1. Avoid combats that offer no chance of victory or other valuable results.
2. Make every effort for the success of the general plan and avoid spectacular plays that have no bearing on the general result.
3. Have a definite plan and carry it out vigorously. Do not vacillate.
4. Do not attempt complicated maneuvers.
5. Keep the command in hand; avoid undue extension and dispersion.
6. Study the ground and direct the advance in such a way as to take advantage of all available cover and thereby diminish losses.
7. Never deploy until the purpose and the proper direction are known.
8. Deploy enough men for the immediate task in hand; hold out the rest and avoid undue haste in committing them to the action.
9. Flanks must be protected either by reserves, fortifications, or the terrain.
10. In a decisive action, gain and keep fire superiority.
11. Keep up reconnaissance.
12. Use the reserve, but not until needed or a very favorable opportunity for its use presents itself. Keep some reserve as long as practicable.
13. Do not hesitate to sacrifice the command if the result is worth the cost.
14. Spare the command all unnecessary hardship and exertion.
and more specific to the WOT
596. Minor warfare embraces both regular and irregular operations.
Regular operations consist of minor actions involving small bodies of trained and organized troops on both sides.
The tactics employed are in general those prescribed for the smaller units.
597. Irregular operations consist of actions against unorganized or partially organized forces, acting in and independent or semi-independent bodies. Such bodies have little or only crude training and are under nominal and loose leadership and control. They assemble, roam about, and disperse at will. They endeavor to win by stealth or by force of superior numbers, employing ambuscades, sudden dashes or rushes, and hand-to-hand fighting.
Troops operating against such an enemy usually do so in small units, such as platoons, detachments, or companies, and the tactics employed must be adapted to meet the requirements of the situation. Frequently the enemy’s own methods may be employed to advantage.
In general, such operations should not be undertaken hastily; every preparation should be made to strike suddenly and to inflict the maximum punishment.
598. In general, the service of information will be insufficient; adequate reconnaissance will rarely be practicable. March and bivouac formations must be such as to admit of rapid deployment and fire action in any direction.
599. In the open country, where surprise is not probable, troops may be marched in column of squads preceded, within sight, by a squad as an advance party.
600. In close country, where surprise is possible, the troops must be held in close formation. The use of flank patrols becomes difficult. Occasionally, an advance party - never less than a squad - may be sent out. In general, however, such a party accomplishes little, since an enemy intent on surprise will permit it to pass unmolested and will fall upon the main body.
Under such conditions, especially when the road or trail is narrow, the column of twos or files in a convenient formation, the officers placing themselves in the column so as to divide it into nearly equal parts. If rushed from the flank, such a column will be in readiness to face and fire toward either or both flank, the ranks being back to back; if rushed from the front, the head of the column may be deployed, the rest of the column closing up to support it and to protect its flanks and rear. In any event, the men should be taught to take some form of a closed back formation.
601. The column may often be broken into two or more approximately equal detachments separated on the march by distances of 50 to 100 yards. As a rule the detachments should not consist of less than 25 men each. With this arrangement of the column, it will rarely be possible for an enemy to close simultaneously with all of the detachments, one or more being left unengaged and under control to support those engaged or to inflict severe punishment upon the enemy when he is repulsed.
602. The site for camp or bivouac should be selected with special reference to economical and effective protection against surprise. Double sentinels are posted on the avenues of approach and the troops sleep in readiness for instant action. When practicable, troops should be instructed in advance as to what they are to do in case of attack at night.
603. Night operations are frequently advisable. With the small forces employed, control is not difficult. Irregular troops rarely provide proper camp protection, and they may frequently be surprised and severely punished by a properly conducted night march and attack.