UPDATE 4/26
HB 551, MSSA's bill to clean up the RKBA in the Montana Constitution,
Need messages sent to three members of the house to get this one on the ballot this fall!!
I will reply with Gary Marbut's message today.


HB 517, clarifying Board of Regents' authority, passed Second Reading
with a vote of 66-34.  The only Republican to vote against this was
Rep. Rusk of Corvallis.

The vote that controls on these will be the Third Reading vote
tomorrow.  Maybe Fitzpatrick and Rusk will come around.  You can email
them individually at [email protected] and
[email protected].  If you do email them, BE NICE, be polite, and
be brief.  Like my mother used to say, you catch more flies with sugar
than with vinegar.

Both of these bills are constitutional referenda, so both will need
100 votes from the Legislature to go on the 2024 ballot for a vote of
the people.  This means that HB 551 will need to get 35 votes in the
Senate and HB 517 will need to get 34 votes in the Senate.  Both are
doable if we don't lose more R votes.

HB 631 will be up for public hearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee tomorrow morning at 8 AM.  This bill is to allow you to
collect court costs and attorney fees if you win a lawsuit against a
government entity to assert your RKBA.  If you cannot be there to
support HB 631, please send a brief message to all members of the SJC
asking for their support.  I recommend you use the function on the
Legislature's Website at:

https://leg.mt.gov/web-messaging/



All 7 MSSA supported bills have been introduced. I will try and keep this op updated and bump as necessary.

Send messages to committees and legislators here.

MONTANA SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION
2023 LEGISLATIVE ISSUES

These first 3 do not have the same transmittal deadline as typical bills.

These first 3 are Constitutional Referenda and need 100 of the 150 senators to vote for them to show up on the ballot for voters in 2024.


SB 272
1.  Sheriffs in the Constitution.  Sponsor, Sen. Theresa Manzella.  SB
272   In some states the office of sheriff has been effectively
abolished, usually by moving essential powers from sheriffs into the
hands of a bureaucratically-controlled state police force.  Shifting
power from a locally elected official into the hands of unelected,
state-level bureaucrats diminishes liberty, damages accountability,
and shifts even more power from people to government.  To prevent this
drift in Montana, MSSA proposes a constitutional referendum to
strengthen the language about the office of sheriff in the Montana
Constitution.  This new language would:  1) Establish the office of
sheriff as a constitutionally-specified office; 2) make the office
mandatory for each county; 3) require that the sheriff always be
elected (not appointed except to fill a mid-term vacancy); 4) specify
that any elector is qualified to seek the office of sheriff; 5)
clarify that the sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer in the
sheriff's county, and 6) reserve essential law enforcement powers to
the sheriff at the county level.

HB 197
2.  Power of the Board of Regents.  Sponsor, Rep. Jennifer Carlson.
HB 197.  The Board of Regents has sued to block the campus carry
feature of HB 102 from the 2021 session.  The Regents assert that the
power given to them in Article X of the Montana Constitution to manage
the affairs of the university system allows them to ignore the right
to keep or bear arms that the people have reserved to themselves in
Article II of the Constitution.  We propose a constitutional
referendum to clarify that the Regents are subject to other parts of
the Constitution and not only Article X, are subject to laws passed by
the Legislature and signed by the Governor, and also to give the
Governor the power to veto any act by the Board of Regents.

HB 551
3.  Constitutional cleanup.  Sponsor, Rep. Casey Knudsen.  LC1645  The
Montana Constitution's reservation of the right to keep or bear arms
contains this archaic language from the territorial constitution of
1884, "... but nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the
carrying of concealed weapons."  This was a cultural issue in 1884 and
was likely copied from the Missouri Constitution of that time.  For
Missouri, this was probably a Reconstruction-era, Jim Crow provision
intended to help keep freed slaves disarmed, defenseless, and
subservient.  We propose a constitutional referendum to remove this
archaic provision from the Montana Constitution.


The rest of these are standard bills.

SB 361 Amended and Passed 2nd reading
Current Status

1.  Non-discrimination over firearms.  Sponsor, Sen. John Fuller.
There are a number of ways that discrimination against
firearms may be rearing its ugly head.  Some lenders and credit or payment processors are refusing to provide services to entities that manufacture, distribute or sell firearms.  Some insurers may decline to service firearm-related businesses or firearm owners.  Some private
entities with public access may disallow firearms but fail to offer
any actual safety to disarmed people.  Some employers may disallow
safe travel to and from work by prohibiting firearms in employees'
private vehicles.  All of these are discriminatory.  MSSA proposes
legislation to prohibit discrimination against firearms manufactures,
distributors, sellers, and owners.



