Apparently the UK Royal Navy was responsible for winning the Battle of Britain, not the RAF.

UK newspaper article

3 legs of the tripod, one fails they all fall

No the invasion was stopped by the RN. The battle of Britain was won by by the RAF.

RN ruled the waves at the time. USN does it now

I'll buy that.

By my understanding the RAF fighter machine was on the verge of collapse when Hitler decided to switch to startegic bombing anyway.

Quoted: I'll buy that. By my understanding the RAF fighter machine was on the verge of collapse when Hitler decided to switch to startegic bombing anyway.

Not really. The luftwaffe didn't have aircraft with enough range to cover all of the UK (the only German fighters that could get over the UK at all were based in France and could only cover the southern end of the Uk, maybe 1/6th of the UK total land area) so there were "safe havens" in the UK where the RAF would rotate squadrens to recover (most of the entire UK was a safe haven from the luftwaffe). Most of the UK's heavy industries were outside the range of the luftwaffe. Cetainly the luftwaffe's bombers had longer range than their fighters but the luftwaffe had suffered particularly bad losses to the RAF when they had attempted unescorted bombing raids. The RAF practice was to rotate squadrens between the combat areas and bases outsdide the combat areas to give RAF squadrens time to rest and replace lost aircraft and pilots. The RAF always maintained a reserve of fighter squadrens at bases well beyond the reach of the luftwaffe.

Also, the UK aircraft production figures are an eye opener. Let's compare fighter and bomber production for 1939 and 1940 (which is when the Battle of Britain occoured) for Germany and the UK.

1939.
German fighters, 615. UK fighters, 1324.
German bombers, 747. UK bombers, 1837.

1940.
German fighters, 1735. UK fighters, 4283.
German bombers, 2852. UK bombers, 3487.

According to this page in wikipedia the only year between 1939 and 1945 that Germany built more aircraft of all types than the UK was in 1944. WW2 aircraft production

I'm having trouble tracking down the numbers for pilot training during the same years but I'm inclined to think the UK was training more pilots than Germany as well.

If you're prepared to read it, here are a couple of very good articles discussing the UK pre-war plans for industrial expansion during wartime to support expanded military forces, and a comparison of how the UK and Germany supported their airforces during the Battle of Britain. UK pre-war planning was well intentioned but for a variety of reasons was not very well executed. Having said that the preparations that were finished before the war actually started meant that the UK wasn't as badly positioned as many people think. There was some scrambling to rush through other planning that had not been completed in time, but overall the UK was better positioned to fight the Battle of Britain than many people give the UK credit for.

Logistics and the Battle of Britain

Also on the same topic if you're interested is this: British war planning and production

Here is a very interesting quote from the Logistics article I linked to:

In operational terms, Fighter Command significantly outperformed the Luftwaffe. A comparison of day-fighter sorties between the respective air forces indicates that Fighter Command was able to generate as many as four times the weekly sortie rate as the Luftwaffe (Figure 9). Even at the peak of the battle, Fighter Command's Spitfires and Hurricanes flew 1,000 more sorties per week than the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s. [48] Fighter Command clearly possessed an increasing advantage in single-seat fighters as the battle continued, notwithstanding higher aircraft and pilot attrition. How, then, was this achieved? Production Balance The simple answer is that losses were never greater than production. Deliveries to the operational squadrons actually exceeded wastage throughout the battle (Figure 10). This disguises, however, the crucial role played by the CRO (Civilian Repair Orginisation. Civilian staffed aircraft repair groups associated with the UK aircraft  factories) [49] While the sustained efforts of the aircraft industry were vital to maintaining the front line, repair provided 40 percent of the total output received by the fighter Command operational squadrons (Figure 11) (out of the total number of fighters deliverd to RAF squadrens each month, 40 percent of them were damaged aircraft that had been repaired by the CRO). At the height of the battle, the CRO achieved Hurricane and Spitfire repair turnaround times of less than 6 weeks, employing a combination of depot, fly-in, and onsite repair. The Luftwaffe had no capability on this scale. In fact, as late as 1942, repair output was no more than 25 percent of production (only 25 percent of the fighters deliverd to luftwaffe squadrens per month were repaired aircraft, the factories had to make up the difference with new aircraft). {50} Germany had entered the war with reserves of 900 aircraft, equivalent to 25 percent of front-line strength, compared to reserves of 2,200 aircraft, some 115 percent of front-line strength, held by the Royal Air Force. Accordingly, the Luftwaffe's relatively modest reserves were rapidly dissipated through operational attrition. Fighter Command's reserves did shrink after July 1940, but they never totally disappeared and by the end of the year had returned to their previous levels (Figure 12).

The RAF had three considerable advantages over the luftwaffe before the Battle of Britain even started. 1: The RAF had more spare aircraft ready and waiting to replace aircraft destroyed in combat before the war started, 2200 compared to 900 spare luftwaffe aircraft. 2: The RAF had more extensive repair facilities and could repair more damaged aircraft per month than the luftwaffe could, meaning the RAF was placing less demand on the UK aircraft factories to provide them with new aircraft every month to replace lost aircraft. 3: The UK aircraft factories were building more new aircraft than their German counterparts anyway.

