The Los Angeles Times
August 6 2001

Israel Has the System Down on Security
A big reason for the failure of Arafat's offensive was Israel's readiness.
By EDWARD N. LUTTWAK

http://latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-000063989aug06.story?coll=la%2

While diplomats and Middle East experts wonder how peace negotiations can
ever resume after the colossal failure of the Oslo process, and while
Palestinian sufferings continue, security experts everywhere are fascinated
by the extraordinary Israeli success in minimizing their casualties.
The constant, dramatic coverage of shootings and bombings is contradicted by
statistics: In the 10 months since the outbreak of violence, a total of 136
Israeli civilians and soldiers have been killed--many fewer than the number
who died in road accidents over the same period, and an amazingly small
number considering the sheer magnitude of the violence. Physical damage to
Israeli public infrastructures and private property has been insignificant
and, more importantly, not one of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank or
Gaza has been evacuated.
Israel's ability to keep damage to a minimum explains why world attention is
no longer focused on the heroics of the Israeli military, which were so
apparent in the 1970s and 1980s, but instead on Israel's security system,
which immediately went into action once Yasser Arafat's men started
shooting. In a world where even impeccably democratic governments are
confronted by terrorist attacks, there is more than idle curiosity in the
secrets of Israeli success. Information publicly available provides
tantalizing glimpses. For example, the Web site of RAFAEL, the
high-technology leader in Israel's defense industry, shows new items for
"low-intensity warfare," including high-altitude surveillance balloons
equipped with telescopes. These may explain how terrorist chiefs sitting in
their offices or riding in cars in the midst of other traffic can be killed
remotely by missiles--and with no errors so far. These kinds of electronic
detectors may even explain how so many explosive devices have been found
before they could explode. A specialized undercover Israeli commando unit
that kills individual terrorists as they move about in the apparent security
of Palestinian towns does not find them just by accidentally spotting them
in the crowd.
Every day, press photographs clearly show Israeli soldiers wearing
target-distorting bags over their helmets, while all soldiers and policemen
wear their Israeli-made bulletproof vests that in spite of the extreme heat
of the Middle East summer do not seem to contribute to heat prostration.
These may seem like technical, micro-details but they are not unimportant in
the overall politics of the conflict, because when Arafat's riflemen started
shooting 10 months ago, one of his goals was to trigger an antiwar movement
within Israeli society by killing as many soldiers as possible. They are
almost all young conscripts, with duly anxious parents.
While well-equipped snipers also helped to keep the Israeli death toll
low--in 4,016 shooting incidents against outposts, just 12 Israeli soldiers
lost their lives--the very good protective equipment of the troops,
including vehicles with advanced light armor and a unique set of mobile
fortifications, also played a part.

But a much bigger reason for the failure of Arafat's offensive was that the
Israelis were fully ready for it. In spite of the abrupt transition from the
high hopes of peace to the outbreak of armed violence, there was no
surprise, no shock, no confusion.
On the face of it, Israeli intelligence can claim the credit for
anticipating Arafat's moves. But there was much more to it than that: When
the shooting started, hundreds of separate army and police units throughout
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were already on high alert, all personnel
were already wearing their helmets and armor at all times, all radio and
data networks were already up and running, all foot and vehicle patrols were
being carried out in a full combat mode. This could not have been achieved
just by transmitting a last-minute warning; only a policy decision at the
highest level could have set the machinery in motion.
That rules out the possibility that the orders ultimately came from Lt. Gen.
Shaul Mofaz, the country's top military officer. For months now, Arafat has
been attacking Mofaz in a crude and personal way as he never attacked any
Israeli general before, but when he blames Mofaz for what Israeli forces
have been doing to his men, he is wrong twice over.
Mofaz certainly seems competent, but policies are made at levels above him
by the civilian leadership. Mofaz's top priority has been to keep the armed
forces focused on its real mission: To prepare for an all-out war in the
event that regional stability should break down, not to fight Arafat's
ragtag forces, kids throwing stones or even terrorists.
While Arafat imagines Mofaz plotting devilish new tricks against his men,
Mofaz must actually spend his time juggling personnel and budgets to ensure
that the military continues to train intensively for large-scale operations
against regular armies and to develop antimissile systems against both
Hezbollah bombardment rockets and the ballistic missiles of Iran and Syria.
Even now, in spite of all the action in the West Bank and Gaza, the Israelis
are using only a fraction of their personnel and money to contain the
intifada, and it is Mofaz's job to keep it that way.
But if Mofaz could not issue the crucial orders that prevented a debacle,
who did? His superior of course--Ehud Barak, the defense minister at the
time, who also happened to be the prime minister. This is the same Barak who
gambled his political career on an all-out attempt to reach a comprehensive
agreement with Arafat and who was still trying to negotiate a peace treaty
even after the Camp David failure and, indeed, even after Arafat's riflemen
had started shooting.
It is not duplicity that explains the paradox but rather Israel's
existential predicament, which forces mere politicians to act like
statesmen.
Until the Camp David summit, Barak was evidently convinced that Arafat
wanted peace. Gen. Amos Gilad, head of military intelligence analysis, was
just as sure that his data proved Barak wrong, forecasting both Arafat's
refusal at Camp David and his resort to violence in the aftermath

Prime Minister Barak was extremely irritated with Gilad, but Defense Minister
Barak had no data to contradict him, therefore he neither removed Gilad from
his position nor did he suppress Gilad's gloomy estimates. They circulated
in the usual way to all military, police and security headquarters, and
through them down to every operational unit, whose commanders duly reacted
with the precautions that prevented a bloody debacle last October.
Israel's security system, while technically admirable is not, however,
bringing peace any closer. On the contrary, by doing such a good job of
limiting the damage, it is making indefinite conflict seem more tolerable,
and any fundamental decisions seem less necessary.

Edward N. Luttwak is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington

In reading this article, it occurred to me that maybe Sharon's appearance on the "Temple Mount" 10 months ago was a very cunning and calculated attempt at some finality between the Jews and Palestinians, Total Peace or Total War.

Maybe Barak offered so much in the peace treaty with Arafat (to the chagrin of many Israelis) knowing full well that Arafat [u]wouldn't[/u] take the bait thereby giving the two sides an opportunity to "air their difference"--pushing for a resolution either way (peace or war).