HB 604  - Probably Dead
Current Status

2.  Sheriffs First - Law Enforcement Cooperation.  Sponsor, Rep.
Jennifer Carlson.  LC1048.   Many Montanans, both citizens and people
in public office, are concerned about the lack of accountability of
federal officers conducting law enforcement operations in Montana.  In
Montana, we know our county sheriff.  He is elected and accountable
locally.  We believe the sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer
in the county, and ought to have the tools to implement that status.
MSSA will offer a bill to require federal officers to obtain the
written permission of the local sheriff before conducting an arrest,
search, or seizure in the sheriff’s county.  There are exceptions for
federal reservations, Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, close pursuit, when a federal officer witnesses a crime that
requires an immediate response, if the sheriff or his personnel are
under investigation, and other necessary exceptions.  This bill was
passed by the Legislature in 1995, but was vetoed by the Governor.
See:  http://www.SheriffsFirst.net

HB 629 Amended and Passed 2nd reading  Current Status

3.  The cost of self defense.  Sponsor, Rep. Brandon Ler.  LC1046.  A
person who legitimately defends himself or herself may still be
destroyed financially by an overzealous or careless criminal
prosecution.  We propose that if a person is prosecuted for a crime,
claims self-defense successfully and is not convicted, then the cost
of the person's defense must be awarded to the accused by the court.
This would be a claim against the prosecutor's budget.

HB 631 Amended and Passed 3rd reading
Current Status

4.  The price of civil rights.  Sponsor, Rep. Jedediah Hinkle.
LC1047.  There are times when people's right to keep or bear arms is
violated by a governmental entity.  The person complains, but the
entity tells the person to get lost.  The person threatens to sue to
get rights enforced by a court.  The abusive entity says, so sue - we
have lawyers on staff paid by the taxpayers just to deal with things
like this.  The message is, getting correction of civil rights abuse
will be expensive and will eliminate many citizens from any contest.
We propose a law clarifying that if a person must sue to enforce
constitutional rights and the person prevails, then the person should
be awarded the cost of pursuing the necessary lawsuit.

Awesome! But I thought we already had #16

They need to pass a law to clarify that commercial landlords cannot post property that is leased to tenants.

I'm unsure. Maybe the law was passed by the Legislature but  vetoed by the governor?

From 1/9

Good news.  MSSA's bill for a constitutional referendum to prohibit
the Board of Regents from exercising any powers that conflict with the
Montana Constitution or state laws has been introduced by Rep.
Jennifer Carlson as HB 197.  It has not been assigned a committee
public hearing date yet.  That will happen soon, maybe later today.

Excellent!

A public hearing date for HB 197 before
the Judiciary Committee was just announced for this Friday, January
20th, at 8AM.

Eta: The hearing was canceled.

Just got an update from Gary of MSSA. He has been pouring a ton of time into the Sheriff First piece. He had a pretty lengthy email which he laid out his response he submitted to a Legal Note that was essentially questioning the legality of the Bill. I just thought that it was important to give him due credit for the number of hours that he is working behind the scenes. Honestly, it is unreal how much this guy puts into this work and how much it means to him. It screams dedication.

It is lengthy but if anyone wants to read it, I can post it.

Post it. Please and thank you.

Dear MSSA Friends,

A lot of work has been going on behind the scenes herding the various
cats in MSSA's 2023 legislative agenda forward.  One example of that
is described here for your interest.  I'll do another email soon about
other examples.

Final copies of bills are prepared for a legislator's introduction by
the attorneys of the Legislature's employees, the Legislative Services
Division (LSD).  If these employees have questions about the
constitutionality of a proposed bill, they may insist on attaching a
"legal note" to a bill.  This legal note becomes a part of the
information publicly available about the bill and will both provide
fodder for bill opponents and likely be cited later if the bill is
passed and there is a legal challenge to the measure.

Thus, a legal note on a bill is not good news and must be addressed.
A legislator who submits a bill draft request for a bill is allowed to
submit a "Requestor's Comment" that will be attached to the legal note
as a rebuttal of the legal note.  This also becomes a part of the
public domain history of the bill.

The LSD wrote a legal note for MSSA's LC 1048, our Sheriffs First
bill.  This bill would make it a state crime for a federal officer to
arrest, search, or seize in Montana without the advanced written
permission of the elected county sheriff.  The LSD-written legal note
argued that this bill would violate the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, and would likely be held unconstitutional under federal
law if tested in court.

First, I was able to persuade the LSD to substantially tone down the
proposed legal note, thereby reducing the octane of the argument that
will be used by bill opponents.  Then, I crafted a Requestor's Comment
to serve as a rebuttal to the legal note.  This will be a part of the
public record and will give fodder to bill proponents.

Both the revised legal note and my Requestor's Comment on this legal
note are pasted below for the legal nerds on MSSA's email list.  I
will not try to replicate character formatting, such as italics and
bold because I don't know how those will survive my and your email
software.

The rest of the story is that things are percolating along with MSSA's
legislative agenda and I expect our remaining bills to be getting
introduced soon.  Stay tuned.

==========

LSD Legal Note

CONFORMITY WITH STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS

As required pursuant to section 5-11-112(1)(c), MCA, it is the
Legislative Services Division's statutory responsibility to conduct
"legal review of draft bills". The comments noted below regarding
conformity with state and federal constitutions are provided to assist
the Legislature in making its own determination as to the
constitutionality of the bill. The comments are based on an analysis
of jurisdictionally relevant state and federal constitutional law as
applied to the bill. The comments are not written for the purpose of
influencing whether the bill should become law but are written to
provide information relevant to the Legislature's consideration of
this bill. The comments are not a formal legal opinion and are not a
substitute for the judgment of the judiciary, which has the authority
to determine the constitutionality of a law in the context of a
specific case.

