Logistics - Like Rumsfeld said, and got mocked for, you go to war with what you got. You don't get to wait (usually). Which shows why the South really had no realistic chance when they started the war when they did. They really didn't have enough of anything to fight with at the time. Only a major lack of leadership in the North kept them barely in the game. Lincoln didn't have the political support to go after the South until after Ft. Sumter. Had the south waited and built up supplies and relations with overseas suppliers, they might have had a chance, but then had minimal capability to make what they needed, They couldn't make RR rail, they only had Tredegar to make big engines, they only had a few places that could make artillery. They couldn't make small arms in quantities, they couldn't make or adequately ocean going shipping, Their capability to make "modern" riverine craft was marginal, little steamboats, yeah, but not ironclads that could go up against Union craft (no ability to make and/or replace decent plate/bars, stock or rail) for armor
Grant's Campaign to take Vicksburg - Both the first phase - getting down there up to and including the river crossing, the Second phase blocking forces, hitting Jackson (city) and then turning on Pemberton and stuffing him back into V'Burg, opening up his acees to a river supply line above the city, and setting Sherman as a blocking force against Johnston. Also a great illustration of divided command/chain of command issues. Jeff Davis was telling Pemberton his biggest duty was to hold the city. Johnston, who was his actual military superior was telling him to get out and save the Army while he could, rather than lose Army and City.
The Siege of Petersburg - Grant anchored his line at the James River, allowing him to build up a tremendous amount of stores over the winter. Then moving to his left gradually cutting off Lees supply lines. Lee had a finite number of men, to man an elongating defensive line, Grant was also making it harder to get out , if Lee needed to breakout to join up with Johnston, who was getting pushed north by Sherman. Lee was caught with an un-winnable predicament. He could save his Army (maybe) or protect Richmond. Politically the loss of Richmond would guarantee that no help would come from Europe (a faint hope still expected by Southern political leaders). Grant just kept pressing until Lee could not save his Army or the City and tried to save his Army when it was too late. One of the studies here would be to explore the political ramifications of a confederation based on individual states and a weak central government leading to an inability for the central government to compel the states to send needed supplies to the Army.
Vietnam - The strategy employed by McNamara, Kennedy and Johnson of limiting responses, not going after supplies in the north and supply routes, not hitting the dikes and harbors.
Counterinsurgency wars in Malaya, Argentina, Chile, various African countries, Algeria.