Lengthy but very good (and sobering) post incoming. Konrad Muzyka thoughts after visiting southern Ukraine with Kofman, Lee, and Gady.

. The Ukrainian counteroffensive ended without achieving its primary or secondary objectives; It is good that General Zaluzhny made it clear in the Economist article that there will be no breakthrough; Ukrainian operational potential in Zaporizhihia is exhausted;

. From my point of view, the discrepancy between tactics and strategy was too big and consequently, Ukraine's approach during the counteroffensive (small unit) tactics could not deliver the expected objectives;

. But the downside to Zaluzhny's article was one of the words he used: stalemate. I think (and this is purely my own interpretation) that Zelensky's approach centres around exerting continuous pressure on Western partners to provide Ukraine with equipment. In this context, a stalemate, a cessation of activities, or the freezing of the frontline has strong 2015 vibes and could result in the freezing of the war in general. Ukrainian political leadership wants to avoid such an outcome as it may encourage some Western partners to seek to go "back to business as usual" with Russia.

. That's why Zelensky quickly hit back to Zaluzhny's words, saying there was no stalemate. But Zelensky nevertheless dismissed the commander of Ukrainian SOF behind Zaluzhny's back;

. It is, therefore, clear that the relationship between both men is strained;

. Personally, I heard nothing about the issue of "negotiations with Russia";

. I expect Ukrainian attacks in the south (Kherson and Zaporizhiia) to continue over the coming weeks and months, even though they can only deliver tactical gains.

. For weeks, we warned (Rochan) that the Ukrainian intensity of operations would need to decrease due to shortages of artillery munitions (we predicted late September-early October). Ultimately, we were slightly off. Ukrainian access to artillery munitions is limited, resulting in significantly decreased intensity of artillery strikes. With Ukraine's land forces being very artillery-centric, it is hard to imagine any major(ish) offensive actions over the next six months. A lot will depend on the Western supply of artillery munitions. Still, with the US and Europe not fulfilling their production objectives, Ukraine may limit their offensive operations throughout the entire 2024.

. Western supplies of artillery ammunition are not only limited but also occur irregularly, which makes it very difficult to plan fire missions; Likewise, Ukrainians would like to understand the logistics of any system in the long term perspective so that they could plan operations accordingly over a longer period;

. With small exceptions (Kherson and Orikhiv), Ukrainians are now on the defensive along the entire front, which will likely necessitate the creation of fortified lines on the Ukrainian side; This, combined with mobilisation (see below), would significantly decrease pressure on Ukrainian forces needed (also its quality) to defend the frontline;

. The aftermath of the counteroffensive will likely force Kyiv to rework its theory of victory. I think that pushing Russia out of Ukraine (even to pre-FEB22) border will be an incredibly difficult task. As stated, the initiative has shifted. Russia is now on the offensive, and with its economy or war footing, it can produce more of everything compared to Ukraine. Its economic potential can sustain the war, and I expect Russians to conduct several attempts to break the frontline deadlock from now until the end of 2024;

. Ukraine suffers from shortages of almost everything, although its industry is working hard to plug some gaps. For instance, Ukraine plans to produce hundreds of thousands of drones next year, which can not only improve its ISR but fill some gaps caused by an insufficient number of artillery shells;

. The deficit of 152 mm shells is huge, but ideally, over the next few years, Ukrainians would like to make the full switch to NATO's 155 mm standard;

. Ukrainians cannot scale production as fast as the Russians, leaving them vulnerable in many areas (artillery production, armour, drones, missiles); Another interesting, although not necessarily surprising, idea is to push a lot of funding from the government to the private/NGO sector; Ukrainian companies made great quality products and are more cost-effective and flexible in fulfiling military needs; They also respond to changes in requirements quicker;

. Some gaps will be more difficult to address. For instance, many Ukrainian soldiers we spoke to spoke highly of M113s APCs and asked for more; No one asked for ATACMS, but almost everyone asked for M113s; Request for ATACMS was political rather than military driven, although again, everything depends on the numbers; My view is that if Ukrainian soldiers were to choose between hundreds of M113s and 20 ATACMS, they'd choose the former;

. Tanks are neither obsolete nor heading for obsolescence; They are used regularly, and Ukrainians asked for more; They continue to offer a high degree of manoeuvrability, firepower and protection;

. The war is also very drone-centric. There could be 20 drones flying near the frontline along the 10 km wide front. Neither side has the ability to achieve a tactical surprise unless an attack is launched in drone adverse weather (rain with very heavy winds); Readiness to respond to ground attacks is very high. We saw Russian troops (a platoon) walking towards the frontline. Once they were detected, they were engaged by mortars within 30 seconds and by artillery cluster munitions after an additional four minutes. Both sides have capabilities to ISR opposing forces' tactical depths;