This review is intended to inform the bill draft requestor of
potential constitutional conformity issues that may be raised by the
bill as drafted. This review IS NOT dispositive of the issue of
constitutional conformity and the general rule as repeatedly stated by
the Montana Supreme Court is that an enactment of the Legislature is
presumed to be constitutional unless it is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the enactment is unconstitutional. See Alexander v. Bozeman
Motors, Inc., 356 Mont. 439, 234 P.3d 880 (2010); Eklund v. Wheatland
County, 351 Mont. 370, 212 P.3d 297 (2009); St. v. Pyette, 337 Mont.
265, 159 P.3d 232 (2007); and Elliott v. Dept. of Revenue, 334 Mont.
195, 146 P.3d 741 (2006).

Legal Reviewer Comments:

LC1048 provides that federal employees who are not Montana peace
officers must obtain the written permission of a county sheriff to
execute an arrest, search, or seizure in the county where the arrest,
search, or seizure will occur, except under certain circumstances. The
county sheriff may refuse permission for any reason. Federal employees
may exercise one of the enumerated exceptions in the draft by
requesting and receiving the written permission of the Montana
Attorney General. Similarly, the Attorney General may refuse the
request for any reason.

There are several consequences provided in the proposed legislation
for noncompliance. For example, as drafted, any arrest, search, or
seizure in violation of the legislation would subject a federal
employee to prosecution by the county attorney for kidnapping or
various other offenses.

A county attorney would be required to prosecute a claim by the county
sheriff, and any failure to prosecute could subject the county
attorney to recall by the voters and prosecution for official
misconduct.  As drafted, LC1048 may raise potential legal issues
regarding whether the proposed legislation complies with federal law.
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides:

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides that if a
conflict between state and federal law exists, federal law controls
and state law is preempted.

If a federal agent is charged with a violation of state law, the
federal agent can assert a
Supremacy Clause immunity defense. In a United State Supreme Court
decision dating back to 1890, a federal officer was released from a
state criminal charge where the alleged crime arose during the
performance of federal duties. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75-76, 10 S.
Ct. 658 (1890).

The case law has been expanded since 1890, but ultimately once a
Supremacy Clause immunity defense is established the prosecution has
no basis upon which to prosecute a federal agent. Clifton v. Cox, 549
F.2d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 1977). The defense is established by showing
that a federal agent "employed means which he could . . . honestly
consider reasonable in discharging his duties." Id. at 730.

Likewise, the Supremacy clause immunity defense does not exist when a
federal agent "was acting outside the scope of his authority or ...
[when] he employed means which he could not honestly consider
reasonable in discharging his duties. Id. The defense also does not
exist if a federal agent acts out of "out of malice or with some
criminal intent". Id. at 728.

The proposed legislation may hinder federal agents from reasonably
discharging duties while enforcing federal law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3052, 3107 (subpoena enforcement and arrests by FBI agents). As
such, LC1048 may raise potential conformity issues with the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

----------------------

Requester Comments:

This Legal Note makes several errors fatal to its argument.

First, the Note ignores the prime principle of our form of government,
dual sovereignty.  The Note assumes, as may be taught in law schools
favoring a limitless federal government, that the Supremacy Clause
empowers the federal government to exercise any power it wishes,
notwithstanding state powers and laws.  If this were correct, all
employees of the federal government would be exempt from state laws
criminalizing murder, rape, robbery, and other prohibited conduct.
They are not so exempt because of dual sovereignty and states'
retention of police powers.  There are substantial limits on
application of the Supremacy Clause consistent with dual sovereignty.

Second, the Note conveniently ignores the fact that the Supremacy
Clause was amended.  The effect of an amendment is to change or modify
the underlying law that it amends.  Whatever the Supremacy Clause may
have meant when adopted, that meaning was amended and changed forever
by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  Those two amendments clarify and
assert substantial restraints on application of the Supremacy Clause,
an effect the Legal Note seeks to ignore or wish away.  That wish is
unimpressive as a legal argument.

Third, the Legal Note commits a fatal error of overt omission, an
omission that leads to a wrong conclusion.  The "Supremacy Clause" of
the U.S. Constitution, says, in part, "This Constitution, and the laws
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ..."
(emphasis added.)  The fatal omission of the Legal Note is the failure
to account for or admit the import of the words "in pursuance
thereof".  These words control to the extent of allowing the Supremacy
Clause to apply ONLY to federal laws made with authority granted
Congress in the Constitution, specifically in the "enumerated powers."

Alexander Hamilton, at New York’s convention: “I maintain that the
word supreme imports no more than this — that the Constitution, and
laws made in pursuance thereof, cannot be controlled or defeated by
any other law. The acts of the United States, therefore, will be
absolutely obligatory as to all the proper objects and powers of the
general government ... but the laws of Congress are restricted to a
certain sphere, and when they depart from this sphere, they are no
longer supreme or binding” (emphasis added).

In Federalist #33, Hamilton added: “It will not, I presume, have
escaped observation that it expressly confines this supremacy to laws
made pursuant to the Constitution ....”

Thomas McKean, at the Pennsylvania convention: “The meaning [of the
Supremacy Clause] which appears to be plain and well expressed is
simply this, that Congress have the power of making laws upon any
subject over which the proposed plan gives them a jurisdiction, and
that those laws, thus made in pursuance of the Constitution, shall be
binding upon the states”.  (emphasis added).

