During this time, Castro's forces were quite small, at times less than 200 men, while the Cuban army and police force numbered between 30,000 and 40,000 in strength.[3] Yet nearly every time the army fought against the revolutionaries, they were the ones who retreated from the fight. The Cuban military was remarkably ineffective. A growing problem for the Batista forces was an arms embargo imposed on the Cuban government by the United States government on March 14, 1958. The Cuban air force rapidly lost its power as planes could not be repaired without spare parts from the U.S.
In the question of support and supply for the insurgency, too, the official figures available from both the U. S. Government and the Cuban government are somewhat suspect. In fact, the 26th of July columns were constantly supplied with ammunition, ordnance, and certain specialized communications equipment, by air and sea, from various locations in Florida and Louisiana. The bulk of the ordinary military stores were drawn from the armouries of the Alabama National Guard, which served as the 'augmentation' for the para-military operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in Latin America.[citation needed] Towards the final stages of the conflict, limited numbers of aircraft and armoured vehicles were supplied to the insurgents directly from the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, so that the handful of early, cast-hull M4A3 Shermans (equipped with the low-velocity 75mm gun) of the Cuban Army found themselves facing 'Easy Eights' (M4 Shermans with upgraded armour, high-velocity 76mm guns, and HVSS) 'issued' from U.S. Army National Guard and Reserve stores.[citation needed]
From Wikipedia