. As you are hopefully accustomed to how we report frontline changes (The situation at selected axes and directions), we want to make it clear that probably 90% (if not more) of attacks conducted by both sides involve squad/platoon formations. Company-level attacks are a rarity; That's why initial Russian attacks near Avdiivka were so unusual, as they involved the concurrent deployment of battalions/regiments, something we have not seen since MAR2022;

. Ukrainians suffer from the lack of battalion commanders. That's many in some brigades, battalions were expanded to include new companies;

. Morale is high, but troops are also exhausted; Many have been in the fight for months or, in some cases, more than a year. Legislation has been introduced now to allow 40-day of vacations a year, something which was welcomed by soldiers on the ground;

. The bulk of Ukrainian forces are deployed in or near the front, which makes it very difficult to train and regenerate formations. In this context, I believe that Kyiv's current approach to mobilisation (ongoing but hidden) is insufficient to build up forces necessary for force regeneration, let alone future large-scale counteroffensives;

. Although the initial training has been extended from 30 to 60 days, it still fails to address manpower gaps. Even partial mobilisation would allow currently deployed troops to be rotated, retrained and regenerated, which should improve their survivability (decrease losses) and increase combat effectiveness;

. Although it has already been reported in the Polish press, we confirmed that Polish 155mm Krab SPHS are very versatile. The manufacturer recommends changing the barrel every 1,500 fires. Some Ukrainian guns fired more than 6,000 rounds. As a result, some barrels can now fire 157 mm rounds;

. Russians don't conserve glide bombs;

. Russians continue to operate Ka-52s with three usually on standby; if a target pops up, one helo lights it with a laser and two engage with missiles; They have a new missile with 11-12 km range.

. Ukrainians cannot effectively counter this threat;

. There are concerns that Russians may finally push to reach the Osikl River in the Kharkiv Oblast (they have the capacity); However, at the same time, troops told us that some Russian actions appeared to have a fixing character; We cannot presently assess the likelihood of a Russian large-scale attack in this area;

. The situation in Kupyansk is interesting in that Russians have the capacity to reach the Osikl River; If attacks are successful, Russians may again begin to hit Kharkiv with artillery;

That was awesome!


Me too!

Everyone wanted a piece of them. 😂

Boris: The doors can still open?! Wha…??!!
Oof! Ow! Ohhhh gawd…mpf!  Aaack gurgle gurgle

You summed that up well.

Those members will be quick to throw Europe under the bus should Russia attack a European country.

Exactly. The older F16 isn’t a wunder weapon that will cross red lines. 😂😁😁. It brings Ukraine CLOSER to peer status  but still falls short. So why the damn foot dragging for 18 months?!

The F16 will be much better than the even more worn out Mig-29s they are using. And even a meager 40+ airframes is still relatively significant compared to the few planes they have now. But the radar and quantity fall far short of what Ukraine needs to WIN.

All Western nations except Netherlands (and Norway?) should hang their head in absolute shame. A fucking tragedy. They should have received a few hundred Taurus, 1,000 more ATACMS, 200 newest model F16 coming out of the meat of some air forces, 2,000 more various types of tank/armor vehicles.

US/NATO will spend 10x over the next ten years from slow walking than if they jumped in and helped win this with quarries of top tier equipment plus surpluses.

Literally shit faced!

It makes me wonder more on just how many troops in the Soviet Army would have fought the West versus how many would have just killed Russians.

The West will run out of surplus mid 2024, there is not much left to send to Ukraine.

10:10

Certainly true for Germany and probably most of NATO. Not true for the USA.

I think they would’ve fought.  The evil empire knows how to ensure compliance and makes no bones about it.
They’d kill the mutineers, preferably after torture.  Before killing them they’d make sure they knew their whole families were being arrested, kicked out of their homes, sent to Siberia in the dead of winter with nothing but the shirt on their back, raped, tortured, and/or murdered.
They had the apparatus to do just that and they did so, repeatedly.

Let the drone wars begin...

Debatable.

"That guy" is the same all over the world.
Talking shit ALL DAY, then "I didn't do anything!"

Surplus what?  F16s?   I doubt it.

That’s why I said out the latest ones out of the meat. Fuck surplus when it comes to jets.  The US and some allies would be getting a bargain to help Ukraine WITH WHATEVER THEY NEED NOW AND THE NEXT TWO YEARS (yelling at FJB, FAB, FLA, not you 😁). If Ukraine falls, we will be spending boat loads more weapons and money helping the Baltics, Finland, Moldova, and Romania right out of the gate.

Selfie just now…

Really good video, contextualizes a lot of the video segments we've seen recently.

A really good Ukraine war news Update video from Warleaks November 1.
Which became available for download on telegram when i became a paid member.
This is part one, they're really good quality and long, with a lot of footage I've never seen before.
Part 2 below \uD83D\uDC47#ArmUkraineNow pic.twitter.com/RIYhr2BHxn

— Kvist.P\uD83D\uDC99\uD83D\uDC9B??\uD83C\uDDE9\uD83C\uDDF0 (@kvistp) November 20, 2023

Part 2. #ArmUkraineNow #Ukraine? pic.twitter.com/4peDTPOBHn

— Kvist.P\uD83D\uDC99\uD83D\uDC9B??\uD83C\uDDE9\uD83C\uDDF0 (@kvistp) November 20, 2023

Winter 2023 won’t be the same as winter 2022 for sure and for certain.