James Iredell, at the First North Carolina convention: “When Congress
passes a law consistent with the Constitution, it is to be binding on
the people. If Congress, under pretense of executing one power,
should, in fact, usurp another, they will violate the Constitution.”

It is widely understood and accepted that the states did not delegate
the "police powers" to the federal government in the Constitution, but
reserved those to the states. If there were any question about this,
one merely needs to observe that police powers are not among the
enumerated powers the states delegated to Congress, and then refer to
the Tenth Amendment to see that the police powers, not having been
delegated, were reserved to the states and the people.

The Federalist No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).

In Printz v.U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 913 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court declared:

"It is incontestible that the Constitution established a system of
'dual sovereignty.' Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991);
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). Although the States
surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they
retained 'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,' The Federalist No.
39, at 245 (J. Madison). This is reflected throughout the
Constitution's text, Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869);
Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869), including (to mention only a
few examples) the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or
combination of a State's territory, Art. IV, §3; the Judicial Power
Clause, Art. III, §2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art.
IV, §2, which speak of the 'Citizens' of the States; the amendment
provision, Article V, which requires the votes of three fourths of the
States to amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV,
§4, which 'presupposes the continued existence of the states and . . .
those means and instrumentalities which are the creation of their
sovereign and reserved rights,' Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405,
414-415 (1938). Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of
course, in the Constitution's conferral upon Congress of not all
governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, §8,
which implication was rendered express by the Tenth Amendment's
assertion that '[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.' "

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said in Idaho v. Horiuchi:

"Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government
will at times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state
governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the
general government.  If [the people's] rights are invaded by either,
they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.

We have grown accustomed to relying on the federal government to
protect our liberties against the excesses of state law enforcement.
Federal prosecutors may bring criminal charges against state police
who violate the rights of citizens.  See, e.g., Koon v. United States,
518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996).  Those citizens
may also seek redress by bringing private suits in federal court.  See
42 U.S.C. §1983.  While state prosecutions of federal officers are
less common, they provide an avenue of redress on the flip side of the
federalism coin.  When federal officers violate the Constitution,
either through malice or excessive zeal, they can be held accountable
for violating the state's criminal laws."

Concerning the issue of qualified immunity for federal officers raised
by the Note, that also is not without limits.  The reader is referred
to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 US 551 -
Supreme Court 2004.  In that decision, SCOTUS clarified that qualified
immunity depends on "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001).  Thus, a federal officer violating
the law is not entitled to qualified immunity as a defense against a
state prosecution.

In conclusion, by reading the Constitution as if Supremacy Clause
words "in pursuance thereof" had been removed, as if the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments were absent, and by ignoring the prime principle of
dual sovereignty, the Legal Note arrives at an incorrect conclusion.
This view may be favored by those who prefer a strong federal
government of limitless power, but it is not correct.  The Legal Note
that relies on the legal philosophy of limitless federal power is also
incorrect.

-------------------

If you are still with me at this point, you will recognize that many
hours of effort went in to this  interaction over this one aspect of
just one bill, all "behind the scenes."  Stay tuned for more.

Best wishes,

--
Gary Marbut, President
Montana Shooting Sports Association
http://www.mtssa.org

Not MSSA related. should I start new thread?

SB99 passed in the senate, now on to the house.

- 2023
68th Legislature 2023 SB0099.2
- 1 - Authorized Print Version – SB 99
1 SENATE BILL NO. 99
2 INTRODUCED BY J. FULLER
3
4 A BILL FOR AN ACT ENTITLED: “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A YOUTH HEALTH PROTECTION ACT;
5 PROHIBITING CERTAIN MEDICAL AND SURGICAL TREATMENTS TO TREAT MINORS WITH GENDER
6 DYSPHORIA; PROHIBITING PUBLIC FUNDS, PROGRAMS, PROPERTY, AND EMPLOYEES FROM BEING
7 USED FOR THESE TREATMENTS; PROVIDING THAT A HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL WHO VIOLATES
8 THIS LAW COMMITS PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT; PROVIDING A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION;
9 PROHIBITING DISCHARGE OF PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY VIA INSURANCE; AND PROVIDING
10 DEFINITIONS.”
11
12 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MONTANA:
13
14 NEW SECTION. Section 1. Short title. [Sections 1 through 6] may be cited as the "Youth Health
15 Protection Act".
16
17 NEW SECTION. Section 2. Purpose. The purpose of [sections 1 through 6] is to enhance the
18 protection of minors AND THEIR FAMILIES, pursuant to Article II, section 15, of the Montana constitution, from any
19 form of pressure to RECEIVE HARMFUL, EXPERIMENTAL PUBERTY BLOCKERS AND CROSS-SEX HORMONES AND TO
20 undergo irreversible medical, LIFE-ALTERING SURGICAL procedures to change sex prior to attaining the age of
21 majority.
22
23 NEW SECTION. Section 3. Definitions. As used in this part [SECTIONS 1 THROUGH 6], unless the
24 context clearly indicates otherwise, the following definitions apply:
25 (1) "Female" means an individual who is a member of the female sex A MEMBER OF THE HUMAN
26 SPECIES WHO, UNDER NORMAL DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCES A RELATIVELY LARGE, RELATIVELY IMMOBILE GAMETE DURING
27 HER LIFE CYCLE AND HAS A REPRODUCTIVE AND ENDOCRINE SYSTEM ORIENTED AROUND THE PRODUCTION OF THAT
28 GAMETE.

