EMERGING ISSUES
The following issues were raised during “national policy team” delib-erations
by wargame participants who were role-playing senior gov-ernment
officials such as the President, Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, Attorney General, and so forth. While sufficient analysis
was not conducted during the wargames to develop findings or con-clusions,
these issues were the subject of debate and require further
study.
• Paramilitary or covert attacks within the United States may have
the potential to blur the line between law enforcement and mili-tary
operations. For instance, an attack on U.S. critical infra-structure
or command and control sites such as the Pentagon
could be considered either an act of terrorism or an act of war. At
what point does a hostile act cross the line from a crime to a
national security threat? What new organizational structures,
policies, and procedures are required to integrate the capabilities
....
Furthermore
• Existing statutes may not adequately anticipate asymmetric mili-tary
attacks in the homeland and, consequently, create a per-ceived
legal barrier that is likely to impede the initial response of
the military. Do existing statutes provide sufficient legal basis
and clarity to prepare for future asymmetric attacks within the
United States? If not, what specific legislation would provide the
necessary statutory authority to counter such threats?

If this is a
mission for the Army, are the selected units enabled by appropriate
organizations, doctrine, training, and equipment to meet the
threat—given legal constraints such as Posse Comitatus that are
designed to limit military operations within the homeland? How
might the Army work in conjunction with law enforcement in such
situations?

to prevail in combat against a wide spectrum of
opponents, and to achieve rapid victory for the United States.
To accomplish these goals, it was assumed that the majority of future
Army forces would begin the deployment process from forts and
bases located within the United States. A smaller number of forces
would remain forward deployed and would be available for rede-ployment
in times of crisis. Moreover, future Army forces were cred-ited
with tactical and operational dominance in all aspects of game
play. This assumed battlefield dominance of an Army dependent
upon power projection caused Red (i.e., opposing) team leaders to
plan for the use of special operations forces and covert agents to
disrupt, degrade, and delay the deployment of U.S. forces. As early
as 1996, the AAN hypothesized that a potential adversary might
choose to “expand hostilities as rapidly as possible outside his region
and even into the U.S. homeland in an effort to defeat the over-whelming
battlefield capabilities of the United States.”5 Interest-ingly,
in every wargame the Red military staff contemplated military
strikes within the United States both to prevent the successful em-ployment
of U.S. forces overseas and to establish some form of
strategic symmetry in which homeland risks were not just limited to
Red. Thus, from the standpoint of the Red commanders, the ques-tion
was not whether to attack forces inside the United States, but
when and how to conduct such attacks.

weapons, but also a large, powerful, and fully modernized conven-tional
military force. This “near-peer” competitor was designed to
challenge the full spectrum of U.S. military capabilities.
Homeland security was not specifically played during this first
wargame. Nevertheless, a significant discussion took place in the
Red planning cell about the value of preemptive attacks on U.S.
forces to preclude their timely arrival in theater. While a number of
military plans for attacking the United States were developed, the
Red political leaders were reluctant to authorize an attack on the U.S.
homeland, convinced that such actions would cause them to lose
political and diplomatic support in the international community.
Moreover, the Red political leadership was not willing to attack the
homeland of the United States because of the possibility of creating a
“Pearl Harbor effect”—energizing the will of the American public and
alienating the international community. Not only was Red reluctant
to conduct physical attacks against military targets located within the
United States, it was also unwilling to employ information opera-tions
against U.S. space-related ground facilities, believing that such
attacks violated the “homeland sanctuary” of the United States.3
Throughout the wargame, however, the Red military commander
continued to request authorization for selective attacks on militarily
significant targets within the United States. Toward the end of the
game, after the U.S. military attacked targets inside the adversary’s
homeland, the Red political leadership authorized special operations
forces and covert action agents to conduct attacks inside the United
States. These attacks came too late to influence the outcome of the
war. Moreover, even when the United States was attacked, the game
controllers made decisions that caused the attack to have very little
effect on the outcome of the wargame.

