law that would burden the ‘fundamental,’ core right of self- defense in the home by a law- abiding citi zen would be subject to strict scrutiny. But, as we move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited.” United States v. Masciand a ro, 638 F.3d 458,470 (4th Cir. 2011). “[T]his longstanding out- of- the- home/in- the- home distinction bears directly on the level of scrutiny applicable,” i d., with strict scrutiny applying to laws restricting the right to self- defense in the home, see Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 878 (4th Cir. 2013) (observing that restrictions on “the right to arm one self at home” necessitates the application of strict scrutiny). Strict scrutiny, then, is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the ban of semi- automatic rifles and magazines holding more than 10 rounds. See Friedman, 784 F.3d at 418 (Manion, J., dissenting); cf. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1284 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (reading Heller as departing from traditional scrutiny standards but stating that “[e]ven if it were appropriate to apply one of the levels of scrutiny after Heller, surely it would be strict scrutiny rather than . . . intermediate scrutiny”).

We recognize that other courts have reached different outcomes when assessing similar bans, but we ultimately find those decisions unconvincing.