- 2023
68th Legislature 2023 SB0099.2
- 2 - Authorized Print Version – SB 99
1 (2) "Gender" means the psychological, behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being male or
2 female.
3 (3) "Gender dysphoria" is the diagnosis of gender dysphoria under the Diagnostic and Statistical
4 Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition.
5 (4) "Health care professional" means a person who is licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized
6 by the laws of this state to administer health care in the ordinary course of the practice of the person's
7 profession.
8 (5) "Male" means an individual who is a member of the male sex A MEMBER OF THE HUMAN SPECIES
9 WHO, UNDER NORMAL DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCES SMALL, MOBILE GAMETES DURING HIS LIFE CYCLE, AND HAS A
10 REPRODUCTIVE AND ENDOCRINE SYSTEM ORIENTED AROUND THE PRODUCTION OF THOSE GAMETES.
11 (6) "Mental health professional" means a person who is licensed to diagnose and treat mental
12 health conditions in this state.
13 (7) "Minor" means an individual under 18 years of age.

14 (8) "Perceived gender" is a person's internal sense of his or her gender.

15 (9) "Perceived sex" is a person's internal sense of his or her sex.
16 (10)(8) "Physician" means a person who is licensed to practice medicine in this state.

17 (11)(9) "Sex" means the biological indication of male and female in the context of reproductive
18 potential or capacity, such as sex chromosomes, naturally occurring sex hormones, gonads, and unambiguous
19 internal and external genitalia present at birth, including secondary sex characteristics, without regard to an
20 individual's psychological, chosen, or subjective experience of gender. THE ORGANIZATION OF BODY PLANS AND
21 GAMETES FOR REPRODUCTION IN HUMAN BEINGS AND OTHER ORGANISMS. IN HUMAN BEINGS, THERE ARE EXACTLY TWO
22 SEXES, MALE AND FEMALE, WITH TWO CORRESPONDING GAMETES. THE SEXES ARE DETERMINED BY THE BIOLOGICAL
23 INDICATION OF MALE OR FEMALE, INCLUDING SEX CHROMOSOMES, NATURALLY OCCURRING SEX CHROMOSOMES,
24 GONADS, AND NONAMBIGUOUS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL GENITALIA PRESENT AT BIRTH, WITHOUT REGARD TO AN
25 INDIVIDUAL'S PSYCHOLOGICAL, BEHAVIORAL, SOCIAL, CULTURAL, CHOSEN, OR SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF GENDER
26 (12)(10)"Social transitioning" means acts other than pharmaceutical or surgical interventions that are
27 offered as treatment to a minor for the minor presenting as the opposite sex or an identity other than the minor's
28 sex, including the changing of a minor's preferred pronouns or dress and the recommendation to wear clothing

