Oddly enough I did a major research project on that very topic in college. I really enjoyed studying engagements where one side had a modern day army (rifles, arty, cavalry, telegraphs, etc), and the other more primitive (spears, swords, clubs, shields, loincloth, etc). The late 1800's is full of battles of this nature. From the Indian Wars of the US, to South Africa, to the South Asia Frontier of India, to the North African campaigns. China. Etc, etc.
The two larger battles I focused on were Isandlwana and Little Big Horn. The discussion and debate on tactics and "what if's" is never ending, really. But in terms of being "worse" and having a larger impact on the losing army and country, Isandlewana was by far a deeper wound to the pride and politics of Great Britain than Little Big Horn was to the United States.
Isandlwana could have been won, or at least a draw. Same with Little Big Horn. The glaring difference is the Chelmsford split his army before the battle and prior to the intelligence of "where and when", where as Custer made his blunder as the battle was unfolding right in front of him per say. The obvious mistake they both made is that they split their force in the face of an unknown size (and location) of an impending enemy. There are many other variables involved. But to keep on topic: Isandlwana was "worse".
Etc, etc, on and on.