The conservative justice also looked at the plain language of the Second Amendment, which protects the right "to keep and bear arms." He described keeping and bearing as two separate things, noting that Heller defines "bear" as "to wear, bear, or carry." This implies public carrying, Thomas said, because someone would not generally wear their gun in a holster at home, but would "keep" it somewhere.

"We know of no other constitutional right that an individual may exercise only after demonstrating to government officers some special need. That is not how the First Amendment works when it comes to unpopular speech or the free exercise of religion. It is not how the Sixth Amendment works when it comes to a defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. And it is not how the Second Amendment works when it comes to public carry for self-defense," Thomas wrote.

Originally Posted By Combat_Diver:
bottom of page 36.

9To be clear, nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest
the unconstitutionality of the 43 States’ “shall-issue” licensing regimes,
under which “a general desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a
[permit].” Drake v. Filko, 724 F. 3d 426, 442 (CA3 2013) (Hardiman, J.,
dissenting). Because these licensing regimes do not require applicants
to show an atypical need for armed self-defense, they do not necessarily
prevent “law-abiding, responsible citizens” from exercising their Second
Amendment right to public carry. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U. S. 570, 635 (2008). Rather, it appears that these shall-issue regimes,
which often require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a
firearms safety course, are designed to ensure only that those bearing
arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”
Ibid. And they likewise appear to contain only “narrow, objective, and
definite standards” guiding licensing officials, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 151 (1969), rather than requiring the “appraisal of
facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion,” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 305 (1940)—features that typify
proper-cause standards like New York’s. That said, because any permitting scheme can be put toward abusive ends, we do not rule out constitutional challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example, lengthy wait
times in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary
citizens their right to public carry.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf

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