1 or devices, such as binders, for the purpose of concealing a minor's secondary sex characteristics.
2
3 NEW SECTION. Section 4. Prohibitions. (1) (A) EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION (1)(C), A PERSON
4 MAY NOT KNOWINGLY PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING TO A FEMALE MINOR TO ADDRESS THE MINOR'S PERCEPTION THAT HER
5 GENDER OR SEX IS NOT FEMALE:
6 (I) SURGICAL PROCEDURES, INCLUDING A VAGINECTOMY, HYSTERECTOMY, OOPHORECTOMY,
7 OVARIECTOMY, RECONSTRUCTION OF THE URETHRA, METOIDIOPLASTY, PHALLOPLASTY, SCROTOPLASTY, IMPLANTATION
8 OF ERECTION OR TESTICULAR PROTHESES, SUBCUTANEOUS MASTECTOMY, VOICE SURGERY, OR PECTORAL IMPLANTS;
9 (II) SUPRAPHYSIOLOGIC DOSES OF TESTOSTERONE OR OTHER ANDROGENS; OR
10 (III) PUBERTY BLOCKERS SUCH AS GNRH AGONISTS OR OTHER SYNTHETIC DRUGS THAT SUPPRESS THE
11 PRODUCTION OF ESTROGEN AND PROGESTERONE TO DELAY OR SUPPRESS PUBERTAL DEVELOPMENT IN FEMALE MINORS.
12 (B) EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION (1)(C), A PERSON MAY NOT KNOWINGLY PROVIDE THE
13 FOLLOWING TO A MALE MINOR TO ADDRESS THE MINOR'S PERCEPTION THAT HIS GENDER OR SEX IS NOT MALE:
14 (I) SURGICAL PROCEDURES, INCLUDING A PENECTOMY, ORCHIECTOMY, VAGINOPLASTY, CLITOROPLASTY,
15 VULVOPLASTY, AUGMENTATION MAMMOPLASTY, FACIAL FEMINIZATION SURGERY, VOICE SURGERY, THYROID CARTILAGE
16 REDUCTION, OR GLUTEAL AUGMENTATION;
17 (II) SUPRAPHYSIOLOGIC DOSES OF ESTROGEN; OR
18 (III) PUBERTY BLOCKERS SUCH AS GNRH AGONISTS OR OTHER SYNTHETIC DRUGS THAT SUPPRESS THE
19 PRODUCTION OF TESTOSTERONE OR DELAY OR SUPPRESS PUBERTAL DEVELOPMENT IN MALE MINORS.
20 (C) THE PROCEDURES LISTED IN SUBSECTIONS (1)(A) AND (1)(B) ARE PROHIBITED ONLY WHEN KNOWINGLY
21 PROVIDED TO ADDRESS A FEMALE MINOR'S PERCEPTION THAT HER GENDER OR SEX IS NOT FEMALE OR A MALE MINOR'S
22 PERCEPTION THAT HIS GENDER OR SEX IS NOT MALE. SUBSECTIONS (1)(A) AND (1)(B) DO NOT APPLY FOR OTHER
23 PURPOSES, INCLUDING:
24 (I) TREATMENT FOR A PERSON BORN WITH A MEDICALLY VERIFIABLE DISORDER OF SEX DEVELOPMENT,
25 INCLUDING:
26 (A) A PERSON BORN WITH EXTERNAL BIOLOGICAL SEX CHARACTERISTICS THAT ARE IRRESOLVABLY
27 AMBIGUOUS, INCLUDING AN INDIVIDUAL BORN WITH 46 XX CHROMOSOMES WITH VIRILIZATION, 46 XY CHROMOSOMES
28 WITH UNDERVIRILIZATION, OR HAVING BOTH OVARIAN AND TESTICULAR TISSUE; AND
1 (B) A PERSON WHOM A PHYSICIAN HAS OTHERWISE DIAGNOSED WITH A DISORDER OF SEXUAL
2 DEVELOPMENT IN WHICH THE PHYSICIAN HAS DETERMINED THROUGH GENETIC OR BIOCHEMICAL TESTING THAT THE
3 PERSON DOES NOT HAVE NORMAL SEX CHROMOSOME STRUCTURE, SEX STEROID HORMONE PRODUCTION, OR SEX
4 STEROID HORMONE ACTION FOR A MALE OR FEMALE; AND
5 (II) TREATMENT OF ANY INFECTION, INJURY, DISEASE, OR DISORDER THAT HAS BEEN CAUSED OR
6 EXACERBATED BY THE PERFORMANCE OF A PROCEDURE LISTED IN SUBSECTION (1)(A) OR (1)(B), WHETHER OR NOT THE
7 PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE AND FEDERAL LAW AND WHETHER OR NOT FUNDING FOR THE
8 PROCEDURE IS PERMISSIBLE UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW.
9 (2) IF A HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL OR PHYSICIAN VIOLATES SUBSECTION (1)(A) OR (1)(B):
10 (A) THE HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL OR PHYSICIAN HAS ENGAGED IN UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND IS
11 SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINE BY THE APPROPRIATE LICENSING ENTITY OR DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD WITH COMPETENT
12 JURISDICTION IN THIS STATE. THAT DISCIPLINE MUST INCLUDE SUSPENSION OF THE ABILITY TO ADMINISTER HEALTH CARE
13 OR PRACTICE MEDICINE FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR.
14 (B) PARENTS OR GUARDIANS OF THE MINOR SUBJECT TO THE VIOLATION HAVE A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
15 FOR DAMAGES AND EQUITABLE RELIEF AS THE COURT MAY DETERMINE IS JUSTIFIED. THE COURT MAY ALSO AWARD
16 REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS TO A PREVAILING PARTY.
17 (1)(3) Public funds may not be directly or indirectly used, granted, paid, or distributed to any
18 individual, entity, or organization that provides or subsidizes medication or surgery as a treatment to address an
19 inconsistency between a minor's sex and the minor's perceived gender or perceived sex THE PROCEDURES
20 DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (1)(A) OR (1)(B).
21 (2)(4) Any individual or entity that receives state funds to pay FOR or subsidize the treatment of
22 minors for psychological conditions, including gender dysphoria, may not use state funds to promote or
23 advocate medication or surgery as a treatment to address an inconsistency between a minor's sex and the
24 minor's perceived gender or perceived sex THE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (1)(A) OR (1)(B).
25 (3)(5) Any amount paid by an individual or entity during a tax year for the provision of either
26 medication or surgery as a treatment to address an inconsistency between a minor's sex and the minor's
27 perceived gender or perceived sex is not tax deductible THE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (1)(A) OR
28 (1)(B) IS NOT TAX DEDUCTIBLE.

