French foreign legion and standard legs used it to good use in Algeria, & Dien Bien Phu.
Algeria
The MAS-49 proved to be a particularly long-lived infantry rifle, serving with French Army and French Foreign Legion until 1979. It had a reputation for reliability in conditions of poor maintenance, sometimes being cleaned with nothing more than rags and motor oil. The rifle could also endure harsh service environments (many Foreign Legion MAS rifles saw service in Algeria, Djibouti, Indochina, and French Guiana).
[edit] Variants
An improved version called the MAS-49/56 was introduced in 1957 and incorporated lessons learned from service in Algeria, Indochina, and the Suez Crisis. The rifle was shortened and lightened to improve mobility for mechanized and airborne troops, and a bayonet was added. Other improvements included a built-in grenade launcher sight and combination grenade launcher/compensator for use in destroying enemy strongpoints. The MAS-49/56 ended production in 1980 (at which time a few of them were rechambered for the 7.62 x 51 mm NATO cartridge) and was replaced with the 5.56 x 45 mm NATO caliber FAMAS bullpup assault rifle.
Many MAS-49/56 rifles imported as surplus in the USA had been rechambered locally to fire the 7.62 x 51 mm NATO round, but several user reports have noted this conversion was unsatisfactory (resulting in numerous action stoppages and misfires) at best and possibly dangerous at worst, since the 7.62 mm NATO cartridge generates much higher chamber pressures than the original 7.5 x 54 mm round.
and Dien Bien Phu
After WWII France reclaimed their colonial influence over the Southeast Asian region known as Indo-China. The French fought an eight-year war against communist Vietminh rebels that culminated in the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu.
Algeria
Dien Bien Phu.
The commander of the French expeditionary forces in Indo-China was General Henri Navarre. Part of his difficulties at Dien Bien Phu was a result of him being given no clear strategic objectives. After eight years of fighting France was not so much intent on winning the war as they were on stabilizing the region in order to bring about a negotiated settlement and save face. The only strategic intent Navarre received from France was to ensure the safety of the expeditionary corps. His operational goals were to protect Laos, which was a French territory and had been attacked by the Vietminh. Another operational objective was to use a buildup at Dien Bien Phu to draw the Vietminh out into a set piece battle that the French had been successful at in the past.
Dien Bein Phu was located in a remote, forest covered area in northwestern Vietnam. It was located in a bowl-shaped valley that had a flat enough bottom for a major airbase, and was surrounded easily defendable hills. Navarre’s tactical plan was to drop forces in by parachute, secure an airbase, and establish defensive positions on eight surrounding hills in order to secure the area. Operation Castor was launched on November 20, 1953 when the French dropped in 9,000 troops. By early 1954, French troops totaled 13,000, including artillery and light tanks.
The Vietminh were commanded by General Vo Nguyen Giap. Unlike the French, the Vietminh had very clear, consistent objectives. Strategically, they wanted an overwhelming military victory to force the French to negotiate on Ho Chi Minh’s terms. Operationally, General Giap also wanted to engage in a set piece battle to decisively defeat the French but would only do this when he had his forces massed, had artillery support, and secured his lines of communication. His tactical plan involved massing his forces at certain points at Dein Bein Phu’s defenses and overwhelming them with artillery and superior numbers.
In early 1954, the Vietminh had massed four divisions totaling 50,000 troops surrounding Dien Bien Phu. This was compared to the only 13,000 French troops. Giap was also launching diversionary attacks throughout the region to prevent more troops from reinforcing them. The Vietminh were much more mobile than the French had anticipated, surrounding the area within a month after the initial drops and had managed to get over 200 pieces of heavy artillery into the surrounding hills, something no one thought possible given the region’s terrain.
At the beginning of the attack in early March the Vietminh had dug over 100 kilometers of trenches around the northern French strong points of Beatrice, Gabrielle, and Anne-Marie. The attack began on March 13, 1954, with the strong point of Beatrice completely engulfed in artillery fire. The command post at Beatrice was destroyed in the initial artillery attack and all radio communications with the outpost ceased. At the same time, the Vietminh bombarded the airfield, leaving Dein Bein Phu completely cut off from reinforcements. Beatrice finally fell to human wave attacks by the Vietminh.
The next strong point to fall to the Vietminh was Gabrielle. Instead of using human wave attacks like they did on Beatrice they used massive artillery fire and infiltration. By now the only aid available to the French was coming in by airdrop and even that was next to impossible with Vietminh anti-aircraft guns thoroughly emplaced and hidden around the area. The French launched an assault to destroy enemy anti-aircraft positions in the hills around Claudine. They were successful but could not hold the area and the Vietminh soon replaced the guns.
The Vietminh continued to dig trenches approaching the strong points of Dominique and Elaine. The Vietminh launched an infantry assault at these to areas on March 30 but were beaten back. However, a division of Vietminh had overcome the outpost at Elaine. The outpost Isabelle was isolated seven kilometers to the south and the 1,000 troops located there were fighting only for their own survival. Anti-aircraft guns had choked off almost all aid to the French.
By the end of April, the fortress at Dien Bien Phu had been substantially reduced. The French only held parts of Huguette, Dominique, and a few highpoints on Elaine. The final assault was launched on May 1. Waves of Vietminh followed artillery barrages. The French would beat back one assault only to be hit with more waves. Finally, on May 7th the situation became hopeless. Plans for a breakout had been considered but by now the French had neither the strength nor the means to enact any such plans. Colonel de Castries, commander of the troops at Dien Bien Phu, signaled his intent to stop fighting to the Vietminh and ordered his men to destroy what weapons and equipment they had left.
Although they inflicted heavy casualties on the Vietminh, Dien Bien Phu was a tactical and operational failure for the French. Their losses totaled 7,184 casualties, included 1,142 dead and 1,606 missing. The Vietminh suffered 7,900 dead and over 15,000 wounded. The French conceded many sound principles of warfare, to include initiative, high ground, and concentration of forces, to the Vietminh in an attempt to draw them out into a battle. They were also completely surprised by the logistical capabilities of the Vietminh. Their ability to get heavy artillery pieces and ammunition into the high, roadless mountains surrounding Dien Bien Phu was not even considered a possibility. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) had mobilized over 33,000 workers to support the contingent at Dien Bien Phu, which allowed it to sustain the 50,000-man siege for the five-month operation.
It is hard to say whether or not Dien Bien Phu was a strategic failure for the French since they did not have any clear strategic goals. It was a tactical and operational success for the Vietminh; they had achieved their decisive victory over the French. However, their strategic goal of using the victory to obtain concessions at the Geneva negotiations failed. They were forced to accept a temporary partition of their country with elections to be held two years later. However, the south government headed by Ngo Dinh Diem and backed by the US established a separate government and ignored the call for elections in 1956. This would lead to many more years of Western involvement in Vietnam.