Quoted: Quoted: I'll buy that. By my understanding the RAF fighter machine was on the verge of collapse when Hitler decided to switch to startegic bombing anyway. Not really. The luftwaffe didn't have aircraft with enough range to cover all of the UK (the only German fighters that could get over the UK at all were based in France and could only cover the southern end of the Uk, maybe 1/6th of the UK total land area) so there were "safe havens" in the UK where the RAF would rotate squadrens to recover (most of the entire UK was a safe haven from the luftwaffe). Most of the UK's heavy industries were outside the range of the luftwaffe. Cetainly the luftwaffe's bombers had longer range than their fighters but the luftwaffe had suffered particularly bad losses to the RAF when they had attempted unescorted bombing raids. The RAF practice was to rotate squadrens between the combat areas and bases outsdide the combat areas to give RAF squadrens time to rest and replace lost aircraft and pilots. The RAF always maintained a reserve of fighter squadrens at bases well beyond the reach of the luftwaffe. Also, the UK aircraft production figures are an eye opener. Let's compare fighter and bomber production for 1939 and 1940 (which is when the Battle of Britain occoured) for Germany and the UK. 1939. German fighters, 615. UK fighters, 1324. German bombers, 747. UK bombers, 1837. 1940. German fighters, 1735. UK fighters, 4283. German bombers, 2852. UK bombers, 3487. According to this page in wikipedia the only year between 1939 and 1945 that Germany built more aircraft of all types than the UK was in 1944. WW2 aircraft production I'm having trouble tracking down the numbers for pilot training during the same years but I'm inclined to think the UK was training more pilots than Germany as well. If you're prepared to read it, here are a couple of very good articles discussing the UK pre-war plans for industrial expansion during wartime to support expanded military forces, and a comparison of how the UK and Germany supported their airforces during the Battle of Britain. UK pre-war planning was well intentioned but for a variety of reasons was not very well executed. Having said that the preparations that were finished before the war actually started meant that the UK wasn't as badly positioned as many people think. There was some scrambling to rush through other planning that had not been completed in time, but overall the UK was better positioned to fight the Battle of Britain than many people give the UK credit for. Logistics and the Battle of Britain Also on the same topic if you're interested is this: British war planning and production Here is a very interesting quote from the Logistics article I linked to: In operational terms, Fighter Command significantly outperformed the Luftwaffe. A comparison of day-fighter sorties between the respective air forces indicates that Fighter Command was able to generate as many as four times the weekly sortie rate as the Luftwaffe (Figure 9). Even at the peak of the battle, Fighter Command's Spitfires and Hurricanes flew 1,000 more sorties per week than the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s. [48] Fighter Command clearly possessed an increasing advantage in single-seat fighters as the battle continued, notwithstanding higher aircraft and pilot attrition. How, then, was this achieved? Production Balance The simple answer is that losses were never greater than production. Deliveries to the operational squadrons actually exceeded wastage throughout the battle (Figure 10). This disguises, however, the crucial role played by the CRO (Civilian Repair Orginisation. Civilian staffed aircraft repair groups associated with the UK aircraft  factories) [49] While the sustained efforts of the aircraft industry were vital to maintaining the front line, repair provided 40 percent of the total output received by the fighter Command operational squadrons (Figure 11) (out of the total number of fighters deliverd to RAF squadrens each month, 40 percent of them were damaged aircraft that had been repaired by the CRO). At the height of the battle, the CRO achieved Hurricane and Spitfire repair turnaround times of less than 6 weeks, employing a combination of depot, fly-in, and onsite repair. The Luftwaffe had no capability on this scale. In fact, as late as 1942, repair output was no more than 25 percent of production (only 25 percent of the fighters deliverd to luftwaffe squadrens per month were repaired aircraft, the factories had to make up the difference with new aircraft). {50} Germany had entered the war with reserves of 900 aircraft, equivalent to 25 percent of front-line strength, compared to reserves of 2,200 aircraft, some 115 percent of front-line strength, held by the Royal Air Force. Accordingly, the Luftwaffe's relatively modest reserves were rapidly dissipated through operational attrition. Fighter Command's reserves did shrink after July 1940, but they never totally disappeared and by the end of the year had returned to their previous levels (Figure 12). The RAF had three considerable advantages over the luftwaffe before the Battle of Britain even started. 1: The RAF had more spare aircraft ready and waiting to replace aircraft destroyed in combat before the war started, 2200 compared to 900 spare luftwaffe aircraft. 2: The RAF had more extensive repair facilities and could repair more damaged aircraft per month than the luftwaffe could, meaning the RAF was placing less demand on the UK aircraft factories to provide them with new aircraft every month to replace lost aircraft. 3: The UK aircraft factories were building more new aircraft than their German counterparts anyway.

The theories of strategic bombing, which hinged on the collapse of public morale, were undone by British defiance in the face of the day and night Blitzes. The switch to a terror bombing strategy allowed the RAF to recuperate and to defend against the attacks. Even if the attacks on the 11 Group airfields had continued, the British could have afforded to withdraw to the Midlands out of German fighter range and continued the battle from there. Post-war records show that British aircraft were being replaced faster than those of the Germans; the RAF maintained its strength even as the Luftwaffe's declined. In losses of aircraft and experienced aircrew the battle was a blow from which the Luftwaffe never fully recovered.

It appears I was somewhat right and you were correct.

The problem with the British supply of aircraft wasn't the airframes, it was the lack of sufficient pilots to man them.

Granted, it did help that they were playing a home game, so if they bailed out the could get into another crate.

NTM