(4)(6) The Montana medicaid program may not reimburse or provide coverage for medication or
2 surgery as a treatment to address an inconsistency between a minor's sex and the minor's perceived gender or
3 perceived sex THE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (1)(A) OR (1)(B).
4 (5)(7) Except to the extent required by the first amendment to the United States constitution, state
5 property, facilities, or buildings may not be KNOWINGLY used to promote or advocate the use of social
6 transitioning, medication, or surgery as a treatment to address an inconsistency between a minor's sex and the
7 minor's perceived gender or perceived sex OR THE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (1)(A) OR (1)(B) TO
8 ADDRESS A FEMALE MINOR'S PERCEPTION THAT HER GENDER OR SEX IS NOT FEMALE OR A MALE MINOR'S PERCEPTION
9 THAT HIS GENDER OR SEX IS NOT MALE.
10 (6)(8) A health care professional or physician employed by the state or a county or local government
11 may not KNOWINGLY provide medication or surgery as a treatment to address an inconsistency between a
12 minor's sex and the minor's perceived gender or perceived sex THE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION
13 (1)(A) OR (1)(B).
14 (7)(9) State property, facilities, or buildings may not KNOWINGLY be used to provide medication or
15 surgery as a treatment to address an inconsistency between a minor's sex and the minor's perceived gender or
16 perceived sex THE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (1)(A) OR (1)(B).
17 (8)(10) A state employee whose official duties include the care of minors may not, while engaged in
18 those official duties, KNOWINGLY provide or promote the use of social transitioning, medication, or surgery as a
19 treatment to address an inconsistency between a minor's sex and the minor's perceived gender or perceived
20 sex PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (1)(A) OR (1)(B).
21 (11) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MAY BRING AN ACTION TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH THIS SECTION.
22 (9) (a) Except as provided in subsection (9)(c), a person may not knowingly provide the following
23 treatment, either as a necessary or elective treatment, to a female minor to address the minor's perception that
24 her gender or sex is not female:
25 (i) surgical procedures, including a vaginectomy, hysterectomy, oophorectomy, ovariectomy,
26 reconstruction of the urethra, metoidioplasty, phalloplasty, scrotoplasty, implantation of erection or testicular
27 protheses, subcutaneous mastectomy, voice surgery, or pectoral implants;
28 (ii) supraphysiologic doses of testosterone or other androgens; or

1 (iii) puberty blockers such as GnRH agonists or other synthetic drugs that suppress the production
2 of estrogen and progesterone to delay or suppress pubertal development in female minors.
3 (b) Except as provided in subsection (9)(c), a person may not knowingly provide the following
4 treatment, either as a necessary or elective treatment, to a male minor to address the minor's perception that
5 his gender or sex is not male:
6 (i) surgical procedures, including a penectomy, orchiectomy, vaginoplasty, clitoroplasty,
7 vulvoplasty, augmentation mammoplasty, facial feminization surgery, voice surgery, thyroid cartilage reduction,
8 or gluteal augmentation;
9 (ii) supraphysiologic doses of estrogen; or
10 (iii) puberty blockers such as GnRH agonists or other synthetic drugs that suppress the production
11 of testosterone or delay or suppress pubertal development in male minors.
12 (c) The procedures listed in subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b) are prohibited only when knowingly
13 provided as treatment to address a female minor's perception that her gender or sex is not female or a male
14 minor's perception that his gender or sex is not male. Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b) do not apply to treatment for
15 other purposes, including:
16 (i) treatment for a person born with a medically verifiable disorder of sex development, including:
17 (A) a person born with external biological sex characteristics that are irresolvably ambiguous,
18 including an individual born with 46 XX chromosomes with virilization, 46 XY chromosomes with

undervirilization, or having both ovarian and testicular tissue; and
20 (B) a person whom a physician has otherwise diagnosed with a disorder of sexual development in
21 which the physician has determined through genetic or biochemical testing that the person does not have
22 normal sex chromosome structure, sex steroid hormone production, or sex steroid hormone action for a male or
23 female; and
24 (ii) treatment of any infection, injury, disease, or disorder that has been caused or exacerbated by
25 the performance of a procedure listed in subsection (9)(a) or (9)(b), whether or not the procedure was
26 performed in accordance with state and federal law and whether or not funding for the procedure is permissible
27 under state and federal law.
28 (10) If a health care professional or physician violates subsection (9)(a) or (9)(b):

1 (a) the health care professional or physician has engaged in unprofessional conduct and is subject
2 to discipline by the appropriate licensing entity or disciplinary review board with competent jurisdiction in this
3 state. That discipline must include suspension of the ability to administer health care or practice medicine for at
4 least 1 year.
5 (b) parents or guardians of the minor subject to the violation have a private cause of action for
6 damages and equitable relief as the court may determine is justified. The court may also award reasonable
7 attorney fees and court costs to a prevailing party.
8
9 NEW SECTION. Section 5. Private cause of action for subsequent harm. (1) Any health care
10 professional or physician who provides puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, or surgical procedures as a
11 treatment to address an inconsistency between a minor's sex and the minor's perceived gender or perceived
12 sex THE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN [SECTION 4(1)(A) OR (1)(B)] is strictly liable to that minor if the treatment or the
13 after-effects of the treatment result in any injury, including physical, psychological, emotional, or physiological
14 harms, within the next 25 years.
15 (2) Except as provided in subsection (3), a person who suffers an injury described in subsection
16 (1) OR FOR ANY VIOLATION OF [SECTION 4], or the person's legal guardian or estate, may bring a civil action either
17 within 25 years from the day the person reaches 18 years of age or within 4 years from the time of discovery by
18 the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the treatment and the injury, whichever
19 date is later, against the offending health care professional or physician in a court of competent jurisdiction for:
20 (a) declaratory or injunctive relief;
21 (b) compensatory damages, including but not limited to pain and suffering, loss of reputation, loss
22 of income, and loss of consortium, including the loss of expectation of sharing parenthood;
23 (c) punitive damages;
24 (d) any other appropriate relief; and
25 (e) attorney fees and costs.
26 (3) (a) If, at the time the person subjected to treatment attains 18 years of age, the person is under
27 other legal disability, the limitation period in subsection (2) does not begin to run until the removal of the
28 disability.