Nice find!

Video of mothershipping with a Baba Yaga.

\uD83D\uDC40\uD83D\uDD25
Ukraine found a new tactic of using heavy octocopters, which the Russians call "Baba Yaga".

It is a carrier of FPV drones and a signal repeater.

Thus, the flight range of ammunition increases to 20-30 kilometers. pic.twitter.com/hY8H2OofRt

— Kvist.P\uD83D\uDC99\uD83D\uDC9B??\uD83C\uDDE9\uD83C\uDDF0 (@kvistp) November 20, 2023

drone launching a drone. Its drones all the way down. You cant see it, but its a fpv drone working the drone controls on the other side with its little propellers. droneception. pic.twitter.com/7GRAVseQDs

Andrew Perpetua  (@AndrewPerpetua) November 20, 2023

A visual video of the operation of an aircraft carrier drone. The idea is to fly small FPV drones over a longer range. There their attack will be unexpected. When full-fledged electronic warfare systems appear at the front, they will have to be installed even at remote sites. In general, so far the battle between drones and air defenses is still won by flying cars, which are becoming more and more advanced. Very similar to the development of aviation during the First World War, only faster

????????? ????? ? ??????? ????????????-?????????. ???? ? ???, ????? ??????????? ?????? FPV-????? ?? ??????? ?????????. ??? ?? ????? ?????? ???????????. ????? ??????????? ??????? ??? ???????? ?? ??????, ?? ???????? ??????? ???? ?? ?????????? ????????. ? ?????, ???? ????????… pic.twitter.com/MNTLV40Ih7

— IanMatveev (@ian_matveev) November 20, 2023

I'm concerned that the good footage is getting monetized/paywalled on TG.

ISW assessment for November 20th.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2023

Just a heads up, there's talk of a P-8 "crash" at Kane'ohe Bay.
It was a hard landing that rolled into the water at the end of the runway.
No real injuries.

https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/2023/11/21/emergency-crews-responding-after-reported-downed-military-aircraft-kaneohe-bay/

Not good.  We need evey one we got.

??The \uD83C\uDDF5\uD83C\uDDF1Polish company (UMO SP) exported \uD83C\uDDE8\uD83C\uDDEDSwiss sniper (145,000 cartridges) and rifle (500,000) ammunition to \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6Ukraine. Switzerland has launched an investigation pic.twitter.com/8soxK6aN85

— \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6Ukrainian Front (@front_ukrainian) November 20, 2023

Source: https://t.co/uZGGp6Rk7L

— \uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6Ukrainian Front (@front_ukrainian) November 20, 2023

Remember, I told you about failed russian attacks around Andriivka - Kurdumivka area, when they all died and non survived?

I got a permission to post the some of the work of the drone operators doing their dark business. It's brutal, but it's the reality of the war, and it has…

— ?\uD83C\uDF52 Constantine \uD83C\uDF52? (@Teoyaomiquu) November 20, 2023

As promised, the video from the Andriikva-Kurdumivka area is now available.

The footage is grim, starkly portraying the harsh reality of war. It's challenging to fully grasp the extent of the atrocities that the invaders inflict upon the neighboring nation in their ruthless… pic.twitter.com/jVrUguP4s7

— ?\uD83C\uDF52 Constantine \uD83C\uDF52? (@Teoyaomiquu) November 21, 2023

Invaders’ wages.

#Russia / #Ukraine \uD83C\uDDF7\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDFA\uD83C\uDDE6: A recently-posted photo of a #Ukrainian combatant with a noteable ammunition.

The combatant is seemingly carrying a 105mm MKE M1 High-explosive (HE) projectile.
It was originally produced and supplied by #Turkey (#Türkiye) \uD83C\uDDF9\uD83C\uDDF7.#RussiaUkraineWar pic.twitter.com/FfOq1y5YPU

— War Noir (@war_noir) November 20, 2023

There's one more issue there. Russia was constantly shelling Kherson, and I think Ukraine wanted to save the city from being reduced to rubble the way other cities were. Kherson is the largest city liberated, and they want to restore some life to the place, which they can't do with constant Russian bombardment. Which is, of course, usually hitting civilian targets. Pushing Russia out of range of Kherson city is its own objective. Maybe it pays benefits in supporting larger crossings later, but there is an immediate benefit.

@Easterner

Make some Coke can bucket traps and fill the buckets with enough water to drown the mice.  If you don't have buckets, dig some 5-gallon holes in the ground and use the stiff wire and Coke can across the top of the hole.

Agreed!