You'd think after 40 years of de-orbiting capsules, the Russian would've figured how to drop it on target.
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[url]http://www.msnbc.com/news/909677.asp[/url]
Software bug sent Soyuz off course
By James Oberg, NBC News space analyst
A mysterious software fault in the new guidance computer of the Soyuz TMA-1 spacecraft was the cause of the high-anxiety off-course landing over the weekend, NASA sources tell MSNBC.com.
ONCE IDENTIFIED, the error should be easy to fix in the computer of the Soyuz TMA-2, which is now attached to the International Space Station to provide the new two-man crew with a way to return to Earth.
But until the flaw has been identified and, if it is generic in all models of the spacecraft, repaired, it's one more worry for the new crew of the space station. They, too, might face a grueling drop back to Earth if they need to evacuate the station.
Improvements to the landing equipment on this new model spacecraft, along with the Feb. 1 Columbia tragedy, combined to heighten anxiety even before the Soyuz headed back to Earth on Saturday. So when the premature euphoria of an incorrectly-announced "safe landing" shifted to the worrisome news that the Soyuz was far off course and out of radio contact, the possibility of a second space landing disaster wasn't far from anyone's minds.
WHAT HAPPENED
The Soyuz was skimming horizontally across the edge of the upper atmosphere at close to 25,000 feet per second (Mach 25, or 25 times the speed of sound), using air drag to shed its tremendous velocity. Normal plans would have called for choosing an altitude where the air was just thick enough to slow the craft by about 150 feet per second every second. In terms of earth surface gravity, whose acceleration is the classic 32 feet per second per second, that gives a deceleration force of about five G's.
This flight plan requires the Soyuz to fly with the upper edge of its heat shield tilted slightly forward, to gain a small amount of "lift" and keep it from dropping into the lower, thicker layers of the atmosphere which will slow the spacecraft faster -- and thus decelerate it more strongly. To accomplish this, the spacecraft was designed to have its center of mass off center, closer to the outer hull above the heads of the crew. By rolling -- rotating along its long axis -- the heavy side "up," the necessary lift-producing tilt can be created and controlled.
But this requires that the guidance computer recognize what direction is "up" and where the spacecraft is in relation to its aim point far ahead. While not a particularly complex calculation, it is one that must be done with high precision and reliability. Gemini, Apollo, and Soyuz spacecraft perfected this technique in the mid- to late-1960's.
What happened this time was that the autopilot suddenly announced to the crew that it had forgotten where it was and which way it was headed.
"The auto system switched to backup," a NASA source told MSNBC.com, "which surprised them".
U.S. astronaut Kenneth Bowersox, one of the three men aboard the Soyuz, was even more dramatic in an interview given on his way back to Moscow.
"The first thing we saw was signs on our displays that the entry was going to be off nominal," Bowersox said. "And when we saw those signs our eyes got very wide."
The crew knew that without guidance commands, the autopilot would stabilize the spacecraft using a simple-minded backup procedure. It would send commands to steering thrusters to perform a slow roll, turning the spacecraft's "heavy side" continuously around the dial. This had the desired effect of "nulling out" any now-unsteerable lift and let the Soyuz follow a "ballistic" descent.
But this also meant that without the lift to stretch its flight path, the Soyuz would fall faster into thicker air. That in turn would impede the spacecraft's forward speed even more "aggressively" (Bowersox's word), resulting in a deceleration about twice as high as normal and a landing far short of the planned site.
SOFTWARE PROBLEMS CAN BE FATAL
Historically, this is a very rare type of failure. It occurred several times between 1967 and 1975, but never afterwards. Thus, suspicion immediately focused on this new Soyuz's "improved" guidance computer.
"Ken suspects a software problem", a NASA source told MSNBC.com.
There was also the real possibility of crew error, and on Sunday, the head of the corporation that builds and operates the Soyuz spacecraft, Yuriy Semyonov, suggested that "one of the Americans" had pushed the backup-mode activation button. Bowersox was the only American who had any active role in the descent (it was astronaut Donald Pettit's job to follow the checklists), and he denied touching the button -- which, he joked, was being guarded carefully by Russian cosmonaut Nikolai Budarin. "We don't think we did anything to cause that to happen," he later said to a NASA press official.
Software problems in the Soyuz guidance computer aren't just a matter of landing randomly back on Earth; they are potentially fatal. In 1988, a confused guidance computer nearly jettisoned the Soyuz T-M5's rocket engine section while the crew was still in orbit, a malfunction that would have doomed the men to a slow death by suffocation. Only the alertness of one of the pilots detected and aborted the insane command.
In March 1997, the three-man Soyuz TM-24 barely evaded two potential catastrophic software flaws during its return to Earth. First, after separating from its propulsion module, the command module was nearly rammed by the jettisoned unit when its control computer fired the wrong set of pointing rockets. Moments later, the command module's autopilot lined it up for atmospheric entry -- but in precisely the wrong direction, nose first rather than heat shield first. Manual intervention fixed that problem -- but even at the height of the shuttle-Mir US-Russian space partnership, there's no indication the Russians shared news of either of these flaws with NASA.
This time, since Budarin, Bowersox and Pettit knew that their backup descent profile was safe -- if rougher -- they kept their hands off the manual controls. "They didn't do anything," MSNBC.com was told. "[They] just let the auto system control."
The rest of the descent appeared to go as planned, and the parachutes and soft-landing engines did their job. As in about half of all Soyuz landings, the landing module wound up on its side, probably pulled over by a gust of wind in its parachute just at touchdown.
The three men, who knew they were far off course, were able to open the hatch themselves and get out; it's a much easier drop to the ground when the capsule is on its side. They then waited two hours to be spotted by a search plane, and several hours more for the arrival of the first helicopter.