The bottom line, however, is that it is difficult to identify the
exact firing point quickly enough to action forces before the attacker
flees. It is necessary to work with local residents to identify the
perpetrators and the locals are more afraid of the Threat than they are
willing to help the Coalition. It all goes back to that "wait and see"
mentality. We have, in the Brigade zone, used indirect fires to counter the
mortar threat but units must understand the constraints facing them when
they conduct this type of response. Given the proximity of non-combatants
to threat targets, counter-battery is nearly non-existent because indirect
fires are nearly impossible to clear. Further compounding this dilemma is
the fact that disposition of U.S. forces in relationship to threat targets
often prevent adequate firing solutions above 120mm mortars, minimizing the
capability of the 155mm howitzers available for fire support.
7. Why attack the lion when you can attack the sheep? Most attacks
when we first arrived in zone were conducted against my infantry patrols.
This was a very bad choice of targets and the threat paid dearly for these
attacks. Threat planners and financiers have switched tactics to attack log
convoys or other soft targets. I believe the Threat has learned to
distinguish between units that will stop, establish a base of fire and then
maneuver to destroy them versus units that break contact. Our unit marking
systems aid this identification. My units are the former as the Threat has
discovered over time, and my units have repeatedly passed through areas
unscathed only to have another convoy (one that adheres to the "break
contact" TTP) trailing 15 minutes behind and get hit with IEDs, RPGs, and
small arms fire.
Attacks on convoys in our AO have been deterred by several TTPs.
Initially, our BFVs, scouts and other combat patrols were ambushed with
direct fire and RPGs. Despite their efforts, the threat rarely escaped
without suffering casualties. We found that if we maintain contact and
immediately attack their positions, the threat will immediately try to break
contact and runaway. He knows he cannot win toe to toe with US forces.
Unaware of our night fighting capability, they would often mistake distance
with safety, thinking we cannot see them. Many would be attackers walked
into direct fire engagements initiated by our forces as a result.
Occasionally the Threat was successful in initiating ambushes or attacks but
very rarely did these cause damage to US forces personnel or equipment.
They usually did result in Threat casualties and/or detention. If a convoy
is attacked, the element must return fire, maintain contact and attack
through the enemy. If not, the threat will escape and fight another day.
The threat uses hit and run tactics, but if you do not engage him he will
stay and continue to try inflict damage. If a convoy breaks contact, the
enemy will escape before a QRF can get out there.
The threat soon stopped ambushing/attacking us with small arms and
RPGs and resorted to the use of IEDs. This increased their stand off and
increased their chances of escape. Despite this, we still were able to
engage them and cause enemy casualties. They have since stopped attacking
any of our convoys, resorting instead to attacking vehicle convoys that are
not from our task force. We believe that if units look prepared (i.e.,
gunners up and scanning, crew served weapons manned and scanning, personnel
in vehicles facing out and vigilant) then they most likely they will not be
attacked.
The threat picks his targets wisely, and given the macho influence
of this region, normally attempts to avoid direct contact with prepared and
capable forces. The best deterrence to threat contact is to appear prepared
and willing to return fire and destroy the threat.
8. Strange bedfellows (opposition groups teaming up)- The adage
that my enemy's enemy is my ally is very much alive in this AO. Groups
(both political and religious) that previously opposed each other, quickly
find common ground when they share a common enemy (e.g. U.S. forces). At
the same time, one cannot assume that these types of alliances are automatic
given a common foe, as the sides can/do play each side against each other,
in an attempt to eliminate both threats simultaneously.
9. Sheiks - A balance between Sheiks (family heads),
professionals (educated citizens), religious leaders (Imams), and political
party leaders is essential in establishing a functional and legitimate
government. Appointed/selected positions and social perception are
essential to the preservation of the Sheiks status within this society. In
addition, it is imperative to ascertain the difference between a legacy
Sheik (one who inherited the position/title through legitimate family
ascension) and "90s" Sheiks, appointed by the former regime based upon
loyalty or wealth.
To combat local populace apathy and vendettas, we must hold the local sheiks
and people accountable for actions that occur in their towns/villages. They
would much rather have us work with the Sheiks then clear every house in
their village. The local villages and towns are fairly closed and are very
aware of outsiders when they come in to their town. After a relationship is
established with a sheik, he will often identify troublemakers and outsiders
that don't belong in the area. We try to make them understand that the
more peaceful the town, the more NGO's come in, the more money, the more
improvement.
10. Government/limited CA - The traditional BN/TF is ill-equipped
(and manned) to conduct "nation-building" without significant augmentation
and training (e.g. establishment of government, police, judicial, and
financial activities). Personal talents may mitigate this shortfall, but it
does not correct the systemic shortage of trained resources.
Tactical Human Intelligence Teams, Tactical Psyops Teams, Civil
Affairs, and translators all contribute significantly to successful
interaction between the local populace and Coalition Forces. These assets,
as critical as they are, do not prepare the commander for his role in
assisting in the formation of local governments, entering into negotiations,
and dealing with Sheiks and other community leaders.
Translators MUST be provided early on in theater in order to facilitate
day-to-day operations. Units cannot plan-on or rely-on English-speaking
local nationals for this duty, as many locals will remain apart from U.S.
forces until the situation stabilizes.
One final thought; the biggest combat multiplier is money. Population
approval and acceptance is the decisive point and while combat operations
against non-compliant forces are necessary, they should not be viewed as the
task Forces Main Effort.
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED