Sent:
Sir,
I am writing to you to tell you that I don't think you should support SB 543. As I'm sure you know, there are significant due process issues surrounding the so-called 'red-flag' laws being passed in various states across the Union. I urge you to set aside the politically divisive gun politics involved and focus instead on defending the greatest possible due process rights we can afford our citizens.
Although not directly on point, the Fuentes/Mitchill/Di-Chem line of supreme court cases lends support to my appeal for greater due process protection than SB 543 affords. Fuentes v. Shevin and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. both stand for the proposition that parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard, and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. According to these two cases, notice and opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, and any taking by the state of personal property requires this due process.
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Company is supportive of the red flag type of law, because it upheld a Louisiana statute that allowed for sequestration of private property upon a clear showing of the nature of the claim and the grounds relied upon by the creditors for the issuance of the writ of sequestration. It is similar to the red flag law in SB 543 in that it required a judge instead of the court clerk to issue the writ, and also because there was a higher evidentiary burden to meet in order to get the writ issued. The court held that these offered adequate protection of the due process rights of the parties, even though they did not even have a chance to be heard prior to the sequestration.
Although Mitchell seems to lend support to red flag laws, there are a few important differences that distinguish it. First, the personal property being sequestered was not the subject of an enumerated constitutional right. Second, the nature of state confiscation of firearms is inherently and fundamentally different than the sequestration of funds owed on a refrigerator; the attempt to seize firearms from a private citizen will often end in pointless bloodshed (see the case of Gary J. Willis, Maryland). The tension of armed police showing up at someone's door to serve an armed citizen with notice that they are having their firearms removed would be relieved by the opportunity for the citizen to be heard at a fair hearing prior to the confiscation. Finally, Mitchell serves as the very outer bounds of what a state can do under the due process limits of the constitution, according to the court. When it comes to items that are embedded in some peoples' ways of life (as are firearms), and when it comes to items that are part of the fundamental rights set out in the bill of rights, I suggest that the state of Missouri stay as far away from that outer bound as possible.
Finally, as a policy argument, I urge you to consider the fundamental commitment to due process that is passed on through our English common law system, rooted in procedure and anchored by the idea that a person's inalienable rights (like their life, their liberty, or their property) should not and cannot be wrenched from them without a fair hearing or procedure. Flowing from §39 of the Magna Carta through the due process and takings clauses of the constitution, all the way to the Boumediene case, Anglo-American governments and judges have consistently seen procedural due process as the bedrock of the rule of law and the cornerstone of liberty.
You have my vote next election if you oppose this bill. Please let me know what you intend to do.
Thank you,