When it became clear that conflict was inevitable, Blue forces began
to take initial steps toward deploying forces to assist Green. How-ever,
Orange took an unusual step and leaked information about its
capability and willingness to conduct multiple large-scale terrorist
operations within the United States if the United States entered the
conflict.9 This disclosure prompted the Blue President to authorize
the employment of all National Technical Means to assist the FBI to
“locate and apprehend” suspected Orange covert agents.10
Because vital U.S. interests were not at stake, the Blue President fur-ther
decided to delay the deployment of U.S. forces until he was
convinced that the majority of Orange agents had either been cap-tured
or their whereabouts identified. This was a contentious issue
because many of the Blue players believed that the United States
should not “give in to terrorism.” Nevertheless, the Blue President
argued that he was unwilling to place American citizens at risk sim-ply
to facilitate a rapid deployment of military forces in a conflict
where less-than-vital interests were at stake. Finally, over the strong
objection of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Blue
President decided to delay the deployment of special mission units
that are typically under the control of the Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) in the event that the FBI or other law enforcement
agencies needed assistance.
During the Senior Leader Seminar, the Blue President stated that
asymmetric responses can create explicit linkages among domestic
security, international security, and general policy concerns which,
together, will limit options for policymakers.11 In this game, asym-metries
directed against citizens within the United States had a
crippling effect on the willingness of the Blue political leadership to
enter a conflict until the large-scale terrorist threat was eliminated.

SPRING WARGAME, 1998
The 1998 Spring Wargame consisted of 2 two-sided wargames where
Red and Orange forces simultaneously challenged Blue forces.12
Orange represented the New Nationalist Movement, which was
threatening a friendly government in Asia. The Red forces in this
game represented the New Independent Republic (NIR), which was
the dominant political, economic, and military power in the Persian
Gulf region. In addition to a modernized military capable of rapidly
invading neighboring countries, the NIR had a nuclear capability,
ballistic missile delivery systems, and stockpiles of both chemical
and biological weapons.
The Red political and military leadership concluded that it could
achieve victory only if it could move rapidly enough to occupy key
portions of Saudi Arabia before the United States could respond
either politically or militarily to the crisis. To freeze Blue politically,
Red waged an extensive propaganda campaign designed to convince
the U.S. public and international community that Red only sought to
“liberate” holy cities in Saudi Arabia to allow unencumbered access
to all Muslims—including Americans. When Blue forces began air
and missile attacks against NIR forces, the Red military commander
“reluctantly” initiated limited attacks against CONUS military air-fields
and selected ports of embarkation to delay and degrade the
arrival of Blue forces in theater.13 It is also important to note that the
NIR attacks in the United States were timed to assure that they could
be justified as legitimate reciprocity for Blue attacks on the Red
homeland.
The Red threat to CONUS-based facilities posed in this game was
substantial. For planning purposes, Blue was informed that there
were between 500 and 700 enemy special operations personnel and
covert agents within the United States. Moreover, given their level of
training, it was determined that Red special operations forces (SOF)
had the potential to conduct a coordinated attack at multiple loca-tions
within the United States. Additionally, the Blue policy team...

was told that the primary focus of Red SOF was most likely to be mili-tarily
significant targets associated with the deployment of U.S.
forces and capabilities. Finally, while it was recognized that chemi-cal
or biological agents might be used, Blue reasoned that weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) would only be used as a last resort—if
the survival of the Red regime were threatened.
Given this scenario, [size=2][blue]the Blue President decided to create a Task Force
led by the Deputy Attorney General—a position created by the Blue
team specifically to address this issue. The Task Force membership
included the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, De-partment
of Customs, Department of Treasury, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. Additionally, intelligence support
was provided by a number of agencies, including the Central Intelli-gence
Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National
Security Agency (NSA)[/blue][/size=2].14 Further, the military commander in chief
(CINC) responsible for CONUS-based forces was directed to create
three Joint Task Forces (JTFs) to provide command and control for
military forces operating within the United States. One of these JTFs,
JTF Crisis Response, was also designated as the Joint Special Opera-tions
Command (JSOC). The JSOC commander remained under the
command of the CINC and controlled all military forces assigned
crisis response missions, including national mission units that have
counterterrorism responsibilities. Consistent with an Operation
Order approved by the National Command Authority (NCA), the
JSOC commander received taskings for operations conducted within
the United States directly from the Deputy Attorney General.

Quoted:
Thanks Ben, interesting read....