1 (b) The limitation period in subsection (2) does not run during a time period when the individual is
2 subject to threats, intimidation, manipulation, fraudulent concealment, or fraud perpetrated by the health care
3 professional or physician who provided the treatment described in subsection (1) or by any person acting in the
4 interest of the health care professional or physician.
5 (4) A health care professional or physician may not be indemnified for potential liability under this
6 section.
7 (5) The attorney general may bring an action to enforce compliance with this section.
8 (6) This section does not deny, impair, or otherwise affect any right or authority of the attorney
9 general, the state, or any agency, officer, or employee of the state, acting under any law other than this section,
10 to institute or intervene in any proceeding.
11

12 NEW SECTION. Section 6. Prohibited insurance coverage. A professional liability insurance policy
13 issued to a health care professional or physician may not include coverage for damages assessed against the
14 health care professional or physician who provides any medication or surgical procedure described in [section
15 4(1)(A) OR (1)(B)] as a treatment to address an inconsistency between a minor's sex and the minor's perceived
16 gender or perceived sex.

18 NEW SECTION. Section 7. Medical or surgical transition for minors. Failure of a health care
19 professional, mental health professional, or physician to adhere to [section 4] constitutes unprofessional
20 conduct, with a mandatory minimum suspension of the ability to practice the person's profession for 1 year.
21
22 NEW SECTION. Section 8. Prohibited reimbursement or coverage. Pursuant to [section 4], the
23 Montana medicaid program may not reimburse or provide coverage for medication or surgery as a treatment to
24 address an inconsistency between a minor's sex and the minor's perceived gender or perceived sex ANY
25 MEDICATION OR SURGICAL PROCEDURE DESCRIBED IN [SECTION 4(1)(A) OR (1)(B)].
26
27 NEW SECTION. Section 9. Codification instruction. (1) [Sections 1 through 6] are intended to be
28 codified as an integral part of Title 50, and the provisions of Title 50 apply to [sections 1 through 6].

1 (2) [Section 7] is intended to be codified as an integral part of Title 37, chapter 2, part 3, and the
2 provisions of Title 37, chapter 2, part 3, apply to [section 7].
3 (3) [Section 8] is intended to be codified as an integral part of Title 53, chapter 6, part 1, and the
4 provisions of Title 53, chapter 6, part 1, apply to [section 8].
5
6 NEW SECTION. Section 10. Severability. If a part of [this act] is invalid, all valid parts that are
7 severable from the invalid part remain in effect. If a part of [this act] is invalid in one or more of its applications,
8 the part remains in effect in all valid applications that are severable from the invalid applications.
9 - END -


https://leg.mt.gov/bills/2023/billpdf/SB0099.pdf

@Anastasios

I don't have a problem with it, falls under the legislative session.

It sure took me a long while to scroll to the bottom of it on my phone.

SB 361 needs messages. See OP

4 of MSSA's bills have hearings this week. Please send messages to the appropriate committees listed in the OP.

Link for the message system is in the OP as well

For those that are on mobile/can't figure out what to do:

Click here: https://leg.mt.gov/web-messaging/

Fill out your info and select "send message to committees"

We want to support these:
Senate Business and Labor Committee [pick (S) (S) Business Labor and Economic Affairs] - support SB 361

House Judiciary Committee [pick (H) (H) Judiciary Committee] - support HB 604 HB 629 HB 631

Your message can be as simple as "Please support SB/HB ###".

Thank God they did not bow down to changing Columbus Day.

Contact your Senator or House Member (depending on the type of bill) to support the four bills at the bottom of OP.

We only have until Friday for these bills to have the third reading to be transferred to the other chamber.

Bump. See the top of OP for Direct Action

Two emails sent.

Looks like we aren't going to get much of anything out of this year's session. I will try and get the op updated later.

I don't think either of the Constitutional Referenda will make it  with 100 votes.

Gary M's email today:

HB 551 passed the Senate today on Third Reading with 33 Rs voting yes
and all Ds and one R voting no.  Esp and Welborn stayed with us and
Salomon switched back to yes, probably thanks to your messages.  So we
picked up one more vote in our quest for 100.


HB 551 will now return to the House for concurrence with the Senate
amendment to change "or" to "and".

In the previous House vote, 65 Rs voted yes and 3 Rs voted no.  To get
the required 100 votes to put HB 551 on the ballot and let people
vote, we need 67 yes votes in the House.

The three Rs who previously voted against the bill include:

Rep. John Fitzpatrick from the Anaconda/Phillipsburg area;
Rep. Wayne Rusk from the Bitterroot in the Corvallis area; and
Kenneth Walsh from the Twin Bridges area.

Walsh may have pushed the wrong button when voting.  Rusk has said
he's voting against all constitutional referenda, but seems to be
softening in re HB 551.  I don't know what Fitzpatrick's issue is.  He
won his seat by the narrowest margin, so it seems he'd be more careful
to not offend constituents on this sensitive RKBA issue.

All of them need messages asking them to "Please support HB 551."  Use
phone, text, email, the legislative messaging, and even smoke signals
- use ALL.  Be polite and be brief.

[email protected] - 406-459-8407
[email protected] - 406-370-8486
[email protected] - 406-596-418

https://leg.mt.gov/web-messaging/

Folks, we only need to get two more votes in the House to put HB 551
on the ballot.  Keep up the messages.

Thanks so much!

Best wishes,

--
Gary Marbut, President
Montana Shooting Sports Association
http://www.mtssa.org